


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

A standard linear barcode is located in the upper left corner of the label. It consists of vertical black bars of varying widths on a white background.

3 1761 00888864 6







HSP
V3418h

THE

HISTORY
OF THE
REIGN
OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BY ROBERT WATSON, LL. D.

PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITED COLLEGES OF ST. SALVATOR AND
ST. LEONARDS, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

FIRST AMERICAN, FROM THE LAST LONDON EDITION.

NEW-YORK :

PUBLISHED BY JAMES EASTBURN & CO.



10038
~~28/11/90~~

26

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.



BOOK I.

PHILIP II. King of Spain, son of the Emperor Charles V. and of Isabella, daughter of Emanuel the Great, King of Portugal, was born at Valladolid on the twenty-first of May, one thousand five hundred and twenty-seven. He was educated in Spain under Ecclesiastics, noted for their bigotry, who were appointed by his father to instruct him ; and, by this circumstance, several of those features in his character were either formed, or greatly heightened, which were afterwards so conspicuous in his conduct.

Birth and education of Philip.

Charles, who was born in the Netherlands, and passed his early youth there, had, through his whole reign, entertained such a manifest partiality for that country, as was the source of much dissatisfaction to his Spanish subjects. But they were soothed by the preference which they received from the young prince, and flattered themselves with hopes, which were not frustrated, of obtaining, under his administration, that share of the royal favour, which the Flemings had enjoyed under the Emperor^a.

Philip early displayed sagacity, prudence, and application : and discovered likewise a disposition wonderfully suited to the religious instructions which he received. His mind, being naturally serious and thoughtful, gave a ready admittance to all the sentiments of that illiberal superstition, which formed, at that time, the distinguishing character of the Spanish Ecclesiastics.

At the age of sixteen, he espoused Mary, a princess of Portugal ; who died in less than two years after her marriage, in child-bed ; when she was delivered of Don Carlos, whose unhappy fate will be related in the sequel.

His first marriage.

Philip continued to reside in Spain, and was intrusted with the administration of the kingdom, till the year one thousand five hundred and

^a Harzeus *Annales Belgii*, &c. p. 570. Cabrera *Vida del Filipe II.* lib. i. c. 1.

He is called by his father to the Netherlands. ^{forty-eight.} At that time, he was called by his father into the Low Countries ; where he arrived, in the beginning of the following year, with a numerous retinue of Spanish nobles. Upon his entrance into Brussels, as he was ever desirous to maintain the appearance of extraordinary piety, he went first to the cathedral church, to render thanks to the Almighty for his preservation ; and then proceeded to the palace. After passing some days there with the Emperor, who, in all his behaviour, discovered that fond affection, which is natural to a person in the decline of life towards an only son, he set out to visit the principal cities in the Low Countries, accompanied by the Regent, his aunt, the Queen Dowager of Hungary^b.

Nothing could exceed the pomp with which he was every His recep-
tion there. where received. In presents, entertainments, illuminations, and tournaments, immense sums were expended. The cities vied with each other in displaying that magnificence which their industry had enabled them to attain ; and the people gave every where the strongest demonstrations of their attachment^c.

But Philip, in the midst of those scenes of festivity which His unpopu-
lar manners. were exhibited for his amusement, and which were so well calculated to gratify a young, ambitious mind, could not conceal the natural austerity of his temper. The Flemings observed, with anxiety, that there was a striking contrast between the father and the son. Charles was courteous and affable ; but Philip, they perceived, was distant, haughty, and severe. The former could speak with facility the principal languages of Europe, and used to discourse familiarly with all his subjects ; the latter had declined learning to speak any other but the Spanish tongue, conversed little with the inhabitants of the Low Countries, and was almost inaccessible to all but the Spanish nobles. He lived in every respect as he had been wont to do in Spain, wore a Spanish dress, and refused to conform, in any thing, to the modes and customs of the Netherlands^d.

Their effect on the Flemings. This behaviour, equally ungracious and impolitic, made a deep impression on the minds of the Flemings, and created in them a jealousy of the Spaniards, which they did not study to conceal. Charles having required the States to swear allegiance to Philip, as they had formerly done to himself, they rejected his request ; and refused to acknowledge Philip's right of succession, till he engaged to exclude all foreigners from any share in the government of the provinces. And even to this nothing would have made them agree, but their respect for the Emperor, and the awe in which they stood of his power ; for, if the distemper, under which Charles laboured at this time, had proved mortal, it was believed, they would have excluded Philip from the sovereignty, and conferred it on Maximilian his cousin, son of Ferdinand King of Hungary and Bohemia^e.

The Emperor's scheme for procuring him to be elected King of the Romans. From the Low Countries the Emperor carried his son into Germany, in order to facilitate the execution of a schemé, which he had lately formed, of having him elected King of the Romans. In the year one thousand five hundred and thirty, Charles had procured that dignity for

^b Haræi Annales Ducum Brabantiae, &c. tom. ii. p. 653. Antwerpia, 1623. Lud. Guicciardini, lib. ii. p. 127.

^c Meteren, p. 9.

^d Bentivoglio, Historia della Guerra de Fiandra, p. 5. In Parigi 1645.

^e Memoires de Ribier, tom. ii. p. 219, à Paris, 1666.

his brother Ferdinand ; but having now a son grown up to maturity, of whose talents for government he entertained the most favourable opinion, he repented of what he had done in behalf of his brother ; and resolved, in case he would not resign, to endeavour to persuade the Electors to annul his election.

But Philip's manners were not less disgusting in Germany, than they had been in the Netherlands ; and served rather to alienate the affections of the Germans, than to conciliate their favour. His demeanour there was equally distant, reserved, and haughty. He suffered even princes of the highest rank to remain uncovered in his presence ; and in all his behaviour, affected a degree of state and dignity which the Emperors themselves had never been accustomed to assume. The Germans dreaded the dominion of one whose behaviour, even when he was courting their favor, was so cold and distant. They refused to listen to the Emperor's proposal ; and they were confirmed in their resolution of rejecting it, partly by their remembrance of the calamities which they had suffered from conferring the Imperial crown on Charles, whose power had proved almost fatal to their liberty ; and partly by their attachment to Ferdinand, joined with the affection which they bore to Maximilian, whose character and manners were entirely the reverse of those of Philip.

Charles was not of a temper to be easily diverted from his designs ; and, being conscious of the great superiority which he had lately acquired, from his triumph over the confederacy of Smalkalde, he doubted not of being able to compel the electors to make choice of his son, provided he could prevail on Ferdinand to resign. To effectuate this, he applied himself with all that earnestness and ardour which he commonly discovered in the prosecution of his schemes. Nothing but the intoxication of prosperity could have inspired a prince of so great sagacity as Charles, with the hopes of succeeding in so chimerical an attempt. Ferdinand himself was in the full vigour of life ; and, considering the declining state of his brother's health, his prospect of the Imperial dignity was not distant : his son had been educated with the view of attaining the same exalted station after his father's death ; and, from the great popularity of his character, he had just ground to entertain the most sanguine expectations of success. Charles might easily have perceived, that no arguments which he could employ, would persuade either the father or the son to forego a prospect so alluring. Accordingly, although he had, on all former occasions, found his brother's behaviour towards him respectful and complying ; and, to give greater weight to his present application, made use of the powerful intercession of his sister the Queen Dowager of Hungary, to whom his brother was indebted for the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia ; yet Ferdinand withheld all his sister's entreaties, and rejected all the offers of compensation which were made to him. Charles had given his daughter in marriage to Maximilian, and intrusted him with the government of Spain, during Philip's absence, in order to sooth him under the disappointment which he was preparing for him, and to remove him to a distance from Germany, when his father's affection was about to be put to the trial. This young prince was greatly alarmed when he heard of the design which was carrying on against him ; and having left Spain, and returned to Germany, he omitted nothing in his power, to confirm his father's purpose, and to render it unalterable. Charles saw at last the necessity of drop-

Aversion of the
Germans to that
scheme.

ping, for the present, the prosecution of his scheme : and Philip left Germany, much dissatisfied with the Electors, and other German princes, but with none more than with his kinsmen^f.

From Germany he returned to Spain, where he held the regency of the kingdom, and acquitted himself of his charge, in such a manner as led his subjects to form a favourable opinion of his prudence, his industry, and his capacity for government. But the cotemporary historians have mentioned no particulars of his conduct during this period that deserve to be recorded. He remained in Spain till his marriage with the Queen of England, in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-four.

No sooner was Mary, daughter of Henry VIII. seated on the throne, than Charles, whose ruling passion, towards the close of his reign, was to aggrandize his son, conceived the

design of uniting England to his other dominions, by the marriage of Philip with the queen. Had Philip declined this match, it was believed, that Charles would have offered himself to Mary, rather than have lost so inviting an opportunity of augmenting his power. But the son was not less governed by ambition than the father ; and readily consented, at the age of twenty-six, to marry a princess of thirty-seven, disagreeable in her temper and manners, homely in her person, and entirely destitute of every female charm^g.

When Charles found that Philip was not averse to the marriage, he immediately dispatched a messenger to the court of London to propose it ; and Mary hesitated not a moment in declaring her consent. Philip's bigotry, which rendered him unamiable in the eyes of others, recommended him to her. She was ever strongly attached to her mother's family ; and she considered how much so powerful an alliance would enable her to execute her favourite scheme of extirpating heresy from her dominions.

Mary's subjects had not the same reasons with their sovereign to make them fond of this alliance. They had beheld, for more than thirty years, that restless ambition with which

the Emperor was actuated ; and they now received a striking proof of Philip's inordinate thirst after power, by his agreeing so readily to the intended marriage, to which there was nothing but motives of ambition that could allure him. They were all well acquainted with his private character, and the prejudices which his haughty demeanour had, a few years before, created against him in Germany and the Netherlands. They dreaded the consequences of having their Queen, whose temper was naturally rigid and severe, united to a prince of so imperious a character. They trembled at the thoughts of the danger to which their liberty and independence would be exposed ; and they were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions of falling under the dominion of the Spaniards ; a nation noted for their violent use of power in the Netherlands and Italy, infamous for the barbarities which they had exercised over the natives of America, and distinguished, above all other nations, for their bigoted attachment to the church of Rome^h.

^f Lud. Guicciardin. lib. ii. p. 128. Pallavicini Istoria di concilio di Trento, lib xi. c. 15. Thuanus, lib. vii. ab initio. Extrait des Lettres de Marillac au Roy de France en Ribier, July 22, 1550.

^g Ribier, tom. ii. p. 457.

^h Burnet's Ref. part ii. p. 284 ; and Carte, vol. ii. p. 297.

To quiet these alarms, Charles had recourse to different expedients. He prevailed on Mary to suspend her persecution of the Protestants ; and to resume the title of Supreme Head of the Church, which she had laid aside some months before. He sent over immense sums of money to be distributed among the members of parliament ; and he ordered the marriage articles to be drawn in terms the most honourable and advantageous to Mary and her subjects.

Charles labours to remove them.

By these articles it was provided, that Philip should have only the name of King, while the sovereign power should remain entire in the hands of Mary ; that no foreigner should be admitted into any public employment ; no innovation made in the laws and customs, and no violation offered to the rights or privileges of the nation ; that England should not, in consequence of the marriage, be involved in any war between France and Spain ; that the heirs of the marriage should not only inherit the Netherlands and England, but, in the event of Don Carlos's dying without issue, should succeed to the crown of Spain, and to the rest of Philip's hereditary dominions ; and that if the Queen should die without issue, Philip should have no claim to any share in the government of England, but the crown of that kingdom should devolve immediately to the lawful heir ⁱ.

These concessions were not altogether without effect. They ^{His success-} did not indeed entirely dispel the apprehensions that were entertained ; and many persons thought that the more advantageous the conditions offered were, there was so much the greater reason for suspecting that Charles and his son had no serious intention to fulfil them. But they furnished the courtiers, and other partisans of the Spanish match, with specious arguments in its defence : and deprived those who still remained averse to it, of any plausible pretext under which they might have procured an association against it. This was attempted by Sir Thomas Wyat and others, who succeeded so far, as to persuade several hundreds of the people to take up arms ; but this inconsiderable and ill-concerted insurrection was quickly suppressed, and served only to confirm that power of the Queen to dispose of herself in marriage, which the malcontents intended to have controlled^k.

Every obstacle being removed, and the articles of marriage ratified by parliament, Mary now employed herself in preparing for the reception of her future husband ; for whom, although she had never seen him, she had conceived so violent a passion, as filled her mind with the most anxious impatience for his arrival. She was, at the same time, extremely mortified with his coldness towards her ; and complained, that, although she had so readily consented to bestow upon him both her kingdom and herself, he had never vouchsafed to write her a letter on the subject, or to satisfy her as to the causes of his delay in coming to England. At length he sent the Marquis De las Navas to inform her, that every thing was in readiness for his leaving Spain. But before his departure, the Spanish historians relate, that, having visited the shrine of St. Jago in Galicia, he there heard mass with much devotion ; kneeling on the ground, without allowing the monks to furnish him with a cushion ; and recommending himself to the protection of the patron saint ^l.

ⁱ Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. p. ii. b. ii. p. 260. Carte, b. xvii.

^k Burnet, p. 262. Carte.

^l Carte, b. xvii. p. 312. Cabrera, lib. i. c. 4.

Philip's arrival in England. He set sail from Corunna, in the beginning of July, one thousand five hundred and fifty-four, and arrived at Southampton, after a prosperous voyage, on the 19th or 20th of the same month. In a few days after his arrival, the marriage ceremony was performed at Winchester; where Philip received, from the Emperor's ambassador, the investiture of Naples, Sicily, and Milan, together with the titular kingdom of Jerusalem; all which Charles resigned to him on this occasion, as a testimony of the joy and satisfaction which the marriage afforded him, and in order to render his son a husband more worthy of his royal spouse^m.

Having brought with him a numerous train of Spanish nobility, Philip studied to dazzle the eyes of the English, by the pomp and splendour of his public appearances, and to gain their affections by his liberality. But he could not, with all his endeavours, hide the blemishes of his character. His natural reserve and haughtiness still appeared in all his demeanour. He was too much a Spaniard to relish any thing that was not Spanish. He could, on no occasion, comply with the manners of the English. He suffered even the chief nobility to remain in his presence without taking any notice of them; allowed no person to approach him without having previously obtained permission; and thus made himself difficult of access, even to those whose favour he wished to conciliate or secureⁿ.

He discovers his ambitious views. It soon appeared, how little he was satisfied with that article of his marriage treaty, by which he was excluded from the government. At his desire, and in order to gain his affections, which Mary regarded more than either the interest of her people, or even her own importance in the kingdom, she requested of the parliament to declare him the presumptive heir of the crown, and to commit the administration of the state into his hands.

Both houses had hitherto shewn themselves extremely obsequious to her will; but they saw now the necessity of putting an end to their compliances. They easily perceived the spirit and tendency of her demands, and considered them as an indubitable proof of her determined purpose to gratify her husband's ambition, without regard to the fatal consequences that might follow. They rejected both her requests. Although they had consented to Philip's bearing the title of King, they would not agree to the ceremony of his coronation; and they obstinately refused to assist the Emperor in the war which he was carrying on against France^o.

To overcome the prejudices, which, from this conduct of the His artifice. parliament, Philip perceived were entertained against him, he resolved to curb his natural disposition, and to assume the appearance of moderation. With this design, he obtained from Mary the release of several persons of distinction, whom she had thrown into prison, on suspicion of their dissatisfaction to her government. But there was no part of his conduct better calculated to conciliate the favour of the English, than his protection of the lady Elizabeth; against whom Mary had given such proofs of jealousy and resentment, as rendered the

^m Burnet's Ref. p. ii. b. 2. Carte, b. xvii. p. 313. Summonte Hist. di Napoli, libro uno, p. 263.

ⁿ Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. v. ii. p. 288. Carte, b. xvii. p. 313.

^o "His carriage," says Bishop Burnet, "was such, that the acting him and his Spaniards was one of the great diversions of queen Elizabeth's court."

^o Carte, p. 315.

nation extremely anxious with regard to the life of that princess. It was unfortunate, however, for Philip, that the favour which he showed towards Elizabeth admitted of an interpretation very different from what he expected would have been put upon it. Men were not inclined to ascribe to generosity, in a prince of his interested character, an action to which he must have been prompted by this political consideration, that if Elizabeth were cut off, and Mary to die without issue, England would be inherited by the Queen of Scots ; by whose marriage with the Dauphin, both the crowns of Scotland and of England would be united to that of France^p.

Mary had, in order to ingratiate herself with the people, and to advance the views of her husband, suspended her persecution of the ^{Persecution of the Protestants.} Reformers. But her zeal and bigotry were too violent to be long restrained ; and Philip was not inclined, either from principle or temper, to oppose those sanguinary measures which she was now determined to pursue. Courts no less arbitrary than the Spanish Inquisition were instituted ; and the same barbarous punishments, which that tribunal denounces, were inflicted on great numbers of persons without distinction of either age or sex. No person doubted that Mary was of herself sufficiently prone to employ those dreadful severities which were exercised ; but as all men knew how implicitly she was devoted to her husband's will, they could not help considering them as the consequence of either his advice or his approbation^q. Philip was sensible of the odium to which he was exposed ; and, in order to remove or lessen it, he had recourse to the ridiculous expedient of making his confessor, a Franciscan Friar, deliver before him, a sermon in favour of toleration^r. But notwithstanding this artifice, which was too gross to impose upon any person, and though Philip seldom appeared openly to act a part in the administration, the prepossessions against him still remained. All his conduct was beheld with an eye of watchful jealousy and distrust ; nor was it possible for Mary to obtain any higher concession from the parliament in his favour, than this, that if she should die, and leave issue behind her, Philip should be protector during the minority.

For several months, this concession was not deemed so insignificant as it afterwards proved. A belief prevailed throughout the kingdom, that Mary was with child, and Philip, and even Mary herself, believed it.^s Philip remained in England while there was any reason to entertain hopes of so desirable an event ; which might have realized that power at which he had aspir-

^{Philip leaves England.}

^p Burnet, vol. ii. b. ii. p. 287. Carte, p. 316. Camden's Apparatus.

^q Philip's historian Cabrera ascribes the persecutions to Philip as matter of praise, p. 28. lib. i. c. 7.

^r This sermon was delivered on the 10th of February ; yet, on the 24th of May following, Philip joined with Mary, upon occasion of Bonner's declining to take all the odium of the persecution upon himself, in writing to that brutal prelate, requiring him to proceed in the execution of the laws against heretics ; so as that, through his good furtherance, both God's glory may be the better advanced, and the commonwealth the more quietly governed. Burnet's Collection of Records, No. 20.

^s On the 30th of April, a report was spread that she was actually delivered of a son. All the bells in London were set a ringing. Bonfires were lighted up in every corner of the city. A Te Deum was sung in the Cathedral of St. Paul's ; and a priest indulged his credulity to such a height as to describe, with great particularity, the proportions and features of the young prince, whom he represented as the healthiest and most beautiful that had been ever seen. Carte, p. 317.

ed ever since his arrival in that kingdom. But when those appearances, which gave rise to the belief of Mary's pregnancy, were found to be nothing but the approach of a dropsy ; when all prospect of her ever having children was annihilated, and her anxiety for offspring, joined with her natural sourness and jealousy, had preyed upon her health, and rendered her person, as well as her conversation, disagreeable ; Philip left England, after having staid in it fourteen months, and passed over to the Netherlands^t.

There the Emperor was preparing to execute a resolution which he had formed of resigning his dominions, in order to pass the remainder of his life in retirement. The Emperor's
resignation of
his dominions.

At the time of Philip's marriage with the Queen of England, he had ceded to him the kingdom of Naples, and the Dutchy of Milan ; and had little reason to be satisfied with his son's behaviour towards him, after giving so strong a proof of his paternal affection and munificence. Philip, besides refusing to come over to Flanders, where Charles was desirous of seeing him, unless he were invested with some authority in that country, during his abode in it, insisted, that the grant of the Italian States should be absolute and unconditional ; and no sooner had he entered upon the possession of them, than he displaced his father's ministers, in order to make room for creatures of his own. This undutiful behaviour did not deter the Emperor from resolving to resign to his son all the rest of his dominions. On the contrary, it appears to have been his principal motive in forming this resolution ; as it gave him a clear discovery of Philip's imperious temper, and shewed that he had now reduced himself to the disagreeable alternative, of either contending with him, or of yielding to him^u.

Had Charles enjoyed the same vigour, either of body or of mind, which he possessed some years before, it is probable that Philip's behaviour would have operated upon him very differently, and have determined him to abridge, rather than to augment, his son's power. But finding himself worn out, partly by the excruciating pain which he had long suffered from frequent returns of the gout, and partly by his incessant activity, and continual application to business, he perceived that he must, for the future, either trust to his ministers, which he had hitherto avoided ; or sink ere long under the weight of the government of so many States as were subject to his dominions. It was therefore become necessary for him to disengage himself from, at least, a part of those cares which oppressed him. If Philip's ambition had been more moderate, or his temper of mind more complying, Charles might have invested him with the chief branches of administration, and have still retained the supreme authority ; or, after resigning to him the sovereignty of a part of his dominions, he might have reserved the remainder in his own hands ; but he foresaw that Philip's temper would, in either of these cases, have proved the source of continual uneasiness to him ; and this he could not, with dignity, avoid, by any other means, than by retiring from the world, and making an absolute cession of his whole dominions^x.

Determined by these motives, he resigned the sovereignty of the Low

^t Haræus, Carte, p. 317. Burnet, part II. b. ii. p. 312.

^u L'Evesque, p. 24, 25. Summonte, lib. ix. p. 263.

^x Ribieri, p. 455.

Countries in October 1555, and that of Spain in the month of January immediately following. But he retained possession of his Imperial crown for several months longer, till he had made another fruitless attempt to persuade his brother to relinquish his claim to the empire, in behalf of Philip. Charles was retiring from the world under a conviction of the vanity of human greatness, yet he was as solicitous to secure an accession of that greatness to his son, as if he had believed that it constituted the supreme felicity of man. His own experience had furnished him with the strongest proof, that dominions so widely extended conferred the appearance of power more than the substance or reality ; that they are the source of continual and distracting anxiety ; that they engage the possessor in enterprises beyond his strength, and that the right government of them is a task above the capacity of any individual : yet he desired nothing so much as to load his son with that burden, which he himself had found intolerable, and under which he had sunk long before the period when old age obliges men to quit the scenes of active life. Charles had long fostered that preposterous ambition of princes, which prompts them to the pursuit of power, without regard to the great end for which alone it is desirable, the happiness of their subjects : and it was become impossible for him entirely to divest himself of this passion, although he was determined never more to indulge it.

It is much easier to enter into the motives from which he

acted, with respect to another part of his conduct at this time.

The truce of
Vaucelles

Previously to his abdication, he had been exceedingly desirous

to have peace established with France, in order to give his son leisure to recover his dominions from that exhausted state to which his own continual wars, together with the sums transmitted to England, had reduced them. In this, however, all his attempts had hitherto failed. But, having been detained in the Low-Countries by sickness and the severity of the season, much longer than he intended, he had the satisfaction, before his departure, to employ his endeavours successfully in effectuating the truce of Vaucelles : and, before the expiration of that truce, there was ground to hope, that the several points of difference between his son and the French monarch would be amicably adjusted. Soon after this, he set out for his retreat in Spain : where, having buried, in the solitude of a convent, all his schemes of glory and ambition, he seldom inquired, or even suffered his domestics to inform him, concerning what was passing in the world ^y.

^y Gianone, tom. iv. p. 198.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK II.

NOTWITHSTANDING Charles was disappointed in his scheme of transmitting the empire to his son, Philip was still the most powerful monarch of the age. In Europe, besides the united kingdoms of Castile, Arragon, and Navarre, he possessed the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Dutchy of Milan, Franche-Comté, and the Netherlands; in Africa, Tunis, Oran, the Cape-Verd, and the Canary Islands; in Asia, the Philippine and Sunda Islands, and a part of the Moluccas: and in America, the empires of Peru and Mexico, New Spain and Chili, besides Hispaniola, Cuba and many other of the American Islands. The mines of Mexico, Chili and Potosi, were, at the time of Philip's accession, a source of greater wealth than almost all the other princes in Europe were possessed of^a. His fleet was much more numerous than that of any other European power. His troops were better disciplined, and more accustomed to war and victory: and they were commanded by the ablest and most experienced generals of the age.

Such extensive power, and such copious resources, could not but appear extremely formidable to the other European States; especially when they reflected upon the dark, imperious character of the prince to whom they belonged. For although Philip had neither his father's valour, nor his enterprising activity, yet he was plodding, industrious, and penetrating. He had already shewn that his ambition was not less ardent than that of the Emperor; and it was the more to be dreaded, as it was concealed under the cloak of fervent zeal for the interest of religion.

But how much soever Philip's power and character were fitted to excite jealousy in the neighbouring states, there were few of them, at that period, in a condition to counteract his

Philip's power and dominions.

^a They brought him 25,000,000 of guilders yearly. Meteren.

of England. designs. The English had, since Mary's accession, lost much of that importance in Europe, which they had enjoyed for half a century before. Commerce was either neglected, or oppressed ; their troops were undisciplined, and disused to war ; and their navy was in the most languishing condition. During Philip's residence among them, they had given proof of their native spirit of independence, by refusing to admit him to any share of the administration ; but they had, in every thing else, shewn themselves tamely submissive to the will of their weak bigoted Queen ; and there was ground to apprehend, that, instead of opposing, they would be compelled by her to assist him, in the execution of any violent or hostile plan, which his ambition or bigotry might prompt him to pursue.

He had no greater reason to expect opposition from Germany. Of Germany. many than from England. For whatever disgust his competition with Ferdinand for the Imperial crown might have created, there was no probability that it would ever occasion any violent dissension, or open rupture between them. Ferdinand was not yet fully settled in the possession of Hungary. He was disquieted with apprehensions that the Sultan would ere long renew hostilities against him in that kingdom ; and, in order to provide against this event, and secure to himself that support, of which, in case it should happen, he would stand in need, he laboured assiduously to establish concord among the several princes of the Germanic body, and to compose the animosities which the differences in religion had produced.

Portugal had, at this time, reached the summit of its prosperity and glory. Of Portugal. Those discoveries and conquests in the most distant regions of the globe, which had advanced that kingdom to a rank so much superior to what it held before, were almost completed. But John the Third, under whose government and auspices so great a number of discoveries and conquests had been made, was now in the decline of life ; beloved by his people ; respected by his neighbours ; and only solicitous to maintain peace, and to render his subjects happy.

The thrones of Denmark and Sweden were filled by Christiern the Third and Gustavus Vasa. Denmark and Sweden. Under the just and mild administration of the former monarch, Denmark was beginning

to recover from that exhausted state to which civil dissensions, the calamities of foreign war, and the oppression of an odious tyrant lately dethroned, had reduced it : while the Swedes, who, under Gustavus, had thrown off the yoke of the neighbouring kingdom, and bestowed their crown upon their brave deliverer, were enjoying under him the sweets of liberty, and laying the foundation of that greatness to which they afterwards attained. Neither of these nations, however, were yet in a condition to take a part in the affairs of the other European powers ; and the patriotic princes who ruled over them, found sufficient employment in establishing tranquillity within their kingdoms.

In Italy, the dominion of the church, lately much diminished Of the Pope's dominions. by the grant which Paul the Third had made of the Dutchies of Parma and Placentia to Octavio Farnese his grandson, were

shut up between the Dutchy of Milan on the one hand, and the kingdom of Naples on the other. The sovereign Pontiff, therefore, was more dependent on Philip, than upon any other prince, and was much more likely to find his interest in courting that monarch's favour, than in promoting any scheme of opposition to his designs.

Cosmo de Medici, Duke of Tuscany, had been greatly indebted to the late Emperor for the sovereignty which he enjoyed ; and his dominions were, by the Emperor's favour and his own wise policy, become so considerable, that only the viceroy of Naples, or the governor of Milan, could give him any just ground of uneasiness. Both gratitude and interest seemed to call on that political prince to attach himself to the king of Spain, and to cultivate his friendship.

Octavio de Farnese, duke of Parma, had been deprived of the dutchy of Placentia by the Emperor ; and Philibert Emanuel, duke of Savoy, had been stript, in his father's lifetime, both of Savoy and Piedmont, by the French. Without the favour of Philip, neither of these two princes had any prospect of recovering his dominions.

The republic of Venice, formerly so powerful and ambitious, had, after the league of Cambray, discovered the folly of their ambition ; and they now adhered steadfastly to the cautious maxim of maintaining a strict neutrality in all the quarrels of the European powers ; whose friendship, and especially that of Philip, they were solicitous to secure, as the only means by which the invasions of their formidable enemy, the Turkish Sultan, could be repelled.

From this view of the European States at the time of Philip's accession, it is evident there was no other counterpoise in Christendom to his power, but France : which was not indeed of so great extent as Philip's dominions, but possessed such advantages in its situation, in its people, and in its government, as made it at least the second kingdom in Europe, and qualified it to serve as a bulwark of the general liberty against the power of Spain. Although the frontier of this mighty monarchy did not reach so far as it does at present, yet it extended from the British Channel to the Mediterranean and Italy, and from the Pyrenees to Germany and the Netherlands ; and, through all that space, was unmixed with the territories of any other state ; lying between Philip's dominions in Spain or Italy, and the Netherlands ; and in the time of war, rendering it difficult for his troops in one of these countries, to co-operate with those in the other.

During the reigns of several princes, the French nation had been accustomed almost perpetually to the use of arms, and had never become sufficiently acquainted either with the arts, or with the sweets of peace, to be averse to war. The spirit of chivalry, the heroic valour, romantic love of military fame, which, whilst the feudal government subsisted, proved the source of so many calamities to the kingdom, still animated in a high degree the French nobility ; but having taken a different direction, instead of engaging them in hostilities against one another, it inflamed them with the laudable ambition of courting toil and danger in support of the glory of the nation and the crown.

Henry the Second, who governed this warlike people, had already shewn himself possessed of no inconsiderable share of that ardent and ambitious spirit by which his father was so eminently distinguished. He had not indeed the bold military genius of Francis ; but this defect in his character was abundantly supplied by his generals : among whom were the Mareschal de Brisac, the conqueror of Piedmont ; the Constable Montmorency, so much celebrated for his he-

Tuscany.

Savoy, Par-
ma, and
Placentia.

Venice.

of France.

Character of
the French.

Henry II.

roic valour ; and Francis of Lorrain duke of Guise, who had lately acquired immortal honour by his defence of Metz against the Emperor.

Henry was formidable, from his connexions with foreign His allies. powers, as well as on account of his internal resources. The

Queen of Scotshaving been educated at his court, and betrothed to his eldest son, her kingdom was likely to become a province of France. And, in imitation of his father, he had courted assiduously the friendship of the Swiss, and entered into a strict alliance with the Sultan ; as from the former he might, in case of a rupture with Spain, receive assistance by land, and from the latter by sea, on the coast of Spain and Italy.

It appeared, almost from the beginning of Henry's reign, that he had thoroughly imbibed his father's passions, his ambition to recover possession of those Italian dominions which had occasioned so many bloody wars, and his jealousy of the Spanish or Austrian power and greatness.

Prompted by these passions, he had, in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-one, taken Octavio Farnese, duke of Parma, under his protection, in opposition both to the Pope and to the Emperor. And he had entered into a league against Charles, with the Protestant princes in Germany, than which, he could not have given a stronger demonstration of his jealousy of the Emperor ; since the principal end of this alliance was, to save from ruin in Germany, that religion, the professors of which he had persecuted in France with unrelenting rigour. The war, which was the consequence of this alliance, continued with various success, till a stop was put to it for a few months by the truce of Vaucelles above mentioned. By this truce the contending parties were to retain possession of their conquests for five years, unless their respective claims were adjusted before the expiration of that term. This was the principal article ; and, in virtue of it, not only Metz and Toul and Verdun, which rendered France secure on the German frontier, but almost the whole of Savoy and Piedmont (the restoration of which the Emperor was in honour bound to procure to the duke of Savoy), were to remain in the hands of the French. Charles would never have consented to this condition, which he had rejected when it was proposed in the preceding year, had he not thought it necessary that his son should enjoy some years of peace. Henry, on the other hand, had the highest reason to be satisfied ; yet it was by him the truce was violated. Into this measure, of which he had much reason afterwards to repent, he was drawn, partly by that hereditary ambition, which had impelled so many of his predecessors to attempt to gain a footing in Italy, and partly by the interested counsels of the family of Guise ; but chiefly by the solicitations and importunity of the sovereign pontiff.

Paul the Fourth, one of the most singular characters of the age, and whose conduct furnished, at this time, a striking contrast to that of the Emperor, had been lately advanced to the papacy ; after having passed the greatest part of his life either in the study of the learned languages and scholastic theology, or in the austerities of a cloister. Born of the the family of Caraffa in the kingdom of Naples, he had in his youth enjoyed several rich preferments, and been employed as a nuncio in Naples, in Spain, and in England. But having grown tired of this public life, he had relinquished the paths of ambition ; resigned his benefices ; instituted an order of monks, and lived, for several years, in strict conformity to the rigid rules which he prescribed them. Paul the

Third with difficulty persuaded him to quit his retirement, and accept the dignity of Cardinal : nor would he have been induced to comply with the Pope's request, by any other motive, but the hope of contributing towards the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy ; against which he had ever shewn the most furious and bigoted zeal. He was the oldest cardinal when Marcellus died ; and this circumstance had served not a little to promote his election ; as it flattered the other competitors with the prospect of seeing, ere long, another vacancy in the papal chair.

But his advanced age had given him neither moderation nor prudence, nor any useful acquaintance with the world. He talked perpetually of the power belonging to the successor of St. Peter, and of his superiority to princes, in terms that might have been suffered in the dark ages of the church, but which, from the revolution men's sentiments had lately undergone, appeared, even to his courtiers, ridiculous and extravagant. In all his demeanour he discovered a degree of haughtiness, that astonished those who observed it ; and he began his pontificate at the age of seventy-nine, with an impetuosity and violence seldom to be met with in the ardour of youth^b.

He had long held a distinguished character for sanctity of manners, and disinterested zeal for the honour of the Holy His nephews. See ; but having now attained the highest dignity to which he could aspire, and having no longer any reason to disguise his sentiments, he devoted himself, with a blind attachment, to his nephews, and seemed to have no other aim, in the exercise of his pontifical power, than to advance their interests, and assist them in the execution of their ambitious designs. Unfortunately for the peace of Europe, their ambition could not be satisfied with the dignities, which, as supreme pontiff, he had the power of conferring ; although he bestowed on Count Montoric, his eldest nephew, the dukedom of Palliano, of which he had violently dispossessed Mark Antony Colonna ; on the second the government of Rome, with the county of Bagno, and the title of Marquis of Montebello ; and had made the youngest a cardinal, and legate of Bologna. But these men aspired at some sovereign or independent establishment, such as had been procured by Leo and Clement, for the Medici ; and by Paul the Third, for the family of Farnese. They saw no other means of accomplishing their design, but by dispossessing the Emperor and his son of their Italian dominions : and to attempt this, both Paul and his nephews were incited by motives of resentment, as well as interest. The younger Caraffa, formerly a soldier, and one of the knights of Malta, though now a cardinal, having, when he served in the Emperor's army in Germany, challenged a Spanish officer to single combat, Charles had put him under arrest ; and afterwards, when the Pope had conferred on him the priory of St. Jerom in Naples, the Emperor's viceroy had prevented him from entering on the possession of it^c.

Paul himself, during his residence as nuncio in Spain, having acquired the esteem of Ferdinand the Catholic, had been admitted by him into the council of state, and had retained his place there after the accession of Charles. But having on some occasion spoken with too much freedom against the Emperor in the consistory at Rome, Charles had testified his

^b F. Paul, lib. v. *Onuphrii Panvinni vita Pauli IV. Thuani, lib. xv. c. 12.* Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. part ii. b. ii.

^c Pallavicini, p. 60. Father Paul, lib. v.

displeasure with him, by ordering his name to be struck out of the list of counsellors. Not satisfied with this, he had first opposed his being admitted to the archbishopric of Naples, to which Paul the Third had presented him ; and afterwards, though Charles was persuaded by Julius the Third to consent to his investiture, yet he had molested him in the exercise of his jurisdiction ; and had exerted all his influence in the conclave to prevent his advancement to the papal throne^d.

These injuries made a deep impression on the proud and fiery temper of the pontiff ; nor was he solicitous to conceal his indignation. Even in the presence of the Cardinals of the Imperial party, he used to inveigh bitterly against the Emperor, and to join menaces to his invectives ; and would sometimes add, that they might inform their master, if they pleased, of what he said.

It is probable, however, that he would not have formed ^{Their artifices.} the resolution of having recourse to arms, had not his nephews, and particularly the Cardinal, the most ambitious and intriguing, employed various artifices to deceive him. They gave him information of nocturnal assemblies held in Rome, by the partisans of the Emperor, at which, measures were concerted prejudicial to his authority ; they informed him of a detection which they had made, of persons hired by the Emperor, to poison, or assassinate both him and them ; and they carried him intercepted letters writ in cypher, from which, according to the Cardinal's interpretation, it appeared that some secret machinations were in agitation against him among the Imperial ministers.

By these and other means of the same nature, they at once roused his fears, and inflamed his resentment : and he at length resolved, in conformity with their advice, to endeavour to engage the French king, whose war with the Emperor still subsisted, to enter into a treaty of alliance with him against the common enemy.

^{Paul forms an alliance with Henry II.} Having, with this view, called such of his courtiers as he confided in, to a secret conference, at which he desired the French ambassador, Avanson, to be present ; he informed them of the several plots against him and his nephews, which had fortunately been detected, and lamented that, notwithstanding it had pleased God to appoint him to be the common father of Christians, yet his children, by conspiring to accomplish his destruction, had reduced him to the painful necessity of taking arms against them, in order to maintain that sacred dignity with which he was invested. And he concluded with saying, that his hopes of deliverance from the dangers which threatened him and the church, were founded principally on the power and zeal of his most Christian majesty.

Avanson replied to this discourse, by assuring him that the king and kingdom of France would be ready to devote themselves to the defence of his sacred person, and the Apostolic See ; and Paul dismissed the assembly, after observing that he hoped ere long to see *one* of the king's sons in possession of Naples and another, of the Dutchy of Milan.

Caraffa the cardinal, impatient of delay, immediately set on foot a treaty between his uncle and Avanson ; and having, without much difficulty, brought it to a conclusion, he transmitted it to the court of France^e.

^d Summonte, lib. x. p. 269. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. xiv. F. Paul, lib. v.

^e From this treaty it is evident, that however solicitous Paul was to advance the ambitious and interested views of his nephews, he was not entirely under their direction, nor altogether regardless of the interest of the Holy See. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. xv.

The most important articles were these, That the King of France should take upon himself the protection of the Pope, and all the family of Caraffa : that the Pope should furnish an army of ten thousand men ; and the King the same, or a greater number, if necessary, to co-operate with the ecclesiastical forces, in restoring liberty to Tuscany, and in expelling the Imperialists and Spaniards from the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. And that, in case their arms should be attended with success, the Pope should immediately grant the investiture of these kingdoms to a younger son of the French monarch ; reserving for the Ecclesiastical State, the city of Benevento, with its territory, and an annual tribute of twenty thousand crowns ; besides an independent establishment, in the kingdom of Naples, of twenty-five thousand crowns, for the Count Montorio ; and another of fifteen thousand for Antonio de Caraffa.^f

This treaty met with such a reception at the court of France, as Avanson had given reason to expect. Henry was allured by the prospect which it opened to him of acquiring those Italian dominions, for which his predecessors had so often contended ; and was of himself strongly inclined to comply with the pope's proposals. The constable Montmorency, ever bold, and often rash in action, but in counsel provident, circumspect, and cautious, employed several cogent arguments to dissuade him ; and was warmly seconded by the cardinal of Tournon.

They observed, that, as the Emperor was about to resign his dominions, it was highly probable, that either a peace, or a truce with Spain, might soon be established ; they represented how pernicious all those enterprises in Italy had been, which Henry's ancestors had undertaken, in circumstances much more favourable than at the present period, when the nation was exhausted by a long succession of expensive wars. And they endeavoured to convince him of the imprudence of unnecessarily prolonging war with a prince possessed of so many resources as the Emperor, depending on the feeble aid of a pope, at the age of eighty ; after whose death those very forces on which he now relied, would probably be ranged on the side of the enemy.

Henry, who had been long accustomed to pay the highest deference to the constable's opinion, would have yielded to these arguments, had they not been warmly opposed by the duke of Guise, and his brother the cardinal of Lorrain : who flattered the king's ambition, and thereby obtained an easy victory on this occasion over their rival. Whether there was ground for the suspicions which were entertained, that Guise had formed a design on the kingdom of Naples, and the cardinal on the papal throne, it is impossible to decide ; but, from the interested and ambitious characters of these men, there is reason to believe, that neither a regard to the welfare of France, nor the glory of the King, determined them to offer the counsel which they gave. They knew that the management of the war, and the conduct of all the negociations relative to it, would be put into their hands ; and they hoped, if the event were prosperous, to enjoy in Italy, a more independent authority than they could expect to exercise in France, where they must submit to perpetual control from the presence of the King, or from their rivals in the court.

" So fair an opportunity," said the Cardinal, " of recovering those dominions in Italy, which the crown of Spain has usurped, ought not to

^f Summonte, lib. x. p. 278.

be neglected. It was from the sovereign pontiff, that the French monarchs had originally received their title to the Neapolitan kingdom ; and it would not be difficult for the King to assert his claim, with the assistance of the present Pope, whose family would, by their credit and influence, engage the friends of France to stand forth in defence of a cause which their ancestors had so strenuously supported. And with regard to what had been said of peace with the Emperor, as the prospect of it was extremely precarious, so it was not to be supposed, that any benefit that would accrue from it, could be put in the balance with that accession of glory, which the King and the French nation would derive from the proposed alliance."

This specious, but flimsy declamation, produced the desired effect on the improvident temper of the King. The cardinal of Lorrain, agreeably to his expectations, was immediately ordered to repair to Rome ; and the cardinal of Tournon, though extremely averse to the measure adopted, was required to accompany him. Not long afterwards the treaty was concluded in form, and both parties began secretly to prepare for putting it in execution.

But Henry soon forgot the obligations which he had brought himself under in this treaty ; and in less than two months after it was signed, agreed to the truce of Vaucelles. The cardinal

Truec of
Vaucelles,
Dec. 15,
1555.
of Lorrain was at that time in Italy ; and the Constable, taking advantage of his absence, represented to the King in so strong a light, the benefit which would arise from the truce, as overcame the resolution of that unsteady prince, and persuaded him to abandon those alluring prospects with which he had been dazzled and deceived. The Cardinal, after his last audience of the Pope, was about to set out from Rome, in order to solicit the duke of Ferrera and the republic of Venice to accede to the alliances ; when intelligence was brought him from the court of France, that, in a conference held at Vaucelles for an exchange of prisoners, a truce, with the condition of leaving both parties in possession of their conquests, had been proposed by the Imperialists. But he thought it so exceedingly improbable that either the Emperor, or Philip, would consent to this condition, that he still persisted in his journey, and left his information with the cardinal of Tournon, to be communicated to the Pope. It made no greater impression on Paul, than on the cardinal of Lorrain. He endeavoured to make Tournon believe, that such a truce would give him pleasure : but it was an event, he said, to be desired, rather than to be hoped for, or expected.

Not many days after, he received certain intelligence from Constitution of Paul. his nuncio at the court of France, that this event, which he thought so exceedingly improbable, had taken place ; that the truce was actually signed, and that Henry, as well as the Emperor and his son, had sworn to observe it ; the first at Blois, in the presence of the Count de Lalain, and the two last before the Admiral de Coligni at Brussels. The news of this transaction excited in Paul and his nephews the most alarming apprehensions. They were conscious of having given the Emperor and Philip the justest ground of offence. They could not suppose that their conduct had been entirely secret, and they were now exposed to the resentment of enemies, by whom they must be quickly overwhelmeds.

In order to elude that vengeance which they justly merited, Paul affected to rejoice, as became the father of the Christian church, at seeing an end put to the calamities of war. Under this mask he concealed his intention for some time, and that he might conceal it still longer and more effectually, he sent two nuncios, a cardinal of the name of Rebiba, to the Emperor and Philip ; and his nephew cardinal Caraffa, to the King of France. He gave the same public instructions to both, and ordered them to make an offer to these princes of his mediation for establishing a solid peace on the foundation of the truce ; and to treat with them of the measures proper to be taken for assembling a general council. But the real design of Caraffa's embassy was, to persuade Henry to fulfil the conditions of that alliance with the Pope into which he had entered some months before^h.

Rebiba was purposely detained in Rome for several weeks ; but Caraffa, having carried along with him mareschal Strozzi, a kinsman of the Queen of France, proceeded in his journey to Paris with the utmost expedition. He possessed, in an eminent degree, the art and eloquence necessary for executing the difficult negociation which he had undertaken. And it was not without good reason that the Pontiff, when he reflected on his nephew's talents, still flattered himself with the hopes of success.

Upon his arrival at Fountainbleau, Caraffa found the Courtiers divided as formerly, with regard to the subject of this embassy. When Henry first entered into alliance with the Pope, the Constable was suspected of having too faintly opposed it ; not from any doubt which he entertained of its inexpediency, but, either from the faithless complaisance of a courtier to the inclinations of the King ; or from a desire to have his rivals of the family of Guise removed to a distance from the court. But whatever ground there was for this suspicion, it is certain that Montmorency had been the chief promoter of the truce of Vaucelles ; and that he now shewed himself extremely averse to that shameful violation of it, which Caraffa had come to solicit.

The duke of Guise, on the other hand, and his brother the Cardinal, were still as much bent on the Italian war as ever ; and made no more scruple to exhort their master to undertake it, after he had sworn to observe the truce with the Emperor, than they had done formerly, when he was at liberty, consistently with his honour, either to embrace or reject it.

Between the opposite counsels which were given him, the unstable mind of Henry remained for several days in suspense. Elated with the success which had hitherto attended his arms, and inflamed with the ambition of acquiring the Neapolitan kingdom, he was inclined to a renewal of the war, and withheld his consent from it, only out of respect for his oath, and his deference to the opinion of the Constable. At length Caraffa having gained over the Queen, through the influence of Strozzi ; and the Guises having employed the still more powerful intercession of the dutchess of Valentinoisⁱ, Henry began to yield to the importunity of such powerful solicitors, and admitted Caraffa to a private audience, which he had requested, in the hopes of completing that victory over the Constable's remonstrances, and the King's remaining scruples, which his associates had begun. On this occasion, having with the usual cere-

His dissimulation.

His nephew persuades Henry to violate the truce.

^h Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. xvi.

ⁱ The famous Diana of Poitiers, Henry's mistress.

mony, presented to the King, a consecrated sword, he remonstrated to him, at great length, on the breach of his engagements with the Pontiff; and when he found that Henry was not offended with this freedom, he next addressed himself to his ambition, and represented, that a more favourable juncture than the present could not be desired for attempting to expel the Spaniards from Italy. That the reins of government were now abandoned by the Emperor, and committed to his son; who, besides his inexperience, was extremely unacceptable to the Italian states and princes, and was not yet firmly established on his throne. That his exchequer was drained by those expensive wars in which the Emperor had been almost continually engaged; and his armies were neither so numerous nor so flourishing as at any former period since the commencement of his father's reign. While, on the other hand, the French army would have easy access to Naples, through the territories of the Pope, and would thence likewise be furnished, both with fresh troops, and with abundant supplies of ammunition and provisions.

Henry found it difficult any longer to withhold his consent. But there were two points on which he required still farther satisfaction, than either Caraffa's arguments or promises had given him. He could not entirely divest himself of the scruples which arose from his oath; and nothing offered by Caraffa had taken off the force of the Constable's objection against entering into engagements with a Pope in the extremity of old age, who, it was likely, would die before the end of the proposed alliance could be accomplished. Caraffa had foreseen both these difficulties, and was prepared to remove them. He produced from Paul a power to absolve Henry from the obligation of his oath; he engaged that such a number of cardinals, partisans of France, and enemies to Spain, should be nominated at the next promotion, as would secure to Henry the absolute disposal of the papacy, in the event of the Pontiff's death; and, for his further security, he promised, in all events, that Bologna, Ancona, Paliano, Civita-Vecchia, and even the castle of St. Angelo, should be put into his possession.

The war was now resolved upon without further hesitation. Caraffa immediately dispatched a messenger to Rebiba, who, according to his instructions, was advancing by slow journeys towards Brussels, to inform him of what had passed, and to desire him to return to Rome. Henry received absolution in form from the obligation of that sacred law of Nature, which enjoins the observance of an oath; and, at the same time, he received a dispensation from a law of nations, considered as no less sacred, by which it was held to be unchristian and barbarous to begin hostilities without a previous declaration of war^k.

As he flattered himself that his transaction with Caraffa might be for some time concealed, he was determined, if possible, to attack the Emperor and Philip, while, trusting to the truce, they were off their guard. And thus did this monarch, who was not less virtuous than most of his cotemporary princes, deliberately resolve to add treachery to the perjury and falsehood into which he had been betrayed; under a persuasion that his conduct was not only justifiable, but even honourable, and meritorious in the sight of God and man. Such is the fascinating power of false religion: and so pernicious to society that impious pretension to the power of annulling the sacred obligations of morality, which was claim-

^k Thuanus, lib. xvii. c. vii. Father Paul, lib. v. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. x. p. 71.

ed by the Roman Pontiffs, and which, through the ignorance of their votaries, they were permitted for many ages to enjoy.

Caraffa had endeavoured to conceal his negociation at the court of France, under the pretext of treating with the King about the establishment of peace, and the calling of a general council. But the Emperor and Philip were too well acquainted with his character, to be so easily deceived. They had penetrated into the real intention of the embassy, and had for some time kept a watchful eye over all the motions both of Henry and the Pope.

The conduct of Paul was extremely ill-calculated to elude the penetration of the Spanish ministers. Besides excommunicating the family of Colonna, and depriving them of their territories, he had treated with much severity and injustice all those whom he suspected of being attached to the Spanish interest ; and had received, in the most gracious manner, some Neapolitan exiles, who had fled to Rome. Some of his letters having been intercepted, he had put to the torture Antonio de Tassis postmaster at Rome, though a Spanish subject ; and, in violation of a privilege long enjoyed by the kings of Spain, had given his office to another. He had put under arrest de la Vega, Philip's ambassador at Rome ; and, with no small degree of vanity, set on foot a trial in the consistory, against Philip himself, on pretence that, as his liege-lord, he had a right to deprive him of the kingdom of Naples, on account of his having failed in the payment of 700 ducats, which he alleged was an annual tribute due from the possessor of that kingdom to the Holy See .

The violence of Paul.

While Paul gave these impotent proofs of his resentment, his nephews were making diligent preparation for the approaching war. They were employed assiduously in repairing the fortifications of Rome, Paliano, and other places. And, having levied a considerable number of troops, they engaged Camillo Orsini, one of the ablest generals of the age, to command them.

The administration of Philip's affairs in Italy was at this time in the hands of Ferdinand de Toledo duke of ^{The duke of Alva,} Alva ; a singular and distinguished personage in Philip's reign, whom there will be frequent occasion to mention in the sequel. He was arrogant, vain, and proud ; violent, inflexible, and relentless ; but patient, prudent, and sagacious ; inured from his youth to arms, and possessed of consummate skill in the art of war. He had been intrusted with the supreme command of the Emperor's forces in Germany ; and, though unsuccessful in the siege of Metz, had discovered uncommon vigour and abilities. He did not, however, enjoy the same degree of credit with the father, which he afterwards attained under the son ; whom he nearly resembled in his character, and whose favour he had courted with great assiduity and success. Through the influence of Ruy Gomez de Silva, Philip's principal favourite, who beheld with a jealous eye Alva's growing favour with the King, and was desirous, on that account to have him removed to a distance from the helm of government, he had, about a year before, been appointed viceroy of Naples, as well as governor of Milan, and commander in chief of all the Spanish forces in Italy.

I Gianone, liv. xxxiii. c. i. The duke of Alva's letter in Summonte, tom iv. p. 270. Clement VII. had renounced this claim.

Philip had been fully informed by Alva, of the Pope's conduct with regard to him ; and even before he knew of his alliance with Henry, he could not entertain any doubt of his intentions. Had he permitted Alva to act with vigour, and to improve the advantage over Paul, which his defenceless situation afforded him, he might have got possession of all his fortified places, have deterred Henry from entering into any new connexion with him, and have thereby prevented the renewal of the war. But being convinced that Henry would never violate the truce of Vaucelles, by which he was so great a gainer ; and knowing that the Pontiff could do nothing without the assistance of the French, he gave orders to Alva, to use every art of persuasion, before he should have recourse to arms. Alva, though naturally averse to all mild expedients, complied with his instructions ; and, by letters and messengers, complained, remonstrated, and even soothed and flattered both Paul and his nephews. All his endeavours, however, were ineffectual. They still continued their preparations ; and gave him sometimes haughty, and always unsatisfactory replies. At length the duke of Alva sent Pirro de Lofredo, with one letter to the college of cardinals, and another to Paul^m ; in which, after enumerating the various injuries which his master had received, and renewing his former offers of peace and friendship, he concluded with protesting, that if his offers were again rejected, the Pope should be chargeable with all the calamities that might follow. Before the arrival of Lofredo, Paul had received intelligence from France of the success of the Cardinal's negociation ; and the duke of Alva's letter served only to precipitate him into new extravagances. He threw Lofredo into prison, and would even have put him to death, had not the college of cardinals interposedⁿ. He then gave orders to Aldobrandin, the consistorial advocate, to finish the process which he had begun against Philip, on account of his failure in the paying tribute for Naples ; and, after hearing the cause pleaded, he passed sentence, depriving him of the sovereignty of that kingdom^o.

This violent conduct of Paul gave great offence throughout Europe ; and, in Italy, served rather to obstruct, than to promote his designs. The Venetians refused to accede to his alliance ; and the Neapolitans, perceiving what the ambition of his nephews aimed at, with respect to them, entered warmly into all the prudent measures which the duke of Alva planned for their defence.

But Paul's extravagant behaviour did not excite in Philip that ^{Philip's} resentment and indignation which might have been expected from scruples. a young, ambitious, powerful monarch, of a temper of mind impatient of injuries and affronts. Notwithstanding the contumelious treatment which he had received, he still continued irresolute, and discovered an amazing reluctance against proceeding to extremities.

Some historians affirm, that he had early imbibed, from the Spanish Ecclesiastics, who had the care of his education, the highest veneration for the Holy See ; and entertained some scruples as to the lawfulness of employing force against the sovereign Pontiff. Others assert, that these scruples were mere grimace and affectation. He had already formed the plan of subjecting Europe to his dominion ; and zeal for the Catho-

^m The original letters are preserved by Summonte, lib. x. and dated August 21, 1556.

ⁿ Summonte, lib. x. p. 277. Gianone, lib. xxxiii. c. i.

^o Gianone adds, that he was dissuaded from publishing it by Camerario of Benevento, the great Civilian, a Neapolitan exile.

lic faith was both the pretext and the instrument which he had resolved to employ for accomplishing his design.

Neither of these accounts ought to be entirely rejected ; and neither of them ought to be admitted as satisfactory. On the one hand, it is impossible to doubt that ambition, and not religion, was the ruling principle of Philip's conduct ; and on the other, when we reflect on the pains which were taken, from his earliest infancy, to inspire him with an attachment to the popish faith, and consider how serious and zealous he ever appeared in the profession and support of it ; it will be impossible to suppose, that in religious matters, he was entirely hypocritical. It is improbable that any person could act so uniform a part as Philip did, without feeling, in a considerable degree, the power of that motive which he held forth to the world as the principle of his conduct. Nor does it afford the smallest presumption against this supposition, that his conduct was, on many occasions, inconsistent with religious sincerity. His religion was not surely pure and genuine. It was neither the religion of nature, nor that of Christ, but was the barbarous superstition of the church of Rome, which, in the age of Philip, instead of deterring men from vice, tended to encourage them in the practice of it, by inculcating upon them the highest reverence for an order of priests, supposed to be invested with the power of absolving from the guilt and punishment of the most enormous crimes. To Philip's superstitious veneration for the Holy See, therefore, may be ascribed, in part, both his moderation in the present juncture, and a resolution which he formed, to consult the most distinguished divines, with regard to the lawfulness of waging war against an enemy whose person he deemed so sacred and inviolable.

Those men knew well what counsel was suited to his present circumstances ; and they declared, that, although it behoved him to begin with supplicating his Holiness, as the universal father of the church, yet, if his entreaties were rejected, the law of nature would permit him to defend his territories, and to vindicate his right by force of arms ^p.

By this answer, Philip's religious scruples were removed. Still, however, he lamented the necessity he lay under, of beginning his reign with hostilities, against a power, with which, more than with any other, he was desirous of cultivating peace and friendship. But at last, after having lost a great deal of time in negotiating, he sent orders to the duke of Alva to take the field.

That general, having some time before gone from the dutchy of Milan to the kingdom of Naples, and fixed his head-quarters near the confines of the Ecclesiastical State, began his march in the beginning of September one thousand five hundred and fifty-six, with a well disciplined army ; which, though small in number, was superior to that which the Pontiff had provided to oppose it. In a few weeks Alva reduced several towns in the Campagna di Roma ; and took possession of them in the name of the sacred college, and of the future Pope. The people of Rome were thrown into consternation by his approach ; and many families left the city, in order to avoid the calamities of a siege. Paul still retained all his wonted haughtiness, and poured out threats and anathemas against the enemy.

But the duke of Alva still continued to advance till his troops could make incursions almost to the gates of Rome. In this situation cardinal Caraffa found his uncle's affairs upon

Alva's military operations.

^p Ferreras, vol. ix. p. 373.

1556. his return from France. The army which he had obtained from Henry had already reached Piedmont ; but, being detained there by the rigour of the winter, could not arrive in time to save Rome from falling into the hands of the Spaniards. In order to prevent this, Caraffa prevailed on Paul, who, from pride, and ignorance of his danger, was extremely reluctant, to apply for a cessation of arms ; and Alva, at the request of his uncle, the cardinal of St. James, consented to a conference with Caraffa, in the Isle of Fiumicino. He could not be ignorant, that this crafty Italian's intention was only to amuse him till the French army should approach. But an interval of repose was no less expedient for himself, than for the enemy. His army was greatly diminished by putting garrisons into the conquered towns. His ships with provisions had been long detained by contrary winds ; and his presence was necessary in Naples, to hasten his levies, and put the kingdom into a posture of defence before the arrival of the duke of Guise. Influenced by these considerations, Alva readily consented to a truce of forty days ; and, immediately after concluding it, he set out for Naples, where he exerted himself, with great assiduity, in completing his preparations for the next campaign.

1557. The duke of Guise had now passed the Alps, with twelve thousand foot, and near two thousand horse, and had advanced as far as Rieggio. There he was met by the duke of Ferrara, who, having acceded to the alliance between the Pope and Henry, had brought along with him near seven thousand men. Guise deliberated for some time whether he should begin his operations with laying siege to Cremona, Milan, and other towns in the north of Italy ; or, leaving these behind him in the hands of the enemy, should march directly towards Naples. He had been earnestly exhorted by mareschal de Brissac, whom he saw in Piedmont, to embrace the former of these measures, as being the safest and most practicable ; and in this opinion the duke of Ferrara concurred ; but Guise had received positive orders from the King, to be directed in this matter by the Pope, who insisted that he should advance without delay towards Naples. In compliance, therefore, with his instructions, he pursued his march southward till he reached the frontiers of that part of the kingdom which is called the Abruzzo. At his arrival in Rome, he was received in triumph, as if he had been already crowned with victory. But he soon found that he had been cruelly deceived by Caraffa, with regard to the assistance which that prelate had so confidently promised him in the name of the Pontiff ; who had not been able either to raise the troops which he had stipulated, or to furnish his magazines with an adequate quantity of military stores. Guise was extremely mortified at his present disagreeable situation, and saw that he was likely to meet with nothing but disgrace and shame, where he had flattered himself with the

He lays
siege to
Civitella.

hopes of adding to his former glory. He laid siege, however, to Civitella, and carried on his operations against it, for more than three weeks, with his wonted spirit and intrepidity.

After having made a breach in the wall, he attempted to take the place by storm. But his troops were repulsed with great loss by the garrison, who were bravely seconded by the inhabitants. Even the women discovered, on this occasion, the most undaunted resolution, and seemed determined to lay down their lives, rather than submit to the dominion of the French ; whose insolent use of victory, in former Italian expeditions, was not yet, after many years, obliterated from their minds.

The duke of Alva had resolved, with his usual caution, to act on the defensive ; and to fortify his camp on the south side of the river Piscarra, which lay between him and the enemy. But when he found that their enterprise against Civitella detained them so long, he concluded that the accounts which he had received of their strength must have been exaggerated ; and therefore he crossed the river, and advanced towards them.

Guise was extremely unwilling to quit the siege ; but, having received certain intelligence that the Spanish army was superior to his own, he listened to the advice of mareschal Strozzi ; and retired into the Ecclesiastical territories. Alva followed him : but neither he nor Guise seem to have wished for a general engagement. The former could not have ventured on it with any probability of success ; and the latter thought it absurd to risk a kingdom without necessity on the chance of a battle^q.

Whilst these things passed in the Abruzzo, Mark Antony Colonna made rapid progress in the neighbourhood of Rome, where he reduced several forts and towns, and obtained a victory over the Pope's forces, commanded by Julio Orsini and the marquis of Montebello.

By these disasters, Paul was overwhelmed with terror. And when he was lamenting in the consistory, the calamities in which his dominions were involved, he expressed his dread, that ere long the Vatican itself would be in the hands of the enemy. He added, that he longed now to be with Christ ; and, as if he had engaged in the present war from zeal for the faith, and not from ambition and resentment, he concluded with saying, that he would wait for his crown of martyrdom without dismay.

He was willing, however, to preserve his earthly crown as long as possible ; and had sent to the duke of Guise, intreating him to hasten towards Rome for his defence. This general was now on his march thither ; full of vexation and chagrin on account of the inglorious part which he had acted. He called upon cardinal Caraffa to fulfil his promises ; and he employed all his interest to procure supplies from the court of France. But the Pope's resources were already exhausted ; and the French monarch had more than sufficient employment at home for all the troops which he had reserved, after providing for his Italian expedition.

Philip had, for the reasons above mentioned, entered into the war with reluctance ; but having, in the origin of it, received the highest provocation from Henry, as well as from the Pope, and knowing that, in the beginning of his reign, the eyes of all Europe would be fixed upon his conduct, he had resolved to exert his utmost vigour, and to attack Henry, in that quarter, where he could most successfully annoy him.

With extraordinary industry and dispatch, he assembled a numerous army in the neighbourhood of Charlemont, under the command of Philibert Emanuel, duke of Savoy. And Emanuel cheerfully undertook the charge committed to him, as it gave him at once an opportunity of displaying his great abilities, and of taking vengeance on the French king, by whom he had been expelled from his dominions. Of the army which was collected, only a small part consisted of Spaniards ; the greatest

^q Haræus says, that Guise laboured to force Alva to engage ; but this does not appear from the detail in Thuanus.

1557. part were either Dutch and Flemings, or Germans. In levying them, Philip was much indebted to the zeal and alacrity with which his subjects in the Netherlands espoused his cause. For the States of these provinces notwithstanding the prejudice to their commerce, which they foresaw must arise from the war, granted, with unusual liberality, all the supplies which he demanded. But while in this they gave proof of their loyalty, they discovered, by another part of their conduct, their jealousy and discontent. They reserved in their own hands the administration of the money which they voted him; and appointed commissioners to apply it to the payment of the troops. This action, which proceeded from their jealousy of the Spaniards, made a deep impression on the dark resentful mind of Philip; it contributed to alienate his affections from his Flemish subjects; and gave him an inveterate prejudice against that free constitution of their government, by which they were thus enabled to limit his authority. But he was sensible how improper it would have been, in the present conjuncture, to discover his resentment, or to dispute their privileges. He agreed to accept of their supplies, with the condition annexed to the grant of them; and proceeded to complete his preparations.

Philip engaged England from Germany and the Netherlands, augmented by a reinforcement sent from Spain; he resolved, if possible, to persuade the English to enter into the war. With this view he went over to England. He found the privy-counsellors, the Queen herself, and the whole body of the people averse to his design. It has almost never happened, either before or since that period, that war with the French was not agreeable to the English. During many centuries they had been accustomed to consider their French neighbours as enemies and rivals, with whom they often shewed an eagerness to contend, when it was greatly their interest to remain at peace. But their enmity towards the French yielded at this time to their jealousy of the Spaniards; and they entertained the most irreconcilable aversion to the proposed alliance. Mary, as just now hinted, was not of herself inclined to the war; but notwithstanding this, and the cold indifference with which Philip had ever treated her, she was unable to resist his solicitation^r.

Her kinsman cardinal Pole, and her other counsellors, represented, that it was a chief article of her marriage-treaty, that the alliance with France should be preserved inviolate; that the violation of it would excite an universal alarm with regard to the observance of the other articles; and that the present state of her finances would render it impossible for her, if she should enter into the war, to acquit herself with honour. But Philip having said, that if he were not gratified in his request, he would leave England, and never return to it; Mary was deaf to every argument that could be employed to dissuade her from her purpose; and, without further hesitation, ordered war to be declared in the city of Rheims, with the usual ceremony; on pretences which were either entirely false, or extremely frivolous. As she knew it would be in vain to apply to her parliament for assistance in carrying on a war so disagreeable to the nation, she had recourse to the oppressive expedient of extorting loans from individuals and corporations. By this, and other means of the same nature, she equipped a considerable fleet, and raised

^r Van Meteren. Thuanus, lib. xix. c. vii. Camden's Apparatus.

an army of eight thousand men ; of which she gave the command to the earl of Pembroke. 1557.

When this reinforcement had joined the duke of Savoy, his cavalry amounted to twelve thousand, and his infantry to between forty and fifty thousand ; an army much superior to any which Henry could muster to oppose it. This inconsiderate monarch had not expected that Philip would have been able to make so great an effort, and saw now the folly of his late engagements with the Pope. He was not wanting, however, either in prudence or activity, in repairing his fault, and providing for the security of his kingdom. He committed the chief command of the forces to the Constable, whom, notwithstanding his averseness to the war, he chose to employ, as the ablest of all his generals, to conduct it ; and a great number of the principal nobility and gentry flocked to the camp, eager to display that zeal and bravery, which the French nation hath often exhibited in defence of their king and country.

The Constable could not for some time conjecture on which side the duke of Savoy intended to turn his arms. The siege and battle of St. Quintin. His first movements were calculated to beget a persuasion, that he designed to enter France by the way of Champaign ; but no sooner had he drawn the French army to that quarter, than, changing his route, he marched into Picardy, and laid siege to St. Quintin.

This town must quickly have surrendered to so great a force, had it not been defended by the celebrated Jasper de Coligni, admiral of France, who made, on this occasion, a conspicuous display of those extraordinary talents which rendered him afterwards one of the most illustrious personages of the age. Being governor of the province in which the place lay, he thought it his duty to exert himself to the utmost for its preservation ; and he forced his way into it, through the surrounding army, with a body of troops, which he animated to expose themselves to every hazard of war in its defence. Immediately after his arrival, he expelled the Spaniards from the suburbs, and set fire to the houses. But he soon perceived, that, by reason of the neglected state of the fortifications, the garrison was still too weak ; and that, without a reinforcement, it would be impossible to hold out long against so numerous an enemy. Of this he gave immediate intelligence to the Constable his uncle, and at the same time informed him where it would be easiest to introduce the succour which he requested. The Constable, anxious for his nephew's safety, and sensible how necessary it was for the preservation of the kingdom that the duke of Savoy should be detained before St. Quintin, appointed d'Andelot, the admiral's brother, to the command of a select body of two thousand foot, destined for the relief of the besieged. A person of the name of Valpergue, well acquainted with the face of the country, had been sent by the admiral, to serve as a guide to this reinforcement. But whether he mistook his way, or the duke of Savoy had got intelligence of the design, is uncertain. D'Andelot found the enemy prepared to receive him, and was so vigorously attacked, that he escaped with difficulty, after the greatest part of his troops had been cut to pieces.

By this disaster the besieged were extremely dejected, and the Admiral had much occasion to exert all his address and eloquence, to prevent them from abandoning themselves to despair. From a high tower in the town he could view the country round, and saw that the place was completely invested on every side but one, where there was a marsh or

1557. lake, too deep in some places to be passed on foot, and in others too shallow to admit of boats. Through this marsh, however, he hoped that his friends might introduce a reinforcement. Having concerted with the Constable the time and manner of putting his design in execution, he threw up the earth in a part of the marsh, and reduced the water into a canal large enough to receive some small boats which he had prepared. The Constable then advanced toward the lake with all his forces, and gave d'Andelot an opportunity of entering the town, with between four and five hundred men^s. But, in making his approach, the Constable had led his army through some narrow defiles, which he must repass before he could put his troops in safety. His misconduct, in thus exposing his army to so great a risk in sight of an enemy so much superior, was quickly perceived by the duke of Savoy: and a council of war was immediately called to consider of the measures proper to be pursued. Many of the officers thought that the Constable should be suffered to retire; but count Egmont, general of the horse, whom Philip afterwards used so ungratefully, maintained with warmth^t, that it was practicable to attack him in his retreat with the highest probability of success. The duke of Savoy approved of the plan of attack which the Count proposed, and committed the execution of it to himself. No time was lost. Egmont advanced instantly at the head of the cavalry, while the Duke hastened forward with the infantry to support him; and finding the enemy unprepared for their defence, he soon threw them into disorder. The Constable exerted himself strenuously to retrieve his error; but count Egmont, seconded by the infantry, with the general at their head, advanced with such impetuosity, that the Constable found it impossible to recover his troops from the confusion into which they had been thrown. Perceiving that the fortune of the battle was irretrievable, and stung with the consciousness of the imprudence of which he had been guilty, he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and seemed determined not to survive the reproach in which his rashness had involved him. He was dangerously wounded, and would have fallen in the field, as he desired; but, being personally known to some Flemish officers, he was by them rescued from the soldiers and taken prisoner. His army was entirely broken.

^{The French} ^{defeated.} Three thousand men were killed on the spot, and four thousand taken prisoners; among whom, besides the Constable and his two sons, there were many persons of distinction, and several of the first nobility in France. On the side of the victors only eighty men were killed; a certain proof that the attack had been conducted with no less prudence than intrepidity.

Philip, although a slave to the lust of power, yet unambitious of military glory, remained at Cambray till intelligence was brought him of the victory. He then entered the camp with great pomp, and when the duke of Savoy and count Egmont approached him, he received them in the most gracious manner, and expressed his gratitude for the important service they had performed, with a degree of sensibility and joy which he was seldom accustomed to discover^u. His conduct on this occasion was in another respect more agreeable to his character. In memory of the battle, he vowed to consecrate a palace, a church, and a monastery,

^s Laboureur additions, &c. p. 375.

^t Auctore, consuatore, & prope dicam, perfectore Egmondensi. L. Guicciardini, p. 150. lib. iii.

^u Cabrera, lib. iv. c. 7.

to St. Laurence, because it was on the anniversary of that Saint that he had obtained the victory. He afterwards religiously fulfilled his vow by building the Escurial ; for which he reserved immense sums, notwithstanding the difficulties in which, through his expensive wars, he was almost continually involved.

The battle of St. Quintin might have been attended with the most important consequences, if Philip had complied with the advice of some of his general officers, who exhorted him to lead his army without delay into the heart of France. But this measure was too bold to be relished by a prince like Philip, whose caution often bordered on timidity. He gave orders to proceed in the siege of St. Quintin ; saying, that it would be dangerous to leave so strong a place behind him in the hands of the enemy, and that every army that ventured to penetrate into powerful a kingdom, like that of France, ought first to secure their retreat. His officers were the more easily reconciled to these orders, as they believed it impossible for the besieged to hold out above a few days longer. But they were disappointed in their expectations by the skill and intrepidity of the Admiral ; who, in order to save his country, and retard the progress of the Spanish arms, had resolved to bury himself in the ruins of the place, rather than agree to a surrender. He inspired the garrison with the same generous resolution ; and though the fortifications were weak and ruinous, he withstood all the vigorous and skilful efforts of the duke of Savoy, till the seventeenth day after the renewal of the siege, when the town was assaulted in eleven different places at one time, and both the Admiral and his brother, after a brave and obstinate defence, were taken prisoners on the breach. During the assault, Philip shewed himself to his troops in complete armour ; and this was the only time in his life in which he was ever seen in a military dress. He allowed his army to plunder the town, as a reward of their labours ; but gave strict orders to preserve the churches and the relics of the tutelary saint.

In the mean time Henry's ministers, who had been overwhelmed with consternation, employed to the best advantage the leisure which the Admiral's heroic bravery afforded them. They levied forces in every quarter of the kingdom, gathered together the remains of the vanquished army, sent for the troops which served in Piedmont under the mareschal de Brissac, and recalled the duke of Guise. In a few weeks the whole eastern frontier was in a posture of defence, and an army collected in Picardy under the duke of Neveres, able to make head against the enemy. Philip then perceived that he had suffered the only opportunity to escape which he would probably ever have, of penetrating into France, and seizing the capital unprepared. He was now under a necessity of being satisfied with employing his troops in enterprises of less splendour and importance ; and the only fruit of his victory at St. Quintin was, the taking of the inconsiderable towns of Catelet, Ham, and Noyon ; after which, he dismissed a great part of his army, sent home his English forces, and retired himself to Brussels ^x.

The recalling of the duke of Guise from Italy rendered it necessary for the Pope, though exceedingly reluctant, to apply for peace ; to which Philip readily consented upon much more moderate terms than could have been expected,

Surrender
of St. Quintin.

Peace conclud-
ed between Phi-
lip and the Pope.

^x Thuanus says, that the English and Spaniards quarrelled after the battle, and that this was the reason why Philip so hastily broke up his camp. Lib. xix. p. 660.

1557. considering that Paul was now entirely at his mercy, and that no enemy remained in Italy able to withstand his power. The same motives, whether religious or political, that made him so averse to entering into this war with the Pontiff, determined him to have it brought as soon as possible to a conclusion. Almost the only condition which he required was, that Paul should observe a strict neutrality between France and Spain. All the ecclesiastical towns which had been taken were restored ; and orders sent to the duke of Alva to go to Rome, and supplicate the Pope's forgiveness, both in his own name and that of his master, for their crime of invading the sacred possessions of the church. In these conditions, and in the manner in which they were fulfilled, Paul appeared as if his arms had been victorious ; and Philip, as if he had been humbled and overcome. Such was the reverence which the latter either felt in reality for the Holy See, or thought it necessary to affect, in order to promote his ambitious designs ^y.

The duke of Guise returns from Italy. In this manner did Philip put a period to the war with the sovereign Pontiff ; but that with Henry still continued. This prince, conscious of his incapacity, and sensible that an exer-

tion of the highest abilities was necessary in the present critical situation of his affairs, transferred almost his whole authority to the duke of Guise, and created him viceroy of France, under the name of Lieutenant General of the kingdom. The French nation knew how much the ambition of this nobleman had contributed to involve them in their present calamities ; nor were they ignorant how unsuccessful his attempts in Italy had been against the sagacity and skill of Alva ; yet so splendid were his accomplishments, and to so great a height in the general esteem had his spirited defence of Metz against the Emperor exalted him, that his arrival diffused universal joy, and roused the nation from that despondency into which it had been cast by the late disaster at St. Quintin. He quickly shewed that his

1558. January. Siege of Calais. countrymen were not mistaken in the opinion which they entertained of his abilities. The ordinary season for action was over, and the enemy had gone into winter quarters, when

he took the field, at the head of an army which he had collected with the utmost secrecy and dispatch. The eyes of all Europe were directed towards him, and Philip attended to his motions with much anxiety ; never doubting that he intended to fall either upon St. Quintin, or some of the frontier towns of the Netherlands. It soon appeared that he meditated an attack, by which the interests of Philip's allies would be more affected than his own, but in the success of which France was more deeply interested than even in the recovery of St. Quintin. For more than two hundred years the town of Calais had remained in the hands of the English ; and as it served for a key by which they could at all times open an entrance for their armies into France, it had been ever deemed one of their most valuable possessions. The French monarchs were fully sensible of the dishonour, as well as of the danger, which attended the suffering a rival nation to possess a place of so much importance in their dominions. But in those days, when the art of attacking towns was little known, Calais was regarded as impregnable. Nor had any of the French Kings, even in the height of prosperity, ever thought of laying siege to it. They were ignorant of the means of taking it by storm, and they could not reduce it by blockade ; while the

^y Thuanus. Summonte, c. 10.

English could easily furnish it by sea with fresh troops, stores, and provisions. But a plan of attack, which had never occurred to any person, was discovered by the fruitful genius of the Admiral de Coligni, and by him had been suggested to the duke of Guise. 1555.

In order to carry this plan into execution, and thereby to redeem the nation from what had ever been considered as reproachful and ignominious, Guise put his troops in motion long before the usual season for action had arrived. He judged wisely in making choice of the rigour of winter for beginning his enterprise ; for besides that the enemy had no army in the field at this time to disturb his operations, he knew that the Queen of England and her ministers had, from a principle of ill-judged œconomy, been accustomed to dismiss a great part of the garrison in the end of autumn, and to trust, for the security of the place, to the marshy ground on the land-side, by which, they believed, that, in winter, all access to it would be rendered impracticable.

But the briskness of the duke of Guise's approaches soon convinced the governor, lord Wentworth, how little reason there was for this imprudent confidence. Wentworth represented to the English ministry, the necessity of sending him an immediate reinforcement. He acquainted them, that he had not above one-fourth of the number requisite to defend the works ; and that, with the present garrison, it was impossible to prevent the place from falling quickly into the hands of the enemy. Had Mary's ministers been ever so desirous of complying with his request, it would not have availed him. Guise was sensible that the success of his enterprise depended on his conducting it with expedition. He pushed forward all the operations of the siege with extraordinary vigour, and although it is acknowledged that the governor and garrison acquitted themselves with honour, yet he reduced them to the necessity of capitulating on the eighth day after his arrivalz. He then laid siege to Guisnes and Ham, which he subdued with great facility ; and thus, January 8th. in less than four weeks, he expelled the English from all those possessions on the continent which they had enjoyed since the time of Edward the Third, and in the acquisition of which that victorious prince had, after the battle of Cressy, employed a numerous army for near a twelvemonth.

The remaining part of winter was spent in preparing for the next campaign : and, on the part of the French, preparations were carried on with the utmost diligence, not only in France but in Germany, where forces were levied to the amount of four thousand horse and fourteen thousand foot. These troops the duke of Guise received in Lorrain ; and then he marched with his whole forces united, and invested Thionville, a city of great importance in the province of Luxemburg. The garrison which consisted of eighteen hundred men, made a vigorous defence ; but as the vigilance of Guise rendered all attempts to introduce supplies impracticable, they were soon obliged to capitulate.

While the duke of Guise was thus employed in Luxemburg, the mareschal de Thermes, an old experienced commander, who had been appointed governor of Calais, having collected an army of ten thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, invaded Flanders, took and destroyed Dunkirk, together with some other places of

The reduction of Thionville.

The battle of Grave-lines.

^z Thuanus, l. 20. Van Meteren, p. 18. Carte's Hist. of England

1558. smaller note, and penetrated as far as Newport, laying waste the country with fire and sword. Philip sent count Egmont, with an army superior in number, to oppose him. On the Count's approach, De Thermes retired hastily towards Gravelines, intending to continue his march to Calais, along the shore, without risking a battle. But the impetuosity and ardor of count Egmont, who advanced towards him with great rapidity, put it out of his power to execute this design. His men too were loaded with the spoil of the ravaged country, which, whilst it retarded their march, contributed not a little to accelerate the progress of the enemy. He had time, however, to repass the river Aa ; but finding it impossible any longer to avoid an engagement, he drew up his army advantageously on a plain, where the enemy could not attack him but in front, nor avail themselves of the superiority of their number. He placed his carriages with the baggage and plunder on the south, and had the sea upon the north, and the mouth of the Aa behind him. In this posture he waited for the enemy ; and being fully prepared for their reception, he made considerable havoc among them with his artillery as they advanced. This served only to quicken the approach of the Flemings, and to bring on the sooner a close fight, in which almost every part of both armies was engaged, troop with troop, and man with man. The French were rendered desperate by their situation in an enemy's country, where they could not escape without conquering ; and the Flemings were animated, partly by revenge for the outrages that had been committed by the enemy, and partly by the desire of recovering the spoil which they had carried off. The battle was obstinate and bloody, and the issue remained for some time doubtful. It would probably have been sooner decided, if the Germans in count Egmont's army had shewn an equal regard with the Flemings to the exhortations and example of their general, who not only acted the part of a prudent commander, but often mingled with the foremost combatants, and gave conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valour. The French, however, still maintained their ground, and seemed resolved either on death or victory ; when, fortunately for count Egmont, some English ships of war, which happened to be cruising upon the coast, perceiving the smoke, and conjecturing the occasion of it, entered the river, and began to discharge their guns upon the French army. Although they did not approach near enough to do much execution, yet so unexpected an event, in the time of battle, could not fail to produce an alarm even in the most resolute, and it threw the cavalry into confusion. Count Egmont improved, with great dexterity, the advantage which was thus presented to him ; and pushing forward with all his force, he broke their ranks and dispersed them. The infantry intimidated, turned their backs and fled. Near two thousand veteran troops were slain on the field of battle. Many were drowned in the river ; and some were killed by the peasants, in revenge for the devastation of their country. A small number only made their escape. The mareschal De Thermes, who was grievously wounded, and several other persons of distinction, besides three thousand common soldiers, were taken prisoners. All the artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the victors ; whose loss did not exceed four hundred men^a.

Philip was now at liberty to employ all his forces united against the duke of Guise. Having almost exhausted his finances by the extraordi-

^a Thuanus, lib. xx. Van Meteren, p. 16. Harœus, tom. ii. p. 698.

nary effort which he made in the first campaign, and having found it impossible to draw any considerable supplies from England, it was late in the season before he could assemble an army of sufficient strength. But after the mareschal De Thermes was defeated, and count Egmont's victorious troops were combined with those under the duke of Savoy, the armies of the two monarchs were nearly a match for one another, and consisted, each of them, of more than forty thousand men.

They came in sight of each other, upon the borders of Picardy, where the duke of Savoy pitched his camp near Dour-lens, and the duke of Guise in the neighbourhood of Pierrepont. Both Kings discovered that anxiety which it was natural for them to feel in their present critical situation ; and though they placed entire confidence in their generals, they could not be at ease while they remained at a distance from the scene of action, and therefore they repaired, each of them, to his respective camp. Many skirmishes happened with various success. But it soon appeared that neither of the two monarchs was inclined to risk a general engagement. The principal strength of both armies consisted in their German forces, and it was apprehended that, if either of the two armies were defeated, the victors as well as the vanquished would be exposed to the injuries and insults of the foreign troops ^b.

Anxiety of
Philip and
Henry.

Besides this consideration, by which both parties were alike affected, there were other motives peculiar to each. Henry had, from his late misfortunes, learned a degree of caution, which nature had not bestowed on him. He dreaded the event of another battle, in which he must encounter the same generals by whom his troops had been already twice conquered ; and considered that, after his defeat at St. Quintin, it had been owing to the remissness or misconduct of the enemy, more than to his own strength that his capital had not been taken, and his kingdom over-run. Philip, on the other hand, was, in all military affairs, cautious to excess ; and chose rather to accomplish his designs by political negociation, in which he judged for himself, than by the operations of war, in which he depended on the abilities of others. Far from being elated with the success which had hitherto accompanied his arms, he was now as desirous of peace, as he had been before averse to entering into the war. This is not to be ascribed either to his moderation, or his freedom from the ambition of extending his power and territories. No prince ever gave more convincing proofs of his being actuated by that ambition ; but having, as was just now hinted, found, that his most vigorous exertions had been necessary to assemble the forces, which he had brought into the field ; he dreaded, that, in case his present army were defeated, the difficulty of raising another would be insurmountable ^c. His arms, indeed, had hitherto been crowned with victory ; but none of his generals had entered the lists on equal terms with the duke of Guise ; and he was justly apprehensive with regard to the issue of a battle in which he must contend with a general so highly celebrated for his military genius, and whose enterprises had been so often accompanied with success.

They wish
for peace.

These considerations derived additional force from Philip's extreme impatience to return to Spain ; for which, in preference to his other do-

^b Meteren, L. Guicciardini, lib. iii.

^c Carte says, he received no less than three millions of gold during this war, from Peru, p. 343.

1558. minions, he discovered, through his whole reign, a warm and partial affection. And his desire of going thither was increased by accounts which he received at this time, that the opinions of the Protestants had made their way into that kingdom. He dreaded the propagation of these opinions, and resolved, as soon as possible, to embrace this opportunity in his native country, in testifying his zeal for the Catholic faith, by shewing, that he would treat those who opposed it, without mercy, in whatever part of his dominions they should be found.

Such were the motives which made the contending monarchs Negotiations for peace. so desirous to put a period to the war. A negotiation had been begun for this purpose in the month of August, by the constable

Montmorenci, and William the first prince of Orange. Montmorenci, who beheld with much anxiety the exaltation of the family of Guise, had borne his captivity with great impatience ; and in order to obtain his liberty, had exerted himself strenuously in removing every obstacle to the establishment of peace. He was permitted to go to Paris on his parole, to treat in person with the King. A marriage was concluded about that time between his son and a grand-daughter of the dutchess of Valentinois, and by this event, joined to the King's habitual attachment to him, he recovered all his wonted influence ; and easily persuaded Henry to consent to such terms of accommodation as it was not likely that Philip would reject.

Plenipotentiaries were soon afterwards named by both princes, and a congress for discussing their respective claims, appointed to be held at the Abbey of Cercamps, not far from the place where the armies were encamped. The duke of Alva, the prince of Orange, Ruy Gomez de Sylva, Granvelle bishop of Arras, and Vigilius, president of the council of state at Brussels, were nominated by Philip ; and by Henry, the Constable himself was named, the Cardinal of Lorrain, the mareschal of St. André, Morvilliers bishop of Orange, and Aubespine the secretary of state. The dutchess of Lorrain, whom it highly imported, on account of the vicinity of her dominions, that the two kings should put an end to the war, acted with great assiduity the part of mediator between them.

The conferences, which were opened in October, were soon afterwards interrupted by the death of Mary Queen of England, who ended her short inglorious reign on the seventeenth of November following. But Elizabeth renewed the powers of the English commissioners, and the 1559. congress was resumed in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and fifty nine, at Chateau Cambresis^d.

In removing so many grounds of difference as subsisted between Philip and Henry, the plenipotentiaries encountered many difficulties ; but the zeal and activity of the Constable, added to the unlimited influence which he had acquired over his master, surmounted every obstacle, and soon brought the treaty, so far as Philip, Henry, and the duke of Savoy were concerned, to the desired conclusion. Nothing retarded the signing of it, but the determined obstinacy of the French commissioners in refusing to restore Calais to the Queen of England ; who, on the other hand, declared, that she would not lay down her arms unless that conquest were restored. Philip thought himself bound in honour to support the claim of Elizabeth ; since it was entirely on his account that the English nation had engaged in the war, and incurred the loss of the place in question.

^d Forbes's Full View, p. 1.

In a political view, likewise, he was desirous that Calais should be restored. He considered, that, in some future period, he might derive advantage, as his father had sometimes done, from that facility which the possession of Calais gave the English of invading France. 1559.

But the zeal which Philip discovered on this occasion in behalf of Elizabeth, arose principally from a very different motive. By Mary's death, his connexion with England had lately been dissolved, and he had formed the scheme of renewing it, by marrying Elizabeth. The duke of Feria, his ambassador at London, was ordered to propose the marriage, and at the same time to acquaint the Queen, that his master would procure a dispensation for it from the Pope.

Elizabeth had many motives to deter her from listening to this proposal. Philip's imperious temper would alone have been a sufficient reason for rejecting it. Besides this, she knew well what apprehensions her sister's marriage had occasioned among the English, with regard to their liberty and independence ; and that her own popularity was greatly owing to the universal joy which their deliverance from these apprehensions had excited. She considered that her marriage with Philip would be liable to the same objection as that of her father with Catharine of Arragon ; and that her accepting of the Pope's dispensation would be in effect to acknowledge that her mother's marriage was unlawful, and she herself illegitimate. By doing this she might secure to herself the protection of Spain, and thereby hold a precarious and dependent authority during Philip's life ; but she would forfeit for ever the favour of her Protestant subjects, who alone were sincerely attached to her person and government ; while she would throw herself on the mercy of the Catholics ; who, considering her as an usurper, would, on the first favourable opportunity of asserting the title of the Queen of Scotland, think it their duty to deprive her of her crown.

While, for these reasons, Elizabeth was unalterably determined not to accept of Philip for a husband, she thought it prudent for some time to conceal her intention ; and she returned such an ambiguous, but obliging answer to his ambassador, that Philip flattered himself with the hopes of success, and actually took some steps to procure a dispensation. As long as there remained any foundation for these hopes, he appeared extremely zealous for the restitution of Calais. But when Elizabeth, finding herself firmly established on the throne, ventured to introduce certain alterations in religion, which discovered her resolution to abolish popery in her dominions, Philip considered this part of her conduct as a sufficient indication of her intentions with regard to him. That zeal with which he had at first espoused her interest, began to abate ; and the English plenipotentiaries dreaded that, without regard to the claim of their mistress, he would not delay much longer to put the finishing hand to his treaty with the king of France ^e.

Elizabeth at length perceived that it was in vain to hope for recovering Calais by treaty ; and as the situation of her affairs at home rendered it highly inexpedient to employ force, she wisely resolved to give it up

^e If it is likewise true, that he made an offer to Elizabeth, of continuing the war till she should recover what she had lost, upon condition that she too would engage to carry it on for a certain term of years ; it would then seem, that he gave little reason for accusing him, as some authors have done, of having acted ungenerously towards his English allies. But as this circumstance is omitted by the principal historians, and contradicts what is said of his coldness with regard to the interest of Elizabeth, I have not ventured to advance it as an undoubted fact. Burnet, part ii. 333.

1559. on the following conditions : that Henry should restore it before the end of eight years, or pay 500,000 crowns ; that foreign merchants, not subjects of France, should give security for the money ; that hostages should be delivered, till that security were procured ; and that, whether the money were paid or not, Elizabeth's claim should remain valid, unless within the time specified, she should commit hostilities against the subjects of the French King.

^{Peace con-} Towards his other allies, Philip's conduct was perfectly con-
^{cluded.} formable to the dictates of the strictest honour. He procured

the restitution of Montferrat to the duke of Mantua ; of Bouillon to the bishop of Liege ; of the isle of Corsica to the Genoese ; and of all the towns which the French had seized in Savoy, Piedmont, and Bresse, to the duke of Savoy. This peace was advantageous to himself, as well as to the princes in alliance with him. He recovered Thionville, Marienburgh, Montmedi, and all the other places which had been taken by the French generals during the war, and acquired the sovereignty of the county of Charolois ^f.

In return for the many concessions made by Henry, that monarch received no other compensation but St. Quintin, and the two unimportant towns of Ham and Catelet. While his people, therefore, rejoiced at the conclusion of the war, which had sometimes excited in their minds the most dreadful apprehensions, they complained bitterly of the inequality of the terms of peace, and were highly exasperated against the constable ; who, in order to accomplish his private views, had abused the too easy temper of his master, and made a sacrifice of the interests and the honour of France. Montmorenci durst not have counselled Henry to consent to such disadvantageous terms, had he not devised the expedient of giving Elizabeth, Henry's eldest daughter, in marriage to Philip, and Margaret, his sister, to the duke of Savoy. These marriages served, in some measure, as an excuse for the ample concessions made to these two princes ; since honourable settlements were thereby obtained for the daughter and sister of the King.

Amidst that attention which Philip and Henry bestowed in this treaty, on their political and civil interests, religion was not forgotten. They bound themselves mutually to maintain the Catholic faith in their dominions ; and to procure ^g the convocation of a general council, for suppressing heresy, and restoring tranquillity to the church.

It is not to be doubted that Henry would have fulfilled this article of the treaty with the same exactness which he observed in executing the other articles ; but a sudden period was put to his life, in a few months after the peace was signed, by an accident which happened in the time of the rejoicings celebrated on account of his sister's marriage. Having entered the lists at a tournament with the count of Montgomery, captain of his guards, the count's lance broke on Henry's corslet, and a splinter of it having pierced his right eye, inflicted a wound, of which he died in a few days, at the age of forty.

This melancholy event made no alteration with respect to the treaty of peace. The duke of Alva had some time before espoused Elizabeth, in his master's name ; and Margaret's marriage with Emmanuel was celebrated privately in a chapel of the palace.

^f Meteren, p. 24. Guicciardini, lib. iii.

^g Padre Paolo Hjet. lib. v.

The courtiers and the people of France were affected variously by Henry's death. The Constable lost thereby all the fruits of his late intrigues, and was soon afterwards obliged to retire from court, and to resign that power which he had shewn himself so solicitous to attain, into the hands of his enemies.

The young King, Francis the Second, a prince equally weak in body and in mind, was entirely governed by his wife, the celebrated Mary Queen of Scots ; who was blindly devoted to her uncles, the cardinal of Lorrain and the duke of Guise. These two men engrossed almost the whole administration of the kingdom ; admitting only the Queen-mother to a share of it, from their knowledge of her ambitious, intriguing spirit, and the dread which they entertained of her influence, as a mother, over the feeble mind of Francis. They shewed no moderation in the exercise of the power which they had usurped ; but seized on every advantage for themselves, and laid hold of every opportunity to humble and mortify their adversaries. The princes of the blood, with Lewis prince of Condé at their head, bore with extreme impatience the insignificance to which they were reduced ; and resolved to embrace the first occasion that should offer, to vindicate their right to that share in the management of affairs, to which they thought themselves entitled by their birth, and the ancient practice of the realm ¹.

While the great men in France were thus animated against each other by considerations of a political nature, the people were violently agitated, and their minds inflamed by religious controversies. Under the reign of Henry, the Calvinists had suffered the most cruel persecution ; yet they had multiplied exceedingly during that period in every quarter of the kingdom. The duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorrain kept alive the flames of persecution against them, and on all occasions appeared intent on their destruction. This alone would have determined the prince of Condé and his adherents to espouse the Protestant cause ; for even although we should not believe that the chiefs in either party were sincere in their religious profession, yet it cannot be supposed they would have failed to embrace so specious a pretext as the differences in religion afforded them to palliate their conduct. The prince of Condé would instantly have had recourse to arms, if the Admiral, more prudent and sagacious, had not prevailed on him to suspend his resolution till a more favourable juncture ; but it was impossible that passions so violent as those by which both parties were impelled, could be kept long under restraint ; and to every person capable of reflecting on what he saw passing before him, it was apparent that the nation was upon the eve of a civil war.

France has in no period produced a more remarkable assemblage of great men than in the present and the succeeding reigns ; and had there been a prince upon the throne possessed of abilities sufficient to control their inordinate ambition, the French nation might have much sooner reached that degree of greatness and prosperity, which it attained towards the conclusion of the following century : but this mighty kingdom, possessed of every advantage which nature bestows, became a scene of devastation and misery for almost forty years, through the misapplication of those very talents, which, if they had been properly employed, would have rendered it prosperous and happy.

1559.
State of France.

¹ Davila, Castelnau ab initio, & Additions aux Mémoires de Castelnau.

1559. Nothing could be more desirable to Philip than this confusion, and the debility consequent upon it, in that nation, from which alone he had reason to expect opposition to his designs. It left him at liberty to pursue whatever measures he should think proper for the confirmation and increase of his power in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands ; and it gave no small reason to the other European powers to apprehend, that France itself would fall under the Spanish yoke.

In Italy, the state of affairs was no less favourable to Philip's views, than in France. He was now the sole and undisputed sovereign of the dutchy of Milan, and the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. His inveterate enemy, Paul the Fourth, was lately dead ; and Pius the Fourth, who was no less devoted to his interest than Paul had been adverse, was raised to the papal throne. The republic of Genoa, the dukes of Savoy, Mantua, Tuscany, and Parma, were his allies, whom he had bound to his interest by the strongest ties ; the three first, by procuring for them the restitution of their dominions from the French King ; the fourth, by granting him the investiture of Sienna ; and the last, by ceding to him the city of Placentia and its territory.

After the conclusion of the peace, nothing remained to render Philip uneasy, either in his own dominions, or in the neighbouring kingdoms, but the progress which the reformers had made, and were still making, in almost every country in Europe. From Germany and Switzerland, where the Reformation took its rise, it had spread with the most astonishing rapidity. It had become the established religion, not only in several of the considerable provinces and free cities in Germany and the cantons in Switzerland, but likewise in the kingdoms of England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmark ; and in some of those states where the ancient religion still maintained its ground, the Protestants were grown so numerous as to be extremely formidable to their opponents.

From the constant intercourse which subsists between Germany and the Netherlands, it was impossible but the new opinions must have been early propagated from the former to the latter ; and accordingly, in the month of May 1521, the Emperor Charles had published an edict, in which all the penalties of high treason were pronounced against those who should be found guilty of holding any of Luther's tenets ; or of republishing, or vending any books written by him or his followers. In the execution of this edict, which Charles from time to time renewed, all the fury of persecution was exercised ; and it is affirmed by several contemporary historians, that during the reign of Charles fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the Low Countries were put to death on account of their religious principles. These principles, however, far from being extirpated, were more and more diffused in the midst of those severities which were employed to suppress them.

Philip was not ignorant of the progress which they had made ; and it gave him the greater uneasiness, because, being exceedingly desirous of setting out for Spain, he would be obliged to commit the business of extirpating heresy from the Netherlands to others, whom he could not suppose possessed of the same fervent zeal against it, of which he himself was conscious. In order to prevent as much as possible the inconveniences which might arise from his absence, he had gone from his camp at Dourlens to Brussels, and had been employed during the winter season in settling the government of the provinces.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND.
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK III.

THE provinces, which, on account of their situation, are called the Netherlands, were long governed by their respective princes, under the titles of Dukes, Marquisses, or Counts. These princes were for many years engaged in perpetual wars with the neighbouring powers, or with one another ; and, as they had frequent occasions, during these wars, to have recourse to the people for supplies, the cities, the nobles, and ecclesiastics, acquired, in return, several rights and privileges, by which the provinces partook more of the nature of republics, than of regal governments. The supreme authority was lodged in the assembly of the States, which had the power of meeting as often as the members thought expedient. And without the consent of that assembly, no war could be undertaken, no taxes could be imposed, no new laws enacted, no change made in the current coin, and no foreigners admitted into any branch of the administration. The sovereignty descended according to the ordinary laws of hereditary succession ; but no prince was allowed to enter upon the exercise of it, till he had solemnly sworn to observe and maintain the fundamental laws^a.

1559.
Ancient
state of the
Netherlands.

In this situation these provinces remained for several ages ; till by the failure of the male line in some of the reigning families, by intermarriages, and by conquests, they fell under the dominion of the house of Burgundy. After this event they still continued to enjoy their ancient privileges, and to be governed according to their old laws ; with this difference only, that whereas all criminal and civil causes had been formerly determined, in the last resort, by the councils of the several provinces, it was established, that parties might appeal from these to the tribunal of Mechlin ; which was instituted in order to unite the provinces more closely, and to give them more the appearance of one state.

^a Grotius de Antiq. Repub. Batav. cap. 5.

1559.
Prosperity
of the pro-
vinces. Under the administration of the Burgundian princes, and even long before their accession to the sovereignty, trade and manufactures flourished in the Netherlands more than in any other European state. No city in those days, except Venice, possessed such extensive commerce as Antwerp. It was the staple, or great mart of all the northern nations. Bruges was little inferior. Arras was famous for tapestries, which still retain the name of that place. In the city of Ghent there were many thousand artificers employed in the woollen manufacture, long before the art was known to the English, from whom the wool was purchased by the industrious Flemings.

Causes of it. For this prosperity the inhabitants of the Netherlands were, in a great measure, indebted to the nature and situation of their country ; which, as it lies in the centre of Europe, commanding the entrance and navigation of several of the great rivers of Germany, and is almost every where intersected by these rivers, or by canals and branches of the sea, is admirably fitted both for foreign and domestic or inland trade. This singular advantage, however, could not have enabled the Flemings to leave the other European nations so far behind them, if the form of their civil government had not been peculiarly favourable to their exertions. The greatest advantages which nature affords for improvement in the arts of life, may be rendered useless to the people who possess them, by an injudicious, or tyrannical and oppressive exercise of the civil power. And universal experience proves, how vain it is to expect that men will apply themselves with vigour to commercial pursuits, where their persons are insecure, or where the fruits of their industry may be seized by the rapacious hand of a despotic prince. But happily for the inhabitants of the Low Countries, the sovereigns of the several provinces (unable, perhaps, from the small extent of their dominions, to execute any plan of tyranny against the people) were, at a very early period, induced to give their consent and sanction to the above-mentioned system of fundamental laws ; by which, although their prerogative was abridged, yet their power and resources were greatly augmented, through that prosperity which their moderate government had enabled their subjects to attain.

The sovereignty of these flourishing provinces passed from the family of Burgundy into that of Austria, by the marriage of Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold, and sole heiress of his dominions, with Maximilian, son of Frederick the Third, emperor of Germany. This marriage was set on foot and concluded by the Flemings themselves, who, agreeably to their free maxims of government, assumed the direction of the conduct of their princes in this matter, which so nearly concerned their prosperity and safety.

Lewis the Eleventh of France had demanded her for his son the dauphin ; whilst he most impolitically gave offence to the States, by seizing upon Burgundy and Picardy as fiefs of the kingdom of France. This imprudent step, and the death of the bishop of Liege, uncle of Mary, and a partisan of Lewis, determined the Flemings in their choice. They judged wisely, that their liberty would be safer in the hands of Maximilian, whose hereditary dominions were small, and lay at a distance from them, than in those of a neighbouring prince so powerful as Lewis, who, in all his conduct, had discovered so much injustice and rapacity.

The Flemings shewed the same laudable jealousy of their privileges after Maximilian's marriage with their princess, which had influenced

them in their choice of him for her husband. About four years after her marriage, Mary died of a bruise which she received by a fall from horseback, when she was big with child. Maximilian, under the name of tutor to his son Philip, assumed the reins of government. The Flemings considered his conduct as an incroachment on their rights, and refused to acknowledge his authority, till the States had ordained that he should be admitted as governor, only for a limited time, and upon conditions which they required he should take an oath to fulfil.

He did not observe these conditions so exactly as they expected. They complained of his conferring offices upon Burgundians and Germans. They were grievously offended with him for introducing foreign troops into the provinces, and apprehended that he had formed a design against their liberty. After he was elected king of the Romans, their suspicions arose to so great a height, that, upon his entering the city of Bruges with a numerous train of attendants, the inhabitants ran to arms, surrounded him in the market-place, seized his person, and confined him in the castle, where they kept him prisoner for several months. The Pope and Emperor interposed in his behalf, but could not obtain his liberty, till he had given security with regard to the several particulars on account of which they had taken offence.

Of the same jealous attention to their liberty the Flemings gave proofs during the administration of Maximilian's successors. Under that of his grandson Charles V. they had real ground of uneasiness. Charles might have easily subdued them, if he had been inclined to use his power so ungenerously, and his arbitrary temper had sufficiently appeared in his government of Spain and Germany; in both which countries he had trampled on all those rights of the people, which had been long esteemed the most inviolable. On several occasions he had introduced foreign troops into the Low Countries; and it has been asserted^b, that he once deliberated whether he should employ them in establishing in the provinces the same sort of arbitrary government which subsisted in his Spanish and Italian dominions.

But Charles was born in the Netherlands, and had passed there the pleasantest of his younger days. He loved the people, and was fond of their manners; which resembled his own, and were not so reserved and stately as those of the Spaniards. From taste and early attachment he kept them always about his person, and had bestowed on them the most important offices in his dominions. To his preceptor, Adrian of Utrecht, who, through his interest, was afterwards advanced to the papacy, he committed the government of Spain: and Charles de Lanoy, whom he appointed viceroy of Naples, was intrusted with the management of his affairs in Italy for several years, with unlimited authority. In all the wars which he carried on in Germany, and on the frontiers of France, he placed a particular confidence in his Flemish troops; used the people, when he resided among them, with the most courteous familiarity, and banished from his intercourse with them, that form and ceremony which renders it so difficult for princes either to know that they are beloved, or to shew that they deserve it^c.

The Flemings entertained a grateful sense of the kindness with which he treated them. If we except the insurrection of the people of Ghent,

^b Grotius, p. 6.

^c Bentivoglio, p. 4.

1559. there happened almost no disturbance in the Netherlands during his reign. The States assisted him liberally in defraying the expense of those wars in which he was almost continually engaged, and discovered, at all times, a warm attachment to his person.

Charles would gladly have transmitted to his son the affection which he bore towards his Flemish subjects ; and for this purpose he had, as above related, brought him to Flanders in his youth, in order to reconcile him to the manners and customs of the people. And afterwards, when he himself had resolved to retire from the world, and to leave the government of his dominions in the hands of Philip, he exhorted him, with much earnestness, to cultivate the affections of the Flemings, and to govern them according to those laws to which they had been so long accustomed, and were so strongly attached.

Of Philip. His unpopular behaviour. But Philip could not enter into his father's views. He had never made any considerable stay in the Netherlands ; and could not be fond of a people whose manners were so different from his own. In Spain, where he received his education, he had been taught the most superstitious reverence for the Holy See, and had imbibed the most extravagant ideas of the extent of regal authority. Charles was not, in reality, less fond of power ; but in him ambition was, in some measure, tempered and corrected by his acquaintance with the world ; whereas, in Philip, it was perverted and inflamed by the sentiments of an illiberal, cruel, gloomy superstition.

The Flemings jealous of him. The Flemings had long perceived and lamented the difference between the character of their late, and that of their present sovereign. Philip had taken the usual oath, by which he bound himself to maintain their privileges ; and had made them the strongest professions of regard and affection. But they judged of his disposition towards them from his conduct, rather than from his oath or his professions. They were not admitted, whilst he lived amongst them, to any share of his trust and confidence ; and, in violation of their fundamental laws, he committed the administration of the most important branches of government to the bishop of Arras, a Burgundian ; or to his Spanish ministers, Ruy Gomez de Sylva, prince of Eboli, and the dukes of Feria and Alva ; whom the Flemings considered as enemies to their nation, and strenuous abettors of that despotic power, to which, from the beginning of Philip's reign, they had suspected that he aspired.

The edicts against the protestants. It was not long before he gave them convincing proof how well grounded their fears were with regard to his intentions, by the measures which he employed for extinguishing the new opinions in religion. These opinions had been of late diffused through every corner of the Netherlands ; having been imported thither, partly by foreign merchants who came to reside there ; and partly by the Swiss and German troops, whom both Charles and Philip had employed in their wars against France ; but chiefly by the English, French, and German Protestants, who had fled from the persecutions which were carried on against them in their native countries.

Charles had, as mentioned in the preceding book, shewn the same inclination to extirpate the reformed religion in the Netherlands, which he had discovered in Germany ; and had, for this purpose, published several edicts against the Protestants ; many of whom had suffered the most cruel death ^d.

^d It is almost incredible that the number of those who suffered could amount to 50,000,

Great numbers had begun to leave the provinces, and to transport their families and effects to the neighbouring states. Charles was moved with the representation which he received of this event, from the regent his sister, the queen-dowager of Hungary. He felt for the calamities of the people, and he dreaded the consequences of depopulating a country from which he had often received the most effectual assistance and support.

But these considerations had no degree of influence on Philip. He republished the edicts, and ordered the governors and magistrates to carry them into rigorous execution.

In these edicts it was enacted, that all persons who held any erroneous opinion should be deprived of their offices, and degraded from their rank. It was ordained, that whoever should be convicted of having taught heretical doctrines, or of having been present at the religious meetings of heretics, should, if they were men, be put to death by the sword ; and if women, be buried alive. Such were the punishments denounced even against those who repented of their errors and forsook them ; while all who persisted in them were condemned to the flames. And even those who afforded shelter to heretics in their houses, or who omitted to give information against them, were subjected to the same penalties as heretics themselves.

Philip was not satisfied with publishing and executing these cruel edicts. He likewise established a particular tribunal for the extirpation of heresy, which, although it was not called by the name Inquisition, had all the essentials of that iniquitous institution. Persons were committed to prison upon bare suspicion, and put to the torture on the slightest evidence. The accused were not confronted with their accusers, or made acquainted with the crimes for which they suffered. The civil judges were not allowed to take any further concern in prosecutions for heresy, than to execute the sentences which the inquisitors had pronounced. The possessions of the sufferers were confiscated ; and informers were encouraged, by an assurance of impunity in case they themselves were guilty, and by the promise of rewards ^e.

It is not surprising, that the establishment of this arbitrary tribunal should have occasioned disquietude in the Netherlands. It had created disturbance even in Spain and Italy, where the people could not boast so much as the Flemings of their civil rights ; and had been strenuously opposed by many who were sincerely attached to the Catholic religion. In the Flemings it excited the most frightful apprehensions. They considered it as utterly subversive of their liberty. They dreaded the ruin of their commerce ; which could not subsist unless the foreign merchants, many of whom were Protestants, could reside among them with safety. The new opinions had been propagated throughout all the provinces, and men knew not how far the inquisitors might extend their power, or how great a number might be found liable to punishments that were denounced, not only against heretics themselves, but against all those who were suspected to befriend them.

To these causes of discontent Philip added another, by increasing the number of bishoprics from five to seventeen, the number of the provinces. This measure, which would not at

New erection of bishoprics.

yet this is affirmed by several historians. Meteren calls the number 50,000. Grotius, p. 12. calls it 100,000. F. Paul, lib. calls it 50,000.

^e Grotius Annales, lib. i.

1559. any other time have given much offence, was in the present juncture universally disagreeable. Granvelle, bishop of Arras, was the chief adviser of it ; nor did he and the king's other counsellors scruple to acknowledge, that their intention in promoting it, was to have at all times a sufficient number of persons in the Netherlands, upon whose zeal the king could rely for a vigorous execution of the edicts.

The new bishops were therefore considered as so many new inquisitors. Their creation was regarded as an incroachment on the privileges of the provinces, and a violation, on the part of the king, of the oath which he had taken at his accession, to preserve the church in the condition in which he found it. The principal nobility were particularly averse to this innovation, because the number of the counsellors of state was thereby greatly augmented, and consequently the influence of the ancient members of the council was impaired, and the balance of power thrown into the hands of the clergy ; who, they doubted not, would on all occasions shew themselves ready to support the arbitrary measures of the sovereign. But no sect of men exclaimed so loudly as the Monks and Abbots, whose opposition was inflamed by motives both of ambition and interest. For besides that they would be obliged to yield the pre-cedency to the bishops, and have much less weight than hitherto in the assemblies of the States, it was out of their revenues that the new bishoprics were to be endowed. They were therefore highly incensed. They laboured to connect their private interest with that of the public ; and represented the new erection as no less pernicious to the country in general, than it was to their order in particular ^f.

<sup>Spanish
troops in
the Neth-
erlands.</sup> Besides the grievances enumerated, the Flemings complained bitterly, that in the midst of peace the provinces were filled with Spanish soldiers. They had ever esteemed it one of their most valuable privileges, that, according to their fundamental laws, no foreign troops could be brought into the Netherlands. Charles indeed had often introduced them in the course of his wars with France, and with the Protestants in Germany. But the Flemings had been dazzled with the glory which generally attended that monarch's arms, and had not entertained the same jealousy of his intentions as of those of Philip ; who, they could not help thinking, had formed a design to reduce them under a despotic government ; and had, with this view, deferred so long the dismission of his Spanish troops. Their discontent was greatly increased by the insolent and rapacious behaviour of these troops ; which in Zealand was so intolerable, that the people actually refused to work at their dykes, saying, that they chose rather to be swallowed up by the ocean, than to remain a prey to the cruelty and avarice of the Spanish soldiers ^g.

Such was the state of affairs, and such the temper of the people, when Philip, intending to set out for Spain, was deliberating concerning a proper person to whom he might commit the government of the Netherlands.

<sup>The dutch-
ess of Parma
appointed
regent.</sup> He hesitated for some time between Christina the dutchess of Lorrain, his cousin, and Margaret dutchess of Parma, a natural daughter of the late Emperor. The former had distinguished herself by her prudent conduct in the government of Lorrain after her husband's death, and had lately acquired considera-

^f Bentivoglio, lib. i.

^g These soldiers were not removed till the year following, when Philip had occasion for them elsewhere. Reidanus, p. 5. Meursii Auriacus, near the beginning.

ble reputation by her negociations in the treaty of peace at Chateau-Cambresis. From the vicinity of Lorrain to the Low Countries, the Flemings were well acquainted with her character ; and, as they had groaned under the burden of the French war, and had now begun to taste, with gratitude, the fruits of that peace which Christina's wisdom had contributed to procure for them, they were exceedingly desirous that the government of the provinces should be left in her hands. But Philip had good reason for the preference which he gave to the dutchess of Parma. The dukes of Lorrain were, from their situation, in some measure dependent upon the crown of France ; whereas the dutchess of Parma was surrounded with Philip's Italian dominions ; and the duke and dutchess were willing to send their son, the celebrated Alexander Farnese prince of Parma, to the court of Spain ; on pretence of being educated there, but, in truth, as a pledge of that implicit obedience which the dutchess engaged to yield to the king's injunctions in her government of the provinces^h.

As Philip did not intend to return soon to the Netherlands, he thought proper, before his departure, to summon a convention of the States ; which was accordingly held in Ghent. He was present himself, accompanied by the new regent, at the first opening of that assembly ; but as he could not speak the language of the country, he employed the bishop of Arras to address the deputies in his name.

The bishop began his speech with informing them of the king's resolution of going to Spain, and the reasons which rendered his journey thither necessary. He expatiated on the affection which Philip bore towards his Flemish subjects ; to whom his family had been so much indebted for that ascendant and influence, which had given them possession of such extensive territories. His affairs in Spain, he hoped, would not detain him long ; but, in case they should, he promised to send his son to reside in the Netherlands. In the mean time he earnestly exhorted the States to study to preserve the public peace ; and to this end he thought that nothing could conduce so much, as the extirpation of heresy, which, whilst it set men at variance with God, put arms into their hands against their civil sovereign. They ought therefore zealously to maintain the purity of their ancient faith, and for this purpose, to execute with vigour the several edicts published for the suppression of heresy. In this, and every other measure, he hoped that they would concur cheerfully with the dutchess of Parma, whom he had appointed regent in his absence. He would leave the Netherlands, impressed with the deepest sense of that fidelity and affection which his subjects there had ever shewn him ; and would, as soon as possible, remove the foreign troops, and deliver the people from every other burden which the exigency of his affairs had made it necessary to impose^k.

The bishop
of Arras's
speech to
the States.

The answer of the States to this speech contained the warmest sentiments of affection and loyalty. But, before the convention was dissolved, Philip perceived that the deputies were far from being satisfied with every part of his administration. They had expected that the troops would have been immediately transported to Spain, and could not discover any reason for keeping them longer in the Low Countries, but such as filled their minds with terror. Their suspicion that the Inquisi-

^h Bentivoglio.

^k Bentivoglio, p. 9.

1559. tion was about to be established in the Netherlands, excited the most disquieting apprehensions. There were some of the deputies, who scrupled not openly to remonstrate, That the Low Countries had never been accustomed to an institution of so much rigour and severity: That the people trembled at the very name of the Inquisition, and would fly to the remotest corners of the earth rather than submit to it: That it was not by fire and sword, but by the gentlest and softest remedies, that the evil complained of must be cured: That as each individual had a habit or constitution of body peculiar to himself, so every nation had a peculiar temperament or character: That what might be suitable to Spain or Italy, would be extremely unfit for the Netherlands; and that, in general, the nations in the southern parts of the world could live happily under a degree of restraint which would render the northern nations extremely miserable¹.

Philip refused to gratify the King himself by some of the deputies, who endeavoured to persuade him to annul, or at least to moderate, the edicts. But on this head Philip was inexorable. And when one of his ministers represented, that by persisting in the execution of these edicts, he might kindle the seeds of rebellion, and thereby lose the sovereignty of the provinces; he replied, "That he had much rather be no King at all than have heretics for his subjects^m."

His religion, which was of all superstitions the most intolerant; his temper of mind, which was naturally haughty and severe; his pride, which would have been wounded by yielding to what he had repeatedly declared he would never yield; his engagements with the Pope, and an oath which he had taken to devote his reign to the defence of the Popish faith and the extirpation of heresy; above all, his thirst for despotic power, with which he considered the liberties claimed in religious matters by the Protestants as utterly incompatible; all these causes united, rendered him deaf to the remonstrances which were made to him, and fixed him unalterably in his resolution to execute the edicts with the utmost rigour. He shewed himself equally inflexible with regard to the new bishoprics; nor would he consent at this time to withdraw the Spanish soldiers. In order, however, to lessen the odium arising from his refusal, he offered the command of these troops to the prince of Orange and count Egmont, the two ablest and most popular noblemen in the Netherlands; the former of whom he had appointed governor of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht; and the latter of Artois and Flanders. Both of them declined accepting of the offer which was made to them, and had the courage to declare, that they considered the continuance of the troops in the Low Countries, after peace had been established with France, as a violation of the fundamental laws of the constitution.

Count Egmont, descended from the dukes of Guelderland, and one of the most accomplished noblemen in the Netherlands.

Count Eg. having lately gained immortal honour by the victories of St. Quintin and Gravelines, had just ground to expect the highest rewards in the power of Philip to bestow.

¹ Bentivoglio, lib. i.

^m Chegli voleva piu tosto restar senza regni, che possedergli con heresia. Bentivoglio, p. 10.

The prince of Orange, so well known in history by the name of William the First, was the representative of the ancient and illustrious family of Nassau in Germany. From his ancestors, one of whom had been Emperor of Germany, he inherited several rich possessions in the Netherlands; and he had succeeded to the principality of Orange by the will of René Nassau and Chalons, his cousin-german, in the year 1544. From that time the late Emperor had kept him perpetually about his person, and had early discovered in him all those extraordinary talents which rendered him afterwards one of the most illustrious personages of the age. Both he and Count Egmont had aspired to the regency; and their declining to accept of the command of the Spanish troops was, by some, ascribed to the chagrin occasioned by their disappointmentⁿ. The prince of Orange, after dropping his own pretensions, had expressed his desire to have the regency bestowed on the dutchy of Lorrain; and this discovery of William's inclination is said to have been a principal motive with Philip, and his Spanish counsellors, for conferring it on the dutchess of Parma. Nor where they satisfied with thwarting him in this. He had begun and made some progress in a treaty of marriage with one of the princesses of Lorrain. In this measure likewise they opposed him, from an apprehension, it was pretended, that so close a connexion with a family of so great influence, and whose territories lay so near the Netherlands, would give him an accession of power that might be dangerous in the hands of a person whose loyalty there was reason to suspect.

It does not however appear, that, before the assembly of the States, Philip had any just ground for his suspicions of William's conduct; and there is only one circumstance recorded to which they can be ascribed. The prince having been sent to France as an hostage for the execution of some articles of the peace of Chateau-Cambresis, had, during his residence there, discovered a scheme formed by the French and the Spanish monarchs for the extirpation of the Protestants. This scheme he had communicated to such of his friends in the Netherlands as had embraced the reformed religion, and from that time the King ceased to treat him with his wonted confidence^o.

But we find a still more satisfactory account of Philip's alienation from the Prince, in the jealousy of Granvelle and the Spanish ministers. From his early youth William had been considered as a principal favourite of the late Emperor, who had on all occasions distinguished him with peculiar marks of his esteem. Charles used to communicate to him his most secret counsels, and had been heard to declare, that the Prince, though scarcely arrived at the years of manhood, had often suggested expedients to him that were of great advantage to his affairs. William was in the twenty-third year of his age when Charles resigned his dominions, yet he had already received several public proofs of the Emperor's attachment. Not to mention his making choice of him to support him in that august assembly in which he resigned his dominions, or his bestowing on him, in preference to his other courtiers, the honour of carrying the Imperial crown to his brother Ferdinand; he had appointed him commander in chief of his army, in the absence of the duke of Savoy, when the Prince was only two and twenty years old.

1559.
William I.
prince of
Orange.

Causes of
Philip's
alienation
from him.

ⁿ Ferreras, tom. ix. Grotius, p. 4—9.

^o Bentivoglio, p. 6. Thuanus, tom. i. lib. xxii. sect. 10.

1559. Against this measure all his counsellors had remonstrated, and had represented to him the superior character of the French generals, the duke de Nevers, and the admiral de Coligni. But Charles adhered to his choice, and had no reason afterwards to repent of it. William not only saved the troops while they were under his command from sustaining any misfortune or calamity, but fortified Charlemont and Philipville, and thereby secured the frontier of the Netherlands, in spite of the most vigorous efforts which the enemy could make to prevent him. This uncommon degree of attachment that was shewn him by the father, was the real cause of the coldness with which he was treated by the son. Granvelle and the Spanish ministers were envious of his rising greatness, and took every opportunity to inspire Philip with suspicions of his designs, and an aversion to his character. Philip was confirmed in his suspicions by William's refusing to accept of the command of the troops ; and saw that neither he, nor count Egmont, who likewise declined accepting it, were persons on whom he could depend for executing the plan which he had formed for establishing despotism in the provinces.

He left them, however, in possession of the several governments to which they had been appointed, and still allowed them to hold their places as formerly in the council of State. Their merit, he was sensible, intitled them to all the honours and offices which they enjoyed. He knew how extensive their influence was among the people ; and he was conscious they had been guilty of nothing that could justify him for removing them from their employments ; since, even when their conduct had offended him the most, they had only exercised those rights, which, by the fundamental laws of the country, belonged to every inhabitant of the Netherlands.

But although Philip did not think proper to dismiss them from his service, he resolved that they should not have power to frustrate his intentions. And for this purpose he left, for principal counsellor to the regent, the bishop of Arras, whose views were entirely coincident with his own, and in whom, therefore, the dutchess of Parma was desired to repose unlimited confidence.

The bishop of Arras. Anthony Perenot, bishop of Arras, so well known in the history of the Netherlands by the name of cardinal Granvelle,

was son to the celebrated chancellor of that name, whom the late Emperor had for many years intrusted with the management of his most important affairs. Anthony having been early initiated into business, had been employed by the Emperor for several years in the nicest political negociations, and in some of the highest departments of the state. He was a person of extraordinary abilities, and particularly distinguished for his eloquence, his activity, his industry, and address. Yet he was extremely odious to the people whom he was left to govern, who considered him as the principal author of all their grievances. In the court of Charles, and afterwards in that of Philip, he had acquired habits and principles not unsuitable, perhaps, to the minister of a despotic prince, but which rendered him exceedingly unfit for the government of the Low Countries, where the power of the sovereign was so much limited by the laws. He was naturally choleric and haughty, vain, and ostentatious of his credit with the king ; and, by an imperious and interested behaviour, had disgusted many of his friends, and inflamed the resentment of his enemies. He was particularly obnoxious to the principal nobility ; and, in the course of his ministry, had been instrumental

in disappointing many of them in their most favourite views of ambition and interest ^{1559.}

In the hands of a person so universally disliked, it could not reasonably be expected that the government would proceed smoothly. While Philip himself was present, the discontented nobles were overawed. But no sooner was that restraint removed which the king's presence imposed upon them, than their ill-humour broke out with a degree of violence that drew after it the most serious and important consequences.

ⁿ Bentivoglio, & Strada, & Dom'l'Evesque, tom. i.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK IV.

PHILIP set sail from the Netherlands with a fleet of near seventy ships, on the 20th of August, and arrived at Loredo, in the province of Biscay, on the 29th. He reached the port in safety, but no sooner had he landed, than a dreadful storm arose, in which a part of his fleet was shipwrecked ; above a thousand men perished, and a great number of capital paintings, statues, and other curious works of art, were lost, which Charles had been employed during forty years in collecting, in Germany, Italy, and Flanders.

1559.
Philip's
arrival in
Spain.

Philip, animated by a spirit similar to that which prompted him, after the victory of St. Quintin, to consecrate a church to St. Laurence, thought he could not on this occasion, express his gratitude for his preservation, in a manner more acceptable to the Deity, than by declaring his resolution to dedicate his life to the defence of the Catholic faith, and the extirpation of heresy^a.

As the Spaniards had not for many years enjoyed the presence of their sovereign, his arrival diffused universal joy throughout the kingdom. His administration before his marriage with the queen of England had procured him the general esteem, and he was now more respected than ever, on account of the signal success with which his arms had been attended in his wars with France, and the moderation and equity which he had displayed in the peace of Chateau-Cambresis.

The joy of the
Spaniards on
this occasion.

The proofs of affection which he received at this time from his Spanish subjects, were the stronger, because, although Philip seldom suffered either joy or sorrow to appear in his looks, his discourse, or behaviour, it was well known how much he was attached to his native country, more than to any of his other dominions ; and it was generally believed, that he intended to fix in it his

Philip's attach-
ment to Spain.

^a Father Paul, lib. v. p. 417.

1559. perpetual residence. His manners were suited only to those of his Spanish subjects; he could not, as has been already mentioned, speak with facility any other language but theirs, and he possessed not that courage and enterprise by which the late Emperor had been determined to undertake so many voyages and journeys to the different states which were subject to his dominion. The Low Countries had not, in the eyes of Philip, those charms by which Charles had been so powerfully attracted; and were particularly disagreeable to him, on account of the restriction which their free constitution of government imposed on his authority.

In the beginning of the reign of Charles, Spain was one of the freest states in Europe; but as the nobles were humbled, and their power abridged, during the arbitrary, but vigorous administration of cardinal Ximenes; so the ill-concerted and unsuccessful attempt which the commons of Castile made some years afterwards, to assert their rights, served only to exalt the royal prerogative, which they intended to have circumscribed, and to reduce the Cortes to an entire dependance on the crown. And although in Arragon the people still enjoyed their ancient privileges, yet there was little probability that they would ever venture to dispute the will of their prince; who possessed such inexhaustible resources, and could, when he pleased, employ even their own countrymen, the Castilians, to subdue them. But there was no circumstance which served more to increase Philip's partiality for Spain, and to make him prefer it to any of his other dominions for the place of his abode, than the full establishment which the court of inquisition had acquired in that kingdom, and the security which this institution afforded him against the propagation of heresy.

This tribunal, which, although it was not the parent, has been of the inquisition. the nurse and guardian of ignorance and superstition, in every kingdom into which it has been admitted, was introduced into Spain near a century before the present period, by Ferdinand and Isabella; and was principally intended to prevent the relapse of the Jews and Moors, who had been converted, or pretended to be converted, to the faith of the church of Rome. Its jurisdiction was not confined to the Jews and Moors, but extended to all those who, in their practice or opinions, differed from the established church. In the united kingdoms of Castile and Arragon, there were eighteen different inquisitorial courts; having each of them its counsellors, termed Apostolic Inquisitors; its secretaries, sergeants, and other officers; and besides these, there were twenty thousand familiars dispersed throughout the kingdom, who acted as spies and informers, and were employed to apprehend all suspected persons, and to commit them for their trial, to the prisons which belonged to the inquisition. By these familiars, persons were seized on bare suspicion; and, in contradiction to the common rules of law, they were put to the torture, tried and condemned by the inquisitors, without being confronted either with their accusers or with the witnesses on whose evidence they were condemned. The punishments inflicted were more or less dreadful, according to the caprice and humour of the judges. The unhappy victims were either strangled, or committed to the flames, or loaded with chains and shut up in dungeons during life. Their effects were confiscated, and their families stigmatized with infamy^b.

This institution was, no doubt, well calculated to produce an uniformity of religious profession; but it had a tendency likewise to destroy

^b Mariana, lib. xxiv. c. xvi. p. 137.

the sweets of social life ; to banish all freedom of thought and speech ; to disturb men's minds with the most disquieting apprehensions, and to produce the most intolerable slavery, by reducing persons of all ranks of life to a state of abject dependence upon priests ; whose integrity, were it even greater than that of other men, as in every false religion it is less, must have been corrupted by the uncontrollable authority which they were allowed to exercise.

Such nearly were the sentiments which even the Spaniards entertained of this iniquitous tribunal, at the time when it was erected^c. But not having had experience then of its pernicious effects, and considering it as intended for the chastisement of Jews and infidels, they only murmured and complained ; till, the yoke being wreathed about their necks, the most secret murmurings became dangerous, and often fatal to those who uttered them.

By this tribunal, a visible change was wrought in the temper of the people ; and reserve, distrust, and jealousy, became the distinguishing character of a Spaniard. It perpetuated and confirmed the reign of ignorance and superstition. It inflamed the rage of bigotry ; and the cruel spectacles to which, in the execution of its decrees, it familiarized the people, it nourished in them that ferocious spirit, which, in the Netherlands and America, they manifested by deeds that have fixed an everlasting reproach on the Spanish name.

Effects of this institution on the character of the people.

But these considerations could not be apprehended by Philip ; nor if they had been suggested to him, would they have had any influence upon his conduct. He had imbibed, in all its virulence, that spirit of bigotry and persecution, which gave birth to the inquisition. He regarded heretics as the most odious of criminals ; and considered a departure in his subjects from the Roman superstition, as the most dreadful calamity that could befall them. He was therefore determined to support the inquisitors with all his power, and he encouraged them to exert themselves in the exercise of their office, with the utmost diligence.

The zeal and vigilance of these men fully corresponded to that ardour with which their sovereign was inflamed ; yet so irresistible in this age was the spirit of innovation, and so great the force of truth, that the opinions of the Reformers had found their way even into Spain, and were embraced openly by great numbers of both sexes, among whom were both priests and nuns.

Even the archbishop of Toledo, Bartlemi di Caranza y Miranda, was, from certain propositions contained in a catechism, which he published, suspected to have espoused them. The inquisitors informed the King of the grounds of their suspicion, and desired to receive his instructions for their conduct. Caranza had been universally respected as one of the most virtuous and learned prelates in Spain. Having, when provincial of the order of St. Dominique, been carried by Philip into England, as a person well qualified to promote the re-establishment of popery in that kingdom, he had laboured with so much zeal for that end, and thereby recommended himself so powerfully to the King, that in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-seven, Philip advanced him to the primacy. His first employment after attaining this high dignity was to administer spiritual comfort to the late Emperor, whom he attended in his last distress. But the

Caranza abp. of Toledo.

1559. memory of his merit and services was now obliterated. Philip wrote to the Inquisitors from the Netherlands, that they must, without hesitation, proceed against the Archbishop as they would do against other delinquents; and that they should not spare even his own son if they found him guilty of heresy. Caranza was accordingly thrown into prison, and his revenues were sequestrated. The propositions in his catechism, at which the inquisitors had taken offence, were held to be of a disputable nature even among the Catholics themselves. It is probable, however, that sentence would have been pronounced against him, had not the Pope interposed, and claimed an exclusive right to decide the cause. Philip, anxious for the honour of the holy office, to whose power he was desirous that no bounds should be prescribed, employed all his interest to prevail on the Pontiff to drop his pretensions. But at last he himself yielded; and Caranza, after having languished in prison for six years and seven months, was transported to Rome, where he was released from confinement, but died in a few weeks after he was set at liberty^d.

An Autō-de-fé at Valladolid, witnessed by Philip. Before Philip's arrival in the city of Valladolid, an Autō-de-fé had been celebrated, in which a great number of Protestants were committed to the flames. There were still in the prisons of the inquisition more than thirty persons, against whom the same dreadful punishment had been denounced. Philip, eager to give public proof as early as possible of his abhorrence of these innovators, desired the inquisitors to fix a day for their execution; and he resolved to witness it. The dreadful ceremony (more repugnant to humanity, as well as to the spirit of the Christian religion, than the most abominable sacrifices recorded in the annals of the Pagan world) was conducted with the greatest solemnity which the inquisitors could devise; and Philip, attended by his son Don Carlos, by his sister, and by his courtiers and guards, sat within sight of the unhappy victims. After hearing a sermon from the bishop of Zamora, he rose from his seat, and having drawn his sword, as a signal, that with it he would defend the holy faith, he took an oath administered to him by the Inquisitor-General, to support the inquisition and its ministers against all heretics and apostates, and to compel his subjects every where to yield obedience to its decrees.

Among the Protestants condemned, there was a nobleman of the name of Don Carlos di Sessa, who, when the executioners were conducting him to the stake, called out to the King for mercy, saying, "And canst thou thus, O King! witness the torments of thy subjects? save us from this cruel death; we do not deserve it." "No," Philip sternly replied, "I would myself carry wood to burn my own son, were he such a wretch, as thou e." After which he beheld the horrid spectacle that followed, with a composure and tranquillity that betokened the most unfeeling heart.

This dreadful severity, joined with certain rigid laws, enacted to prevent the importation of Lutheran books, soon produced the desired effect. After the celebration of another Autō-de-fé^f, in which about fifty Protestants suffered all the rest, if there were any who still remained, either concealed their sentiments, or made their escape into foreign parts^g.

^d Ferreras, Annis 1559 & 1565. Campana, An. 1559. Miniana, lib. v. c. xi.

^e Yo traen lenna para quemar a mi hijo, si fuere tan malo como vos. Cabrera, lib. v. c. xi.

^f In Seville. ^g Miniana, lib. v. c. xi.

Philip proceeded next to settle the civil government of the kingdom ; and, according to the Spanish historians, he discovered in the choice of his ministers, and of the governors of towns and provinces, much prudence and circumspection ; of which last, an historian gives the following instance, that besides making diligent inquiry concerning the characters of the several candidates for office, he kept a register for his own use, in which he recorded all the vices and defects, as well as the virtues and accomplishments of each ^h.

He might have confined his attention to objects of this nature, and have applied himself wholly to the internal administration of his dominions, had he not found it necessary to provide against the hostile intentions with which the Turkish Emperor, and the corsairs of Barbary, were animated against him.

The Ottoman empire was, in the present period, at the summit of its glory, under the victorious Solyman ; the greatest and the most enlightened of all the Sultans. In Persia, in Hungary, and in Africa, this heroic prince had widely extended the limits of his empire ; had expelled the knights of St. John from Rhodes, which till then had been deemed impregnable ; had stripped the Venetians of a great part of their territories ; laid waste the coasts of Italy and Spain ; and filled all Europe with admiration of his exploits, and with the terror of his name. From the time of his competition with Ferdinand in Hungary, he had regarded the princes of the house of Austria as his rivals. He had assisted Henry II. of France, first against Charles, and afterwards against Philip ; as he had formerly assisted Frâncis against the Emperor. And in the late war, although by some accident his fleet did not arrive in time to act in concert with that of France, yet it came afterwards under his admiral Piali, who, having landed his troops in Italy, and in the islands of Prochita and Minorca, put great numbers of the inhabitants to the sword, and carried off many hundred prisoners into slavery ⁱ.

From an enemy so powerful and enterprising, Philip had much to apprehend. But he believed it to be inconsistent with the character of protector of the church, to which he aspired, to enter into any alliance with a prince who was the declared and irreconcileable enemy of Christianity ; and therefore, far from proposing any terms of accommodation, he issued orders for putting the coasts of Spain and Italy into a posture of defence, lest Solyman should find leisure from his other occupations to renew hostilities.

But the Spanish monarch had more immediate cause of inquietude from the corsairs on the coast of Africa, an enemy ^{The corsairs of Barbary.} much more formidable than before, by the assistance which Solyman had afforded them ever since they acknowledged him for their sovereign. They consisted of Turks, Arabs, Negroes, and Moors ; the last of whom were partly natives, and partly such as had been expelled from Spain in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella. They were all men of barbarous manners, inflamed with the most bigoted zeal for the Mahometan religion, open foes to almost every Christian power, and animated with a peculiar hatred against the Spaniards, who had often attacked them in their strong holds, and had long treated their brother Mahome-

^h Miniana, lib. v. c. xi.

ⁱ Ferreras, ann. 1558

1550. tans, the Morescoes in Spain, with inhumanity. They had often taken full revenge for these injuries, under the celebrated brothers, Horuc and Hayradin Barbarossas. Their principal fleet was now commanded by another corsair, of the name of Dragut, the Barbarossa of his age, and not inferior to either of the two brothers in those qualifications by which they were so eminently distinguished.

Born in a little village in Natolia, opposite to the isle of Rhodes, Dragut, and sprung, like the Barbarossas, from the meanest parents, Dragut had, in his youth, enlisted himself on board a Turkish galley, and had served there for some years as a common sailor. In that station he gave conspicuous proofs of his capacity. He seemed however to be governed by a passion extremely different from that ambition which is the ordinary attendant upon genius, and to have no other end in view than to enrich himself. But as soon as he had acquired a certain sum of money, he purchased a galley of his own, and began the adventurous occupation of a corsair, in which he became remarkable for his skill in navigation, his knowledge of the seas, his intrepidity, and enterprise. His character did not remain long unknown to Hayradin Barbarossa, who was at that time high admiral of the Turkish fleet. Barbarossa gladly received Dragut into his service, and having made him his lieutenant, he gave him the command of twelve of his ships of war. With this fleet Dragut did infinite mischief to all the European states who traded in the Mediterranean, the French only excepted, whose monarchs were in alliance with the Turkish Emperor. He suffered no season to pass unemployed. Scarcely a single Spanish or Italian ship escaped him ; and when he failed in taking a sufficient number of prizes, he commonly made some sudden descent on the coasts of Spain or Italy, plundering the country, and carrying off great numbers of the inhabitants into captivity. In these descents he was generally fortunate ; but in the year 1541, having landed his men in a creek in Corsica, they were scattered along the coast, and employed in collecting their booty, when Juanetin Doria, the brave nephew of the illustrious Andrew Doria, came upon him with a superior force, took nine of his ships, and compelled him to surrender. When he was carried on board the admiral's galley, he could not restrain his indignation, but exclaimed, " And am I then doomed to be thus loaded with fetters by a beardless youth ? " a saying which occasioned his meeting with harder usage than he would otherwise have received. Both Barbarossa and Solyman interested themselves in his behalf, and made tempting offers to the Genoese for his ransom. Notwithstanding which they detained him four years in captivity ; nor could they be persuaded to set him at liberty, till Barbarossa, with a hundred gallies under his command, appeared before their town, and threatened to lay it in ashes, if he were not instantly released. The Genoese found it necessary to comply with this request ; and Dragut, who was immediately afterwards furnished with a strong squadron of ships by Barbarossa, and was now inflamed with redoubled hatred against all who bore the name of Christians, resumed his former occupation, and sought after opportunities, with unceasing ardor, to wreak his vengeance upon his enemies. Besides captures which he made at sea, he sacked and pillaged, year after year, innumerable villages and towns in Italy and the adjacent isles. Having been dispossessed by Doria of his strong sea-port of Mohedia on the 1552. coast of Barbary, he had ample revenge afterwards on that gallant seaman, in an engagement off Naples, in which he took six of

his ships, with a great number of troops on board, and obliged Doria himself, and the rest of the fleet, to fly before him. In the year immediately following he subdued almost the whole island of Corsica, and delivered it into the hands of the French. After this, having made himself master of Tripoli, he fortified that place in the strongest manner. From Tripoli he issued forth as often as the season would permit ; and after Philip's accession, and even after peace was concluded between France and Spain, he continued to practise as formerly his predations upon the coasts of Sicily, Naples, and other states which belonged to the Spanish monarchy.

Of these hostilities Philip had received particular information before he left the Netherlands, and had been earnestly exhorted by the Sieur de la Valette, grand-master of the knights of Malta, and the duke de Medina Cœli, governor of Sicily, to think seriously of putting an end to the innumerable mischiefs to which his subjects were exposed from this active corsair, by sending such a force against him as might compel him to abandon his retreat. Philip readily consented to this request ; and as he was informed by la Valette, that Dragut himself was absent at that time from Tripoli, carrying on an inland war against one of the kings in Barbary, he sent immediate orders to the duke de Medina Cœli, Doria, and others, to hasten forward the preparations necessary for the intended enterprise. The Pope and most of the other princes in Italy contributed their assistance, and a fleet was assembled consisting of more than a hundred ships, having fourteen thousand soldiers on board. This armament, of which the duke de Medina Cœli had the chief command, set sail from Messina in the end of October one thousand five hundred and fifty-nine, and passed over to Syracuse. There it was detained by contrary winds for several weeks, and during that time a disease, occasioned by unwholesome provisions, carried off between three and four thousand of the troops. Medina Cœli, however, proceeded on his voyage, still hoping that he had force sufficient to ensure success ; and it is probable that he would not have been disappointed had he advanced directly and laid siege to Tripoli. But he thought it would facilitate the reduction of that place, to make himself master before-hand of the isle of Gerba, which lies a few miles from Tripoli, and was held by a Moorish governor, attached to the interest of Dragut. This island was subdued with little difficulty ; and a castle which had been erected upon it was, after a feeble resistance, abandoned by the Moors, whose commander swore allegiance upon the Alcoran to the King of Spain.

It was the opinion of some of the principal officers that this castle should be immediately destroyed, and that the fleet should proceed to Tripoli without delay. But the duke was unfortunately of a different opinion, and resolved not only to preserve the castle, but to strengthen and enlarge it. In this preposterous undertaking a great deal of time was lost. Dragut had returned with his army from his inland expedition ; and he had leisure not only to provide for the security of the town, but to send notice to the Grand Seignior of the operations of the Christian fleet, which he represented might be attacked with great advantage in its present situation, while the commander was off his guard, and most of the forces were on shore.

1559.
Expedition
against Tri-
poli and the
isle of Ger-
ba.

1595.
Destruction
of the Spa-
nish fleet by
the Turks.

Solyman embraced without hesitation the tempting opportunity which was thus presented to him. He fitted out, with the utmost expedition, a fleet of seventy-four gallies, put a hundred Janissaries, besides other soldiers, on board each of them, and gave the command to his admiral Piali, with orders to proceed in his voyage as fast as possible. The Spaniards were informed of his approach by a Maltese frigate, and were thrown into great perplexity. A council of war was immediately held. Some officers were for waiting till the enemy should arrive, and advised Medina to give them battle. Others, among whom was the younger Doria^k, whose courage was unquestionable, were of opinion, that considering the sickly condition of the troops, and the great diminution which they had undergone, they could not contend with so powerful an enemy without the utmost danger of a total overthrow, and therefore that they ought immediately to retire, and conduct the fleet to a place of safety. The duke de Medina Cœli, a man of no experience in maritime affairs, and utterly unqualified for the charge which he had undertaken, was at a loss to determine, to which of the two measures proposed he should give the preference. There was a necessity for embracing instantly either the one or the other. Yet he balanced between them for some days, and still continued to make the troops work in completing the fortifications of the castle, till intelligence was brought him that the enemy were at hand, and steering directly towards the island.

There was no time now to put the fleet into a posture of defence. Both the mariners and soldiers were overwhelmed with terror ; and each crew, without waiting for the word of command, made haste, with oars and sails, to escape from the impending danger. Several ships foundered among the flats and shallows. Others were driven back by the wind, or by the enemy, and wrecked upon the island. Some escaped, and particularly those which belonged to the order of St. John, through their superior acquaintance with the coast. Above thirty were taken by the Turks; about one thousand men were killed or drowned, and five thousand taken prisoners. Medina Cœli, with Doria, and some other principal officers, passed in the night through the middle of the enemy's fleet, and arrived safe at Malta : having, before his departure, committed the charge of the fort of Gerba to Don Alvaro de Sandé, to whom he gave the strongest assurances of speedy assistance and relief.

The siege of
the fort of
Gerba by
the Turks.

This valiant Spaniard had very little reason to trust to these assurances, and could not expect to be able to hold out long against so great a force as he knew would be employed against him ; especially as he was but indifferently furnished with provisions, and was much more likely to find enemies than friends in the natives of the island. Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, he readily undertook the arduous task assigned him ; and having got his garrison augmented by the crews of those ships which, in attempting to make their escape, had been driven back upon the coast, he prepared with great alacrity for a vigorous defence.

Piali lost no time after his victory, but immediately landed his troops and began the siege. He was furnished with artillery by Dragut, who brought it himself, together with some fresh forces, from Tripoli. About

^k The elder Doria was prevented from taking a part in this expedition, by the infirmities of old age.

twelve thousand Turks, besides the islanders and other Moors, were employed in the siege. In their first approaches many of them were killed. But soon after their battery had been unmasks, a great part of the wall of the fort was laid in ruins. The besieged in the mean time began to suffer greatly from the heat of the season, and from the scarcity and unwholesomeness of the water and provisions. Great numbers died, and many, grown impatient under the hardships to which they were exposed, deserted to the enemy. By these men Piali was informed of the distressed condition of the garrison ; and he invited them to surrender, and promised to spare their lives. Don Alvaro rejected this offer with disdain, and still persisted in the defence. But at length finding that his stock of provisions was almost spent, and having despaired of the relief which had been promised by End of July
1560. Medina, he called together the garrison, which amounted now only to one thousand men, and having reminded them of the glory which they had acquired, and informed them that they had neither bread to support their bodies, nor numbers to defend the fort any longer, he desired them to resolve, whether they would give themselves up tamely to be the slaves of their barbarous enemy, or imitate the example which he would set them, and die fighting bravely for the honour of their religion and their country. The soldiers called out with one voice, “ That they “ chose death rather than slavery ; and were ready to follow wheresoever he should lead them.” He then desired they would refresh themselves with such victuals as still remained, and hold themselves in readiness to leave the fort about the middle of the night.

At that time they set out, by the gate which looked towards the sea, and having passed a triple rampart, which had been thrown up to prevent their sallies, they made dreadful havoc among the Turks, and had almost reached the general’s tent, when they were put to a stand by the Janissaries. They fought long and desperately ; but at last, the whole Turkish camp being up in arms, they were overpowered by numbers, and almost all of them were slain. Alvaro, with two officers who had kept near him, forced his way through the thickest part of the enemy, till he reached the shore, and got on board a Spanish ship which had been stranded. There he was standing at day-break, with his target in one hand and his sword in the other, surrounded by the Turkish soldiers, who would have quickly buried him under their darts, if their officers, who highly respected his heroic valour, had not restrained them. Having been urged by a Genoese renegado to lay down his arms, and assured of receiving a treatment suitable to his rank and merit, he at last consented to surrender himself to Piali¹.

Such was the conclusion of this unfortunate enterprise ; the failure of which, and all the calamities which ensued, seem to have been owing principally to the weakness, obstinacy, and inexperience of the commander in chief ; yet we do not find that Philip ever expressed any dissatisfaction with his conduct. He either viewed it in a different light from that in which it has been represented by the contemporary historians ; or he considered, that it would have been a tacit acknowledgment of his own want of discernment, to accuse, of imprudence or incapacity, a per-

¹ He was carried to Constantinople with the other prisoners, and was afterwards set at liberty, by an article in a treaty of peace between the Sultan and the Emperor of Germany.

1559. son whom he had judged deserving of so great a trust. Instead of this, he applied himself to provide against the effects which he had reason to dread from the success of the Turkish arms. He could hardly doubt that Piali would pursue his victory, and make a descent on the coasts of Spain or Italy.

The inhabitants were every where agitated with the most alarming apprehensions. Watch-towers were raised along the coast ; and the fleet, which had lately suffered so much, was repaired with the utmost diligence. But these preparations, although they were afterwards found useful, were not at present necessary. Solyman having other objects of ambition which engrossed his attention, recalled his fleet to Constantinople, and thus delivered the Italians and Spaniards from their present fears^m.

The siege of Oran and Masarquivir. Philip soon afterwards received intelligence that Hascem, son of the celebrated Barbarossa, and viceroy of Algiers under Solyman, had formed a design upon Oran and Masarquivir, two strong forts on the coast of Barbary, which had been in the possession of Spain since the year one thousand five hundred and nine, when they were subdued by cardinal Ximenes. In order to frustrate this design, a fleet of twenty-four gallies had been ordered to sail to Oran, for the reinforcement of the garrison ; but this, fleet had been overtaken in the middle of its course by a dreadful storm, in which two and twenty of the ships were lost.

By this accident Hascem was encouraged to proceed in his projected enterprise. Having persuaded several of the Mahometan princes in Barbary to assist him with their troops, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Oran early in the spring, with a fleet of more than thirty ships, and an army of an hundred thousand men. Of the two places which he intended to attack, only Masarquivir is a sea-port, and Oran lies at the distance of near a league from it. With so great an army he was enabled to block up both places at once ; but he began his operations with the siege of Masarquivir, which, though of greater importance by reason of its situation, was not so strongly fortified.

The count de Alcaudeté, the Spanish governor, who had foreseen the approaching storm, had provided to the utmost of his power for the security of the places committed to his care ; and both he and his brother Don Martin de Cordova, to whom he committed the chief command in Masarquivir, were determined to hold out to the last extremity. Many bloody encounters passed between the contending parties, in the sallies which Alcaudeté made from Oran ; and in these the Spaniards had generally the advantage. Don Martin, and the troops under his command, gave, if possible, still stronger proofs of intrepidity in their defence of Masarquivir. The walls were laid in ruins by the enemy's artillery. Hascem made eleven different assaults, and his standard was raised again and again upon the ruins of the walls ; yet he was finally repulsed, and obliged, notwithstanding his numbers, to yield to the unconquerable obstinacy of the Spaniards. These brave men, however, were now sensible, that, from the want of provisions, they must ere long either throw away their lives, or submit to that odious slavery to which they knew that the implacable hatred of their ungenerous enemy had doomed them.

^m Cabrera, lib. v. c. v. viii. xii. xiii. Miniana, lib. v. c. xii.

Philip was not ignorant of the distress to which they were reduced ; and he had exerted himself with great activity in making preparations for their relief. But as Masarquivir was blocked up by sea as well as by land, it was necessary that the supplies which he had provided should be accompanied with a fleet superior to that of the enemy. Such a fleet he at last collected from Italy and the sea-ports in Spain, and gave the command of it to Don Francis de Mendoza, with instructions to sail for Masarquivir with the utmost expedition. Mendoza happily arrived in time. Having come unexpectedly upon Hascem's fleet, he took nine ships, and put the rest to flight ; and Hascem himself, who had been employed for some days in preparing for a new assault, perceiving the danger to which he was exposed from the Spanish fleet on the one hand, and the garrisons in Oran and Masarquivir on the other, raised the siege precipitately, after it had lasted three months ; and marched off with all his forces to Algiers. The Spaniards pursued for several miles ; but finding they were unable to overtake him, they returned ; and the fleet, after reinforcing the garrisons of Oran and Masarquivir, set sail for Spain, where they were received with great rejoicing. The count de Alcaudet⁶ was soon after made viceroy of Navarre ; Don Martin received distinguished marks of the royal favour ; and all the officers, and even the private soldiers, were rewarded in proportion to their rank and meritⁿ.

During the absence of the fleet, the trade of Spain had sustained considerable prejudice from the depredations of a celebrated corsair, of the name of Cara Mustapha, who, with a squadron of six or seven ships, traversed the Mediterranean with unwearyed activity, and made innumerable captures. His retreat was a fort on the African coast, called Pennon de Velez, which, in those days, before the invention of bombs, was reckoned almost impregnable. It is situated on a steep and rugged rock, and is inaccessible, except by a narrow path, cut out in the rock itself ; which is separated from the continent by a channel, capable of containing about a dozen of those ships which were usually employed in cruizing. This rock was fortified, both above and below, with a wall, flanked with bastions, and mounted with cannon ; and afforded a constant shelter and protection to the corsairs, when pursued. From its situation near the Straits, these corsairs could annoy the Christians, while they themselves were exposed to very little danger ; and it was become an object of the most serious concern to all the Christian powers who traded in the Mediterranean, to wrest it from them.

In consequence of a report which gained credit, that Solyman intended this year to make an attack either on Spain or Italy, Philip had greatly augmented his naval force ; but when he found that either there had been no ground for this report, or that the Sultan had changed his design, he thought that he could not employ his fleet more usefully than by attempting to reduce Pennon de Velez, which had been long an object of much dread to his subjects.

Not satisfied with his own numerous fleet, he solicited assistance from Portugal, from the Knights of Malta, and from his allies in Italy ; nor did he permit them to set sail from Malaga, the place of rendezvous, till he had collected above ninety gallies, besides sixty ships of a smaller

1559.
The siege of
Oran raised
by the Spaniards.

The reduction
of Pennon de Ve-
lez by the
Spaniards.

ⁿ Cabrera, lib. vi. Herrera, Hist. Gen. del Mondo, lib. v. c. iii. and iv.

1559. size, with no less than thirteen thousand soldiers on board. The providing of so great a force was not merely an effect of that extraordinary caution with which Philip commonly entered upon any military enterprise ; and such a number of troops could not be employed in besieging a place of such small extent as Pennon de Velez ; but, as the Moors in the country adjacent, were deeply interested in the preservation of the fort, on account of immense quantities of commodities of all kinds, and the number of Christian slaves which were daily sold to them by the corsairs, there was reason to apprehend that they would consider the cause of these pirates as their own, and give all the opposition in their power to the Spaniards, in the operations of the siege.

Agreeably to this persuasion, the allies no sooner arrived upon the coast, than great numbers of these barbarians appeared among the hills, by the foot of which the army were obliged to pass in their way to the fort. But these tumultuary troops were not able to prevent the Spaniards from landing ; nor, although they gave them some annoyance on their march, could they obstruct the operations of so formidable a body of regular forces. Still, however, it was the opinion of several of the allies, that after all could be done to reduce a fort of so singular a construction, they would in the issue find it necessary to abandon their attempt. This would probably have happened, if Mustapha himself had been present. But, in order to save his ships from falling a prey to the enemy, he had left the place some time before, and given the command of it to a renegado, of the name of Ferret, with two hundred Turks under him, and ammunition and provision sufficient to serve for a much longer time than the blockade was likely to continue.

He believed that the Spaniards would soon perceive the folly of their undertaking ; and was therefore employed in his usual practice of cruising, with very little concern about the fate of his retreat. But he had been deceived in his opinion of those to whom he had committed a charge of so great importance. Both the governor and garrison were intimidated by the sight of that powerful fleet and army which now encompassed them. No sooner were some of their guns dismounted by a Spanish battery, and a part of the wall demolished, than they were struck with the most violent panic, and the governor, and most of the garrison, made their escape to the continent in the middle of the night, by swimming. Such of them only remained as could not swim ; and by these men the fort was delivered to the Spaniards.

There was much good fortune and little glory in this valuable conquest ; but the joy which it excited over all the southern coast of Spain was inexpressible ; and it was the more complete, as well as the more generally diffused, because only a very small number had been killed or wounded in their encounters with the Moors. Don Garcia de Toledo, the commander in chief, was soon after his return, rewarded by Philip with the vice-royalty of Sicily ^o.

^o Cabrera, lib. vi. c. xvii. Ferreras, part xiv. Vertot's Hist. of the Knights of Malta.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK V.

DURING the course of those military operations which have been described, Philip beheld with much anxiety the rapid progress of heresy in almost every state in Europe except Spain ; and, in order to obstruct it, he employed all his influence to procure the convocation of a general council of the church.

In the first years of the reformation, the bigotry of those who adhered to the ancient superstition, suffered them not to think of any other means of extirpating the opinions of the Protestants, but persecution ; which was exercised against them with the same unrelenting severity, as if they had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes. But it soon appeared how inadequate this barbarous procedure was to the purpose which the Romanists intended. Those bloody edicts which were published, those fires which were lighted up, and that variety of torments which priests and inquisitors invented with ingenious cruelty, served in reality to propagate the doctrines against which they were employed, and contributed to inflame, rather than extinguish, that ardent zeal with which the Protestants were animated. Being firmly persuaded, that the cause which they maintained, was the cause of God and truth, and that their perseverance would be rewarded with a happy immortality, they courted their punishments, instead of avoiding them ; and in bearing them, they displayed a degree of fortitude and patience, which, by exciting admiration in the beholders, produced innumerable proselytes to the faith for which they suffered.

Several princes had been converted to the faith. In some states the Protestants had become more numerous and powerful than their opponents ; and in others, their opinions so generally prevailed, that the Catholic princes found it no longer possible to extirpate them, without depriving themselves of great multitudes of

Progress of
the reformation.

1559. their most industrious subjects, on whom the wealth and importance of their states depended. The time when persecution might have proved effectual was past, and the princes came at length to perceive the necessity of having recourse to some more gentle means than had been hitherto employed. They were at the same time sensible, notwithstanding their prejudices against the Reformers, that some reformation was extremely necessary ; they had long borne with great impatience the numberless encroachments of the court of Rome ; and were convinced, that if some abuses were removed, it would not be impracticable to persuade the Protestants to return into the bosom of the church.

A general council desired by the Catholic princes. A general council appeared to be the only expedient by which this important end could be obtained ; and the late Emperor Charles had taken infinite pains to procure the convocation of that assembly. In former times the councils of the

church had been convened by the Emperors themselves ; but, in the time of Charles, the power of calling them was, by all true Catholics, considered as the peculiar prerogative of the Popes ; who dreaded, that such assemblies might derogate from their usurped authority, and were therefore inclined, if possible, to prevent them from being held. With the timid Clement, Charles employed all his art and influence to procure a council, but in vain. Paul the Third was no less averse to this measure than Clement ; but the Emperor being seconded by almost all the Catholic princes in Europe, Paul yielded to their importunities, and summoned a council to meet in Trent. From this place it was afterwards translated to Bologna. After the death of Paul it was again assembled in Trent in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-one, and continued to be held there till the year following ; when it was prorogued for two years, upon war being declared against the Emperor by the elector of Saxony.

In the sessions which were held under Paul, that fundamental tenet of the reformers, by which the writings of the evangelists and apostles are held to be the only rule of the Christian faith, was condemned ; and equal authority was ascribed to the books termed Apocryphal, and to the oral traditions of the church.

From the manner in which the deliberations of this assembly were conducted ; from the nature of its decisions, and from the blind attachment of a great majority of its members to the court of Rome, there was little ground to hope for the attainment of those ends for which the calling of it had been so earnestly desired. But no other expedient could be devised, which the Catholics thought so likely to stop the progress of heresy ; and therefore, as soon as the war between France and Spain was concluded, the several Catholic princes began to think seriously of the restoration of the council.

The state of Europe. The state of Europe at that time seemed more than ever to require the application of some immediate remedy. The

power and number of the Protestants were every day becoming more and more considerable. Both England and Scotland had disclaimed allegiance to the see of Rome, and new-modelled their religion. In the Netherlands the reformers had greatly multiplied of late, notwithstanding the most dreadful cruelties had been exercised against them ; and in France, where every province was involved in the most terrible combustion, there was ground to apprehend, that they would soon become too powerful for the Catholics, and be able to wrest from

them the reins of government. The new opinions had penetrated even into Italy, and had been embraced by a considerable number of persons both in Naples and Savoy. From the former of these States they were extirpated by the unrelenting severity of Philip ; who issued orders to his Viceroy to put all heretics to death without mercy, and even to pursue with fire and sword a remnant of them who had fled from Cosenza, and were living quietly among the mountains^a.

But the duke of Savoy, unwilling to deprive himself of so great a number of useful subjects as had been converted to the Protestant faith, was inclined to attempt to enlighten and convince them ; and with this view he desired the Pope's permission to hold a colloquy of the principal ecclesiastics in his dominions, on the subject of religion. Pius was about the same time informed, that in France a resolution had been embraced to have recourse to the same expedient. He believed that no measure could be devised more likely to prove fatal to that exclusive prerogative which he claimed, of judging in matters of religion. He dreaded that the example of France and Savoy would be quickly followed by other States, and the decrees of provincial synods substituted in the place of those of the Holy See. It highly concerned him, therefore, to prevent this measure (so pernicious to his authority) from taking place. Nor did he find much difficulty in dissuading the duke of Savoy from adopting it. " If the heretics," said he to the duke's ambassador, " stand in need of instruction, I will send divines and a legate, by whom they may be both instructed and absolved. But your master will find, that they will lend a deaf ear to all the instructions that can be given them, and will put no other interpretation upon his conduct, but that he wants power to compel them to submit. No good effect was ever produced by that lenity which he inclines to exercise ; but from experience he may learn, that the sooner he shall execute justice on these men and make use of force to reduce them, the more certain will be his success ; and if he will comply with the counsel which I offer, he shall receive from me such assistance as will enable him to carry it into execution."

The duke, who was sincerely attached to the Roman faith, and closely connected with Philip, unfortunately complied with this violent counsel, and engaged in a bloody war with his protestant subjects, of which he had afterwards the greatest reason to repent^b.

The Pope met with much more difficulty in preventing a national synod in France than in Savoy ; and was obliged to promise, that he should call a general council without delay. Pius had, before his promotion, taken an oath to this purpose, as all the other cardinals had likewise done, before they proceeded to his election. But no sooner had he ascended the papal throne, than he adopted the sentiments of his predecessors ; and shewed that he entertained the same aversion to this assembly which they had so uniformly manifested. He remembered the motives which had determined Paul the Third to dissolve it, under the colour of a translation to Bologna. He reflected on the danger to which Julius had been exposed, and from which his good fortune and the war of Germany had delivered him ; and

The Pope's
dread of na-
tional synods
in Savoy and
in France.

His aversion
to the call-
ing of a
council.

^a Paul, lib. v.

^b He found it necessary at last to grant them the free exercise of their religion, after having been worsted by them in several skirmishes among the mountains, and suffering a total overthrow in a pitched battle, in which he lost 7000 of his troops. Paul, lib. v.

1560. he considered, that as there was now no prince so powerful as Charles, by whom the prelates could be overawed, they would probably assume a bolder tone in the council, and attempt to advance their own prerogatives on the ruins of the papacy

^{He finds it necessary to consent to it} For these reasons he would gladly have eluded the performance of his oath. But so great was his dread of the fatal consequences which might arise from a national synod in France, and so earnest the importunity of Philip, of the Emperor, and other catholic princes, that he at last thought it necessary to comply with their request ; resolving to employ all his attention in providing against the dangers to which his authority would be thereby exposed.

After many delays, which Pius knew well how to interpose, the bull of convocation, summoning the council to meet in Trent at Easter, was published in the consistory on the twenty-ninth of September one thousand five hundred and sixty ; and nuncios were dispatched to give intimation of it to all the Christian powers.

^{The bull of convocation.} The Pope and cardinals were greatly at a loss to determine whether the council should be mentioned in the bull as a new one, or as a continuation of that which had been held under Paul and Julius. The decision of this point, seemingly of small importance, was rendered difficult by the consequences which it involved. For if the continuation were declared, then all those decrees of the former sessions, which were levelled against the protestants, would be held sacred, and receive the sanction of the council that was about to be convened. The protestants would consider themselves as already condemned, and pay no regard to the bull of convocation. Whereas, if in this bull the assembly to be summoned were denominated a new council, they might expect that all the points in controversy would be discussed anew, and consequently might be persuaded to send deputies to the council, and to acknowledge its authority.

In this the Emperor and the Queen-mother and ministers of France were deeply interested ; and they urged with great earnestness, that in the bull no mention should be made of the former sessions, and no occasion given the protestants to suspect that any restriction would be laid upon the proceedings of the council. Philip was governed by views and sentiments of a very different nature. His detestation of the protestants prevented him from relishing any other method of dealing with them, but that of force. He was utterly averse to making any concessions to reconcile them ; and he desired the celebration of the council, not so much in order to recover those who had already revolted from the church, as either to prevent others from following their example, or, as Pius afterwards suspected, to increase the power of the bishops and princes, by abridging the jurisdiction of the Pope ; to whose exorbitant pretensions Philip was in reality adverse, notwithstanding that devoted attachment to the Holy See which he affected, in order to promote his ambitious designs. With these views and sentiments, Philip did not desire that the protestants should come to the council. He believed that their presence would serve only to perplex and retard its deliberations. He apprehended, that to suffer the decrees of the former sessions to be again discussed, would contribute to invalidate the authority of the council itself : and for this reason he thought it necessary that the intended meeting should be declared a continuation of the council which had formerly been prorogued.

In this matter Philip's sentiments were entirely conformable to those of the Pope ; but Pius durst not, on this occasion, run the risque of giving offence either to the Emperor, or to the court of France ; and therefore, after long deliberation, he couched the bull of convocation in such ambiguous expressions, as might be interpreted to signify either a new council, or a continuation of the former. This expedient had, in some degree, the effect intended. Although neither of the parties was entirely satisfied, yet neither of them was so much disgusted as either the one or the other would have been, if the terms had been explicit : and the bull was at length received by the Emperor and the French king, as well as by Philip, and the other catholic princes ; who all gave orders to the Ecclesiastics in their dominions to repair to Trent at the time appointed.

In the bull, only bishops, abbots, and others entitled to vote by the rules and ancient practice of the church, were summoned to attend. But an invitation was carried to the several protestant powers, by two nuncios, Martinengo and Commendone.

The Protestants refuse to attend the council.

The protestant princes in Germany were, on this occasion, assembled at Naumburg, in Upper Saxony ; and to that place the Emperor sent three ambassadors, to second the nuncios in their invitation. To the Imperial ambassadors, the princes replied in terms expressive of their respect for Ferdinand. They thanked him for the solicitude which he discovered in their behalf ; and said, that nothing would be more agreeable to them than a general council, provided it were calculated to heal the divisions of the church. But no such desirable effect, they thought, could be expected from the council to which they were now invited ; which was called by one whose authority they could not acknowledge ; and in which (as appeared from the bull of convocation) only those were to have decisive voices, who had sworn allegiance to the Pope and the see of Rome.

The nuncios however were brought in, and briefs were delivered by them from the Pope to each of the princes ; but these briefs were on the next day returned unopened, with the following declaration : "That as they did not acknowledge any jurisdiction in the bishop of Rome, there was no reason why they should explain to him their sentiments of the council, which they had already done to the Emperor".

From Naumburg the nuncios set out for England and Denmark ; but they were obliged to stop short, Martinengo in the Low Countries, and Commendone at Lubec ; the latter having been forbid to proceed by Frederic, and the former by Elizabeth, both of whom had resolved to give no encouragement to the intended council.

The opinion which the protestants entertained of the sinister intentions of the Pope was fully justified by the event. In the very first decree of the first session, when many of the prelates were not yet arrived, his legates, who presided in this assembly, procured it to be enacted, that they only should propose the several questions to be discussed ; and thus they made at once effectual provision against all attempts to correct any of the numberless abuses in the court of Rome, for remedying which the meeting of the council had been desired. Against this decree Philip

The council meets at Trent, and is governed by the Pope and his legates.

1560. and the other princes remonstrated in the most importunate manner, and employed their interest, both with the Pope and in the council, to procure the repeal of it. But all their endeavours were ineffectual. Their solicitude on this head served only to confirm Pius in his suspicions of their having formed a design to encroach on his authority. He eluded their applications with consummate artifice, and sent orders to the legates to make all the opposition in their power to any proposal which might be made for annulling the decree.

This did not prevent several of the prelates from endeavouring to persuade the council to establish certain points, such as the divine institution and the residency of bishops, which would have struck deep at the root of the papal power.

Vain attempts to abridge the power of the Pope. The Pope, from whom the legates received instructions on every difficult emergency, was kept in perpetual anxiety; and he sometimes thought of suddenly dissolving an assembly which he found so difficult to keep within the bounds that he prescribed. But, by unremitting vigilance and attention, by threatening some prelates with his displeasure, by flattering others, and heaping promises upon them of advancement in the church; and above all by means of the great number of Italian bishops^d, who depended entirely on his favour, he secured, in every question, a majority of voices; and not only prevented any decision from being passed that might be detrimental to his authority, but procured the ratification of many of these ecclesiastical usurpations which the princes, who had been so solicitous for the convocation of the council, had expected would have been abolished and condemned. These princes were greatly disappointed and chagrined. Their ambassadors, as well as the prelates, complained, that the council, far from enjoying freedom, were fettered in all their deliberations by the secret orders which were daily sent from Rome: and on this head, remonstrances were made again and again to the Pope himself, who sometimes vouchsafed a soft, evasive reply; and at other times, appearing to be greatly offended, asserted that the council was at perfect liberty; and insinuated that the true source of all the discontent on this head was, that the ambassadors of the princes had not the power of dictating the decrees.

Whatever ground there was for this insinuation, the deliberations of the council were conducted in the same manner as before, till at length Pius, grown impatient under the perpetual attention and expence which it required from him, sent orders to his legates to bring it as soon as

Conclusion of the council. 1563. possible to a conclusion. And it was concluded accordingly, with the most indecent precipitation, towards the end of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-three, without any

considerable opposition from the princes, who had long despaired of deriving from it any of those salutary effects which had been expected^e. They perceived that the Pope's influence over it was not to be controlled; and foresaw that the continuance of it must serve only to augment and strengthen his authority, which it had been their intention to circumscribe. Of this they had the most convincing evidence in the concluding session, in which two decrees were passed that had not been mentioned before, and

^d Many of them were so poor, that he was obliged to defray the expences of their attendance.

^e The acts were subscribed by the 4 legates, 2 cardinals, 3 patriarchs, 25 archbishops, 268 bishops, 7 abbots, 7 generals or regulars, and 39 proxies. Paul, lib. viii.

were manifestly designed as an acknowledgment of the subordination of the council to the Holy See. One of these was, That application should be made to the Pope for his confirmation of the decrees ; and the other, That whatever expressions had been employed in any of the decrees, were to be understood without prejudice to the Pope's authority.

Pius rejoiced exceedingly when he was informed of the dissolution of the council, and still more when he received intelligence of these its last decrees. He ordained, on this occasion, a solemn thanksgiving ; and in the consistory declared, that he would confirm all the decrees, and add many reformations to those which had been enacted by the council. By these reformations, some of his courtiers apprehended that the profits arising from their offices would be diminished ; and they employed all their influence to dissuade him from his purpose. Pius had no intention to introduce any alterations of which they had reason to be afraid ; but he considered, that his refusing to confirm the decrees would be interpreted as a condemnation of the council ; that all its acts would be thereby brought into disrepute ; and that occasion might thence be taken, by the French and others, to hold national assemblies. And he considered likewise, that it would depend entirely upon himself to determine, how far any particular decree should be carried into execution. For these reasons he disregarded the objections of his courtiers, and published his bull of confirmation, with the usual formalities ; requiring all prelates and princes to receive and enforce the decrees of the holy council of Trent ; prohibiting all persons, whether laymen or ecclesiastics, from writing any explication of them under the form of notes or commentaries ; and commanding the Catholics everywhere to have recourse, in all dubious cases, to the Apostolic See.

This bull was addressed only to the Catholics ; for Pius did not expect that any greater regard would be paid to it by the Protestants than they had shewn to his bull of convocation. The whole conduct of the council had, from the beginning, been calculated to widen, instead of closing, that breach which subsisted between them and the Roman church. The ancient religion was now more clearly ascertained. Its doctrines, the offspring of subtle sophistry, artifice, and presumption, were formally defined ; its rites, which had crept into the church in the dark ages of ignorance and superstition, were now made an essential part of worship ; and anathemas were pronounced against all persons by whom either the former or the latter were not embraced. By this impolitic conduct the Protestants were more clearly instructed where to direct their attack ; and in those absurdities, into which men must fall who venture to dogmatise on subjects so mysterious as many articles of the christian faith, they often found abundant matter of victory and triumph. No concessions of any kind had been made by the council, in order to reconcile them ; but all their doctrines had been indiscriminately condemned ; and henceforth all ground of hope was cut off of ever inducing them to return into the bosom of the church, by any other means but open force and persecution.

Pius flattered himself that these means would sooner or later prove effectual ; and was therefore little concerned at the conduct of the Protestants, with respect to the council. He was much more deeply affected by the ill-humour which

1563.

1564.
The Pope's
joy on this
occasion.His bull of
confirmation.Bad effects
of the de-
crees of the
council.The decrees
rejected by
the court of
France.

1561. the Queen-mother and ministers of France discovered on the present occasion. They had been somewhat disgusted at the little regard that had been shewn to their desire, of having the council declared to be a new council. They were displeased with the decrees of reformation, by some of which the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was extended beyond its former bounds ; and they were highly dissatisfied with the tacit acknowledgment contained in the concluding decrees, of the superiority of the Pope above councils : an opinion which in France had been always impugned and rejected. Influenced by these considerations and desirous at the same time of avoiding to give any fresh occasion of discontent to the Calvinists, the French court (although earnestly solicited by Pius) refused to receive and publish the decrees^f.

They are accepted by Philip, and other catholic princes. Pius had reason to apprehend that the example of so great a monarchy would be imitated by the other catholic powers. But he had the pleasure of receiving information from his nuncios, that not only the Republic of Venice, and the several

Italian princes, but most of the catholic princes in Germany, and the king of Spain, had resolved to acknowledge the authority of the council.

In forming this resolution, Philip gave a striking proof of that zeal which he so uniformly felt, or affected, for the catholic religion and the Holy See. No prince was ever more jealous of his power, or more tenacious of his rights ; upon some of which encroachments had been made in the decrees of reformation. During the celebration of the council, he had complained loudly of the dependance in which it was held by the Pope ; he had again and again endeavoured, but in vain, to get that first decree rescinded, by which the legates alone could propose the questions to be discussed ; and he had likewise been highly offended with the Pope's precipitate dissolution of the council, in which measure he had neither been consulted, nor had any delay been granted at his ambassador's request.

Dispute of precedence between the ambassadors of France and Spain, decided in favour of France. To these causes of alienation, Pius added another which might have been attended with the most serious consequences, by determining a dispute for precedence between the Spanish and French ambassadors at Rome, in favour of the latter. To decide this point, which was of so delicate a nature, at so critical a juncture,

the Pontiff was induced, partly by the hopes of prevailing on the court of France to receive the decrees of the council, and partly by his dread, that, if the young King were not gratified in this matter, his counsellors would advise him to break off all connexion with Rome, and to commit the supreme ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom to a patriarch of his own election.

Pius ordered his nuncio to explain these motives to the Catholic King, and spared no pains to convince him of the necessity of the step which he had taken ; nor were his endeavours altogether ineffectual. Philip did not, indeed, for some time, send any ambassador to Rome in the place of Don Louis de Requesens, who left it when the point of precedence was decided ; but being determined, if possible, to live on amicable terms with the Holy See, he resolved to stifle his resentment. Nor did he suffer it to influence his conduct with regard to the decrees of the council, which, although they were not entirely conformable to his wish-

^f Father Paul, lib. v, vi, vii, viii.

es, yet would contribute, he believed, in some measure, to prevent the progress of heresy ; and therefore he issued orders, without hesitation, to have them received and obeyed throughout all his dominions ^{1564.} July. ^{g.}

^{g.} Cabrera, lib. vi. c. 16. Pallavicini, lib. xxiv. cap. 12.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VI.

PHILIP'S attention was, soon after this, called to objects of a very different nature from those by which, during the sitting of the council, it had been engrossed. The success of his enterprise against Pennon de Velez having given great uneasiness to all the piratical states, they had endeavoured to engage the Sultan to undertake the recovery of that fort ; and had intreated him to employ such a fleet and army as might be sufficient to expel the Spaniards from the coast of Africa. Solyman was at the same time earnestly solicited by great numbers of his subjects, to take vengeance on the Knights of Malta, who, besides co-operating with the Spaniards in all their African expeditions, still continued to exercise their wonted hostilities against the Turks at sea, and had of late made innumerable captures.

1565.
Hostile in-
tentions of
the Sultan
against Phi-
lip, and the
Knights of
Malta.

This prince was of himself as much incensed both against the former and the latter of these his enemies, as any of his subjects could desire ; and notwithstanding his great age, he was inflamed as much as ever with the ambition of extending his dominions. He therefore lent a willing ear to the solicitations which he now received ; and having suspended all his other pursuits, he resolved to turn his whole attention against the Maltese and Spaniards. But he hesitated whether he should begin his operations with invading Malta, or the dominions of the Catholic King ; and to assist him in deciding this point, he held a council of his most experienced commanders.

Mahomet, the oldest and wisest of all his Bashas, was of opinion, that it would be highly inexpedient to begin with invading Malta ; in subduing which, he said, the Sultan would find infinitely greater difficulty than he had encountered formerly in the conquest of Rhodes. The latter of these islands, he observed, lay at so great a distance from Europe, as had made it almost impossible for the Christians to send assistance to the besieged ; and was besides so large and fertile as to furnish subsistence

1565. to the Turkish troops. Whereas the former was small and barren ; so far from the Porte, and so near to Sicily and Italy, that the Knights could easily receive from thence perpetual succours and supplies. The king of Spain was deeply concerned in their preservation ; and he, and other Christian princes, would, from religion as well as interest, think themselves bound to support an order of men whom they had long regarded as the champions of their faith. The Knights would defend their island with the utmost obstinacy. And even although the Sultan should at last get possession of it, yet a new crusade would be formed by the Christians for its recovery, and the Turkish fleet would be destroyed in the harbours, before it could be put into a posture of defence. Sicily, he thought, would be a much easier and more certain conquest. The reduction of that island would conduce more to the Sultan's glory, as well as to the interest of his empire ; and it would be quickly followed by the reduction of the Knights of Malta, who could not subsist a single season without those continual supplies of provision which that more fertile region afforded them.

Solyman resolves to begin with the siege of Malta.

A prince of so great penetration as Solyman could not be insensible of the weight of these considerations ; but having been long accustomed to triumph over much more formidable enemies than the knights of Malta, and having formerly ex-

pelled the Knights themselves from Asia, when their power was more considerable than at present, he believed that they could not long resist his victorious arms. In this confidence of success he was confirmed by most of the Bashas, who chose rather to flatter his inclinations at the expence of his interest, than to run the risque of incurring his displeasure. His resentment against the Knights was greatly heightened at this time by the capture of a rich galleon belonging to some of his greatest favourites in the Seraglio. These persons exerted all their influence to procure a speedy vengeance, and contributed to determine the Sultan to open the campaign with the siege of Malta ; after the conquest of which he resolved to turn his arms against the King of Spain.

Having thus fixed his purpose, he issued orders for equipping all the ships in his empire with the utmost expedition ;

His preparations. sent a great number of troops to the sea-ports in the Morea, where he intended they should embark ; and desired Hascem and Dragut, his viceroys in Algiers and Tripoli, to hold their corsairs ready to join his fleet when it should arrive at Malta. He gave the command of the fleet to Piali, and that of the land forces to Mustapha, an experienced general, at the age of sixty-five, who had acquired his esteem and confidence by several victories which he had obtained in Asia. To these men he recommended strongly the acting in concert with each other ; and required them to consult in every matter of importance with Dragut, whom he regarded as the ablest naval officer in his dominions.

The news of his preparations soon reached the several Christian powers on the coast of the Mediterranean. But they were for some time in doubt where the storm which was gathering

La Valette the grand- master of Malta. would burst. At length John de la Valette Parisot, the grand-master of Malta, received certain information of Solyman's design, from spies whom he employed at Constantinople. He immediately communicated his intelligence to the King of Spain, the Pope, and most of the other Christian princes ; and represented to them the necessity of granting their assistance at the present crisis, if they would save from ruin an

order of men whose bravery had for ages past been continually exerted in the protection of Christians of every nation in Europe, 1565. against the implacable enemy of the Christian name.

But although the subjects of almost every Christian state had, on numberless occasions, been supported by their generosity, and protected, or rescued from slavery, by their intrepid valour, yet only such princes thought it incumbent on them to interest themselves in their behalf whose territories lay exposed to immediate danger. Of these no one had so much ground to dread the consequences of suffering the Knights to be overwhelmed, as the King of Spain. For besides that his dominions were more exposed, he was much more obnoxious to the Sultan, than any other Christian monarch. He had repeatedly committed hostilities against the African corsairs, whom Solyman had taken under his protection ; and he could not call in question the intelligence transmitted to him by the grand-master, that as the Turkish armament was to be sent first against the Knights, it would be employed next against himself. Philip had ever looked on Malta as his principal bulwark against the invasions of the Turks ; and he was sensible that he had now more reason than ever to consider it in that view. Prompted by these motives, he resolved to exert himself with vigour in its defence ; and having written to his ministers and allies in Italy, to form an army of twenty thousand men, which should be ready to embark on the shortest notice, he assembled a numerous fleet at Messina, and sent instructions to Don Garcia de Toledo, the viceroy of Sicily, to watch over the preservation of Malta with the same solicitude as if Sicily itself were to be attacked.

The zeal with which Philip espoused the cause of the Knights, delivered them from their anxiety with regard to the final issue of the war, but did not prevent the grand-master from exerting his activity and vigilance in preparing for a vigorous defence. Besides sending a general summons to the Knights dispersed throughout the several provinces in Europe, to repair instantly to Malta ; he distributed all the inhabitants of the island capable of bearing arms, into companies, and appointed the Knights to train them in the several branches of military discipline. He caused two thousand troops to be levied by his agents in Italy, and kept all the ships belonging to the order, perpetually employed in importing arms, military stores, and provisions.

In obedience to his summons, all the Knights hastened to his assistance, except such as were prevented by age or infirmities ; and these supplied their personal services, by sending him all the money which they could raise out of the effects belonging to their convents. Before the arrival of the enemy, he reviewed his forces, and found that they amounted to seven hundred Knights and eight thousand five hundred soldiers, including two companies of Spaniards which were sent to him from Sicily. These troops, after a solemn religious procession, and partaking of the holy sacrament, he distributed among the Knights ; and assigned to all of them their proper stations. In the midst of the multiplicity of affairs which demanded his attention, there was nothing omitted which human prudence could provide. He was continually employed either in visiting the posts, or examining the stores, or strengthening the fortifications, or instructing the officers as to the conduct proper to be observed in case of an attack. The wisdom displayed

Philip's re-solution to support the Knights.

The grand-master's activity and vigilance.

1565. in his plan of defence, inspired his troops with confidence ; and his tranquillity and fortitude communicated to them an elevation of mind, which rendered them superior to every calamity that could befall them.

Arrival of the
Turks at Malta
under Mustapha and Piali. At length the Turkish fleet having left Constantinople in the end of March, arrived in sight of Malta about the middle of May ; consisting of more than two hundred sail, and having on board, besides a great number of Christian slaves, designed to serve as pioneers, above forty thousand land forces, composed chiefly of Janissaries and Spahis, the bravest soldiers of the Ottoman empire. This formidable army landed at some distance from Il Borgo^a, and soon afterwards spread themselves over the country ; setting fire to the villages, putting the peasants to the sword, and carrying off such of the cattle, as, notwithstanding the orders of the grand-master, had not been secured within the forts and towns.

While the Turks were thus employed, La Valette sent out De Copier, marshal of the order, with two hundred horse and six hundred foot, to watch their motions. De Copier, an officer of great experience, executed his commission with so much prudence and vigour, that by falling unexpectedly on detached parties, he cut off one thousand five hundred of the Turks, with the loss of only about eighty men. But La Valette intended, by permitting these skirmishes, only to make trial of his troops, and to accustom them to the looks and shouts of the enemy. He considered, that even so small a loss as was occasioned by these encounters, was more than he could easily support. He therefore recalled De Copier, and sent the soldiers and knights under his command to their respective posts.

The siege of St. Elmo. The Turkish general held a council of war as soon as all his troops were landed, to assist him in resolving where he

should begin his attack. Piali, agreeably to what he understood to have been the Sultan's instructions, was of opinion that they ought not to enter upon action till Dragut should arrive. But Mustapha having received information of the King of Spain's preparations, thought that something must be done instantly for the security of the fleet ; which lay at present in a creek where it was exposed to the violence of the east wind, and might be attacked with great advantage by the Spaniards. On this account he was of opinion, that they should immediately lay siege to a fort called St. Elmo, which stood on a neck of land near Il Borgo, having the principal harbour on one side of it, and on the other, another harbour large enough to contain the whole fleet in safety. This proposal was approved by a majority of the council, and Mustapha proceeded without delay to carry it into execution.

Difficulties attending the siege. He vainly expected that he would be able to reduce the fort in a few days. But besides the valour with which it was defended, there were two circumstances which greatly augmented the difficulty of his enterprise ; one of these was, that the garrison could easily receive supplies from the town, across the great harbour, which was secured by two forts, called St. Angelo and St. Michael, or La Sangue ; and the other, that his approaches to the fort were retarded by the nature of the road leading to it, which was either a bare rock, or the rock thinly covered with a stony soil. This last inconvenience he re-

^a The town where the strength of the order was concentrated.

medied, by substituting in the place of trenches, a parapet formed of planks and beams covered on the side towards the fort with earth, which they brought from a distance, and mixed with straw and rushes. By this invention he was enabled to open a battery mounted with his largest cannon, on the sixth or seventh day after his arrival on the island; and he quickly convinced the governor, the bailiff of Negropont, that it would be impossible for him to hold out long. Of this the governor gave immediate information to the grand-master, and made choice of a knight of the name of La Cerdá for his messenger. 1565. This man, greatly disturbed by fear, exaggerated the danger which he had been sent to represent, and had the imprudence to tell the grand-master, in the presence of many of the Knights, that he must not expect that the place would sustain the siege about a week longer. "And what loss," said La Valette, "have you received that makes you so soon despair?" "The fort," replied La Cerdá, "is to be considered as a sick person, greatly reduced, who must receive continual remedies and supplies." "I myself," answered the grand-master with great indignation, "will be the physician; and will bring others along with me, who, if they cannot cure you of your fear, will at least preserve the fort from falling into the hands of the infidels."

La Valette did not expect that a place which was neither strong, nor large enough to admit a numerous garrison, could be defended long against so great a force as was employed to reduce it; but he thought it necessary that the siege of this fort should be prolonged as much as possible, in order to give the viceroy of Sicily time to come to his relief. With this view he resolved to throw himself into St. Elmo with a select body of troops; and he was preparing to set out when the whole body of Knights remonstrated with such earnest importunity against his leaving the town, that he at last consented to suffer the reinforcement which he had prepared, to be conducted to the fort by a knight called De Medran, upon whose conduct and intrepidity he could rely with the most assured confidence.

Not long after De Medran's arrival in the fort, the garrison made a vigorous sally, in which they drove the enemy from their intrenchments, and put a number of them to the sword. But the rest soon recovered from their surprise; and having returned to the charge, they compelled the Christians to retire. In this encounter, the vigorous efforts of the Janissaries were favoured by the wind, which blew the smoke of the guns upon the fort, and covered the besieged with a thick cloud, through which it was impossible to discern the operations of the enemy. This incident the Turks had the presence of mind to improve to great advantage. They seized, unperceived, upon the counterscarp, made a lodgment there with beams, woolsacks, and gabions; and raised a battery upon it with incredible expedition. After the smoke was dispersed, the besieged beheld what had been done with much astonishment; and they were the more disquieted, as the fortification which the Turks had raised upon the counterscarp, overtopped a ravelin which lay near it, in which the besieged could no longer appear with safety. They resolved, however, to defend this ravelin as long as possible, whatever it should cost them.

In the mean time Dragut and another noted corsair called Uluchiali arrived with twenty gallies, having, besides slaves and seamen, two thousand five hundred troops on board. This

St. Elmo
thought
untenable
by the gar-
rison.

The grand-
master's
reasons for
defending it
to the last.

Progress of
the siege.

Arrival of
Dragut.

1565. reinforcement and the presence of Dragut added fresh vigour to the operations of the siege. This gallant corsair exposed himself on all occasions with the utmost intrepidity ; spent whole days in the trenches ; and as besides his other extraordinary talents, he was particularly skilful in the management of artillery, he caused some new batteries to be raised in more advantageous situations than had hitherto been made choice of ; and kept up a continual fire both upon the ravelin above mentioned, and a cavalier that covered the fort, and was one of its principal defences.

This cavalier soon became the only defence which could prevent the besiegers from coming up to the very foot of the wall. Some Turkish engineers having approached the ravelin

Progress of the siege. at day-break, to examine the effects of their artillery, they observed a gun-port so low, that one of them, when mounted on the shoulders of another, looked into it, and saw the Christian soldiers lying on the ground asleep. Of this they gave immediate information to the troops ; who, advancing as quickly and silently as possible, and clapping ladders to the gun-hole, got up into the ravelin, and cut most of the Christians to pieces.

Between this ravelin and the cavalier lay the ditch, over which the besieged had thrown a temporary bridge of planks, leading up to the cavalier. The Turks perceiving this, leapt instantly upon the bridge, and attempted to make themselves masters of the cavalier, as they had already done of the ravelin. But the garrison was now alarmed ; the bravest of the Knights hastened from different quarters to the post of danger ; and, after an obstinate engagement, they compelled the Turks to retire into the ravelin. There the Janissaries observing another way of reaching the cavalier, by a path from the bottom of the ditch, they threw themselves down without dread or hesitation ; and having ascended by this path to the other side, they renewed their attack with greater fury than ever. The combat lasted from sun-rise till noon, when the invincible bravery of the garrison proved at last victorious. About twenty Knights and a hundred soldiers were killed, and near three thousand of the enemy.

As the ravelin was open on the side towards the fort, the besieged pointed some cannon against it, and made great havoc among the Infidels. But Mustapha, sensible of the value of the acquisition which he had made, poured in fresh soldiers without number ; and the pioneers coming forward with wool-sacks, planks, and gabions, put the troops at length in safety, and made a lodgment in the ravelin, of which the garrison were never able to dispossess them.

The grand-master's concern on account of this disaster was greatly augmented by considering that it could not have happened so soon, without some negligence on the part of the garrison. He sent them however an immediate reinforcement ; but both the siege and the defence were carried on with the same vigour as before.

The distress of the garrison. But the situation of the besieged was now become much more dangerous than formerly. The Turks applied themselves with unremitting diligence to heighten the ravelin till

it overtop the wall of the fort ; and after this, the garrison could no longer appear upon the parapet with safety. Many were killed by the enemy's artillery. Several breaches were made in different parts of the wall, and the hearts of the bravest Knights began to fail

within them. They apprehended, that ere long the Turkish general would attempt to take the fort by storm, and they dreaded that it would be impossible for so small a number to resist so numerous an enemy. 1565.

They agreed, therefore, though with much reluctance, to apply to the grand master for liberty to quit the fort ; and they made choice of the chevalier De Medran for their messenger. De Medran represented that the fort was in reality no longer tenable, and that to continue in it, though only a few days, would infallibly occasion the utter destruction of the garrison. That nothing could be of greater advantage to the Turks than sending the forces of the Order to a place where there were no fortifications to defend them ; that by so doing, the troops necessary for the defence of the other fortresses would soon be consumed, and these fortresses become an easy prey to the enemy. But he concluded with saying, that, although this was the opinion of all the garrison, he was commissioned to declare to the grand master, that whatever resolution he should form, they were determined to yield an implicit obedience to his authority.

Most of the Knights in council thought that this request of the garrison ought to be immediately granted. But La Valette was of a contrary opinion. The fort, he acknowledged, would not probably hold out much longer ; and he lamented the fate of those gallant Knights and soldiers who were stationed in so perilous a situation. But there were cases, he said, in which it was necessary to sacrifice some of the members for the preservation of the body ; and such he knew to be the present critical state of their affairs. For he was credibly informed that the Sicilian viceroy had declared, that if the fort of St Elmo were lost, (as he could not then attack the Turks with the same advantage as at present,) he would not expose his fleet to the risk of a defeat for the sake of the rest of the island. And on this account La Valette subjoined, that the preservation of the Order depended almost entirely on the length of the present siege. This he represented to the chevalier De Medran, and sent him back with instructions to remind the Knights of the vow which they took at their entrance into the Order, of sacrificing their lives for its defence. He likewise bade him assure them, in his name, that he would not fail to send them such reinforcements as they should stand in need of, and was determined, as soon as it should be necessary, to come himself to their assistance, with a fixed, unalterable purpose to lay down his life, sooner than deliver the fort into the hands of the Infidels.

This answer had the desired effect on several of the Knights, and particularly on those whose principles of honour and attachment to the Order were confirmed by years. But the greater part of them were much dissatisfied. They thought the grand-master's treatment of them harsh and cruel, and wrote him a letter, subscribed by fifty-three, in which, after repeating their former request, they informed him, that if he did not, on the next night, send boats to carry them to the town, they were determined to sally out into the Turkish camp, where they might fall honourably by the sword, instead of suffering such an ignominious death as they had reason to expect, if the fort were taken by storm.

To this letter La Valette replied, “ That they were much mistaken, if they expected to satisfy their honour by throwing away their lives ;

They apply
for liberty
to quit the
fort.

1565. since it was no less their duty to submit to his authority, than to sacrifice their lives in defence of the Order : that the preservation of the whole depended on their present obedience to his commands : that no aid was to be expected from Spain if the fort were given up ; and that if he should yield to their request, and bring them to the town, the town itself would then be immediately invested, and they, as well as the rest, soon afterwards reduced to a situation more desperate than that from which they were so solicitous to escape, by deserting an important station which they had undertaken to defend." Besides this letter, he sent three commissioners to examine the state of the fortifications ; intending by this measure, either to gain time, or to prevent the garrison from sinking into despair.

These commissioners differ widely in the accounts which they delivered at their return. Two of them thought it impossible to defend the fort much longer. But the third, named Constantine Castriot, a Greek prince, descended from the famous Albanian hero, Sanderbeg, whether from ignorance, or consciousness of greater resources in his native courage than the other two possessed, maintained that the garrison was far from being reduced to the last extremity ; and to give proof how firmly he was persuaded of the truth of what he said, he offered to enter the fort himself, and to undertake the defence of it with such troops as should be willing to accompany him.

The grand-master, strongly impressed with a sense of the necessity of protracting the siege, immediately accepted this offer, and bestowed the highest encomiums on Castriot's zeal and resolution. Nor did Castriot find any difficulty in persuading a sufficient number to attend him, who were no less zealous and resolute than himself. The soldiers crowded to his standard, and were emulous to have their names enrolled for that dangerous service in which he had engaged.

When La Valette saw the spirit by which these men were animated, and had no longer any doubt of being able, by their means, to prolong the siege of the fort, he sent a letter to the Knights, acquainting them, that he was now willing to give them their discharge ; and would immediately send another garrison, into whose hands, he desired, they should be ready to deliver up the fort, and come themselves to the town in the boats in which their successors were to be transported. " You, my brethren," continued he, " may be in greater safety here than in your present situation ; and I shall then feel less anxiety for the preservation of the fort, although I think it of so great importance, that on the preservation of it, that of our Order seems entirely to depend."

The contents and style of this letter affected the Knights in the most sensible manner, and roused within them that delicate sense of honour, by which the Order had been so long and so eminently distinguished. They dreaded the reception which they were about to meet with from the grand-master and the other Knights : " And should this new garrison," said they to each other, " which is appointed to succeed us, be fortunate enough to hold out till the Spaniards arrive, in what corner of the earth shall we conceal our infamy ? " They resolved without hesitation to remain in the fort till every man should perish, rather than either deliver it to the new garrison, or abandon it to the enemy. And they went in a body to the governor, and intreated him to inform the grand-master, of their repentance, and to join with them in praying that

they might be suffered to wipe out the remembrance of their fault
by their future conduct. 1565.

The governor readily complied ; and, in order to prevent the new garrison from setting out in the night, he dispatched his letter by a noted swimmer before it was dark. La Valette secretly rejoiced at this application ; but sent word to the governor, that he must always prefer even a body of new troops to the most experienced warriors, who had refused to submit to the control of military discipline. When this answer was reported to the Knights, they were overwhelmed with anguish, and had recourse to the most submissive intreaties of forgiveness. The grand-master suffered himself at last to be overcome ; and henceforth the garrison, dismissing all thoughts of their own safety, were intent on nothing but how to prolong the defence.

The grand-master sent them every night fresh troops, to supply the place of the killed and wounded ; and kept them well furnished with provisions, ammunition, and fireworks. Of these last he had invented a particular kind, which consisted of hoops of wood, covered with wool, and steeped in boiling oil, and other inflammable liquors, mixed with nitre and gunpowder. To these machines they set fire, and threw them flaming in the midst of the enemy, when they were crowded together at an assault. It happened often that two or three of the Turks were hooked together and scorched to death ; and the utmost confusion was produced wherever the hoops were thrown.

The besieged stood much in need of these, and every other instrument of mischief, that could be devised for their defence. In spite of the most vigorous opposition, the Turks had cast a bridge over the ditch, and begun to sap and undermine the wall. From the seventeenth of June to the fourteenth of July not a single day past without some rencounter ; and Mustapha had frequently attempted to scale the wall of the fort, but had been as often repulsed with the loss of some of the bravest of his troops.

The invincible
bravery of the
garrison.

Ashamed at having been detained so long before a place of such inconsiderable strength, he resolved to make one great decisive effort, and to bring to the assault as many of his forces as the situation of the place would permit him to employ. He had already made several breaches ; but in order to secure the success of the assault which he now intended, he kept his batteries playing all the fifteenth without intermission, till the wall on that side where he designed his attack was almost level with the rock. On the sixteenth the fleet was drawn up before sun-rise as near the fort as the depth of the water would allow ; four thousand musketeers and archers were stationed in the trenches ; and the rest of the troops, upon a signal given, advanced to the breach. The garrison was prepared to receive them. The breach was lined with several ranks of soldiers, having the Knights interspersed among them at certain distances. The Turks attempted often to break through this determined band, and to overpower them with their numbers. But their numbers served only to augment the loss which they sustained. Every shot from the fort did execution. The artillery made dreadful havoc among them, and the burning hoops were employed with astonishing success. The novelty of these machines, and the shrieks of those who were caught in them, added greatly to the terror which they inspired, and made it impossible for the Turkish officers to keep their

1565. men firm and steady in pursuing the advantages which, had they preserved their ranks, their numbers must have infallibly secured.

At length Mustapha, after having continued the assault for more than six hours, without gaining a single inch of ground on the besieged, gave orders for sounding a retreat.

In this attack the garrison lost about twenty knights and three hundred soldiers ; but this loss was immediately supplied by a reinforcement from the town : and Mustapha was at last convinced, that, unless the communication between the fort and the town were cut off, it would be impossible to bring the siege of the former to a period, while any troops remained in any other part of the island. By the advice of Dragut he resolved to extend his trenches and batteries, on the side next to the town, till they should reach to that part of the sea, or great harbour, where those supplies were landed which the grand-master daily sent to the garrison. This undertaking, he knew, must be attended with the utmost difficulty, because all the space between his entrenchments and the point to which it was necessary to extend them, lay exposed to the artillery both of Fort St. Elmo and Mt. Angelo. In viewing the ground, a Sangiac, in whom he put confidence, was killed by

his side ; and, what was still a more irreparable loss, Dragut ^{Dragut killed.} received a mortal wound, of which he died in a few days^b.

This did not however discourage Mustapha from pursuing his design. By employing his troops and pioneers at the work day and night without intermission, he at length carried it into execution. Then having planted batteries along the shore, and filled his trenches with muskeeters, it was impossible for any boat to pass from the town to the fort, without the most imminent danger of either being sunk or intercepted.

After this precaution, he resumed with fresh vigour his attempt to take the fort by storm. On the twenty-first, he ^{The garrison reduced to the last extremity.} made four different assaults ; all of which the garrison

withstood, and in repulsing so many thousand brave and well-disciplined troops, displayed a degree of prowess and fortitude which almost exceeds belief, and is beyond the power of description. But this heroic garrison was now exceedingly reduced in number ; and there was the strongest reason to apprehend, that, in one assault more, they must inevitably be overpowered, unless a reinforcement were sent them from the town. Of their desperate situation they gave intelligence to the grand-master, by one who swam across the harbour in the night. The boats were instantly filled with knights and other soldiers, who generously resolved to devote themselves to certain destruction, for the general safety and the preservation of the fort. They set off from the town with as much alacrity as if they had entertained the most sanguine hopes of victory ; but they found the Turks every where so much upon their guard, and the lines so strongly defended, that, after several fruitless attempts to land, they were at last obliged to return, depressed with sorrow for the fate of their brave companions.

The garrison now despairing of relief, gave themselves up for lost ; but instead of their capitulating, or attempting to escape, they prepared for death, and passed the night in prayer, and in receiving the sacrament ; after which, they embraced one another tenderly, and then repaired to their respective posts ; while such of the wounded as had

^b He was wounded in the head by the splinters of a stone, which was beat to pieces by a cannon-shot from Fort St. Angelo.

been disabled from walking, were, at their own earnest desire, carried to the side of the breach, where they waited without dismay, for the approach of the Turkish army.

Early in the morning of the twenty-third of July, the Turks advanced to the assault, with loud shouts as to certain victory, which they believed so small a handful men as now remained in the fort would not dare to dispute with them. In this expectation they were disappointed. The garrison being resolved on death, and despising danger, were more than men, and exerted a degree of prowess and valour that filled their enemies with amazement. The combat lasted upwards of four hours, till not only every knight, but every soldier had fallen, except two or three who saved themselves by swimming. The Turkish colours were then planted on the ramparts ; and the fleet entered the harbour which the fort commanded in a kind of triumph. When Mustapha took a view of the fort, and examined its size and fortifications, he could not refrain from saying, “ What will not the father cost us, (meaning the town,) when the son, who is so small, has cost ^{so} many thousand ^e of our bravest troops ? ” But this reflection, far from exciting his admiration of that heroic fortitude which he had found so difficult to overcome, served only to inspire him with a brutal fury. He ordered all such of the garrison as were found lying on the breach alive, to be ript open, and their hearts torn out. And as an insult on the knights and their religion, he caused their dead bodies to be searched for, and large gashes to be made in them, in the form of a cross, after which he tied them on planks, and threw them into the sea, to be carried by the wind and tide to the town, or Fort St. Angelo.

The grand-master was at first melted into tears at this shocking spectacle ; but his grief was soon converted into indignation and revenge ; and these passions betrayed him into an action unworthy of the exalted character which he bore. In order to teach the Basha, as he pretended, to make war with less barbarity, he caused all the Turks whom he had taken prisoners to be massacred ; and then putting their heads into his largest cannon, he shot them into the Turkish camp.

In the siege which has been related, the Order lost about one thousand five hundred men, including one hundred and thirty of the bravest knights. The grand-master was deeply affected at so great a loss ; but he wisely dissembled his concern, and wearing still the same magnanimous and intrepid aspect as before, he inspired all the troops that remained, with a fixed, unalterable resolution to defend the town and the other forts to the last extremity.

Mustapha vainly imagined, that being intimidated by the fate of their companions, they would be now inclined to listen to terms of capitulation ; and in this hope he sent an officer with a white flag to one of the gates, attended by a Christian slave, designed to serve for his interpreter. The Turk was not allowed to enter within the town ; but the Christian was admitted, and was led through several ranks of soldiers under arms by an officer, who, after shewing him all the fortifications of the place, desired him to take particular notice of the depth and breadth of the ditch, and said to him, “ See there, the only spot we can afford

St. Elmo taken by assault.

1565.

^e Eight thousand.

1565. your general ; and there we hope soon to bury him and all his Janissaries."

Siege of II Borgo and fort St. Michael. This insulting speech being reported by the slave, excited in the fiery mind of the Basha the highest degree of wrath and indignation, and made him resolve to exert himself to the

utmost in the prosecution of the siege. His troops, though greatly diminished, were still sufficient to invest at once both the town and the fort of St. Michael^d. He kept a constant fire on both ; but he intended first to apply himself chiefly to the reduction of the latter, which he proposed to attack both by land and water, at the extremity of the peninsula^e on which it stands. In order to accomplish this design, it was necessary he should have some shipping introduced into the harbour, for transporting his forces. But the mouth of the harbour having been rendered inaccessible by a great iron chain, and the cannon of St. Angelo, his design must have been relinquished, if Piali had not suggested an expedient against which the grand-master had not provided. This was to make the Christian slaves and the crews of the ships draw a number of boats, by the strength of their arms, over the neck of land on which stood Fort St. Elmo. Of this proposal, which Mustapha immediately adopted, information was carried to the grand-master by a Turkish officer, who, being by birth a Greek, was touched suddenly with remorse, and deserted to the Christians. In consequence of this intelligence, La Valette set a great number of hands to work in framing a stacado along that part of the promontory where the Turks intended their attack ; and at another part, where the depth of the water or the hardness of the bottom would not admit of the stacado, he ordered strong intrenchments to be made upon the beach. Mustapha in the mean time fired incessantly upon the fort, while the slaves and crews were employed in transporting the boats over land into the harbour. At length the Basha, judging that the number of boats which he had transported would be sufficient, and that the breaches which his artillery had made were practicable, resolved without further delay to make an attack both by sea and land. He was the more confident of

Arrival of Hascem, son of Barbarossa. success, as, since the taking of St. Elmo, he had received a considerable reinforcement, by the arrival of Hascem, son of Barbarossa, with two thousand five hundred select soldiers,

commonly called the Bravoes of Algiers. Hascem, who possessed a considerable share of his father's fire, and was ambitious to distinguish himself in the service of the Sultan, begged of Mustapha to intrust him with the assault of Fort St. Michael ; and vaunted, with his natural arrogance, that he would soon make himself master of it sword in hand. The Basha, whether from an opinion of his valour, or an intention to teach him at his own expence the folly of his presumption, readily complied with his request ; and having added six thousand men to his Algerines, he promised to support him with the rest of his army.

Hascem divided his forces with Candelissa, an old corsair, his lieutenant ; to whom he committed the attack by sea, whilst he reserved that on the land side to himself.

^d They are situated on two promontories that run out into the great harbour, and are separated from each other by a channel, where the gallies belonging to the Order lay, and the mouth of which was strongly secured on each side by batteries.

^e Called the Spur.

Candelissa having put his troops on board the boats, set out with drums beating, and hautboys and other musical instruments playing, preceded by a boat filled with Mahometan priests, some of whom were employed in offering prayers to Heaven for his success, or in singing hymns ; while others had books in their hands out of which they read imprecations against the Christians. Candelissa attempted first to break down the stacado which had been formed to obstruct his landing ; but finding it much stronger than he expected, and that, while he was employed in demolishing it, his troops must suffer greatly from the enemy's fire, he thought it would be easier to make a descent on that part of the shore which the grand-master had strengthened with intrenchments. At this important post the Christian troops were commanded by an ancient knight of the name of Guimaran. This experienced officer reserved his fire till the Turks had advanced within a little distance of the shore, when by a single discharge he killed about four hundred men. This did not prevent the rest from approaching. Candelissa pushed forwards while the Christians were loading their cannon, and landed at the head of his Algerines. But Guimaran having reserved some cannon charged with grape-shot, did dreadful execution among them after they had landed, and many of them began to fly to their boats ; which Candelissa observing, he commanded the boats to be put off to a little distance from the shore. His troops, perceiving then that they must either die or conquer, took courage from despair, and advanced boldly to the intrenchment, with ladders for scaling it in one hand, and their sabres in the other. The combatants on both sides displayed the most intrepid valour. Great numbers fell, and the ditch was choaked with blood, and with the bodies of the dead and wounded. The Turks at last, after an engagement of five hours, reached the top of the intrenchment, and there planted their ensigns. The knights, stung with shame on account of their retreat, returned with redoubled ardour. But they would probably have been overpowered by the superior number of the enemy, had not the grand-master sent them a seasonable reinforcement, under the admiral de Giou, and the Chevalier de Quiney ; who fell upon the Algerines and Turks with a degree of fury that struck terror into Candelissa himself, who was noted for his intrepidity. Having ordered the boats to be brought nearer the shore, he was among the first who fled. His bravoes fought desperately for some time after he had left them ; but were at length thrown down from the intrenchments, and compelled to fly to their boats with the utmost precipitation. The Christians pursued them, and the batteries continued firing on them without intermission. Many of the boats were sunk ; the water was covered with dead bodies, mangled limbs, shields and helmets. Of the four thousand who had been sent on this enterprize, scarcely five hundred remained, and many of these were dangerously wounded.

Hascem was not more fortunate in his assault by land, than Candelissa was by sea. After having been repulsed at one breach with great slaughter, he rallied his troops, and led them on to another, where he fought long and desperately, till most of the bravoes having fallen by his side, he was obliged, with much reluctance and sorrow, to sound a retreat.

Mustapha, not unmindful of his promise to support him, no sooner perceived him beginning to retire, than he ordered the Janissaries, whom he had kept under arms, to advance. The

1565.
Candelissa
repulsed
with great
slaughter.

Mustapha
repulsed.

1565. garrison had maintained an engagement with Hascem for five hours, in the middle of the day, and in the hottest season of the year ; yet, as if they had not been subject to the wants and weaknesses of humanity, they advanced beyond the breach to meet the Janissaries, and fought apparently with as much vigour and fortitude as before. By the power of superior numbers, they were compelled to fall back within the breach. But there they made the most desperate resistance ; and, being reinforced by de Giou and de Guiney, with the troops which had triumphed over Candelissa, they at last repulsed the Janissaries with dreadful slaughter ; after having lost more than forty knights, and two hundred of the bravest of the common men.

Mustapha, enraged by this invincible obstinacy which the Christians displayed in their defence, and dreading that the Spanish succours, which had been already delayed much longer than he expected, might soon arrive, resolved now to employ his whole force at once, and while he himself prosecuted

The siege of Il Borgo, and St. Michael carried on at the same time. the siege of Fort St. Michael with one half of his troops, to employ the other under Piali, against the town. More batteries were raised. The trenches were advanced still nearer than before. Bridges of sail-yards and masts were thrown over the ditches. Mines, notwithstanding the hard and rocky soil, were sprung. Assaults were repeated without number, and the two Bashas, emulous of one another, and each of them agitated with continual anxiety lest victory should declare first for his competitor, exhibited the most shining proof of personal courage, and exhausted all the art of war then known in the world. Yet, through the determined bravery of the knights, conducted by the grand-master with consummate prudence and indefatigable vigilance, the Turks were baffled in every attempt, and repulsed with slaughter. Mustapha flattered himself once with the most sanguine hopes of success on his part, made a machine invented by his principal engineer, in the form of a huge cask bound strongly with iron hoops, and filled with gunpowder, nails, chains, bullets, and such other instruments of death. After setting fire to a train which was fastened to this machine, it was thrown by the force of an engine, upon a ravelin that was the principal defence of the fort. But the garrison undismayed, found means, before it caught fire, to cast it out again into the midst of the assailants. In a moment afterwards it burst with dreadful fury, and filled the Turks with consternation. The knights then sallied out upon them sword in hand, and taking advantage of their confusion, killed many of them, and put the rest to flight.

Success of Piali against Il Borgo. Piali had, on some occasions, still more reason than Mustapha to entertain the hopes of victory, although the town was much stronger than the fort, and La Valette commanded there

in person. By his batteries he had demolished all the out-works of the place, and had made an immense breach in the wall. While his troops were engaged in a furious assault, that engrossed the whole attention of the besieged from morning till night, he employed a great number of pioneers in raising a cavalier or plat-form of earth and stones, close by the breach, and so high as to overlook the parapet. Night, in the mean time, came on, and prevented him from carrying any further this great advantage ; but he doubted not that next day he should be able to make himself master of the place.

As soon as he had drawn off his forces, a council of the Order was convened, and most of the knights were of opinion that the town was no longer tenable ; that the fortifications which still remained should be blown up, and that the garrison and inhabitants should retire into the castle of St. Angelo. But the grand-master received this proposal with horror and indignation. “ This would be in effect,” said he, “ to deliver the whole island into the hands of the Infidels. Fort St. Michael, which has been so gallantly defended, and which is preserved by its communication with the town, would thus be soon reduced to the necessity of surrendering. There is no room in the castle of St. Angelo for the inhabitants and troops ; nor, if there were room, is there water in that fort for so great a number.” It was then proposed that at least the relics of the saints and the ornaments of the churches should be carried into the castle ; and the knights earnestly intreated the grand-master to retire into it himself, assuring him that they would conduct the defence with the utmost vigour and vigilance. “ No, my brethren,” he replied, “ what you propose as to the sacred things, would serve only to intimidate the soldiers. We must conceal our apprehensions. It is here we must either die or conquer. And is it possible that I, at the age of seventy-one, can end my life so honourably, as in fighting, together with my friends and brethren, against the implacable enemies of our holy faith ?” He then told them what he thought proper to be done, and proceeded instantly to put it in execution. Having called all the soldiers from Fort St. Angelo, except a few who were necessary for managing the artillery, he employed them and the inhabitants all night, in throwing up intrenchments within the breach ; after which he sent out some of the bravest knights, with a select body of troops, to make an attempt on the cavalier. These men stole softly along the foot of the wall till they arrived at the place appointed ; when they set up a loud shout, and attacked the guards whom Piali had left there, with so much fury, that the Turks, believing the whole garrison had fallen upon them, abandoned their post, and fled precipitately to their camp.

The cavalier was immediately fortified, a battery of cannon planted on it, and a parapet raised on the side towards the enemy. And thus the breach was rendered impracticable ; the town put in greater security than before ; and a work, which had been devised for its destruction, converted into a bulwark for its defence.

The grand-master had now greater confidence than ever of being able to hold out till the Spaniards should come to his relief. In consequence of the assurances given by Philip, and the Sicilian viceroy, he had, long before this time, entertained the hopes of their arrival, and had often earnestly solicited the viceroy to hasten his departure from Messina. The conduct of this nobleman was long exceedingly mysterious. The patience of the knights was worn out by his delays ; and they, and many others, suspected that the real motive of his conduct was the dread of encountering with an admiral of so great a reputation as Piali. But it afterwards appeared that the viceroy had acted agreeably to his instructions from the court of Spain. For although Philip was, for the reasons above mentioned, sincerely interested in the preservation of the knights, and had amused them with the most flattering promises of assistance, yet he seems from

1565.
The wisdom and intrepidity of the grand-master.

Ungenerous conduct of Philip.
Aug. 24.

1565. the first to have resolved not to expose himself to danger on their account, and to avoid, if possible, a general engagement.

A generous and grateful prince would have acted very differently towards an ally so deserving of his support ; and if either generosity or gratitude had been the leading principle of Philip's conduct, it is probable he would, on this occasion, have regarded the knights as his own subjects ; and have thought it no less incumbent on him to exert himself in their defence, than if they had acknowledged him for their sovereign.

But Philip was affected by the danger only so far as it threatened the tranquillity of his own dominions. He had resolved to interpose in their behalf, rather than to suffer them to be overpowered ; but he appears to have been very little touched with their calamities ; and to have intended to leave them to themselves, as long as there was any prospect of their being able to make resistance ; by doing which he considered, that he would not only preserve his own strength entire, but might afterwards engage with the Turks, when they were exhausted by the operations of the siege.

Philip adhered inflexibly to this plan, notwithstanding the grand-master's repeated importunities, much longer than was consistent even with his own selfish views. For, without a degree of fortitude and prowess on the part of the garrison, and a degree of wisdom, vigilance, and magnanimity, on that of the grand-master, infinitely higher than there could be reason to expect, it must have been impossible for such a handful of men to have withstood, for so long a time, so great a force, and such mighty efforts as were employed to reduce them. Even the death of the grand-master alone, whose person was exposed to perpetual danger, would have proved fatal to the knights, long before Philip sent orders to his viceroy to give them any effectual support ; and in this case, as his own dominions or his fleet would have been immediately attacked, he would probably have had little reason to be satisfied with the timid, ungenerous counsels which he pursued.

Whatever judgment may be formed on this head, the viceroy did not think himself at liberty to yield to the repeated applications of the grand-master, till the operations of the siege began to relax, and the Turkish forces were reduced from forty-five thousand to fifteen or sixteen thousand ; of whom many were worn out with the fatigues which they had undergone, and others rendered unfit for action by a bloody flux, which for several weeks had raged amongst them.

In this situation of affairs, when it was probable that the knights would, without assistance, have compelled the Turks to raise the siege, the viceroy let the grand master know that he had now received such instructions from the King, as put it in his power to shew his attachment to the Order ; that he was not indeed permitted to attack the Turkish fleet ; but that he would immediately bring him a strong body of troops, whose commanders (as he himself must return to Sicily) were to be entirely subject to the grand-master's authority, till the enemy should be expelled.

The viceroy, although still suspected of interposing unnecessary delays, at length fulfilled his promise ; and on the seventh of September landed six thousand men, under Don Alvara de Sandé^e and Ascanio della Corna, in that part of the

^e This is the same nobleman whose valiant defence of the fort of Gerba is described in Book IV. p. 60.

island which lay at the greatest distance from the Turks ; after which he immediately carried back the fleet to Sicily. 1565.

The Turkish bashas had been persuaded by their spies, that the vice-roy's intention was to land his troops at the castle of St. Angelo ; and to prevent this, Piali had lain several days at anchor before the great port after having blocked up the entrance into it by a chain of sail-yards, piles, and boats.

In the mean time, intelligence being brought to Mustapha that the Spaniards were landed, and marching towards him, he was thrown into the most dreadful consternation. Sensible that his soldiers were much disheartened by their ill success, he imagined that he was about to be attacked by a superior army, consisting of the bravest and best disciplined troops in Spain. Without waiting for information of their number, he forthwith raised the siege, drew his garrison out of St. Elmo, and leaving all his heavy cannon behind him, embarked his troops with as much precipitation as if the Spaniards with superior forces had been in sight. He had scarcely got on board when a deserter arrived from the Spanish camp, and informed him that with fifteen or sixteen thousand men, he had fled before an army that did not exceed six thousand, having no general at their head, and commanded by officers who were independent of one another. The Basha was overwhelmed with shame and vexation by this intelligence, and would have immediately disembarked ; but this, he knew, he durst not attempt without consulting Piali, Hascem, and his other principal officers.

While he was deliberating upon it, the grand master improved to the best advantage the leisure that was afforded him. He employed all the inhabitants, men, women, and children, as well as the soldiers, in filling up the enemy's trenches, and demolishing their works ; and put a garrison without delay into Fort St. Elmo ; in which the Turks now beheld from their ships the standard of St. John erected where that of Mahomet had lately stood.

This demonstrated to Mustapha how much new labour awaited him in case he should return to the siege ; but being enraged against himself on account of the precipitancy of his retreat, and disquieted at the thoughts of the reception which he had reason to expect from Solymon, he wished to atone for his imprudence and to wipe off the reproach in which it had involved him, by victory or death. Piali, who from his jealousy of the Basha's credit with the Sultan, was not sorry for the failure of his enterprise, represented, in a council of war convened on this occasion, that as the troops were much dispirited and worn out, it would be exposing them to certain destruction, either to lead them against the enemy, or to resume the operations of the siege. But a majority of the council were of a different opinion ; and it was resolved to land the forces again without delay, and to march directly against the Spaniards.

The Turkish soldiers complained bitterly of this unexpected resolution, and obeyed the orders to disembark with much reluctance. Their officers were obliged to employ threats with some, and force with others. At length the number intended was put on shore, and Mustapha set out at their head in search of the enemy.

The siege raised, and the departure of the Turks.

The Turks again landed.

1556.
and de-
feated by
the Spa-
niards.

The grand-master had not neglected to give early notice of their march to the Spanish commanders, who had intrenched their little army on a steep hill, which the Turks would have found almost inaccessible ; and it was the opinion of some of the principal officers, that they should avail themselves of the advantage of their situation, and stand in their defence. But this proposal was rejected with disdain by the bold adventurous De Sandé, and the greatest part of the Spanish officers ; and the troops were led out of their encampment, to meet the enemy in the open field. This conduct, more fortunate perhaps than prudent, contributed to encrease the dejection of the Turkish soldiers, and to facilitate their defeat. Having been dragged against their inclination to the field of battle ; and being attacked by the Spaniards with great fury, both in front and flank, they scarcely fought ; but, being struck with a sudden panic, they fled with the utmost precipitation.

Mustapha, confounded and enraged by this pusillanimous behaviour of his troops, was hurried along by the violent tide of the fugitives. He fell twice from his horse, and would have been taken prisoner, if his officers had not rescued him. The Spaniards pursued briskly till they came to the sea-shore. There Piali had his boats ready to receive the Turks, and a number of shallops filled with musketeers drawn up to favour their escape. Without this precaution, they must all have perished ; and even, notwithstanding the protection which it afforded them, the number of their killed amounted to two thousand men, while the victors lost only thirteen or fourteen at most.

Such, after four months continuance, was the conclusion of Conclusion. the siege of Malta, which will be for ever memorable on account of that extraordinary display of the most generous and heroic valour by which the knights, so few in number, were enabled to baffle the most vigorous effort which could be made to subdue them by the most powerful monarch in the world. The news of their deliverance gave universal joy to the Christian powers ; and the name of the grand-master excited every where the highest admiration and applause. Congratulations were sent him from every quarter ; and in many States public rejoicings were celebrated on account of his success. The King of Spain, who derived greater advantage than any other from that glorious defence to which La Valette had so highly contributed, sent an ambassador to present him with a sword and dagger of which the hilts were solid gold, adorned with diamonds, as a testimony of his respect ; and engaged to pay him annually a sum of money to assist him in repairing his ruined fortifications^d.

^d Thuanus, lib. xxxviii. Herrera, historia general. lib. vii. Cabrera, lib. vi. Vertot. Hist. des Cheval. de Malthe.

THE
HISTOR Y
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VII.

PHILIP, being now delivered from his apprehensions of a Turkish invasion, applied himself with zeal to his favourite objects, the extirpation of heresy, and the enforcing of obedience to the council of Trent. Nor in these points did he meet with much opposition, in any part of his dominions except the Netherlands ; where the seeds of discord, which had been sown in the beginning of his reign, were approaching fast towards maturity. The dutchess of Parma had, soon after his departure, experienced what a difficult charge she had undertaken. The regular clergy still continued to complain as loudly as ever of the new erection of bishoprics ; and contributed to the utmost of their power to foment the spirit of discontent among the people. No change, they said, could be legally made in the constitution of the church, without the consent of the States. The new erections were therefore a violation of a fundamental law ; which was the more intolerable, as the abbots, on whose ruins the bishoprics were raised, were natives of the country, and deeply interested in the public welfare ; whereas the bishops would be entirely devoted to the courts of Rome and Spain. But the regent was obliged to pay a greater regard to the orders of the King, than to the complaints or remonstrances of the people. Nor did she yield to the importunities of any of the cities, into which it had been resolved that the new bishops should be introduced, except Antwerp ; the citizens whereof sent deputies to Madrid, and found means to convince Philip, that his new institution, through the dread with which it would inspire foreigners that the inquisition was about to be established, would prove destructive to their commerce^a.

The affairs
of the Ne-
therlands.

While the regent was employed in settling the new bishops, she was not unmindful of the King's injunctions with respect to the execution

^a Meteren, lib. ii. p. 37. Bentivoglio. Grotius, &c.

1565. of the edicts. They were executed with the utmost rigour, against persons of all ages and of both sexes, without distinction ; and no greater regard was shewn, on many occasions, to the laws of nature and humanity, than to the constitution of the provinces. The regent was not of herself inclined to those cruel measures that were pursued ; but she was directed in every thing by Granvelle^b, whose views, she knew, were perfectly conformable to those of the King ; and whose judgment, for that reason, she often followed in contradiction to her own.

It was seldom that any matters relative to the edicts or the ^{The nobility} new bishoprics were laid before the council, and when they ^{disgusted} were brought thither, they were proposed as points already fixed, and not as subjects on which there was room to deliberate. The regent formed her resolutions privately, with the assistance of Granvelle, and there was nothing left to the council, but to give their sanction to the measures which had been resolved upon before.

It is not surprising that a conduct so extremely partial should have given umbrage to the other counsellors. The prince of Orange and the counts Egmont and Horn^c were more particularly offended with it. Their high stations, their merit and services, and the trust which had ever been reposed in them by the late Emperor, entitled them to a principal share in the regent's most secret councils ; and they were filled with indignation when they saw that, on every occasion, a preference was given to the cardinal. "In this," they said, "consisted the recompence of all their services, to be reduced by the King, to whose person and interest they had ever shewn the most inviolable attachment, under the dominion of an arrogant and haughty ecclesiastic. The dutchess of Parma had the name of Regent, but the power was lodged in the hands of Granvelle. The most important affairs of the state were all determined in private by him, without the consent, or even the knowledge, of the other counsellors. Their seats in the council, and their government of the provinces, were only high sounding empty names, which gave them the appearance of authority ; whilst they did not possess any real power, but were equally subjected with others to the arbitrary will of Granvelle."

While the prince of Orange and the other discontented lords had so much reason to be dissatisfied, it could not be expected that they would be extremely active in executing the orders of the court. Notwithstanding all that had been done to suppress the new opinions in religion, these opinions were diffused wider and wider every day throughout the provinces. This Granvelle ascribed to the negligence of the magistrates in executing the edicts. The prince of Orange, on the other hand, and count Egmont, threw the blame of it on him ; and said, that by pursuing measures to which the people of the Netherlands had never been accustomed, he had soured their minds, and brought the Regent's government into hatred and contempt. Those complaints were often made in the presence of the Regent herself ; who, being pressed on the one hand by the positive orders of the King, inculcated by Granvelle, and on the other, distressed by her apprehension of the consequences to be dreaded from so much ill humour and discontent, could only give

^b Now Archbishop of Mechlin, and advanced to the dignity of Cardinal.

^c Admirals of the Netherlands.

soothing answers to the complainers, and flatter them with some general hopes that the grounds of their complaints would be removed.

1565.

She was still more embarrassed, when the prince of Orange proposed in the council, that, in order to remedy the present evils, she should summon a convention of the States. It could not be expected that Granvelle would relish this proposal. For he was not ignorant how ill the people stood affected to his person, and his measures of government ; nor how much superior the influence of the prince of Orange would be to his, if the States were assembled. But he did not neglect the present opportunity of ingratiating himself with the King. When the Regent gave Philip information of the proposal which had been made to her, and desired to receive his instructions on the subject, Granvelle took that occasion to represent to him, “ That nothing could be more prejudicial to his authority than the assembling of the States ; a measure which ought at all times to be avoided, as it usually produced an inclination in the people to encroach upon the prerogatives of the crown ; but which there never was so much ground to dread as at present, when persons of all conditions were so deeply infected with a spirit of sedition and discontent. The abbots would come to the convention, inflamed with indignation on account of the late diminution of their revenues. The lower nobility and the deputies of the towns would be gained over by the prince of Orange, and the other discontented lords ; and the people, ever fond of innovations, would be much more inclined to regard the opinion of their deputies than that of the Regent, or the ministers of the King ”

This representation was perfectly agreeable to Philip’s views and sentiments ; nor did he hesitate in complying with the counsel which was offered him. He immediately renewed his orders to the Regent with respect to the rigorous execution of the edicts ; and thereby let the prince of Orange and the other nobles see that there was nothing farther from his intention than to convene the States, in order to consider of more gentle expedients for preventing the growth of heresy^d.

The persecutions, therefore, were carried on as formerly. The compassion which all men felt for the unhappy sufferers, excited a general odium against the government. The magistrates encountered insurmountable difficulties in executing the orders of the court ; and the number of Protestants increased daily, while the most vigorous efforts were made to extirpate them by the Regent and her ministers. Granvelle endeavoured to convince the King, that this was chiefly owing to the remissness of the governors of the provinces. They were not ignorant of his accusation ; and being now incensed against him more than ever, they resolved to make him feel the effects of their resentment. Agreeably to this resolution the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn, wrote a letter to the King, in which they laid the blame of all the disturbances in the Netherlands upon the cardinal ; who, they represented, had assumed the sole direction of affairs, and, by his imperious conduct, had rendered himself the object of universal hatred. “ It was impossible for them to serve either the King or the people, whilst a person so exceedingly obnoxious possessed such unlimited influence. But the government would proceed

Their animosity against cardinal Granvelle.

They apply to Philip for his removal.

^d Bentivoglio, lib. ii. p. 15.

1565. smoothly, if Granvelle were removed ; and in case the King would grant their request, there should be nothing wanting on their part, either to support his authority, or to maintain the purity of the catholic faith, to which they were not less sincerely attached than cardinal Granvelle.'

To this letter Philip, after a delay of some months, made as Philip's reluctance. mild a reply as could justly have been expected ; but he concluded with observing, " That it was not his practice to dismiss his ministers upon the complaints of their enemies, till he had given them an opportunity of vindicating their conduct. Justice too required that, from general accusations, they should descend to mention particular crimes or misdemeanours ; and if they did not incline to do this in writing, one of them might come to Madrid, where he would be received with every mark of distinction and respect."

With this answer the prince of Orange and the other lords were much dissatisfied ; and they had the courage to reply, " That they were greatly disappointed to find so little regard paid to their remonstrance. For they had not writ their former letter, as cardinal Granvelle's accusers, but as the King's counsellors ; who, by virtue of their office, were bound to inform him of whatever appeared to be of consequence to the welfare of his dominions. They did not desire that the Cardinal should suffer harm ; and, in any place except the Netherlands, they should be glad to hear of his prosperity ; but his continuance there, they thought, was incompatible with the public peace." They added, " That they did not esteem the Cardinal so highly as to undertake a journey to Spain on his account ; and that since the King was pleased to repose so little confidence in their opinion, they hoped he would dispense with their further attendance in the council ; where, as they could not be present without a diminution of their dignity, it was impossible for them, while the Cardinal retained his influence, to be of the smallest use."

To this second letter, Philip made no other answer, but that he would consider of what they had said, and that in the mean time he expected 1564. they would continue to give their assistance as formerly in the council.

They now saw that he had no intention to comply with their Departure of Granvelle. request. Still however they obeyed his orders, and at times they went to the council ; but there, and every where else, they treated the Cardinal with so much ridicule and contempt, that being at length disgusted with his situation, he applied for liberty to retire. The King consented, but with great reluctance ; and could never forgive the prince of Orange, and the other lords, who had reduced him to this necessity ^e.

Granvelle's departure was not attended with those advantages which his enemies expected to derive from it. They had flattered themselves with the hopes of obtaining, after his removal, their just share in the administration ; but Viglius ^f, and Count Barlaimont, two zealous Catholics, who had concurred with Granvelle in all his arbitrary measures, were soon received by the regent into the same degree of favour which he had possessed, and were allowed to exercise the same unlimited influence in the government.

^e Bentivoglio, Grotius.

^f President of the privy-council, and esteemed the greatest lawyer in the Netherlands.

A little before this time the council of Trent had published its decrees, and Philip, as mentioned above, had resolved to have them obeyed throughout all his dominions. The disturbances which subsisted in the Low Countries, ought to have deterred him from adding fuel to a flame which already burnt with so much violence. But his bigotry, together with his arbitrary maxims of government, rendered him averse to every mild expedient, and determined him to enforce obedience to the decrees in the Netherlands, as well as in Spain and Italy. When the Regent laid his instructions on this head before the council of State, she found the counsellors much divided in their opinions. The prince of Orange maintained, “That the regent could not require the people of the Netherlands to receive the decrees, because several of them were contrary to the fundamental laws of the constitution. He represented that some Catholic princes had thought proper to reject them; and proposed that a remonstrance should be made to the King on the necessity of recalling his instructions.” Several other lords were of the same opinion. But Viglius, on the other hand, urged with great earnestness, the necessity of complying immediately with the King’s commands. “By general councils,” he said, “the church had in all ages secured the purity of its discipline and doctrines. No remedies for the disorders in the Netherlands could be devised more likely to prove effectual, than the decrees in question. If they should be found in any respect incompatible with the laws or privileges of the Netherlands, the inconveniences dreaded from thence might be prevented, by executing them with prudence and moderation.” He subjoined, “that it was the peculiar glory and happiness of their sovereign, that either he did not entertain the same erroneous sentiments, or lie under the same disagreeable necessity as those other Catholic princes who had rejected the decrees; but held opinions, and could follow measures, which, while they were conducive to the welfare of the church, were necessary in order to secure the peace and prosperity of his subjects.”

1565.
Publication of
the decrees of
the council of
Trent.

This speech of Viglius had the desired effect upon the Regent; who immediately resolved, without regard to what had been offered by the prince of Orange, to publish the decrees. But from different causes, both the number and courage of the reformers were now greatly augmented. In consequence of the civil wars in France, many Protestants of that kingdom had retired into the southern provinces. And through the constant intercourse which subsisted in the way of trade between the more northern provinces and England and Germany; these provinces were filled with Protestant ministers, who, being prompted by that ardent zeal which the knowledge of important truth lately discovered is calculated to inspire, exerted themselves with unceasing industry in propagating their religious tenets. The country abounded at the same time with books written against the Popish rites and doctrines. Several of the nobility, and many of the magistrates, had imbibed the new opinions. The governors of the provinces were either not inclined to execute those edicts to which they had from the beginning shewn themselves averse; or, as they often declared, they found it impracticable to carry them into execution, without laying the country waste, by forcing into exile great

Progress of the
reformation.

1565. numbers of its most industrious inhabitants. In many places the edicts were not executed at all ; and in others, the Protestants were rescued by the people from the hands of the inquisitors, and the inquisitors themselves obliged to fly from the enraged multitude.

The Regent discovered at this time great perplexity
 Count Egmont sent to Spain. and hesitation. She was exceedingly desirous to have her administration approved by the King, and would have gladly complied with his instructions ; but she could not help being alarmed by the repeated representations which were made to her of the consequences that might arise from driving the people to despair. She therefore judged it expedient to send one of the principal nobility to Spain, to inform the King, more fully than she could do by writing, of the real state of the provinces : and having made choice of count Egmont for her ambassador, as one who was equally acceptable to all parties, she employed Vigilius the president to give him her instructions, in presence of the other counsellors. The prince of Orange was highly dissatisfied with the terms in which these instructions were expressed : “ This representation,” said he, “ of the state of her affairs, is not calculated to inform the King, but to deceive him. The relation which the president has given of our calamities falls infinitely short of the truth. We must lay open from the bottom those wounds under which the country bleeds, else the King can never apply the proper cures. Let us not, by our misrepresentations, make him believe the number of heretics to be smaller than it is. Let us acquaint him, that every province, every town, every village is full of them. Let us not conceal from him how much they despise the edicts, and how little they respect the magistrates ; that he may see how impracticable it is to introduce the inquisition, and be convinced that the remedy which he would have us to apply, would be infinitely worse than the disease.” He added, “ That although he was a true Catholic, and a faithful subject to the King, yet he thought the calamities which had been lately experienced in France and Germany, afforded a sufficient proof that the consciences of men were not to be compelled, and that heresy was not to be extirpated by fire and sword, but by reasoning and persuasion ; to which it was in vain to expect that men would be brought to listen, until the present practice of butchering them like beasts was laid aside.” He represented likewise the absurdity of publishing, on this occasion, the decrees of the council of Trent, and proposed that count Egmont should be instructed to request the King to suspend the publication of them till the present tumults were allayed. But the Regent was either not inclined or not at liberty to follow the opinion of the prince of Orange in preference to that of Vigilius. She called count Egmont apart from the council, and having given him such instructions as she thought proper, she made him set out immediately for Spain ; after having flattered him with hopes that his journey thither, if he improved the opportunity afforded him, would secure him the full possession of his master’s favour^h.

The King received him at Madrid, and entertained him, during his reception there, with every testimony of regard. When he was about to return, he made him a present of fifty thousand florins ; and as the count had several daughters, Philip promised to dispose of them in marriages suitable to their father’s rank. The cotem-

^h Bentivoglio, lib. ii. Grotius, lib. i.

porary historians differ widely in their relations of what passed with respect to the subjects of his embassy. The most probable account is, that although Philip's answer was not clear and explicit, yet that he expressed himself with so much softness in speaking of the edicts, and uttered so many strong professions of affection for the people of the Netherlands, that the count, who was in the highest degree candid and sincere, was induced to believe that the King did in reality intend to alter his measures of government. It is certain¹, that he returned to the Low Countries highly satisfied with the court of Spain ; and extolled the goodness of the King, and the love which he bore to his Flemish subjects. The prince of Orange was not so easily deceived. Count Egmont had been imposed upon, he said, by Spanish artifice. His private interest had blinded his penetration, and created in him an ill-grounded security with regard to the public good ^k.

But although count Egmont was not able to satisfy the prince of Orange, it should seem that his report was credited by most of the other counsellors, and even by the Regent herself ; who would not otherwise have agreed to a measure which, immediately after the count's arrival, was suggested in the council. It was there proposed that a certain number of divines and lawyers should meet together in Brussels, to consider of the most effectual methods of putting a stop to the growth of heresy ; and the Regent readily consented to this proposal, without inquiring, as she used to do on other occasions, whether it would be agreeable to the King. To this conference she called the bishops of Arras, Ipres, and Namur ; Ravenstenius and Jansenius, two eminent divines ; the two presidents of the provincial councils of Flanders and Utrecht, and two eminent lawyers from Mechlin and Brabant.

The result of their deliberations was, that schools for instructing youth in the principles of the Catholic faith, should be erected in all the provinces ; that particular attention should be given to reform the lives of the clergy ; and that in punishing heretics mild chastisements should be adopted, in the room of those severe ones, which upon trial had been found so ineffectual ¹.

The Regent having transmitted to the King an account of these determinations, was greatly surprised when she was informed, that, far from approving them, he was extremely dissatisfied with her for allowing the conference to be held. The subjects which had been considered in it, were points, he said, already fixed by his authority ; and which, on that account, ought not to have been brought under deliberation. The disorders which occasioned so much uneasiness to the Regent, had arisen from the connivance or negligence of her ministers. But if any of them were found wanting, either in courage or in zeal for the service which he required, she must immediately dismiss them, and substitute others in their place ; for no service which she could perform, would be either so acceptable to him, or so conducive to his glory and interest, as the extinction of heresy in the Netherlands.

The Regent had, from the beginning of her administration, been extremely solicitous to gratify the court of Spain. Nothing could have made her agree to the conference, but her conviction, founded on count Egmont's report, that it would not

In conse-
quence of
this report,
a conference
appointed.

July.
Philip of-
fended with
it.

ⁱ Grotius.

^k Vid. William's Apology, p. 485.

¹ Bentivoglio, lib. ii. p. 25.

The perse-
cutions re-
viewed.

1565. be unacceptable to the King. As soon as she discovered her mistake, she published an edict, confirming all the former edicts, and requiring the governors and councils to proceed in the execution of them with the utmost diligence ^m.

Even Vigliusⁿ hesitated as to the expediency of this measure at the present juncture ; and it excited in the minds of the people universal indignation and astonishment. Those hopes of deliverance, from their grievances, which they had conceived from count Egmont's journey to Spain, had by his report of the King's disposition towards them, been raised to the greatest height. Their disappointment now was proportionably great. They did not blame count Egmont ; for they were persuaded that he had been deceived ; but they detested the duplicity and artifice of Philip and his ministers.

The count had too much sensibility not to be deeply affected on this occasion ; and he complained bitterly, that the King had acted with no other design in the studied kindness which he had shewn him, but to expose him to the contempt or hatred of his countrymen, and thereby to ruin his credit and influence^o.

^{The prince of Orange remonstrates.} The prince of Orange was almost the only person in whom this unexpected measure created no surprise. When the new edict was transmitted to him, he wrote to the Regent a letter ;

in which he represented, “ That in the present temper of the people, it was impossible for the King's servants to execute the orders imposed upon them, without involving the provinces in a civil war.” “ But if still,” he added, “ your highness be determined to have the edicts carried into immediate execution, then I must desire that some more proper person may be appointed in my place, who, possessing greater authority, may be better qualified to fulfil your intention. The King is not ignorant, that, on other occasions, I have spared neither my person nor my fortune in his service. My present conduct proceeds not from the want of loyalty or zeal, but from a persuasion that I cannot yield the obedience required from me, without dishonour to myself, and infinite prejudice to the Netherlands ^p ”

Neither the prince of Orange, nor the counts Egmont and Horn, expressed their dissatisfaction with the present measures of government in any other way than by making remonstrances and complaints. As it was greatly their interest, so it appears to have been their sincere desire, to avoid incurring the King's displeasure. And they studied to give him every proof of fidelity that could be reasonably expected from those who were members of a free state, and had sworn to maintain the fundamental laws of the constitution.

^{The com-promise.} The conduct of many of the other nobles was not so scrupulous and reserved. They set on foot, at this time, a confederacy, by which they bound themselves to support one another, in preventing the inquisition from being established in the Netherlands.

^{St. Alde-gonde.} The prime mover of this expedient was Philip de Marnix, Lord of St. Aldegonde, a nobleman highly distinguished for his eloquence, his address, and his political abilities, who had the merit of contributing more than any other person (the prince of Orange

^m Meursius Gul. Auriac. p. 4, 5.

^o Strada, lib. iv. p. 118.

ⁿ Ibid. p. 4.

^p Gen. Hist. of the Netherlands.

alone excepted) towards accomplishing that happy revolution, by which the northern provinces were rescued from the Spanish yoke. ^{1566.} By his advice, and according to his direction, a writing was drawn up, termed the Compromise, which is here inserted, as it marks strongly the spirit by which the people of the Netherlands were animated.

“ Whereas certain malicious persons, under the cloak of zeal for the catholic religion, but in reality prompted by ambition, pride, and avarice, have, by their misrepresentations, persuaded our lord the King to introduce into these provinces that most pernicious tribunal the inquisition ; which is not only contrary to all human and divine laws, but exceeds in cruelty the most barbarous institutions of the most savage tyrants in the heathen world ; which subjects all authority to that of the inquisitors, reduces all men to a perpetual state of miserable slavery, and by the visitations which it appoints, exposes the best men to continual apprehensions ; so that if a priest, a Spaniard, or wicked minion of power shall incline, he may, by means of this institution, accuse any man, however innocent, and cause him to be imprisoned, condemned, and put to death, without being confronted with his accusers, and without being allowed to bring evidence of his innocence, or to speak in his defence : For these reasons we whose names are here subscribed have resolved to provide for the security of our families, goods, and persons ; and for this purpose we hereby enter into a sacred league with one another, promising with a solemn oath, to oppose with all our power, the introduction of the above-mentioned inquisition into these provinces ; whether it shall be attempted openly or secretly, and by whatever name it shall be called, whether that of Inquisition, Visitation, Commission, or Edict : declaring at the same time, that we are far from entertaining the design of attempting any thing prejudicial to the interest of our sovereign the King ; but on the contrary, that our fixed intention is, to support and defend his government, to maintain peace, and to prevent, to the utmost of our power, all seditions, tumults, and revolts. This agreement we have sworn ; and we hereby promise and swear to maintain it for ever sacred ; and we call Almighty God to witness, that neither in word nor deed shall we ever weaken or counteract it.

“ We likewise promise and swear mutually to defend one another, in all places, and on all occasions, against every attack that shall be made, or prosecution that shall be raised, against any individual amongst us, on account of his concern in this confederacy. And we declare, that no pretence of the persecutors, who may allege rebellion, insurrection, or any other plea, shall exempt us from this our oath and promise. No action can deserve the name of rebellion, that proceeds from opposition to the iniquitous decrees of the inquisition ; and therefore, whether any of us be attacked directly on account of opposing these decrees, or under pretence of punishing rebellion or insurrection, we hereby swear to endeavour by all lawful means to procure his deliverance.

“ In this and every part of our conduct regarding the inquisition, our meaning is, to submit to the general opinion of our confederates, or to that of those who shall be appointed by the rest to assist us with their counsel.

“ In witness of this our league, we invoke the holy name of the living God, as the searcher of our hearts ; humbly beseeching him to grant us the grace of his holy spirit, that all our enterprises may be attended with success, may promote the honour of his name, contribute to the

1565. welfare of our souls, and advance the peace and true interest of the Netherlands."

Such were the terms of the compromise, which was quickly circulated through the provinces, and subscribed by persons of all ranks, whether Catholics or Protestants. Books were at the same time multiplied, in which liberty of conscience was pleaded, the absurdities in the popish doctrines and worship exposed, and hideous pictures drawn of the inquisition.

The Regent felt great anxiety with regard to the consequences with which so much ill-humour and discontent were likely to be attended. She had never fully credited the representations which the prince of Orange and some of her other counsellors had often made to her. And she now complained bitterly of the situation to which she was reduced by the orders sent from Spain. "For to what purpose was it (she said) to publish edicts, when I wanted power to enforce their execution? They have served only to increase the people's audacity, and to bring my authority into contempt ^q."

Speech of the prince of Orange in the council. The prince of Orange, and the counts Horn and Egmont, had, ever since the last republication of the edicts, absented themselves from the council. The Regent now wrote to them in the most urgent manner, requiring their attendance.

They readily complied; and the Regent, after having informed them of her design in calling them together, desired they would deliver their opinions without reserve. The prince of Orange was among the last who rose, and he spoke as follows ^r:

"Would to Heaven, I had been so fortunate as to gain belief, when I ventured to foretel what has now happened. Desperate remedies would not in that case have been first applied, nor persons who had fallen into error been confirmed in it, by the means employed to reclaim them. We should not certainly think favourably of a physician's prudence, who, in the beginning of a disease, when gentle remedies were likely to prove effectual, should propose the burning or cutting of the part infected.

"There are two species of inquisition. The one is exercised in the name of the Pope, and the other has been long practised by the bishops. To the latter, men are in some measure reconciled by the power of custom; and considering how well we are now provided with bishops in all the provinces, it may be reasonably expected that this sort will alone be found sufficient. The former has been, and will for ever be, an object of abhorrence, and ought to be abolished without delay.

"With respect to those edicts which have been so often published against the innovators in religion, hearken not to me, but to your own experience, which will inform you, that the persecutions to which they have given rise, have served only to increase and propagate the errors against which they have been exercised. The Netherlands have for several years been a school, in which, if we have not been extremely inattentive, we may have learned the folly of persecution. Men do not

^q Bentivoglio and Strada.

^r This speech is recorded by Nicholas Burgundius, who compiled his history from the papers of the president Vigilius. Vide Brandt's History of the Reformation in the Netherlands.

for nothing forego the advantages of life ; much less do they expose themselves to torture and death for nothing. The contempt of death and pain, exhibited by heretics in suffering for their religion, is calculated to produce the most powerful effects on the minds of spectators. It works on their compassion, it excites their admiration of the sufferers, and creates in them a suspicion, that truth must certainly be found where they observe so much constancy and fortitude. Heretics, have been treated with the same severity in France and England as in the Low-Countries. But has it been attended there with better success ? On the contrary, is there not reason, there as well as here, to say what was said of the Christians of old, That the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church ? The emperor Julian, the most formidable enemy whom christianity ever saw, was fully sensible of the truth of this. Harassing and tormenting could only serve, he knew, to inflame that ardent zeal which he wanted to extinguish. He had recourse therefore to the expedient of ridicule and contempt ; and this he found to be more effectual. The Grecian empire was at different periods infected with heresies of various kinds. *Ætius* taught errors in the reign of Constance ; Nestorius in that of Theodosius ; Arius in that of Constantine. No such punishments were inflicted, either on the heresiarchs themselves or on their disciples, as are now practised in the Netherlands ; and yet where are all those false opinions now, which the first broachers were at so much pains to propagate ? Such is the nature of heresy, if it rests, it rusts : but he who rubs it, whets it. Let it be neglected and overlooked, it will soon lose the charm of novelty ; and with that, it will lose the greatest part of its attractive power. But they are not the examples only of heathen princes which I would recommend to the Regent's imitation. In complying with my advice, she will tread in the steps of our late glorious Emperor, her father ; who from experience was convinced, that gentle measures were more likely to prove effectual than severe ones ; and therefore adopted the former, in preference to the latter, for several years before his resignation.

" The king himself appeared, at a certain period, inclined to make trial of mild expedients. But, through the influence of the bishops and other ecclesiastics, he has changed his views. Let these men answer for their conduct if they can. For my own part, I am entirely satisfied that it is impossible to root out the present evils in the Netherlands by force, without shaking the State from its foundation. I conclude with reminding you of what we have all heard frequently, That the Protestants in the Low-Countries have opened a correspondence with those in France. Let us beware of irritating them more than we have already done, lest, by imitating the French Catholics in their severity, we, like them, involve our country in the dreadful miseries of a civil war."

This speech was not entirely without effect. It convinced the Regent, that she must either make some concessions to the confederates, or have recourse to arms. She was inclined to follow the latter of these measures, because she knew it would be more agreeable to the King ; and she desired count Egmont to undertake the command of some forces which he proposed to raise, in order to carry her design into execution ; but the Count declined accepting of it, saying, That he could not fight with honour in defence of the inquisition. The Dutchess found it necessary, therefore, to embrace the other alternative, and to attempt to

1566. sooth the malcontents, by making some abatement in the rigour of the edicts*.

Meanwhile the number of those who had acceded to the compromise was become so considerable, that they thought it was now time to take some step towards fulfilling their engagements. With this view they set out for Brussels, where the court resided, and sent some of their number to desire leave of the Regent, to lay before her their sentiments concerning a subject in which the interest of the King and their personal security were equally concerned. The counsellors were divided in their opinions with regard to the answer proper to be made to this request. Some of them were for rejecting it utterly ; others advised to admit two or three of the confederates and no more ; but the opinion of those prevailed who thought that, at present, it would be imprudent to furnish them with any just ground of offence, by denying them a privilege to which every inhabitant of the Netherlands was entitled ; especially as they were without arms, and no danger could be apprehended from admitting them.

They entered Brussels in the beginning of April one thousand five hundred and sixty-six, in number between three and four hundred on horseback. Besides count Brederode, who was descended from the ancient earls of Holland, there were the counts Colemburg and Treseberg, the marquis of Mons, the baron of Montigny, and count Lewis of Nassau, brother to the prince of Orange ; all of them persons of considerable influence in the provinces.

They went in a body, walking two by two, from the house of count Colemburg to the palace, and were received there by the Regent, attended by the council of state.

They began their petition with declaring, "That as hitherto ^{Petition of the nobles.} they had never failed in loyalty to the King, so they were still

as much as ever determined to hold fast their allegiance. They were sensible that their present conduct might be misconstrued ; but they chose rather to expose themselves to this risk, than not inform the Regent of what they were convinced was of the highest consequence to the interest both of King and the provinces. The solicitude which the King had discovered to preserve religion pure in the Netherlands, deserved the highest praise ; but experience had shewn, that the remedies employed for this purpose contributed only to increase the disease. They had long flattered themselves with hopes, that the States would have been assembled, to devise means more likely to prove successful ; but since this desirable event had not taken place, they thought it their duty to inform her, that if the measures of government respecting religion were not quickly altered, they were persuaded it would be impossible to prevent a general insurrection. It was therefore their earnest desire, that she would send some proper persons to the King, to acquaint him with the necessity of softening the rigour of the edicts ; and they intreated her to suspend the execution of them till his pleasure should be known. But if no regard, they added, should be paid to this our humble and most earnest prayer, we call God and the King, your highness, and these your illustrious counsellors, to witness, that we have given warning of the impending danger, and shall not be accountable for the calamities that may ensue t."

To this petition the Regent gave the following answer in writing : “ That she was not invested by the King with power to suspend the execution of the edicts ; but that she was not averse from sending some proper person to Spain, where she would willingly employ her good offices to procure them satisfaction. That, in the mean time, she would issue orders to the inquisitors to proceed in the exercise of their office with moderation ; and that, in return for her concessions, she expected that the petitioners would study carefully to avoid all occasion of offence.”

The confederates, much dissatisfied with this answer, insisted earnestly upon receiving one that was more explicit ; and the Regent, dreading the consequences of sending them away in ill-humour, ordered her secretary to communicate to them the instructions which, after considering the matter more maturely, she had resolved to transmit to the inquisitors. These were, that henceforth they should proceed against offenders in the article of religion with the utmost gentleness ; and should not punish any of them with banishment, imprisonment, or confiscation, unless they were found guilty of seditious practices. And these instructions, it was added, were to remain in force till the King’s pleasure should be known. The confederates, on the other hand, engaged, not to attempt to make any innovation in religious matters, but to wait patiently for the determination of the assembly of the States ; which, they fondly flattered themselves, would be held soon, in order to put an end to all their grievances.

Agreeably to her first declarations the Regent immediately dispatched the marquis of Mons and the baron of Montigny, to lay the petition before the King. And these two noblemen gladly undertook the task assigned them ; little suspecting either how fruitless their journey was to prove, as to the intention of it, or how fatal to themselves. For, as will appear in the sequel, Philip, did not consider them as the Regent’s ambassadors, but as persons who had brought her under the disagreeable necessity of clothing them with that character, and as the heads of a confederacy which had been formed against his government.

In the mean time a report was propagated in the Netherlands, that the Regent had consented to the public profession of the reformed religion. In the belief of this, the people threw off the reserve which they had hitherto maintained, and the protestant ministers preached in many places to numerous assemblies of persons, who came together in arms, with a resolution to defend themselves, in case the inquisitors should attempt to interrupt them. From these assemblies they soon passed to open violence against the churches, and despoiled them of all their costly ornaments.

These outrages were first committed in the province of Flanders ; and the example of the Flemings was quickly diffused throughout all the provinces. In a little time afterwards the same tumultuous spirit appeared in the great commercial towns ; in which, from their frequent intercourse with foreign Protestants, and from the spirit of liberty that naturally grows up in large communities, almost the whole body of the people had embraced the new opinions.

In Antwerp the reformers indulged themselves in the most unjustifiable extravagancies. They insulted the Catholics when employed in the functions of their religion. They broke furiously into the great church,

1566.
Answer of
the Regent.

The marquis
of Mons and
the baron of
Montigny sent
to Spain.

The intem-
perate zeal
of the re-
formers.

1566. which was one of the richest edifices in Europe, overturned the altars, defaced the paintings, and destroyed all the images of the saints.

From the cathedral they flew with the same ungovernable fury to the monasteries and convents ; and there, after forcing open the gates, and obliging the monks and nuns to fly into the city for shelter, it appeared that, under the cover of religious zeal, many of the most abandoned of the people had joined with the reformers, and embraced the present opportunity of gratifying their rapacity. The same riotous spirit appeared in numberless other places. it spread like a conflagration over all the provinces ; meeting every where with the same combustible materials, and every where producing the same pernicious effects.

In Brussels they were overawed by the presence of the court : yet even there, they had in some measure thrown off their wonted reserve ; and the Regent, apprehensive that her person was in danger, resolved to reside in Mons. This resolution gave much uneasiness to the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn ; who saw how much dishonour it would reflect on them, to have it believed that the person of the princess was insecure, where *they* were invested with such high command, and possessed such extensive influence. They employed every argument that could prevail upon her to alter her intention. They pledged their lives and fortunes for her safety ; and promised to exert their utmost power in quelling those disorders which were the cause of her inquietude. At length she yielded to their intreaties, and consented still to remain at Brussels^u.

The success
and zeal of
the prince
of Orange
in quelling
the tumults. The several governors soon after set out for their respective provinces. The prince of Orange, besides being governor of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Burgundy was viscount and governor of Antwerp. And even the popish historians acknowledge, that, having often gone thither, he had exerted himself strenuously in quieting the tumults occasioned by the intemperate zeal of the reformers. At this time he ordered three of August. the rioters to be executed, and fined and banished several of the rest. He again opened the great church, and restored the exercise of the catholic religion.

But finding it impossible to prevent the Protestants from holding their religious meetings, he entered into an agreement with the persons of the greatest influence among them, by which they were allowed to exercise their religion in churches within the city, provided that they should come together without arms ; that they should give no annoyance to the Catholics ; and that their preachers should refrain from all invectives against the established church. And he consented that this agreement should remain in force till he should know the pleasure of the King ; to whom the Protestants engaged to submit, or immediately to leave the Netherlands.

The Regent approved of every part of William's conduct on this occasion, except his allowing the reformers to hold their meetings within the town. In order to satisfy her on this head, he represented, that he had granted them this indulgence from a conviction which experience had already confirmed, that by means of it he could more easily prevent the pernicious effects of their extravagance ; that when they were un-

^u Bentivoglio, Brandt, &c.

der his own eye, or that of the magistrates, their assemblies were not near so numerous as formerly ; their preachers were not so apt to indulge their enthusiasm, or to use indecent freedoms with the government ; nor the people so apt to be inflamed, as when they assembled without restraint in the open fields. This measure, he added, was not only expedient, but necessary. There was no room for authority or persuasion. The reformers had shewn themselves unalterably determined to set up their worship within the city, whether he had permitted them or not. Their assemblies in the country had generally amounted to twenty-four or twenty-five thousand. Even in the town they were seldom less than ten thousand. He had no army to reduce so great a number to obedience ; and not a single person among the Catholic inhabitants could be persuaded to take up arms against them^x.

After quieting the disturbances in Antwerp, the prince set out for the provinces of Holland and Zealand, where his presence was equally necessary. There too, as in Antwerp, he employed all his power and influence ; and did more towards quelling the tumultuous spirit of the reformers, than any other person could have done, without an armed force to overawe them. He persuaded them to restore the churches which they had usurped ; and, except in one or two places, they were satisfied with the liberty which the Regent was willing to allow, of holding their assemblies for religious worship in the suburbs of the towns, or in the country.

Count Egmont was no less active in his department. From natural temper, as well as from political principles, no man was more averse to harshness and severity ; yet being strongly prompted on this occasion by his desire of gratifying the King, he was at the utmost pains to discover the rioters, and punished many of them with rigour. He restored the priests to their functions, opened the churches which had been shut, and reduced all the Protestants within his government to the necessity of acquiescing in the conditions which the regent had prescribed.

Count Horn likewise acted with uncommon spirit and vigour in the city of Tournay, where the disorders had risen to a greater height than in other places. The inhabitants of that city, to the number of six thousand, having taken arms, and laid siege to the garrison, they soon reduced it to such extremity, as obliged the commander to inform the Regent, that if she did not send him immediate relief, he could not hold out longer than one day. She had not troops sufficient to oppose so great a force ; nor was there any other expedient in her power, by which she could preserve the garrison from surrendering, but that of sending count Horn, their governor's brother, to intercede with the inhabitants. The Count forced his way, at the hazard of his life, into the midst of them ; and with great address persuaded them not only to desist from the blockade, but to lay down their arms, to yield up the churches which they had usurped, and to rest satisfied with certain places of worship which he had assigned them without the city^y.

Count Egmont's success.

Count Horn's success.

^x Brandt. Van Meteren, lib. ii.

^y The baron de Montigny, at this time in Spain.

^z Brandt, Meteren, &c.

1566.
Grounds of
Philip's
aversion to
these no-
blemen

From this representation of the conduct of the prince of Orange and the counts Horn and Egmont, they had very little reason, it should seem, to dread the King's displeasure. For they were not less active, nor less successful, than the other governors^a, with whom Philip is said to have been entirely satisfied. But the disapprobation which they had discovered of his measures of government some years before ; the objections which they had urged against his retaining the Spanish forces in the Low Countries ; the necessity to which they had reduced him, of removing Granvelle ; their frequent remonstrances in the council against the inquisition and edicts ; and the attachment which they had ever shewn to the liberty and constitutional privileges of the provinces : all these causes had alienated him entirely from them, and had begotten, in his dark revengeful mind, a degree of hatred and resentment, which neither time, repentance, nor faithful services, could erase.

These noblemen had been disappointed of the private, as well as public advantages which they expected to derive from the removal of Granvelle. Viglius and count Barlaimont were equally their enemies as the Cardinal, and equally disposed to put malicious interpretations on their conduct. In these they were powerfully seconded by Granvelle ; who some time after his leaving the Netherlands, had been called to Madrid, where he enjoyed his wonted influence. This he did not fail to employ against his enemies in the Netherlands ; and he found it easy to persuade the King, that in secret they had been abettors of all the disturbances which had arisen. Philip was therefore fired with indignation against them, and resolved sooner or later to make them feel the weight of his resentment. At present, however, he thought it necessary to conceal his sentiments ; and in his answer to the account of the late transactions transmitted to him by the Regent, he expressed his gratitude for the zeal that had been discovered in his service, and exhorted her, and the governors of the provinces, to continue their endeavours to allay the tumults in the best manner which the present circumstances would permit.

With this answer he sent money, and an order for raising a body of Catholic troops, upon whose fidelity he could depend for an absolute compliance with his will.

The Regent was not remiss in executing this order. She immediately levied a body of cavalry, and five regiments of infantry ; of which she gave the command to the counts Erbestian, Charles of Mansfelt, Reuls, Baron Schomberg, and the Sieur de Hierges, son of count Barlaimont.

The prince of Orange and the counts Horn and Egmont could easily discern the design of this armament ; and they declared their disapprobation of it in the council, as a measure calculated to rekindle the flames of discord and sedition.

Discovery of Philip's de-
signs. They were at the same time informed by letters from the marquis of Mons, and the baron of Montigny, that whatever public answer had been sent from the court of Spain to the dutchess of Parma, it was known to every person at Madrid, that the King was highly offended at the concessions which they had made lately to the Protestants. That they were considered as fomenters of the tumults, and encouragers of heresy. That the King and his ministers talked now more explicitly than they had hitherto done. The

^a The counts Aremberg and Megen.

compromise had no other name given it but that of a conspiracy ; and the popular insurrections were never mentioned but as an open rebellion. There was no longer any room to doubt that the King, by the advice of Granvelle and Alva, was determined to wreck his resentment on all concerned, and particularly on them, whom he considered as the most guilty. And although at first domestic forces only were to be employed, yet their operations would soon be seconded by those of Spain.

The prince of Orange had several times desired leave of the Regent to resign his employments ; alleging, that it was impossible for him at once to discharge his duty to his country, and to satisfy the King. The Regent had as often refused to consent to his request ; and had accompanied her refusal with expressions of high regard, and with entreaties that he would not forsake her at a time when his assistance was more than ever necessary. On the present occasion he made the same application to the King, who gave him the same answer, and employed the same expressions of regard and confidence^b.

But the prince had received intelligence of Philip's most secret councils, and he knew that his real sentiments were entirely different from those which he professed. Through a correspondence which he held in France, he had procured a copy of a letter to the Regent, from Alva the Spanish minister at Paris, which confirmed the information that had been transmitted by the marquis of Mons and the baron of Montigny. In this letter, Alva particularly insisted on the present favourable opportunity of establishing in the Low Countries that unlimited authority which the King had long so earnestly desired. He advised the Regent, as matters were not yet ripe for execution, to meet the smooth faces of Orange, Horn, and Egmont, with the same artifice which they had employed ; and concluded with informing her, that the King, who knew them to be fomenters of all the disturbances which had happened would soon pay them the wages of their iniquity ; and had sworn to punish them and the other inhabitants of the Netherlands in the most exemplary manner^c.

This letter the prince of Orange communicated to his brother count Lewis, and to the counts Egmont, Horn, Hoogstraten, and several others of the nobility ; who met together at Dendremonde, to deliberate concerning the measures which it would be proper to pursue. Count Lewis, who was naturally bold and ardent, urged that they should immediately incite the people to take up arms ; but his brother the prince of Orange disapproved of this proposal, and observed, that if they should begin to wage war in the present situation of affairs, they would neither be able to carry it on with success, nor to justify their conduct in undertaking it. That the inquisition and edicts were in effect abolished ; and a reasonable liberty allowed in matters of religion. That, considering the tumults which had been excited, the Regent could not be greatly blamed for raising forces ; especially since she had levied none but such as were natives of the Netherlands. At present they could not allege any good reason for having recourse to arms ; but he believed that ere long the best and strongest reasons would not be wanting. And in the mean time his

^b Bentivoglio. See the letter annexed to William's Apology.

^c The concluding words of the letter are, "in a manner, that would make the ears of all Christendom tingle, even though it should put in danger all the rest of his dominions." Brandt, 216. Reidanus, p. 3. Meteren, lib. ii.

1567. advice was, not only to be on their guard themselves, but likewise to awaken in the people a sense of the danger with which they were threatened, that they might be prepared for entering upon action when the proper season should arrive.

Had count Egmont been of the same opinion with the prince of Orange on this occasion, it is not to be doubted that all who were present would have concurred in the measures which he advised ; and considering the greatness of their power and popularity, they might have induced the King to drop his plan, by making him sensible of the difficulty of carrying it into execution.

But they were all exceedingly disappointed when they heard count Egmont declare, “ That far from taking part in any measure that might be offensive to the King, he looked upon every such measure as equally imprudent and undutiful. That from the enormities which had been committed, the King had some reason to entertain suspicions of their vigilance. That, for his own part, he was resolved, if possible, to wipe out these suspicions, by exerting himself strenuously to reduce the people to a state of perfect tranquillity and obedience ; which if he and the other governors could accomplish in their respective provinces, he believed they should hear no more of the Spanish forces ; for, after what the King had repeatedly told him when in Spain, he could not regard what he had heard of his intention to rob the Netherlands of their liberty.”

The prince of Orange and the other discontented lords spent several hours in attempting to bring him over to their opinion, but in vain. Although, as above related, the Count had received sufficient proof of Philip’s insincerity in his discourse with him at Madrid, yet the concern which he had appeared to take in the interest of his family, joined to his professions of personal attachment, had imposed upon him so far as to prevent him from perceiving the danger to which he was exposed^d.

^{The nobility concur with the Regent.} Thus disappointed of the assistance of a person of so great influence, that the other lords saw that nothing remained for them, but to conciliate Philip’s favour, by an active concurrence with the Regent in the measures which she was about to employ for the perfect settlement of the country.

^{Her success in suppressing the reformers.} A great deal had been already done for this end by the governors of the provinces ; but matters were not entirely upon the footing on which the Regent desired to have them placed. The zeal of the reformers burnt with too much violence to be restrained by the authority of the magistrates, and still continued to discover itself in the most unjustifiable irregularities ; particularly in the city of Valenciennes, where the common people had almost universally embraced the reformation. The strength and populousness of that city, its neighbourhood to France, and the correspondence which the people held with the Protestants in that kingdom, were powerful motives with the Regent for desiring to have a garrison placed in it, composed of those troops which had been lately raised. She wished to have had them admitted with the consent of the inhabitants ; but finding that it could not be obtained, she declared them rebels to the King, and ordered the lord of Noircharmes to besiege the town. The citizens seemed at first resolved to defend themselves ; but when they saw the batteries ready

^d Bentivoglio.

to play, their courage failed, and they surrendered the city at discretion. Noircharmes no sooner entered it, than he ordered the governor and his son, the Protestant ministers, and several of the inhabitants who had been the most active in the late disturbances, to be put to death ; after which, having prohibited the public exercise of the reformed religion, he left a strong garrison in the place, under the command of a rigid Catholic.

The success of the Regent's arms filled the Protestants with terror, and inspired the Catholics with fresh courage and resolution. She was not less successful in Tournay, Bois le Duc, and many other places. She even persuaded the city of Antwerp to receive a garrison, by means of which the Catholic party acquired so great authority, and the reformers were so much intimidated, that, without opposition, she banished all the Protestant preachers, and abolished the exercise of their religion^e.

Count Brederode and some others of the confederated lords had recourse at this time to their first expedient of a petition Count Brederode. or remonstrance. But neither the Regent nor the confederates were now in the same situation as formerly. She had no longer any reason to be afraid of them, since she was so well provided with an armed force ; and many of them having before this time become sensible of their weakness, had studied to convince her that they were now entirely devoted to her service.

Count Brederode desired to be admitted into her presence, but this she refused ; and vouchsafed no other answer to his petition, but " That he, and those who concurred with him, had wrested her concessions into a sense which she had never meant ; and, by encouraging riots and tumults, had broken their agreement with her, and thereby forfeited their title to complain f."

From this answer Brederode perceived there was no other resource left him but force of arms. Resolved to try his fortune in this way, he went immediately into Holland, and having drawn together a body of troops, he fortified himself in the town of Vianen. But the counts Aremberg and Megen coming suddenly upon him, he was soon reduced to the necessity of retiring into Germany. He returned to the Low Countries in the year following, and died in the town of Harnhoff^g. He was a person much respected by the Protestants, but appears to have possessed more zeal than capacity, and to have been in no respect qualified to be the leader of a party.

After count Brederode was expelled, the reformers had nowhere courage to lift their heads. The storm which had raged with so much fury was succeeded by a perfect calm. The Tranquillity established. churches were repaired, the altars restored, the images replaced, and the magistrates respected and obeyed, in the same manner as before the disturbances began ; while the discontented lords seemed now to have no other ambition, but to surpass one another in giving proofs of their attachment to the Regent, and of their zeal in the service of the church and of the king^h.

^e Bentivoglio, p. 47. ^f Brandt and Bentivoglio. ^g Brandt. ^h Bentivoglio, p. 48.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VIII.

WHILE the dutchess of Parma was thus successfully employed in quieting the disturbances in the Netherlands, Philip was only deliberating on the subject. The Regent had joined with the confederated lords in representing, that his presence would prove the most effectual remedy for the evils which prevailed ; and this was the opinion too of some of his Spanish ministers. He had long talked as if he intended to comply with their counsel. He had even given orders for preparing ships for his voyage, and all Europe was in expectations of its taking place. But if he was ever serious in proposing it, he was easily induced to alter his intention, by the dread of those inconveniences or dangers with which he apprehended it might be accompanied. These inconveniences and dangers would have been disregarded by the late Emperor ; who undertook a journey to the Netherlands, and put himself in the power of Francis, his rival and antagonist, in order to quell an insurrection in the city of Ghent. But Philip had neither the same personal courage and activity as Charles, nor that degree of affection for his subjects in the Low Countries, which was necessary to make him expose himself to danger on their account ; and through his whole reign he chose rather to issue forth orders from his cabinet, than to execute his schemes in person^a.

Having therefore resolved not to go to the Netherlands himself, it remained for him to determine, whether he should send thither an army, to compel the people to submit to his will, and to punish them for their disobedience ; or should listen to their remonstrances and complaints. His counsellors differed widely in their opinions from each other. The duke of Feria and the prince of Evoli advised him to abolish the inquisition and edicts,

1567.
Delibera-
tions at the
court of
Spain.

Philip re-
solves to
send the
duke of
Alva to the
Nether-
lands.

^a Bentivoglio, ann. 1567. Herrera, lib. ix.

1567. and to make trial of gentler and more indulgent methods of dealing with the reformers ; since he had sufficiently experienced that severe ones were not likely to be attended with success. But the duke of Alva, on the other hand, and cardinal Granvelle, represented, that nothing but too much lenity in the treatment of the heretics in the Low Countries had been the cause of that insolence, and those enormities, in which they had discovered an equal contempt of the true religion and of the royal authority. This was not the proper season, they alleged, for the exercise of clemency. The King had too long received laws from the Netherlands, instead of giving them. The people in these provinces had long and loudly boasted of their privileges. If they were not speedily chastised for their insolence and presumption, they would ere long dispute the King's having any right to command them, and form themselves into an independent state, in opposition to *him*, as the Swiss Cantons had done formerly in opposition to his German ancestors ; or, which was still more likely, the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn, would, under the pretence of defending the liberties of the people, reduce them under their own power, and divide the several provinces as a prey among themselves. Besides, what happier opportunity, said Alva, can be wished for than the present, for introducing an army into the Low Countries, in order to establish the royal authority there on the same desirable footing as in Spain and in Italy ^b?

No arguments could be better suited to the temper and inclinations of the King ; and accordingly, without further hesitation, he resolved to send to the Netherlands a strong and well-disciplined army, under the command of the duke of Alva, whom, from long experience, he knew to be qualified in every respect for executing the plan of tyranny and oppression which he was determined to pursue.

The Regent remonstrates against it In the mean time the dutchess of Parma had reduced the affairs of the Low Countries into the situation which is above described. She sent speedy information to the King of the success with which her endeavours had been accompanied ; and represented to him, that there was not now the least occasion for the army which he had begun to prepare, since the tumults were allayed, the rioters punished, the heretics silenced, the church reinstated in its wonted authority, garrisons put in suspected places, and the whole country settled in a state of perfect order and tranquillity.

Had Philip been in reality influenced by the motives which he pretended, he would, on receiving this intelligence, have countermanded the orders which he had issued for the march of the troops. But in issuing these orders it is impossible to believe, that he was prompted either by zeal for religion, or concern for the welfare of his Flemish subjects ; but partly by the ambition of establishing among them a despotic government on the ruins of their ancient constitution, (a measure which the distance of the Netherlands from his seat of empire must have rendered particularly desirable to a prince of so imperious a temper,) and partly by an implacable resentment against the prince of Orange and the other lords, who had discovered a jealousy of his designs.

Regardless, therefore, of the change which the affairs in the Netherlands had lately undergone, Philip persisted in his purpose. The duke of Alva went by sea for Italy, and thence, after having assembled the

^b Bentivoglio.

several bodies of troops which were cantoned there, amounting to eight thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse, he directed his march towards the Low Countries, first through the territories of the duke of Savoy, and then through Burgundy and Lorrain. His army was augmented on its march, by the addition of three hundred Burgundian cavalry, and four thousand German foot, and soon reached the province of Luxemburg, without meeting with any molestation by the way. After putting garrisons in some of the frontier towns he set out for Brussels, where he arrived in the month of August one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven^c.

His arrival spread great consternation and astonishment over all the provinces. Many thousand persons had before this time left the Netherlands ; among whom was the prince of Orange, who, having long foreseen the impending storm, had withdrawn with his family and friends to his country of Nassau in Germany. He knew well how inveterate those prejudices were, which the King had for several years entertained against him ; and could not account for his sending to the Low Countries so formidable an army, commanded by a man so tyrannical as Alva, without supposing that he was determined to rule the people with a rod of iron ; and, at the same time, to wreck his vengeance upon him, and all such of the nobility as had ventured to dispute his will.

The astonish-
ment excited
by the arrival
of Alva and
the Spaniards.

The prince would gladly have prevailed upon count Egmont to accompany him, and endeavoured to open his eyes to the approaching danger. He repeated the evidence which he had formerly laid before him of the King's intentions, and he reminded him of the imperious character of Alva ; who, from being their enemy and rival, was become their master, and would not fail to employ his power to accomplish their ruin. But count Egmont was the father of a numerous family, which he could not support with dignity in any other country but the Netherlands. Conscious too of his fidelity, and of the important services which he had performed to the King, he could not be persuaded that Philip was insincere in the professions of friendship which he had made to him in Spain ; nor could he believe that he would indulge his resentment any farther, than to punish those who had been concerned in the late disorders.

The prince of
Orange retires
to Germany.

The prince of Orange finding the Count inflexible, left him, with these words : " You are the bridge, count Egmont, by which the duke of Alva will pass into the Netherlands, and he will no sooner pass it, than he will break it down. You will repent of despising the warning which I have given you, but I dread that your repentance will be too late."

In the interval between the departure of the prince of Orange, in April one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven, and the arrival of the duke of Alva in the month of August following, count Egmont perceived his importance much diminished ; but he resolved to submit to his present disagreeable situation, and even humbled himself so far as to receive and welcome Alva in the province of Luxemburg, where he made him a present of two fine horses, as a mark of his desire to live with him on amicable terms. Alva received this present with the haughtiness that was natural to him ; but in all his behaviour towards the

1567. Count, he dissembled his intention, till he was prepared to put it in execution.

^{Imprisonment of the counts Egmont and Horn.} One of his first acts after his arrival at Brussels was, to cast both count Egmont and count Horn into prison. As the deed itself was tyrannical, so the manner of it was insidious.

^{September.} Count Egmont having been first deceived himself, was employed to draw count Horn into the snare^d. When Alva found that their apprehensions were laid asleep, he desired one day that they would come to his house, to give him their opinion with regard to a citadel which he proposed to build in Antwerp ; and after the business for which they had been called was over, they were carried on different pretences into separate apartments, count Egmont by Alva himself, and count Horn by his son Frederic de Toledo. "Count Egmont," said Alva, "deliver your sword ; it is the will of the King that you give it up, and go to prison." The Count, astonished at this unexpected declaration, would have attempted to escape ; but observing himself immediately surrounded by Alva's guards, he delivered his sword, saying, "By this sword the cause of the King has been oftener than once successfully defended^e." Both he and count Horn protested, that, as knights of the Golden Fleece, they could be judged only by their peers, and imprisoned only by their authority. But no regard was paid to this protestation. They were hurried away to prison, in a place at a distance from Brussels, and out of the confines of the province where they resided ; in violation of a sacred privilege, which, by a fundamental law, belonged even to the lowest of the people^f.

^{The people fly into foreign parts.} Intelligence of this event (which was immediately followed by the imprisonment of count Egmont's secretary, the lord of Bickerzel, and several other persons of distinction) was soon conveyed to the remotest corners of the Netherlands and filled the minds of the Catholics as well as Protestants with the most disquieting apprehensions. It was no security, they saw, against the King's resentment, to have adhered to the profession of the Catholic faith, nor even to have been active in opposing the reformers. None were conscious of so much merit of this kind, and none had distinguished themselves so highly in the service of the King, as those illustrious persons who were now devoted to destruction. Men therefore of all ranks were greatly alarmed, and began to abandon their habitations ; and it was computed that, at this time, and a little before Alva's arrival, more than a hundred thousand persons fled into foreign parts. Great numbers of these were the most industrious of the people, who transferred their knowledge of arts and manufactures into the countries which gave them refuge : and thereby enriched the dominions of Philip's enemies whilst they impoverished his own^g.

^{The duchess of Parma leaves the Netherlands.} The imprisonment of the counts Horn and Egmont was matter of surprise to no person so much as to the Regent. Philip had assured her, that although he had conferred on Alva the command of the army, yet the authority of the Regent was still to remain in her hands ; and the royal commission which Alva produced on his first arrival, was agreeable to this declaration. But she could not persuade herself that the duke would have

^d Strada, p. 215.

^e Ibid.

^f Grotius and Bentivoglio.

^g Van Meteren, p. 80.

presumed to make so violent an encroachment on her prerogative, by the imprisonment of two of the first persons in the State, unless he had been invested with an authority much superior to that of which she had been informed. The King had not been ingenuous, she suspected, in his conduct towards her, and had conferred powers on Alva by which her authority as Regent was impaired. This she considered as a proof that Philip had listened to the calumnies of her enemies, and did not repose in her that trust and confidence which she was conscious her zeal to promote his interest had deserved. She judged that it would be derogatory to her honour, to remain any longer in the Netherlands ; and immediately applied for liberty to retire. After repeated solicitation, she at length obtained permission, and left Brussels in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, much regretted by all the inhabitants of the Low Countries, and particularly by the Protestants, to whom her administration appeared mild and gentle, when they compared it with that which they had reason to expect under their present government^h.

After the departure of the dutchess of Parma, the authority of Regent remained entire in the hands of Alva ; and by the royal mandate, which he published, it appeared, that Philip had vested him with higher powers than had ever been bestowed on any former governor. They were much higher than as sovereign of the Low Countries he had a right to bestow, and were utterly subversive of all the laws and privileges which at his inauguration he had solemnly sworn to maintain. But before this time he had had recourse to that method of justifying iniquity, of which the votaries of the Romish church have so often availed themselves ; he had obtained from the Pope a dispensation from his oath, and no longer disguised his intention to establish a despotic government in the Netherlands, on the ruins of the ancient constitution. Besides the absolute command of the army, Alva's commission bore, that the King had conferred upon him the presidency of the three councils, of state, of justice, and the finances ; with full power to punish or to pardon crimes of every sort, as he should judge to be expedient.

He began his administration with publishing a declaration, that a month should be allowed to the reformers for preparing to leave the country, without receiving during that space any trouble or molestation ; and at the same time he issued secret orders to the inquisitors to proceed immediately in the execution of their edicts with the utmost rigour.

To assist and encourage these men in the exercise of their office, he instituted a new council, to which he gave the name of the Council of Tumults, which he appointed to take cognizance of the late disorders, and to search after and punish all those who had been concerned, directly or indirectly, in promoting them. This council consisted of twelve persons, the greatest part of whom were Spaniards. The duke was the president himself, and in his absence, Vargas, a Spanish lawyer, distinguished above all his countrymen by his avarice and crueltyⁱ.

One of the first deeds of this tribunal, which might well be called, as the Flemings termed it, the Council of Blood, was to declare, That to have presented, or subscribed, any petition

^h Bentivoglio and Strada.

ⁱ Brandt, p. 260, 265, &c. Van Meteren, lib. iii.

First deed of the council.

Alva's absolute authority.

1567. against the late erection of bishoprics, or against the edicts or inquisition, or to have permitted the exercise of the new religion under any pretence whatever ; or to insinuate by word of mouth or writing, that the King has no right to abolish those pretended privileges which have been the source of so much impiety, is treason against the King, and justly merits the severest punishment he shall be pleased to inflict^k.

The governor had already stationed his army in such a manner as he thought would most effectually secure the execution of this cruel, undistinguishing resolution of the council. In Antwerp he built a citadel, and compelled the inhabitants to defray the expence which this instrument of their own slavery had cost him. He began to build citadels in other places ; and, in the mean time, he spread his troops over the country in such formidable bodies, that the people, over whom they exercised the most oppressive tyranny, either forsook their habitations, or gave themselves up to despair. Above twenty thousand persons escaped at this time into France, England, and the Protestant provinces of Germany^l. Great numbers were prevented from flying, and seized whilst they were meditating flight by the cruel hand of the persecutor. The innocent were overwhelmed with horror at the sight of the dreadful punishments inflicted on the guilty ; and lamented that this once flourishing country, so much distinguished for the mildness of its government and the happiness of its people, should now present no other object to view, but confiscations, imprisonments, and blood^m.

There was no distinction made of age, sex, or condition. Persons in their earliest youth ; persons worn out, and ready to sink under the infirmities of age ; persons of the highest rank, as well as the lowest of the people, on the slightest evidence, and sometimes even on bare suspicion, were alike sacrificed to the rapacity and cruelty of the governor and his associates.

Although in the space of a few months upwards of eighteen hundred persons suffered by the hand of the executioner ; yet the duke of Alva's thirst of blood was not satiated. Prisoners were not brought in so fast, nor seized in such considerable numbers, as he desired. The time of Carnival was approaching, when he expected that he should find the reformers off their guard. They would then leave their skulking places, he supposed, and visit their families, while the Catholics were immersed in mirth and dissipation. On this occasion his soldiers, accompanied by the inquisitors, like so many wolves, were let loose among the Protestants ; who were seized in the middle of the night in their beds, and from thence dragged to prisons and dungeons.

Many who had been only once present at the Protestant assemblies, even although they declared their faith in the Catholic religion to be firm and unshaken, were hanged or drowned ; while those who professed themselves to be Protestants, or refused to abjure their religion, were put to the rack, in order to make them discover their associates ; they were then dragged by horses to the place of execution, and their bodies being committed to the flames, their sufferings were prolonged with ingenious cruelty.

To prevent them from bearing testimony, in the midst of their tor-

^k Van Meteren, lib. iii. p. 66.

^l Brandt and Bentivoglio.

^m Bentivoglio, p. 58.

ments, to the truth of their profession, their executioners were not satisfied with barely confining their tongues ; they first scorched them with a glowing iron, and then screwed them into a machine, contrived on purpose to produce the most excruciating pain ^{1567.} ⁿ

It is shocking to recount the numberless instances of inhuman cruelty perpetrated by Alva and his associates, especially when we consider that the unhappy victims were not those hardened wretches, who, by daring and bloody deeds, are guilty of violating the laws of nature and humanity, but were generally persons of the most inoffensive characters ; who, having imbibed the new opinions in religion, had too much probity to disguise their sentiments ; or, at the worst, had been betrayed into indiscretions by their zeal for propagating truths, which they believed to be of the highest importance to the glory of God and the happiness of men.

Alva communicated a great share of his savage spirit to the inferior magistrates ; who knew that they could not recommend themselves more effectually either to the King or to the governor, than by the exercise of rigour and severity. Several of them, however, whose humanity prevailed over the considerations of safety and interest, were induced to give the Protestants timely warning to withdraw. Even the members of the bloody council began to feel their hearts revolt against the reiterated instances of cruelty, to which their sanction was required. Some of them applied for dismission ; others had the courage to absent themselves ; and out of the twelve, of which the council was composed, there were seldom above three or four present ^o.

About this time the magistrates of Antwerp, whose behaviour from the beginning of Alva's administration had been extremely obsequious, thought they might venture to interpose in favour of certain citizens whom the inquisitors had imprisoned. Their petition was conceived in the humblest terms ; and they represented, that although the persons for whom they pleaded, had been present two or three times in the Protestant assemblies, yet it was only curiosity that led them thither ; they were still true sons of the church, and faithful subjects to the King ; and they had remained in the country till the time of their imprisonment, on the faith of the declaration which the governor had made, that they should not receive any disturbance on account of what had passed, till the expiration of a month after his arrival in the Netherlands.

To this petition Alva haughtily replied, 'That he was amazed at their folly in presuming to apply to him in behalf of heretics ; and they should have reason, he added, to repent bitterly of their conduct, if they did not act more prudently in future ; for they might rest assured, that he would hang them all, for an example to deter others from the like presumption ^p.

Notwithstanding this, some of the Catholic nobility, and Viglius, who had formerly concurred in all the arbitrary measures of Granvelle, but

ⁿ Brandt and Van Meteren, p. 69.

^o This appears from the sentences which they passed. Many of these were subscribed only by two or three ; as that, for instance, against Anthony Van Straelen, which was signed only by Vargas and two others. Except during the first two or three months, Alva seldom attended, but all the sentences were dictated by him ; and his presence was rendered unnecessary by the active and unrelenting cruelty of Vargas. Grimstone.

^p Brandt, p. 265.

Alva's tyranny and arrogance.

1567. whose heart melted at the present misery of his countrymen, had the courage to remonstrate to the King against the governor's barbarity. Even the Pope exhorted him to greater moderation. Philip, however, refused to countermand the orders which he had given, till he should hear from Vargas ; who advised him to persevere in the plan which he had adopted, assured him of its success, and at the same time flattered him with the hopes of an inexhaustible fund of wealth that would arise from confiscation. Vargas being seconded by the inquisitors at Madrid, Philip lent a deaf ear to the remonstrance which had been made to him, and the persecutions were continued with the same unrelenting fury as before ^q.

The people of the Netherlands were confirmed in their despair of obtaining mercy from Philip, by the accounts transmitted to them at this time from Spain, of his cruel treatment of his son Don Carlos. Various relations are given of that tragical and mysterious affair by the cotemporary historians ; but the following appears the most consistent and probable. This young prince had from his earliest youth been noted for the impetuosity and violence of his temper ; and though he never gave reason to think favourably of his understanding, or his capacity for government, he had discovered the most intemperate ambition to be admitted by his father to a share in the administration of his dominions. Philip, whether from jealousy, or a conviction of his son's unfitness for any important trust, refused to gratify his ambition, and behaved towards him with distance and reserve ; while he gave all his confidence to the duke of Alva, Ruy Gomez de Silva, and the president Spinosa, against whom Don Carlos, partly on this account, and partly because he considered them as spies upon his conduct had conceived the most irreconcilable aversion. In this disposition he did not scruple on different occasions, to censure the measures of his father's government, and particularly those which had been adopted in the Netherlands. He had sometimes expressed his compassion for the people there ; had threatened the duke of Alva, and even made an attempt upon his life, for accepting the government ; had been suspected of holding secret interviews with the marquis of Mons and the baron de Montigny ; and had afterwards formed the design of retiring into the Netherlands, with an intention to put himself at the head of the malcontents.

1568. Of this design intelligence was carried by some of the courtiers to the King ; who, after having consulted with the inquisitors at Madrid, as he usually did in matters of great importance and difficulty, resolved to prevent the prince from putting his scheme in execution, by depriving him of his liberty. For this purpose he went into his chamber in the middle of the night, attended by some of his privy-counsellors and guards ; and, after reproaching him with his undutiful behaviour, told him that he had come to exercise his paternal correction and chastisement. Then having dismissed all his attendants, he commanded him to be clothed in a dark-coloured mourning dress, and appointed guards to watch over him, and to confine him to his chamber. The high spirited young prince was extremely shocked at such unworthy treatment, and prayed his father and his attendants to put an immediate end to his life. He threw himself headlong into the fire, and would have put an end to

^q Brandt. Thuanus, c. xliii. p. 9.

his life had he not been prevented by the guards. During his confinement, his despair and anguish rose to a degree of frenzy ^{1563.} He would fast sometimes for whole days together, then eat voraciously, and endeavour to choke himself by swallowing his victuals without chewing. Several princes interceded for his release, as did many of the principal Spanish nobles. But the father was relentless and inexorable. After six months imprisonment, he caused the inquisition of Madrid to pass sentence against his son, and under the cover of that sentence, ordered poison to be given him, which in a few hours put a period to his miserable life, at the age of twenty-three.

Philip had, before this time, given a proof of the cruelty of his disposition ; when, as above related, he chose to be present ^{February.} at the execution of his Protestant subjects in Spain. His singular conduct on that occasion, and the composure with which he beheld the torments of the unhappy sufferers, were ascribed by some to the power of superstition ; while they were regarded by others, as the most convincing evidence of the sincerity of his zeal for the true religion. But his severity towards his son did not admit of any such interpretation. It was considered by all the world as a proof that his heart was dead to the sentiments of natural affection and humanity ; and his subjects were every where filled with astonishment. It struck terror in a particular manner into the inhabitants of the Low Countries ; who saw how vain it was to expect mercy from a prince, who had so obstinately refused to exercise it towards his own son ; whose only crime, they believed, was his attachment to them, and his compassion for their calamities.

This unhappy people had no resource left but in the wisdom, public spirit, and extensive influence of the prince ^{The prince of Orange cited to stand his trial.} of Orange. Soon after the duke of Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, William had been cited to appear before him ; and a declaration had been published by Alva, in the name of the King, that in case of his appearance, the utmost lenity would be shown him. But the prince was too sagacious to be caught in this snare. He refused to obey the citation, and assigned the following reasons for his refusal.

“ The citation was of such a nature,” he said, “ that the duke of Alva could not expect his compliance with it. It was ^{He refuses to obey.} contrary in several respects to the fundamental laws of the Netherlands ; the time allowed him to make his appearance was not what the laws prescribed ; and was so short, that, considering his distance from the place of trial, it was utterly impossible for him to appear on the day appointed. The duke of Alva was a judge, whose authority he must on every account decline ; since, as a Knight of the Golden Fleece, he could be judged only by his peers ; and, as an inhabitant of Brabant, by his fellow-citizens. It was a breach of his privileges to commit the power of judging him to a person who was qualified in neither of these respects ; and when injustice was done him in the very nomination of his judge, he had little reason to hope for justice in the decision of his cause ; especially when he considered, that the duke of Alva had long been his personal enemy, and had lately, without hearing what he had to say in his defence, proceeded on the supposition of his being guilty, and had seized violently, and sent to

^r Compare Thuanus, lib. xlivi. c. viii. with Strada, lib. vii. p. 225, &c.

1568.
His son carried
to Spain.

Spain, his son the count of Buren, who was pursuing his studies in the university of Louvain ; trusting for the security of his person, to his unquestionable innocence, and the privileges of the place where he resided.”

His estates
confiscated.

At the same time with the prince of Orange, the earls of Hoogstraten and Culemburg, and several other noblemen, were cited to answer for their conduct ; and, as soon as the short term allowed to them for making their appearance was expired, Alva pronounced sentence against them, and confiscated their effects. He ordered the house of count Culemburg in Brussels to be pulled down, because the confederates had sometimes held their assemblies in it ; and he declared all the estates of the prince of Orange, who (besides his principality in the kingdom of France) possessed several in the Low Countries, and some of great extent in Burgundy, to be forfeited to the King ; a considerable share of the profits of which, if we may credit some historians, he either applied to his own use, or bestowed on the numerous informers whom he employed.

He employs
the intercess-
sion of the Em-
peror.

The prince of Orange was too well acquainted with Philip’s inflexible temper, to expect that any consideration or influence would prevail with him to redress his grievances ; yet, that he might more clearly evince to the world the necessity which he lay under of having recourse to arms, he sent to the Emperor Maximilian, a particular account of the treatment which he himself had received, and of the cruelty which the duke of Alva was exercising against the people of the Netherlands ; and intreated him to employ his good offices in *his* and their behalf. Maximilian, a prince entirely opposite in character to Philip, readily complied with this request. To give his intercession the greater weight, he made choice of his brother Charles of Austria for his ambassador ; and instructed him to represent, that in his opinion, and that of all the princes in Germany, the present conduct of the duke of Alva in the Low Countries was no less impolitic than rigid and severe.

Philip’s reply
to the Empe-
ror.

Philip’s answer to this remonstrance was such as from his well-known character there was reason to expect. The severities which had been employed, he said, had not yet been found sufficient to repress the pride and insolence of his Flemish subjects ; and he hoped the Emperor would take care not to permit any troops to be raised against him in Germany by the prince of Orange and his associates^s.

So haughty an answer, given to a prince of the first rank in Europe, who was Philip’s near relation, demonstrated that it would be vain and ineffectual to make any farther attempt to divert him from his purpose. It contributed likewise to alienate Maximilian from his interest, and thereby facilitated the levies which were soon afterwards made in Germany for carrying on the war.

The prince of
Orange pre-
pares for an
invasion of the
Netherlands.

The prince of Orange, who for several months past had been solicited by the Flemish exiles to take up arms, would willingly have deferred complying with their request, in expectation of a more convenient season, when Philip might be involved in war with some of the neighbouring nations, and have it less in his power to bestow attention on the Netherlands. But the

impatience of the exiles to return home, the great additions which the persecutions had made to their numbers, and his dread that Alva, were he suffered to proceed, would establish his power on too firm a foundation to be shaken by any force which could be brought against it ; all these considerations concurred in determining him immediately to begin his preparations.

In order to raise money, he sold his jewels, plate, and furniture. His brother count John of Nassau, supplied him with a considerable sum, and he received contributions from the Flemish exiles in London, Embden, Cleves, and other places, where they had taken shelter.

He was aware how unable the inhabitants of the Netherlands were, to resist the arms of Spain, unless supported by some foreign power. Philip was not, however, near so formidable at this time as during the life of Mary Queen of England, who knew no other law but her husband's will, and never scrupled to sacrifice the interests of her people to his ambition. Had Mary been still alive, and Philip in possession of his former influence over the English councils, the inhabitants of the Netherlands would have struggled for their liberties in vain. It was fortunate for them, that the princess who sat now upon the throne of England was led, both by inclination and interest, to adopt a system of politics entirely contrary to that of Mary. For as Elizabeth had established the Protestant religion in her own dominions, she had before this time shewn herself determined to support the Protestants of the neighbouring kingdoms. She had interested herself deeply in the civil wars of France, in favour of the Calvinists, whilst Philip gave assistance to the opposite party. And the prince of Orange had reason to entertain the most sanguine hopes, that she would not remain an idle spectator of what was passing in the Netherlands.

He had conceived expectations likewise of obtaining succour from the French Protestants ; and with this view had communicated all his measures to their leaders, the prince of Condé and the admiral de Coligny. But his chief dependence was upon the Protestant princes of Germany, whom, ever since he left the Netherlands, he had strenuously endeavoured to persuade, that if they did not exert themselves with vigour, the liberties of the Netherlands would soon be entirely suppressed ; and the trading cities, with the prosperity of which the interest of the higher provinces of Germany was inseparably connected, would be changed into strong holds, filled with Spanish troops, which the duke of Alva, as soon as his purposes in the Low Countries were accomplished, would not fail to employ against the neighbouring powers.

Prompted by these motives, and by zeal for their religion, the count palatine of the Rhine, the duke of Wirtemberg, the Landgrave of Hesse, and several other princes, resolved to support William in his intended armament ; and accordingly they furnished him with considerable supplies of money, promised him more, and assisted him in levying troops within their respective territories.

Whilst the prince was employed in making levies in Cleves, Juliers, and other countries adjoining to Brabant and Guelderland, his brother, count Lewis, was no less active in raising forces in the more northern parts of Germany, and in gathering together the Flemish exiles.

His hopes of assistance

from the Queen of England

and from the German prin-
cesses.

Count Lewis

^{1568.} arrives with an army in the Netherlands; Count Lewis was much sooner ready to take the field than his brother, and he began his march in the end of April or beginning of May. He resolved first to make an attempt on Groningen ; and for this purpose he pitched his camp in such a situation, that whilst he cut off that city from all correspondence with the neighbouring country, he kept a communication open with his friends in Germany.

^{gains a victory over the Spaniards.} The duke of Alva sent count Aremberg, an officer of considerable reputation, to oppose him ; and ordered count

Megen, governor of Guelderland and Zutphen, to march as soon as possible to count Aremberg's assistance, with a regiment of German infantry that was under his command. Upon Aremberg's approach, Lewis drew off his army to a still more advantageous situation ; and encamped on a rising ground with a large morass in front.

The Spaniards gave at this time a striking proof of that ferocity and insolence which they afterwards discovered on numberless occasions, during the course of the present war. Having conceived the most contemptible opinion of the enemy, they were fired with impatience to engage, and as soon as they came in sight demanded the signal of battle. Aremberg endeavoured to restrain their ardour, by representing that the enemy were so strongly posted, and so much superior in number, that it would be impossible to attack them with success till count Megen should arrive. But the Spaniards were not disposed either to regard his opinion, or to respect his authority. They reproached him with infidelity to the King, and accused him of cowardice and ignorance of the art of war. Aremberg had not sufficient strength of mind to despise their reproaches. Inflamed with indignation at their unworthy treatment of him, " Let us march," said he, " not to conquer, but to be overcome ; and not by the arms of the enemy, but by the nature of the place. We shall be buried in the mud and water before we can reach the enemy ; but it will soon appear, whether I am wanting either in courage or in fidelity to the King." Saying this, he gave orders to advance. The Spaniards were in the front, the Germans in the rear, and the cavalry were distributed in different places as the ground would permit. Lewis rejoiced when he saw them approaching towards him. He had placed his cavalry, under the command of his brother count Adolphus of Nassau, on the right. On the left, his main army was covered by a hill, on which he had planted a strong band of musketeers. Behind him there was a little wood and the walls of a convent ; and in his front the morass above mentioned, which was almost impassable. Yet the Spaniards entered it without hesitation, and continued to advance till they were within reach of the enemy's fire. They came to be sensible of their folly when it was too late. Those who had first entered were prevented from returning by those who followed, and the farther they advanced, they were the more exposed to the enemy's shot, and the more entangled in the mud. When they were in this situation, Lewis attacked them vigorously in front, while his brother broke in upon their flank with the cavalry. They were cut to pieces almost without resistance. Six hundred Spaniards were killed. The Germans surrendered at discretion, and were dismissed, after taking an oath that they would never more carry arms for the duke of Alva. Count Aremberg, finding no room to act as general, was obliged to content himself with performing the duty of a common soldier ; and he and count

Adolphus rushing furiously against one another, fell each of them by the other's sword. The Spaniards lost their artillery, baggage, and military chest. The battle was scarcely ended when count Megen, arrived with so strong a body of troops as would have been sufficient, if they had advanced in time, to have changed the fortune of the day. But they were not able alone to face the enemy. And therefore Megen found it necessary to take shelter in Groningen, where he collected the scattered remains of the conquered army^t

The news of this defeat affected the duke of Alva in the most sensible manner. He knew of how much consequence it was to any cause that the first enterprize should be attended with success. He considered that Lewis had but just entered the Low Countries when he had gained a signal victory, and that the prince of Orange was ready to begin his march with a still more formidable army than that of Lewis. The neighbouring powers, he doubted not, would be animated by what had happened, to grant the prince those supplies which they had promised him; and the Flemings would be less afraid to declare in his favour. On these accounts he would have marched immediately into Friesland with his whole army, in order to cut off or scatter the troops under Lewis before his brother should arrive. But he thought it necessary before he set out, to dispatch the trial of the counts Egmont and Horn, and some other lords, whom at his first coming into the Netherlands he had thrown into prison. Some of his friends endeavoured to divert him from his purpose, by representing that the prisoners were so many pledges in his hands for the peaceable behaviour of their adherents; and that putting them to death would only serve to embitter the resentment of the people, and make them receive the prince of Orange with open arms. He still, however, persisted in his resolution, prompted, if we may believe some historians, by the apprehension that, during his absence, the people might take up arms, and release the prisoners. But, if we may credit others, he was influenced rather by revenge than prudence, and could no longer restrain his fury, which was inflamed at this time by the loss which his army had sustained in the late engagement.

In one day he ordered eighteen persons of rank, whom the Council of Tumults had pronounced guilty of subscribing the compromise, or of presenting remonstrances to the dutchess of Parma, to be put to death. Such of them as died Catholics were beheaded, and the rest were committed to the flames. Casembrot, the lord of Beckerzel, count Egmont's secretary, who had been condemned for signing the compromise, was tortured in the most barbarous manner, to make him accuse his friend and master; and when it appeared that his exhausted body was ready to sink under the torments which he suffered, Alva, enraged that nothing had been extorted from him which could justify the condemnation of the count, gave orders that he should be drawn asunder by horses^u. History scarcely furnishes an instance of so cruel a punishment inflicted for so slight an offence.

Such was the prelude to the trial of the counts Horn and Egmont, which followed immediately after what has been just now related.

Although the conduct both of Philip and the duke of Alva, in the Ne-

Alva's in-quietude on this occa-sion.

The trial of the counts Egmont and Horn.

^t Bentivoglio, p. 67, &c.

^u Grimestone and Bentivoglio.

therlands, and particularly their treatment of these two noblemen, 1568. had been an open violation of the laws, yet it was thought necessary to employ the farce of a formal trial before the sentence of condemnation was pronounced. This was intended to lessen the odium which might arise from putting to death two such illustrious persons, who were so exceedingly beloved by the people, and had distinguished themselves so highly in the service of the King. But it was accompanied with the contrary effect. It afforded the two counts an opportunity of placing their innocence in the clearest light, and furnished the world with the most convincing evidence of Philip's lawless tyranny and oppression.

The general charge against them was, that, in conjunction with the prince of Orange, they had formed a plan to abolish the King's authority in the Netherlands ; and the proofs of this

^{against them.} charge were, first, That by their contumelious treatment of cardinal Granvelle, they had obliged the King, contrary to his inclination, to remove that prelate from the Low Countries.

2. That they were privy to the confederacy which had been formed to oppose the introduction of the inquisition and edicts ; and although count Egmont knew that the lord of Bickerzel had subscribed the compromise, he had still retained him in his service.

3. That they had met at Dendremonde, with the prince of Orange, count Lewis of Nassau, and several others, to deliberate about opposing the entrance of the King's army into the Netherlands. And,

4. That, instead of punishing heretics with due severity, they had in some places granted them liberty openly to celebrate their religious assemblies.

In answer to these accusations, the two lords, after protesting ^{Their de-} that, as knights of the Golden Fleece, they could not be tried

^{fences.} by any other judges but the knights of their order, began with declaring, that they had never entertained a thought to the prejudice of the King's authority ; and that when they urged the King to remove cardinal Granvelle from the Netherlands, they believed, and were still persuaded, that his removal was equally calculated to promote the interest of the King and of the provinces. Although they knew of the confederacy, they had neither any concern in it, nor power sufficient to prevent it ; and count Egmont had continued to employ the lord of Bickerzel, after knowing that he had signed the compromise, from a conviction that he was still unshaken in his fidelity to the church and to the King ; of which that nobleman gave afterwards the strongest proof, by exerting himself, with great activity, in detecting and punishing the violators of the churches. They had indeed been present at a conference in Dendremonde, where count Lewis of Nassau had proposed that they should unite their endeavours to prevent the entrance of the Spanish troops ; but, instead of assenting to that proposal, they had disapproved and opposed it. They had done every thing in their power for the suppression of heresy ; they had made diligent search for the rioters, and punished many of them with great severity ; and although they had in some places granted the Protestants liberty to hold their religious assemblies, yet they had done so because they could not otherwise have prevented the demolition of the churches, besides many other mischievous effects, which there was the strongest reason to apprehend from the enthusiastic rage of the reformers. At the worst, they had been guilty only of an error in judgment. They had lived, and would die, in the belief and practice of the Catholic

religion. And as they had not been wanting in their duty to the church ; so they had lately given incontestible evidence of their devotion to the King, by taking cheerfully, at the dutchess of Parma's desire, an oath to obey the King in every thing ; and to regard, as enemies to the State, all those whom he should be pleased to condemn.

While the prisoners offered these satisfactory defences of their conduct, the most earnest solicitations were employed in their behalf. Intercessions in their behalf.

The Emperor Maximilian, agreeably to the humanity of his character, interceded with Philip in their favour, and flattered himself so strongly with the hopes of success, that, a few days before their execution, he sent to inform the countess of Egmont, that her fears for her husband's life would, he now believed, be happily disappointed.

The dutchess of Parma too, who had never suspected that the complaints which she had made against the prisoners during her regency, would have been attended with such serious consequences, transmitted to the King, and seconded, a petition from the countess of Egmont ; in which, after representing that her husband had distinguished himself above his equals, first in the service of the late Emperor, and since in that of the King ; and that he had often borne a principal share in their wars and victories both in Europe and Africa ; she concluded with intreating, that if, notwithstanding her husband's defence of his conduct, he should still be found obnoxious to justice ; yet, on account of his former services, the King would remember him with mercy, and take into consideration the deplorable situation to which she, and her eleven helpless children, would be reduced, by the ignominious death of her husband.

But Philip, cursed with the most unfeeling heart, remained relentless and inflexible ; and, conformably to his orders, Alva pronounced sentence of death both against count Egmont and count Horn, in the beginning of June one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, after they had suffered near nine months imprisonment. The sentence was intimated to them in the middle of the night, when they were in bed, by the bishop of Ipres. They received the intelligence with becoming fortitude and resignation. "I am not conscious," said count Egmont, "of having deserved such hard usage from the King, whose glory and interest I have sincerely studied to promote. But I will submit to my fate with patience ; although my heart bleeds when I think on my wife and children."

A few hours before his death he wrote to the King, "That although it had pleased him to order sentence of death to be pronounced against him as a traitor, and an abettor of heretics ; yet in justice to himself he must declare, that he had never failed, in word or in deed, in his duty either to *him* or to the church. I cannot therefore doubt (continued he) that when you shall receive true information of what has passed in the Low Countries, you will be sensible how unjustly I have been used ; having been condemned for doing what I never did or intended ; and for the truth of this, I call Almighty God to witness, before whom I shall soon appear. My last and only request is, that on account of my former services, and the integrity of my intentions, you will take compassion on my unhappy wife and children ; in the hopes of which I will patiently submit to the execution of the sentence which has been passed against me." June 5th, 1568.

Letter of the countess of Egmont.

Letter of count Egmont to Philip.

^{1568.} _{The execu-} Both prisoners had, a few days before, been brought from Ghent to Brussels. Count Egmont was first conducted to the place of execution, with Julio Romero, camp marshal, on one hand, and the bishop of Ipres on the other. The scaffold was covered with black cloth, and surrounded by a strong guard, consisting of nineteen companies of soldiers. The count went up to the scaffold accompanied only by the bishop of Ipres; with whom, having discoursed some time (on what subject we are not told), he kneeled down and prayed; then rose again, and throwing off his robe, he wrapped his head and face in a handkerchief, and again kneeling down, with his hands joined, he in that posture received the stroke of the executioner.

The head and body, and the blood which flowed from them, were covered with a black cloth, to hide them from the view of count Horn; who was soon after brought thither, accompanied by the same attendants. Having ascended the scaffold, he enquired whether count Egmont was already beheaded; and being told that he was, "We have not seen one another," said he, "since the day when we were cast into prison." But from our fate, my friends," addressing himself to the spectators, "learn to know the measure of obedience required by your superiors. If I have ever offended any of you, I now ask forgiveness, and beseech you to assist me with your prayers." Then having disrobed himself, he submitted to his fate with perfect composure and tranquillity.

The heads were set up opposite to each other, on two iron poles, fastened to the sides of the scaffold where they remained till the afternoon, when they were taken down and delivered, together with the bodies, to the friends of the deceased^x.

The unmerited death of these two great men excited universal grief and indignation. Nor could the spectators be deterred, by the numerous troops which surrounded them, from testifying their resentment. Many of them, forgetting the danger to which they exposed themselves, rushed forward to the scaffold, dipt their handkerchiefs in the blood, and vowed, in the hearing of the Spaniards, that ere long the governor and his associates shold have reason to repent of the cruel murder that had been committed^y.

_{Character of} Count Egmont was forty-six years of age when he suffered. _{count Eg-} To the most splendid bodily accomplishments, he joined great _{mont.} gentleness of manners, and the most engaging affability.

From his youth he had accompanied the late Emperor in his military expeditions, and had on all occasions acquitted himself with the highest honour, while at the same time he rendered himself universally beloved. Of the two victories which Philip's armies gained over the French at St. Quintin and Gravelines, it is allowed that the one was owing in a great measure, and the other entirely, to count Egmont. As all men were acquainted with the advantages which Philip derived from these victories, they were shocked at the ungrateful return which he now made to the person by whose valour and conduct they had been obtained^z.

^x Strada.

^y Bentivoglio

^z At the same time that what is above related was transacted at Brussels, orders were given at Madrid for putting to death the baron of Montigny, brother to count Horn, who had been sent by the dutchess of Parma along with the marquis Mons (who died some months before), to present the petition of the confederates. Bentivoglio.

After this dismal catastrophe, Alva having nothing to prevent him from turning his whole attention to the war with count Lewis of Nassau, ordered bridges to be thrown over the Maese, the Rhine, and the Issel, and marched directly to the enemy. He reached Daventer, where he had given orders for several bodies of troops to meet him about the middle of July ; and in a few days after, he arrived with his whole army, consisting of twelve thousand foot and three thousand horse, in sight of the enemy's camp.

1568.
Alva marches
against count
Lewis.

The army of count Lewis being much inferior both in discipline and number, that general quickly perceived the necessity of quitting his present situation. He retired, however, in good order, and with very little loss, till he arrived at the town of Gemmingen, where he pitched his camp in a place that appeared almost impregnable. Behind him lay the village of Gemmingen ; on his left, the river Ems, by which he could be supplied with provisions from Embden, and other places ; and on his right, a plain which he fortified with trenches and redoubts ; but that which formed the chief strength of his situation was, that the enemy could not approach him but by marching in defile along the dyke of the river. This dyke was ten miles in length, with the river on the one side, and a morass on the other. Having planted a battery of cannon upon it, Lewis intended to open the dyke, and lay the morass under water. And in this encampment, he hoped it would not be difficult for him to keep the enemy at bay, till his brother should begin his operations ; when he did not doubt that the duke of Alva would find it necessary to retire.

Alva was aware of Lewis's intention, and of the danger with which any considerable delay must be attended. and defeats him. With the utmost expedition, he brought forward his best veteran troops, and arrived at the very time when the Flemings were beginning to break down the dyke. Count Lewis and the other nobility were themselves employed at the work. When the enemy appeared, they betook themselves hastily to arms, but they were soon obliged to yield to the superior force of the Spaniards, and to retire behind the battery above mentioned. Here Lewis expected to maintain his ground by the help of his artillery ; but the Germans in his army, to the number of seven thousand, having been disappointed of their pay for some weeks, and believing that Lewis had money in his possession which he had delayed giving them from his dread of their desertion, resolved to embrace the present opportunity to extort from him a compliance with their demands. They rose tumultuously, and threatened that they would not fight unless he immediately paid their arrears. Intelligence of this sedition was carried by through a mu- tiny of the Germans. spies or deserters to the duke of Alva, who perceived that now was the time to make an attempt upon the battery. He ordered a part of his army to enter the morass ; through which, as it was the summer season, and Lewis had been disappointed in his design of laying the ground under water, the Spaniards found their way easier than they expected. They arrived in time to attack the enemy in flank, whilst the rest of the army, without shrinking, marched up to the battery in front, and made a furious assault upon it sword in hand. The Flemish exiles, with count Lewis at their head, defended themselves for some time with great bravery ; but being deserted by the Germans, they were at length compelled to retreat. The Spaniards entered the

1568. camp along with them. The Germans, overwhelmed with terror, made little resistance ; and, as a just punishment of their sedition at so critical a period, great numbers of them were put to the sword. Almost as many were swallowed up in attempting to swim across the river, as fell by the hands of the enemy. On the side of the Spaniards only eighty men were killed ; but of the Germans and the Flemish exiles, between six and seven thousand perished, including those who were drowned. Count Lewis, after having attempted in vain to rally his scattered troops, escaped in a small boat to the opposite side of the river ; and soon afterwards set out with the earl of Hoogstraten for Germany, to join the prince of Orange^a.

The duke of Alva went from the field of battle to the city of Groningen, and from thence to Utrecht and Amsterdam ; carrying on inquiries in these places against the Protestants, and punishing with rigour all who were suspected to have been concerned in the late disorders. He would gladly have spent more time in this employment, so agreeable to the native cruelty of his disposition ; but he was informed that the prince of Orange had begun to put his troops in motion, and was upon his march from Treves to the province of Guelderland, or Brabant.

Before William left Germany, he published a manifesto, in which he explained the motives which induced him to have recourse to arms. "There was no other expedient left," he said, "by which he could save his countrymen from slavery and ruin ; and to attempt this, he thought, was the indispensable duty of every citizen ; especially of one who, like him, had enjoyed the highest dignities of the state. The King, he hoped, would ere long be delivered from those Spanish counsellors by whom he had been led astray ; but, in the mean time, he did not think it incumbent upon any inhabitant of the Low Countries to yield obedience to the King in contradiction to the laws. For Philip did not hold the same unlimited authority in the Netherlands, as in his other dominions. His right to obedience subsisted only whilst he maintained the rights of the people ; and, by the constitutions of the provinces, it was expressly provided, that if the sovereign should attempt to violate any of the fundamental laws, the people should in that case be absolved from their allegiance."

In this manifesto the prince thought proper to make it known, that he had changed his sentiments in religion ; and was now convinced, that the opinions of the Protestants were more conformable than those of the Romish church, to the great rule of Christian faith, the sacred writings.

William's army, including horse and foot, did not exceed The prince's army. twenty thousand ; and the duke of Alva's, after being joined by a reinforcement which he received at this time from Spain, was equal in number, and much better furnished with military stores and provisions. The prince was sensible of the great disadvantage under which he laboured in this respect ; but from the pressing invitations which he received from many of the principal inhabitants in the Netherlands, and from the repeated representations which were made to him of the universal hatred with which the people were animated against the governor, he hoped that, as soon as his army should

^a Strada, Bentivoglio, and Grimstone's General History of the Netherlands.

appear, there would be an insurrection in his favour, or that some of the principal cities would open their gates to receive him.

1563.

He passed the Rhine without opposition in the end of August, a little above Cologn ; and then turning to the left, he advanced towards Aix-la-Chapelle. About this time the duke of Alva arrived at Maestricht. The prince directed his march first towards Liege ; but being disappointed in the hopes which he had conceived, of that city declaring in his favour, he turned his course northwards, with an intention to pass the Maese wherever he should find it fordable. Alva's whole attention was employed to prevent him from putting his design in execution, and with this view he planted strong guards along the banks of the river, and kept his army as nearly opposite as possible to the enemy.

Alva in vain
opposes his
passage over
the Maese.

At last, however, after several marches and countermarches, William effected his passage in the night, opposite to a town called Stochem, where the duke believed it to have been impracticable. But the season had been remarkable dry ; and the prince on this occasion imitated the conduct of Julius Cæsar in his passage of the Ligeris, by placing his cavalry a little above the ford, to break the force of the stream.

When Alva was informed next morning of what had happened, he could not at first believe it, and scornfully asked the officer who brought the intelligence, Whether he imagined that the enemy had wings ?

The prince of Orange endeavoured to persuade his troops, as soon as they had crossed the river, to march directly against the Spaniards ; who, if this request had been complied with, might have been attacked with great advantage ; but the Germans, who unfortunately for themselves, as well as for the cause in which they were engaged, never yielded due obedience to their commander, refused to advance till they should have a night's refreshment ; and thereby lost the only opportunity which the duke of Alva ever gave them, of compelling him to fight.

On the next day, when they were led forward to the Spanish camp to offer battle, they found it so strongly fortified with intrenchments and redoubts, that no attempt could be made upon it with the smallest probability of success. Chiappino Vitelli, an officer of high reputation, was of opinion, that the duke ought not to have declined an engagement, as the enemy were fatigued with their passage of the river, and had not yet made choice of a proper place for their camp, to which they could retire after battle ; besides, that it was of the highest consequence, he imagined, to give an early check to their presumption, in order to prevent the fortified towns from declaring in their favour.

Alva de-
clines fight-
ing.

But Alva had already formed his plan, to which he was unalterably determined to adhere. He considered that he had a great deal more at stake than the prince of Orange ; and that a defeat would be attended not only with the loss of his army, but the greatest part of the provinces. He was acquainted too with the narrowness of William's finances, and knew that he must encounter the most unsurmountable difficulties in supporting so numerous an army for any considerable time ; especially as the winter season was fast approaching, when, unless he should get possession of some of the great towns, it would be impossible for him to remain in the Netherlands.

With this view, as he suspected that the prince intended to lead his army into Brabant, he strengthened the garrisons of Tillemont, Louvain, and Brussels ; and when William direct-

His mo-
tives.

His prudent
conduct.

1568. ed his march towards Tongres, the Duke drew his troops so near that town, as made it impossible for the enemy to approach. Which-ever way the prince of Orange turned his course, the duke of Alva accompanied him ; marching sometimes behind, and sometimes on his flank ; always straitening his quarters, and rendering it difficult for him to furnish his army with forage and provisions ; while he intrenched his own forces with so much skill, that the prince sought in vain for an opportunity of bringing on an engagement.

In this situation frequent skirmishes between the two armies ^{Skirmishes.} were unavoidable, and in these the advantage fell sometimes on the one side, and sometimes on the other ; but each commander made such judicious movements, chose his ground with so much skill, and exerted such an equal degree of vigilance and attention, as effectually prevented his antagonist from obtaining any considerable advantage over him.

The only success which the duke of Alva could boast of, was at the river Geete ; where, having attacked the rear-guard of the enemy's army, he killed some, and put the rest to flight.

The prince of Orange had the same ground of triumph in an action at Quesnoy ; where, having come up with a detachment, consisting of ten companies of German Catholics, eight of Spaniards, and three troops of light-armed infantry, he put them to rout, and took ample vengeance for the loss he had sustained at Geete ^b.

He was on his march at that time to meet the Sieur de Genlis, who had been sent to him by the prince of Condé, with a reinforcement of troops ; which fully compensated all his losses in Brabant.

The causes already mentioned began to operate. The prince had been cruelly disappointed of the greatest part of the money which had been promised him. The dread which the Flemings entertained of the Spanish forces, and the prudent precautions which had been taken by the duke of Alva, had prevented William's friends from making any effort in his behalf. His army had been often pinched for provisions. They now despaired of getting possession of any of the great towns, and they trembled at the thoughts of passing the winter in the open fields. The Germans began to desert in great numbers, and had often, before this time, shewn themselves refractory and disobedient. For these reasons, the prince found it necessary to disband them ; after having given them all the satisfaction in his power, by paying a part of their arrears, and giving security to their leaders for the rest on his lordship of Montfort and the principality of Orange ^c.


After these disasters, the prince, accompanied by his brother count Lewis, went to France, and conducted thither between a thousand and twelve hundred horse, to the assistance of the Calvinists.

Such was the conclusion of the first attempt which the prince of Orange and his brother made to deliver the Netherlands from the Spanish yoke. It must occur to every reader, that if they had begun their operations and entered the provinces at the same time, the issue of their enterprise would probably have been extremely different. The duke of Alva would, in that case, have been obliged to divide his forces, and have probably been overpowered by numbers. But unfortunately count Lewis, who

^b Thuanus.

^c Thuanus Meursius, Albanus, p. 19. Meteren, p. 79.

was more expeditious in making his levies than the prince of Orange, did not possess a fund sufficient to maintain them without employment, and was obliged to enter upon action before his brother was prepared to support him. And to the same cause may be ascribed both the prince's delay in putting his troops in motion, and the necessity to which he was reduced of breaking up his camp.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK IX.

PART I.

WHILE Philip's bigotry, joined to his despotic and arbitrary conduct, had engaged him in war with his subjects in the Netherlands, the same causes produced a similar effect in the province of Granada ; where the Moors, who had long yielded a tame submission to the crown of Spain, were provoked by the tyranny of the present government, to throw off their allegiance, and have recourse to arms. This people, who, during several centuries, had maintained possession of the greatest part of Spain, were at last totally subdued by Ferdinand the Catholic, in the year one thousand four hundred and ninety-two. But although their government was abolished at that time, the people themselves remained ; and were permitted to enjoy not only their possessions, dress, and customs, but even their religion, as in the time of their native kings. And the politic Ferdinand scrupled not to swear solemnly, to observe this condition, in hopes of being able afterwards to devise some efficacious means of reconciling them to the Christian faith.

1503.
The war in
Granada.

History of
the Moors
coes.

Being disappointed in his expectation, and finding, after a trial of several years, that the instructions of his priests were not likely to prove effectual ; he resolved, without regard to the oath which he had sworn, to employ force in order to accomplish his design. He pretended, that the citizens of Granada had forfeited their title to his fulfilling the terms of peace, by an insurrection, into which some of them had been betrayed through the violent administration of cardinal Ximenes ; and, on this pretence, he ordered sentence of death to be pronounced against them, and declared, that unless they would renounce their religion, it should be instantly carried into execution. By this expedient he compelled fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the city of Granada, most of whom had

1568. no concern in the insurrection, to profess themselves converts to Christianity. The inhabitants of the country, and of the smaller towns, being highly exasperated by the violent treatment of their countrymen, and dreading that they themselves would quickly experience the same injustice, began to prepare for resistance. But before they had time to put themselves in a posture of defence, Ferdinand, who was no less provident and active, than false and faithless, came upon them with a numerous army, and after taking one of their towns, of which he put all the inhabitants to the sword, he soon obliged the rest to lay down their arms. Upon their paying him a sum of money, he permitted a certain number to transport themselves to Africa. But the greater part were compelled to remain in the kingdom, and to submit to be baptized. They were still however strongly attached to the Mahometan superstition ; and although they generally conformed to the rites of the Romish church, they could not, on every occasion, conceal their attachment. The inquisitors were perpetually prying into their conduct ; great numbers of them were condemned and burnt as heretics ; and many thousands, dreading the like fate, fled over to Barbary.

Representations were often transmitted to court of the desolation that was thus produced ; but these representations either did not reach the ear of Ferdinand, or they were disregarded. No remedy was ever applied, and the inquisitors continued to exercise without controul their wonted cruelty and oppression.

During the latter part of the reign of Ferdinand, and the whole of that of Charles, the Moors are seldom mentioned by the Spanish historians ; nor do these writers give us any other information concerning them for half a century, than that they still retained their ancient aversion to the Christian faith. But the ecclesiastics, soon after Philip's arrival in Spain, taking encouragement from that bigoted zeal with which they knew their prince to be so strongly actuated, revived their old complaints against that unhappy people, and made repeated representations of their obstinate and incurable infidelity.

“ They are Christians,” said Guerrero, arch-bishop of Granada, “ in name only, but Mahometans in their hearts. They come to hear mass on festival days, only in order to avoid the penalties which they would otherwise incur. They work on these days with their doors shut, and feast and carouse on Fridays. They present their children to be baptized ; but no sooner do they reach their own houses, than they wash them with warm water, circumcise them, and give them Moorish names. They consent to be married in the churches, because the law requires it ; but when they return home, they clothe themselves in a Moorish dress, and celebrate their nuptials with dances, songs, and other species of music which are in use only among the Moors.”

This representation was well calculated to make impression on the superstitious spirit of the King. But the archbishop knew, that political considerations were likely to have as much weight with him as those of a religious nature ; and therefore he subjoined, “ That the Morescoes held a treasonable correspondence with the Turks and corsairs, and were in the practice of carrying off the children of Christians, and either selling them for slaves, or sending them to Barbary, where they were brought up in the religion of Mahomet.” Whether there was any truth in the latter part of this accusation, does not appear with convincing evidence ; but, considering the near affinity between the Morescoes and the African

Moors, in respect of religion, manners, language, and descent, together with the alienation from the Spanish government, which the cruelties exercised against them by the inquisition, and their exclusion from all offices of trust, must have carried to the greatest height, it is not surprising that Philip's apprehensions were alarmed, and that he thought it necessary to make provision against the danger which seemed to threaten him.

His first step was to strip the Morescoes of their arms ; and for this purpose he sent, on different pretences, several regiments of Castilians to quarter among them, by whom a great quantity of arms of all kinds were seized ; but as their suspicions were perpetually awake, they had penetrated his design, and concealed a considerable quantity ^a.

This discovery of Philip's disposition towards them, served to alienate their affections more than ever from his government, and at the same time encouraged the inquisitors to multiply their complaints, and to urge at court the necessity of employing more efficacious measures than had hitherto been adopted. The King himself was far from being averse to comply with the violent counsels that were given him ; and when upon consulting a theologian of the name of Oraduy, that ecclesiastic, in the true spirit of a Spanish inquisitor, quoted to him the proverb, that “ of enemies, the fewer the better.” Philip was highly pleased with his reply.

Having therefore resolved, if possible, to extirpate from his dominions the private as well as the public exercise of Mahometanism, and to wash it out with the blood of its votaries, rather than suffer it to remain, he appointed a select number of ecclesiastics to consider of the proper means by which his design might be accomplished ; and agreeably to the advice of these men, he soon afterwards published an edict which contained the following prohibitions, and denounced death in case of disobedience : “ That henceforth the Morescoes shall lay aside their native language, dress, and peculiar customs, and in future adopt those of the inhabitants of Castile. That they shall no longer take Moorish names or surnames, but such as are generally used in Spain. That they shall bear none of those symbols about them by which the disciples of Mahomet are distinguished. That they shall discontinue the use of their baths, which shall be immediately destroyed. That their women shall not, as hitherto, appear in veils ; that no person shall marry without a dispensation from the ordinary ; that none shall remove from one place to another without permission ; and that they shall on no occasion wear arms, or keep them in their possession.”

The exercise of the Mahometan religion having been prohibited under the severest penalties by former princes, no mention was made of it in the edict ; but the Morescoes readily perceived the design and tendency of the present regulations, and considered, that as they must render the secret practice of their religion infinitely more difficult than formerly, they must infallibly prove ere long the cause of its extirpation. Even although they had not been apprehensive of any such serious consequence, it could not be expected they would tamely submit to those affronting rules which were now prescribed them. Men are often more powerfully attached to the external forms and modes of life, than to

Philip dis-
arms them.

His edict
against
them.

1568. things that are the most essential to their happiness. With this attachment the zeal of the Morescoes for their religion coincided. Their resentment, on account of the innumerable cruelties which had been so long exercised against them by the inquisition, added force to these incentives, and prompted them to resolve to expose themselves to the last extremities, rather than yield obedience to the edict that was now promulgated. But as they were conscious of their weakness, and could not depend upon receiving assistance from any foreign power, they agreed, before they should take up arms, to make trial, whether they could, by solicitation and intreaty, persuade the King to revoke his edict.

“ Their dress,” they represented, “ had surely no relation to any religion, whether the Mahometan or the Christian, since the Mahometans in Morocco, Fez, Tunis, and Turkey, dressed very differently from one another ; while the dress of the Christians in Turkey was the same as that of the Turks : and to require them all to purchase Castilian habits, would subject great numbers of them to an expence which they were unable to defray. It was from modesty alone their women wore veils ; a practice which obtained in many places of Castile, as well as in Granada. Their music and dances were used on days of festivity, only as amusements ; they had not the most remote connection with religion, and they had been regarded as innocent by prelates the most distinguished for their sanctity and zeal.

“ Their baths were used for the purpose of cleanliness only ; those of the men were separate from those of the women ; and it was not in the power of those Christians, to whom the care of them was committed, to allege, that either the former or the latter had been ever applied to any use repugnant either to decency or the Catholic religion. And with regard to their language, as it was difficult to conceive how the Arabic could contain any thing contrary to Christianity, so it was utterly impossible for them at once to lay aside the use of it, since great numbers among them were too far advanced in life to be able to learn a new language ; and in several parts of the country there was no other tongue spoken but the Arabic, nor any means established by which the Castilian could be acquired.” They concluded with professions of loyalty to the King, and with reminding him, that in his foreign wars they had given him many proofs to their attachment and fidelity.

The Morescoes had not access, it should seem, to deliver this remonstrance to Philip himself ; but it was presented to him by Deza the chancellor of Granada, who was seconded by Don John Henriquez, Don Antonio de Toledo, the prior of Leon, and the marquis of Mondejar, captain-general of the province. This last mentioned nobleman spared no pains to divert Philip from his purpose, by representing, that from his knowledge of the Morescoes he was convinced, that an open rebellion would be the consequence of carrying the edict into execution. But the King having formed his resolution after mature deliberation, and by the advice of such counsellors as he most esteemed, lent a deaf ear to all the representations that were made to him, and gave orders to Mondejar immediately to set out for Granada, in order to make preparations for employing force in case he should find it necessary.

The Morescoes were no sooner informed of the ill success of their petition, than they began to meditate a revolt ; and the leading men among them having met privately in Cadair, a town situated in the entrance of the mountains of Alpuxara, they dispatched ambassadors to

Fez, Algiers, and Constantinople, to solicit assistance ; and at the same time spread their emissaries over the province, in order to prepare the minds of the inhabitants.

1568.

The people almost every where, except in those places where they were overawed by the Spanish garrison, obeyed Their insur-
rection. with alacrity the invitation which they received to assert their liberty ; and in a little time the whole region of Alpuxara, which contains a space of seventeen leagues in length and ten in breadth, comprehending many villages and many thousand inhabitants, was up in arms. A reinforcement of several hundred Turks, besides a quantity of military stores, arrived from Africa, and the Morescoes flattered themselves with the hopes that much more powerful assistance would ere long be sent them by the Sultan.

Their leaders in the mean time held another assembly, in which they elected for their King Don Ferdinaud de Valor, a They elect
a king. young man of four or five and twenty, descended from their ancient princes, and in some measure qualified, by his intrepid courage and activity, for the dangerous pre-eminence to which he was now exalted. Having assumed the name of Aben-Humeya, which had been that of his progenitors, he was invested with the ensigns of royalty, with all the forms and ceremonies which were anciently practised at the election of the Moorish kings. He then entered upon the exercise of his new authority, appointed his ministers and officers, and sent orders to all the chiefs who were not present in the assembly, to hold themselves ready to act on the shortest notice.

His first and principal object was to get possession of the city of Granada, in which he doubted not of being able to Their attempt
on Granada. defend himself till the Turkish succours should arrive. Nor was it without some reason that he entertained hopes of succeeding in an attempt on this important city. His party had hitherto concealed their machinations with the most profound and faithful secrecy. Their several meetings had been held on pretences which deceived the penetration of the Spaniards, and their military preparations had been carried on chiefly among the mountains of Alpuxara. The marquis of Mondejar, indeed, notwithstanding these precautions, had conceived a suspicion of their designs, and had represented to Philip the necessity of sending him a much more powerful army than was at present under his command. But there subsisted at this time a violent jealousy between that nobleman and Deza the chancellor, which arose from a competition concerning the rights of their respective offices. Deza, prompted by his animosity against the marquis, endeavoured to discredit his account of the hostile intentions of the Moors, and to persuade the King that there was in reality no danger of a revolt, and that the edict lately published might be sufficiently enforced by a vigorous exercise of the civil power alone ; but that Mondejar was desirous that a war should be kindled, because he expected that the whole administration of it would be committed to himself, and the count of Tendilla his son.

Philip, though naturally provident and suspicious, and more inclined to fear than hope, was by his counsellors, who were Deza's friends, led to believe his representation of the matter, rather than that of the marquis. And thus the march of the troops for which Mondejar had applied was delayed, and the garrison of Granada suffered to continue so weak, that had it not been for an accident which could not be fore-

1568. seen, that city would have fallen into the hands of the Morescoes. Aben-Humeya having held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of the town of Albaicin, which communicates with the city of Granada, and may be considered as a part of it, gave orders about the end of December, to Aben-Farax, one of his principal officers, to march thither with a body of between six and seven thousand men. Had these troops reached Albaicin at the time expected, the inhabitants would have joined them, and thereby have made up an army by which the garrison must have been overpowered ; but by a fall of snow upon a neighbouring mountain, over which they were obliged to pass, they were all prevented from advancing except about one hundred and fifty. With these Aben-Farax himself entered Albaicin in the middle of the night ; and if he could have prevailed upon the inhabitants to take arms and join him, he might still have made himself master of the town ; but though well affected to his cause, they were deterred from declaring in his favour by observing how small a number of troops he had brought along with him ; so that, after having continued in the place for some hours, he was obliged, before the approach of day, to make his escape, to the mountain where his army had been stopt. Philip's eyes were then opened, with regard to the contradictory informations which he had received, and he immediately issued orders for the march of those troops for which the marquis of Mondejar had applied.

Aben-Humeya in the mean time was employed in fortifying ^{Their hos-} the narrow passes which led into the country of Alpujara ; ^{ilities.} after which he, with one body of troops, and Aben-Farax with another, went from place to place, exhorting or compelling the Morescoes to revolt ; destroying the altars and images in the churches, which they converted into mosques ; and putting to death, in the most barbarous manner, all the priests and other Christians who refused to embrace the Mahometan religion.

In order to check their progress, the marquis of Mondejar set out from Granada as soon as he had collected a sufficient number of troops for his intended enterprise. The

^{They submit to the marquis} Morescoes disputed with him for some time the entrance into the mountains ; but they were unable to withstand long the bold intrepid efforts of the Spanish infantry. Mondejar triumphed over them at every pass ; put many of them to the sword ; took a great number of prisoners, and at last obliged Aben-Humeya to fly with the shattered remains of his army, to the more inaccessible parts of the mountains. In a few months almost the whole region of Alpujara was subdued. The people, being every where intimidated by the rapidity of Mondejar's progress, laid down their arms, and either came to him in numerous bodies, or sent deputies, to sue for peace. This he readily granted, on condition of their yielding obedience in future to the King's authority ; and he at the same time gave them protection against (what they had but too much reason to dread) the rapine and violence of the Spanish soldiers. The marquis de los Velez, who commanded a body of troops in the neighbourhood of Almeria, was no less successful in dislodging the Morescoes from some strong holds near the sea-coasts, where they had fortified themselves with a view to favour the descent of the Moors and Turks. And now the marquis of Mondejar, believing the war to be almost entirely extinguished, and that Aben-Humeya must either soon surrender or make his escape out of the kingdom, sent in-

telligence of his success to Philip, and desired that a part of the troops might be recalled. He at the same time recommended the treating gently both such of the Morescoes as had submitted, and such of them as had been taken prisoners. But unfortunately this nobleman's enemies at court had much greater influence than his friends ; and Philip was of himself much more inclined to harshness and severity, than to lenity and mercy. Without regard to Mondejar's representations, a royal mandate was immediately dispatched, commanding all the prisoners above eleven years of age, without distinction of sex or condition, to be sold for slaves^b.

This barbarous treatment of their countrymen revived in the minds of such of the Morescoes as had submitted, all their wonted abhorrence of the Spanish yoke ; and soon afterwards they themselves were treated with equal inhumanity.

Whether Philip's exchequer was in reality drained at this time by his late expensive armaments in the Mediterranean, and his war in the Netherlands, or whether his ministers only pretended this to be the case, in order to gratify their malignity against Mondejar, does not sufficiently appear ; but whatever was the cause, the arrears due to the troops were so great, that the marquis of Mondejar was unable to discharge them. The usual consequence of the ill-payment of an army quickly followed. The general lost his authority, and the soldiers, and several of the officers, deserted their stations, and spread themselves over the country ; plundering, and even butchering and carrying off into slavery, great numbers of those Morescoes for whose security he had pledged his faith. Mondejar seems to have exerted himself strenuously to put a stop to these enormities, by sending out such of his troops as he could trust, to restrain or chastise the delinquents. But his endeavours were in a great measure fruitless. The Spaniards still continued to embrace every opportunity of indulging their rapacity ; and afterwards left their standards, and went off to the neighbouring provinces with their prey.

The Morescoes, highly exasperated by the multiplied oppressions which they suffered, repented of their late submission ; and, being now convinced that there was no safety in trusting to any treaty with an enemy so cruel and perfidious, they resumed their arms, took ample vengeance on scattered parties of the Spaniards, whom they surprised among the mountains, and again arranged themselves under the banners of their King. It happened about this time, that Aben-Humeya received from Africa a reinforcement of four hundred Turks ; who, it was pretended, were soon to be followed by a powerful fleet and army. And thus the Morescoes were determined, partly by hope, and partly by vengeance and despair, to make a second trial of the fortune of war ; the calamities attending which, they thought, could not exceed those which they had lately experienced in the time of peace.

The causes of this second revolt were very differently interpreted by the marquis of Mondejar's enemies and friends. By the former it was said, " That this nobleman had erred egregiously, both in his manner of conducting the war, and in his treatment of the rebels, when they laid down their arms. For it was absurd to expect that an enemy so treacherous as the Morescoes, would regard their engagements any longer

^b The effect of this barbarous treatment, says a Spanish historian (Ferreras), was, that great numbers of the Moresco women languished in slavery for a little time, and then sunk under their calamities.

1568. than they found it necessary ; and no less absurd to hope that such obstinate infidels would ever be sincere converts to the Christian faith. Their late sacrilege, and the barbarous cruelties which they had exercised against the priests, and other Christians, had called aloud for vengeance ; and justice, as well as sound policy, had required, that they should all have been put to the sword, or sold for slaves."

But the marquis, on the other hand, and his adherents, represented, That this deluded people had been chastised with sufficient severity, for enormities into which their leaders had betrayed them. That humanity, and a regard to the interest of the King, had prevented him from sacrificing to revenge, the lives of so many thousand useful subjects, most of whom were innocent of the crimes that had been committed ; and by whose destruction so great a part of the kingdom would have been rendered desolate : besides, that there was no reason to believe that the Morescoes would have violated their faith, if the troops could have been kept under proper discipline ; which he had found it impossible to maintain, partly through the negligence of some of the King's ministers in making remittances for their pay ; and partly through the pains which some persons in power had taken to ruin his authority.

Between these contradictory representations, Philip was
 Don John of Austria com- at a loss to determine what measures to pursue. But at last,
 mander in chief either because he himself, and most of his counsellors, dis-
 approved of Mondejar's lenity in so easily receiving the
 Morescoes into favour, or because he did not incline to subject that nobleman's enemies to the mortification of seeing him still continued in the supreme command, he resolved to bestow it upon his natural brother
 Don John of Austria.

This young prince, whose mother was a German, of the name of Blomberg, a native of Ratisbon, had been educated privately by Lewis Quixada, lord of Villagarcia ; for whose son he had passed, till Philip's arrival in Spain in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-nine. Soon after this, Philip having, agreeably to his father's request, acknowledged Don John for his brother ; had appointed him a household suitable to his rank, and bestowed the same attention on his education as on that of his own son.

Resembling his father in the gracefulness of his person, and in the courteousness of his manners, Don John discovered, from his youth, the love of arms ; and gave many conspicuous proofs of those accomplishments by which he became afterwards one of the most illustrious personages of the age ^c.

But as at this time he was only about twenty-two years old, and did not possess any military experience, Philip, although he conferred upon him the title of commander in chief, forbade him to take the command of the troops into his own hands, and required, that in the whole management of the war, he should conform to the opinion of certain counsellors whom he appointed to assist him. These were, the archbishop of Granada, Deza the president of the chancery, the duke de Sessa, the marquis of Mondejar, and Don Lewis de Requesens, the grand commendator of Castile, whom he named for Don John's lieutenant.

The war was now prosecuted in different quarters at the same time, and a greater number of troops employed than formerly. But the

success was not answerable to the expectations that had been formed. The Morescoes discovered, on many occasions, that they were not destitute of valour, and in some encounters they came off ^{1568.} victorious.

Don John, in the mean time, grown extremely impatient under the restraints which had been imposed on him, endeavoured to persuade the King to permit him to command the forces in person ; and he at length obtained his request. After which, having got his army reinforced, he himself marched against the Morescoes on one side, while Requesens and the marquis de los Velez attacked them on another. But the Morescoes, undisciplined, incompletely armed, and disheartened by the disappointment of their hopes of assistance from the Turks and Moors, were not a match for such numerous regular forces as were now employed to reduce them, and their ruin was hastened by the dissentsions of some of their leaders, and the treachery of others. Aben-Humeya was privately murdered by the friends of his wife, whose father he had put to death on account of his secret practices with the Spaniards. Another chief, called Aben-Aboo, was elected King in his stead ; and he too suffered the same fate, from the hands of some of his officers, who hoped by this sacrifice to atone for their rebellion. With the death of this leader, the war, which had lasted almost two years, was concluded ^a.

Neither Don John nor Requesens acquired any glory by their conduct in this war ; nor did they preserve themselves free from that imputation of inhumanity and implacable revenge, which in this age was generally cast upon the Spaniards.

No other apology can be offered for the dreadful severities which they exercised, but that their conduct was conformable to the instructions given them by the King. For Philip had disapproved of the lenity with which the Morescoes had been treated by the marquis of Mondejar, and, while he listened only to the voice of superstition or resentment, forgot what every wise King will regard as the most sacred maxim of his policy, that the strength and glory of a prince depend on the number and prosperity of his subjects.

But this bigoted monarch set no bounds to his abhorrence of those who deviated, or whom he suspected of deviating, from the Catholic faith. Agreeably to his instructions, great numbers of the Morescoes, living peaceably in the plains of Granada, were, upon suspicion of their corresponding with the insurgents, put to death. All the inhabitants of some villages and districts, men, women, and children, were extirpated. All the prisoners of both sexes were either executed or deprived of their liberty. And of those Morescoes who had refused to join in the rebellion, all but a few, without whom certain manufactures could not be carried on, were torn from their native homes, and transported into the interior provinces ; where they were exposed to the injuries and insults of a haughty people, and many of them by their poverty reduced to a state of dependence on the Castilians, which differed little from the condition of such of their countrymen as had been sold for slaves.

^a In describing this war, the Spanish historians have descended to the most minute detail. But amidst the endless multiplicity of little events and incidents which they relate, there is almost no variety, and no display either of courage or conduct that can interest a reader in the perusal. This part of the Spanish history is besides rendered peculiarly disgusting by the numerous scenes of barbarous cruelty which it presents.

The Morescoes are entirely subdued.

1568. Such was the conclusion of this war ; during which, notwithstanding the great disparity between the contending parties, Philip was exposed to greater danger than at any other period of his reign. Had the Morescoes made themselves masters of the city of Granada, in their attempt on which they failed, more through chance and accident than misconduct or the want of strength ; or had they prevailed with Selim the Turkish emperor, to interest himself in their behalf ; several towns in Andalusia, and almost the whole kingdom of Valentia, which was mostly inhabited by Morescoes, would have joined in the revolt ; and, in that case, so great an army might have been raised, as, with the assistance of the Moors in Barbary, would have furnished employment for many years to all the forces which the King, who was at the same time engaged in war with his subjects in the Netherlands, could have collected to oppose them.

But fortunately for Philip, and perhaps for Christendom, the Sultan was at this time intent upon prosecuting the war of Cyprus against the Venetians, and from that war he could not be diverted, although Mahomet, his grand visier, and the wisest of all his courtiers, advised him earnestly to suspend the prosecution of it, and not to neglect the present happy opportunity of turning his arms against the king of Spain ^e.

^e Thuanus, lib. xlviij. Ferreras, an. 1568-9-70. Cabrera, lib. viii.

PART II.

IT was not long before Selim had reason to be sorry that he had not listened to this advice, as Philip had no sooner completed the reduction of the Morescoes, than he entered into an alliance against him with the republic of Venice, the Pope, and several others of the Italian states and princes. The papal throne was filled at this time by the celebrated Pius the Fifth, who by his merit had raised himself from obscurity to the popedom ; and though strongly tinctured with some of the vices which characterised the ecclesiastics of that age, was endued with certain royal virtues which rendered him worthy of the exalted station to which he had been advanced. Having been solicited by the Venetians, to employ his influence to procure assistance from the Christian princes against the Sultan, who, in the time of peace, and in violation of a solemn treaty, had invaded the isle of Cyprus, Pius readily consented to their request, and with a zeal becoming the head of the church, espoused their cause.

1571.
War with
the Turks.

His application, however, to most of the European monarchs was without effect. For, besides that the season of crusades was now over, and that the most superstitious princes were, in that age, governed more by political views than religious zeal, he found almost all of them unable to grant the assistance which he solicited. The emperor Maximilian had lately concluded a truce with the Sultan, which it was greatly his interest to maintain. The attention of the French king, who had been long in alliance with the Porte, was engrossed by those inveterate factions into which his kingdom was divided. Sebastian, king of Portugal, was too young ; and Sigismund of Poland too much worn out with the infirmities of age, to engage in any foreign enterprise. Philip was the only great prince in Europe with whom Pius had reason to expect success in his present application. That monarch's zeal, as well as his power, was greater than that of any other European prince, and from the situation of his dominions, and the enmity which had long subsisted between him and the Turkish Sultans, he had no less reason to dread the increase of the Ottoman power, than either the Pope or the Venetians.

Without hesitation therefore he resolved to comply with the request that was now made to him, and readily entered into an alliance, by which he bound himself to pay one half of the expense of that powerful armament which it was judged necessary to employ, while the Republic of Venice engaged to defray three-fourths of the other half, and the Pope the remainder.

Philip's
league with
the Pope
and the Ve-
netians.

The preparations stipulated were carried on with the utmost celerity and dispatch, and about the middle of September a fleet was ready to sail from Messina, consisting of upwards of two hundred and fifty ships of war, besides ships of burden, and, if we may believe the cotemporary historians, carrying near fifty thousand men ; fourteen thousand of whom were furnished by the Princes and States of Italy.

The chief command of this mighty armament was given to Don John of Austria, for whom the title of Generalissimo was invented on this occasion. The Grand Commandator Requesens was appointed his lieutenant, and under him were the marquis de Santa-Croce, Doria, M. Antony

1571. Colonna, commander of the Pope's gallies, and Sebastian Veniero, who commanded those of the Venetians.

The aged Pontiff, overjoyed to observe that his negotiations had been attended with so great success, indulged the most sanguine hopes with regard to the issue of the war ; and, as if he had received a revelation concerning it from Heaven, he exhorted Don John to embrace the first opportunity of engaging with the enemy, over whom he assured him he would obtain a complete victory. He sent him at the same time a consecrated standard, and a number of ecclesiastics to officiate in sacred things on board the ships ; and ordered a fast and jubilee to be proclaimed, with an absolution from their sins, to all who should acquit themselves with honour against the infidels.

Selim, on the other hand, exerted himself strenuously in Selim's pre- providing against so great a danger as now threatened to over- parations. whelm him ; and although a part of his troops were still employed in reducing Cyprus, he was able, through the great resources which he possessed, to equip a fleet still more numerous than that of the Christian allies. Hali, to whom the chief command of it was given, arrived on the western coast of Greece about the time when Don John set sail from Sicily ; and the two fleets came in sight of each other, with a resolution not to decline fighting, on the 7th of October, near the gulph of Lepanto.

The battle was begun by the two admirals, and their example was followed by all the other commanders, as fast as the wind, or the general orders which they had received, would permit them to advance. Between Don John and the Basha the engagement was bloody and obstinate. After cannonading one another for some time, they came to close fight, and grappled with each other. The Spanish soldiers thrice boarded the enemy's ship, and were thrice repulsed with great slaughter. But at last Don John having received a reinforcement of two hundred men from the marquis of Santa-Croce, the Turks were overpowered. Hali himself was killed, and all on board were either put to the sword or taken prisoners. The crescent of Mahomet was then taken down, and the standard of the cross erected in its stead ; after which, Don John, in order to intimidate the enemy, gave orders to have the head of the Turkish admiral fixed upon a long pole, which was fastened to the topmast ; and shouts were sent from ship to ship of triumph and victory.

The contending parties were in the mean time engaged in every quarter in furious combat with each other, fighting hand to hand, as on a field of battle, and employing not only guns and muskets, but arrows, pikes, javelins, and all the other ancient as well as modern weapons of war. Both Turks and Christians gave the most striking displays of prowess and intrepidity. Great numbers fell on both sides, and the sea for several miles was tinged with blood, and covered with mangled limbs and carcasses. At last the Christians were almost every where victorious. The Christian slaves, by whom the Turkish gallies were rowed, took courage from the success with which the arms of the allies were attended, broke loose from their chains, and contributed not a little to fix the victory ; while great numbers of the Spanish and Italian galley-slaves, prompted by the hopes of recovering their liberty, having obtained permission from their officers, boarded and attacked the enemy with irresistible fury, and displayed a contempt of danger with which nothing but

despair, or the abhorrence of slavery, could have inspired them. The Turks were at the same time greatly disheartened by the loss of their admiral ; and being tempted by the hopes of making their escape upon a coast inhabited by their fellow subjects, many of them ran their ships ashore, and left them an easy prey to the enemy.

The Christian fleet was much better manned than the Turkish, and the soldiers, having been a shorter time at sea, were more fresh and vigorous. They were infinitely better furnished with mails and helmets, and made much more use of fire-arms than the enemy, many of whom were armed only with bows and arrows, the wounds inflicted by which were seldom mortal. The prows of the Turkish galleys were likewise more open and defenceless ; and the wind, which at first was favourable, changed suddenly against them, and greatly facilitated the motions of the Christian fleet. From these causes, added to the fortunate bravery of Don John, seconded by the prudent and intrepid conduct of Requesens, Santa-Croce, Colonna, and above all of Veniero, Barbarigo and other noble Venetians, the allies gained the most memorable victory of which we read in the history of modern times.

It was not indeed obtained without considerable loss. Near ten thousand of the Christians were killed in the engagement, or died afterwards of their wounds. Among these was the Venetian Proveditor, Barbarigo, a nobleman equally celebrated for his wisdom, his valour and his moderation. His death was deeply lamented by the allies, and proved an irreparable misfortune to the common cause. But to compensate for these losses, near fifteen thousand Christians were delivered from captivity ; and of the Turks, above five and twenty thousand were killed, and ten thousand taken prisoners. A hundred and thirty of their ships fell into the enemy's hands, and all the rest were either sunk or battered to pieces, or burnt, except between thirty and forty with which Ulucciali, the famous corsair, escaped to Constantinople, through his superior skill in navigation, and his knowledge of the seas.

This victory, gained over the implacable enemy of Christendom, spread universal joy throughout all Europe ; and Don John, to whom as commander in chief it was principally ascribed, was celebrated every where as the greatest hero of the age. No person had more reason to rejoice than Philip, yet he received the messenger with a cold indifference ; which his contemporaries were not inclined to attribute to his moderation, so much as to that jealousy of his brother's fame, of which he gave afterwards a more convincing proof. "Don John," said he, "has gained the victory, but he hazarded too much : he might have lost it." The Pope's joy on this occasion was more sincere. When he received the news, he cried out, in the words of sacred writ, "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John."

But the fruits of this signal victory were not proportional to the joy which it excited. The several admirals differed widely from one another with regard to the measures proper to be taken in the further prosecution of the war. Although Don John had been honoured with the extraordinary title of Generalissimo, yet, according to the treaty of alliance, no matter of importance could be determined without the consent of the other commanders. He would have sailed immediately after the battle for the Dardanelles, to intercept the remains of the Turkish fleet, and to block up the communication between

Causes of the victory.

The loss on both sides.

The allies return home.

^{1571.} Constantinople and the Mediterranean ; but the Venetians and other members of the council of war refused to agree to this proposal. Other enterprises were afterwards proposed, and rejected ; nor could they fix on any one common measure, but that of returning home, to repair the damage which had been sustained, and to prepare for resuming their operations in the spring.

^{Embassy of the Greeks to Don John} Not long after Don John's arrival at Messina, the Christians in Albania and Macedonia, filled with admiration of his character, and believing that it must be long before the Turks could

recover from the blow which they had received, sent an embassy to make him an offer of the sovereignty over them, and to assure him, that, if he would come to their assistance with a fleet and army, they would shake off the Turkish yoke, and sacrifice their lives and fortunes in his service

Don John, whose ruling passion was ambition, would gladly have accepted this tempting offer, but was obliged to inform the ambassadors, that before he could comply with their request, the King must be consulted, and his consent obtained. He accordingly sent immediate notice to his brother of the proposal that had been made to him. And Philip, whether prompted by jealousy, as was generally believed, or by motives of prudence and policy, as he gave out, put an end at once to any hopes which Don John might have conceived, by telling him, that at present all thoughts of such an enterprise must be laid aside, lest the Venetians should take the alarm, and abandon the confederacy. This, it is not improbable, would have happened, since the Venetians had no less reason to dread the neighbourhood of the Spaniards than of the Turks ; and had besides a claim themselves to a part of those territories, to the sovereignty of which Don John aspired.

^{Preparations of the Turks.} In the mean time Ulucciali, whom Selim had made commander in chief of all his naval forces, exerted himself with extraordinary vigour and activity in fitting out a new fleet, to supply the place of that which had been ruined in the battle of Lepanto ; and such at this time were the resources of the Turkish empire, that he was ready by the month of April to leave Constantinople, with more than two hundred gallies, besides a great number of other ships.

With this fleet he coasted along Negropont the Morea, and Epirus ; put the maritime towns into a posture of defence ; chastised with great severity many of those Christians who had been concerned in the invitation given to Don John ; and afterwards took his station at Modon in the Morea, with an intention to watch there the motions of the enemy.

^{Inactivity of the allies.} He had full leisure to finish all the preparations which he judged to be necessary. The allies disputed long with one

another concerning the plan of their future operations ; and at last, when, through the inactivity which their dissensions had occasioned, it was become necessary for them to drop their scheme of conquest in Greece and Africa, and to go a second time in quest of the Turkish fleet, Philip having conceived a suspicion that the court of France had, in order to gratify the Sultan, formed the design of attacking him in Piedmont, or the Netherlands, sent instructions to Don John to delay for some time longer his departure from Messina. At this place the Spanish fleet remained till after the massacre of St. Bartholomew ;

^{August, 1572.} when Philip, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the intentions of the French court, gave his brother permission to

join the Venetians, and to act in concert with them in prosecuting the war against the Turks. 1572.

But it was the last day of August before the allies could effectuate a junction of their forces ; and it was the middle of September before they came in sight of the enemy. Immediately after their arrival on the Grecian coast, Ulucciali drew out his fleet, as if he intended to offer battle ; but no sooner had he made a single discharge of his artillery, in the way of bravado or defiance, than he retired under the fortifications of Modon. These he had strengthened in such a manner, as to render it extremely dangerous for the allies to approach ; and he resolved to lie in wait there for some favourable opportunity of attacking them, or at least to keep his fleet in readiness to harass and interrupt them, in case they should attempt a descent.

Don John called a council of his general officers, to consider of the measures proper to be pursued in case the Turkish admiral should persist in his resolution to decline fighting. It was thought impracticable to force their way into the harbour of Modon ; and therefore it was resolved to put the forces on shore, and to besiege the town by land. But from this attempt they were soon deterred, by the information which they received from some troops sent to reconnoitre the strength of the place ; which was so completely fortified, that they could not expect to reduce it before the approach of winter.

It was next agreed to attempt the reduction of Navarino, which is another town on the western coast of the Morea, not many miles from Modon. The conduct of this enterprise was committed to Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, who some years afterwards filled all Europe with his renown, and acquired the character of one of the greatest generals of this or perhaps of any other age. But the present undertaking did not afford him an opportunity of displaying those superior talents for which he is so justly celebrated. The garrison was powerfully reinforced by detachments sent from Modon ; and so numerous an army was drawn together from the neighbouring towns, and sent by Ulucciali to attack the besiegers, that Farnese, after battering the ramparts for several days, was obliged to raise the siege, and put his forces on board the fleet ; which is raised soon afterwards set sail for Messina.

Some months before this time the league had suffered an irreparable loss, by the death of the Pope ; whose successor Gregory the XIIIth had neither the same zeal nor the same influence and authority. Gregory, however, entered readily into his predecessor's views, and shewed himself willing to pursue the plan which Pius had adopted. And Philip, who was now entirely free from his apprehensions of a French invasion, had resolved to exert himself more than ever in the prosecution of the war. But the Venetians having been highly dissatisfied with the inactivity of the Spanish fleet in the preceding summer ; and finding that after a trial of two years they had, notwithstanding the victory of Lepanto, derived little advantage from the war, to compensate for the great expence which it had cost them, they listened to proposals made them by the French ambassador, and through his intercession concluded a separate peace with the Sultan.

They at last
set sail for
Greece.

Ulucciali de-
clines fight-
ing.

Siege of
Navarino.

Death of
Pius.

The Venetians
make peace
with the Turks.

The Pope and Don John expressed their indignation against the Venetians, on this occasion, without reserve. But Philip thought it beneath his dignity to discover either uneasiness or resentment ; and when intelligence of the peace was brought him, he answered coolly, that he had entered into the league at the desire of the sovereign Pontiff ; and that, although the Venetians had thought proper to abandon it, he would still employ his fleet and army as before, for the attainment of those important ends, the humbling of the Infidels, and the security of Christendom, with a view to which the confederacy had been formed.

Agreeably to this resolution, he sent orders to Don John, to Doria, and the marquis of Santa-Croce, to employ their utmost diligence in repairing and augmenting the fleet, and to hold it ready for entering upon action in the spring. These orders were punctually executed. Ulucciali, with the Turkish fleet, advanced as far as Prevesa in Epirus. But neither he nor the Spanish commanders thought it expedient to try their force in a general engagement. At length Ulucciali, after reinforcing the garrisons of the maritime towns, dismissed the corsairs who had come to his assistance, and about the end of the summer set sail for Constantinople. After which Don John, agreeably to his instructions from the King, passed over to Africa, with an intention to undertake the reduction of Tunis ; carrying with him for this purpose a fleet of two thousand sail, having twenty thousand foot on board, besides four hundred light horse, seven hundred pioneers, and a numerous train of heavy artillery.

Tunis was at this time in the hands of the Turks, commanded by Heder Basha, whom Selim had lately sent to govern the town and kingdom. Heder, seized with consternation at the approach of the Spanish fleet, left Tunis with his troops and a great number of the inhabitants, and Don John took possession of the place, without meeting with the smallest opposition.

Philip had instructed his brother, when he sent him on this expedition, to destroy Tunis, and to strengthen the fortifications of the isle and fortress of Goletta^e. But instead of complying with these instructions, Don John resolved to fortify the town more strongly than ever ; and having laid the foundations of a new fort, or citadel, he treated all the inhabitants who remained with lenity and indulgence ; and engaged many of those who had fled, to return and submit to the Spanish government ; after which he carried back his fleet to Sicily.

He soon discovered his intention in acting a part so contrary to the orders of the King. His success in an enterprise in which the late Emperor had failed, though entirely owing to the cowardice of the Turkish governor, had inflamed his ambition ; and he had conceived the hopes that his brother would be persuaded to grant him the title and dignity of the King of Tunis, in compensation for the sovereignty of Greece, which he had prevented him from accepting. The Pope, it is said, had disapproved of Philip's resolution to demolish Tunis ; and had secretly encouraged Don John to venture upon disobeying him ; from an opinion that the erecting a Christian kingdom in Barbary, would prove the most effectual means of extirpating the piratical states. It is certain that Gregory warmly solicited Philip to confer upon his brother the sovereignty of his new conquest, and represented that all Christendom, and

^e The Goletta, which is situated at the entrance of the bay of Tunis, had been in the hands of the Spaniards ever since it was conquered by the emperor Charles.

especially Spain and Italy, would from thence derive the most substantial advantages.

1572.

Philip was conscious that, notwithstanding his copious resources, it was beyond his power, while the war in the Netherlands subsisted, to effectuate the establishment of a new kingdom in opposition to so potent an enemy as the Turkish Sultan. And he had desired the fortifications of Tunis to be dismantled, in order to save the expence of a numerous garrison, which would be necessary for its defence. He did not, however, express great resentment against his brother for counteracting his instructions. But when the Pope interceded with him to confer the sovereignty on Don John, he replied, "That, although no person could be more sincerely concerned than himself, for his brother's honour and interest ; yet there was much ground to doubt, whether either the one or the other would be advanced by his complying with the Pope's request ; and that he could not grant it, till he should know whether he was able to maintain the acquisition that had been made, against the formidable armament which the Sultan was preparing for its recovery." The prudence of this reply, whether it did or did not proceed from some secret motive of jealousy against his brother, was fully justified by the issue.

In the summer following, Selim sent Ulucciali against Tunis, with a fleet consisting of three hundred ships, having about forty thousand troops on board, under the command of his son-in-law Sinan Basha. The new fort which Don John had begun to build, was not yet complete. Nor was the garrison which he had left strong enough to hold out long against so great a force. Don John laboured with much zeal and anxiety in assembling the Spanish fleet, with an intention to raise the siege, but he was detained for several weeks, first in one harbour, and afterwards in another, by tempestuous weather and contrary winds. The Turks in the mean time being powerfully seconded by many thousand Moors, under the governor of Tripoli and the viceroy of Algiers, pushed forward their operations at the same time against Tunis and the Goletta. The garrisons defended themselves long with the utmost bravery ; but at last they were overpowered by numbers, and both the Goletta and the town were taken by assault.

Tunis and the
Goletta taken
by the Turks.

Don John was affected in the most sensible manner by this disaster ; which shewed him the folly of his late presumption, and extinguished those flattering hopes which he had long indulged of attaining some regal or sovereign establishment. His mortification on this occasion was the greater, because, after his most vigorous efforts, the Spanish fleet was still too weak to enable him to take vengeance on the enemy. Philip, for the same reason, dreaded that the Turkish commanders would pursue their conquests, and either attack his other possessions in Africa, or attempt a descent in Naples or Sicily, and it is probable that his apprehensions would have proved but too well founded, had not Selim died about this time, and left his throne to his son Amurath the Third ; who devoted the beginning of his reign to the arts of peace ^f.

^f Prince Cantemir's Hist. of the Ottoman empire. Antonio Herrera ; and Ferreras in hoc anno. Miriana, lib. vii.



THE

7

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK X.

DURING the course of the transactions related in the preceding book, a variety of important events happened in the Netherlands, which require a more circumstantial narration.

1563.
Affairs of
the Nether-
lands.

In opposing the prince of Orange and count Lewis of Nassau, it was confessed, even by the duke of Alva's enemies, that he acted with the most consummate prudence ; and if his conduct afterwards had been equally prudent, he might, notwithstanding the general odium which his tyranny had excited against him, have preserved the Netherlands in obedience to his authority. For if such of the people as were disaffected to his government remained quiet while the prince of Orange was at hand to favour their attempts, it cannot be supposed, that, after all their hopes of assistance were extinguished, they would have ever dared to dispute his will. And indeed the spirits of this unhappy people, at the present period, seem to have been so entirely broken, and their minds so deeply impressed with awe and terror, that nothing could have inspired them with the courage which they afterwards displayed, but insolence and oppression carried to the most enormous height.

As soon as the army of the prince of Orange was disbanded, Alva dismissed his German cavalry, and having distributed the greatest part of his infantry into winter-quarters, he set out himself with the remainder for Brussels ; where, after a triumphant entry, he ordered his victory to be celebrated with every species of rejoicing. He then commanded a solemn thanksgiving for the success which had attended his arms to be observed through all the provinces ; and ordered a statue of himself to be formed in brass, and medals to be struck, which, while they served to perpetuate the memory of his exploits, gave proof of a degree of vanity and arrogance, which put his friends to the blush, and made the world unwilling to yield him that praise

Alva's va-
nity and ar-
rogance.

1568. which his vigour and abilities would have procured him ^b One of the first acts of his administration after his return to Brussels, was to determine the fate of the prisoners whom he had taken during the campaign ; and all such of them as were inhabitants of the Netherlands were treated as rebels, and put to death.

A strict inquiry was set on foot, to discover those who had, His tyranny. either by word or deed, whilst the war subsisted, shewn their inclinations favourable to the prince of Orange. And as the issue of the war had remained long uncertain, and fortune had sometimes favoured one side and sometimes another, many persons had unwarily given vent both to their hopes and to their fears ; little suspecting that they were to be called to so rigorous an account for unguarded expressions, uttered among their friends and neighbours, which were now imputed to them as the most atrocious crimes. The people of the Low Countries had long enjoyed the privilege of not being tried by any judges, but those of the city or district to which they belonged ; and no citizen could be put to death who had not confessed his crime. No regard was paid to either of these privileges. Persons of all ranks were hurried from the places of their residence, and carried to so great a distance as made it impossible for them to disprove the accusations brought against them, however groundless. Great numbers were seized on bare suspicion ; many suffered death on the slightest evidence ; and others were harassed with prosecutions, by which they were reduced to the utmost poverty and distress^c.

^b In one of the medals he was represented riding in a triumphal chariot, with a Victory behind him putting a crown upon his head. In his right-hand he held a sword, to signify that he had conquered count Lewis by open force ; and in the left, an *Ægis*, to express that wisdom of which he had availed himself against the prince of Orange : and as a farther emblem of his wisdom, the chariot was drawn by owls, which in the ancient heathen superstition were sacred to Minerva.

But his statue, which was made at this time, and afterwards placed in the citadel of Antwerp, afforded a still more striking proof of his vanity and arrogance. It was the workmanship of Jockeling, a German artist, the most celebrated sculptor of the age. The governor was represented trampling under his feet the figure of a monster, having certain emblematical signs in different parts, which denoted the petition which had been presented to the duchess of Parma, the compromise, and the insurrection and tumults which ensued. The base of the work was a square pillar of marble, containing on one side the artist's name, and on the other three sides an encomium of the duke of Alva ; who is there said to have extinguished heresy and rebellion, to have saved the church from destruction, and restored justice and tranquillity to the Netherlands. This monument of Alva's vanity was far from being acceptable to the King ; it was a subject of derision among his enemies at the court of Spain ; and in the Flemings, it excited the highest resentment and indignation^{*}.

It appears from Grotius, that about this time the duke made several useful regulations with regard to trade, the coin, and the liberty of the press ; but they failed in promoting the purposes for which they were intended, and even the memory of them was soon effaced by the violence of the measures which he afterwards pursued.

^c The negligence which the judges discovered in the sentences which they passed against the unhappy victims delivered over to them by the inquisitors, and in the warrants which they signed for their execution, would be incredible, if the many instances recorded by the contemporary historians did not put it beyond all doubt. An order was issued at this time for executing several of the prisoners who had been condemned. In the list of their names the name of one man was inserted whose cause had not been tried, and he too was led to execution. Some time after, the judges gave orders to have this man brought before them for his trial. They were informed, that, in obedience to their former command, he had already suffered death ; and proof was at the same time laid before them of his innocence. Most of the judges expressed on this occasion great uneasiness ; but Vargas, the Spanish lawyer observed, that what had happened, if rightly considered, ought not to give them much concern, since it was happy for the man's soul that he died innocent.

* Bentivoglio, p. 86. Van Loon, tom. i. p. 135. Strada, p. 250.

The iniquity and unrelenting cruelty exercised by the inquisitors diffused an universal terror over all the provinces. Not only the Protestants, but likewise all who had ever shewn themselves attached to the liberty of their country, saw that nothing less would satisfy the governor than their utter ruin. It would not avail them, they perceived, to conceal their sentiments, nor even to disclaim them ; since many of those who had done so, had been punished with death and confiscation ; and had received no other favour from the judges, but that of having suffered by the sword or halter, instead of being committed to the flames. Determined by these considerations, great numbers of both sexes abandoned their habitations, and withdrew into foreign parts. We ought not, perhaps, to believe what some historians relate, that no less than a hundred thousand houses were forsaken by the inhabitants. It is however certain, that several of the principal cities were sensibly thinner, and some whole villages and smaller towns were rendered almost desolate. Many of those who left the Netherlands went over to England, where they were well received by Elizabeth. And as in that country they enjoyed the free exercise of their religion, they fixed their residence in it ; and amply rewarded the English for the protection afforded them, by introducing among that people various branches of manufacture, with which they had before been unacquainted.

The Low Countries suffered extremely from this emigration of the inhabitants. But the duke of Alva, far from being deterred by this consideration from the prosecution of his plan, was at pains to prevent the return of the exiles, and even prohibited from returning all such of their friends as had gone to visit them, by publishing an edict, setting forth, that they should be considered as holding intercourse with rebels, and should be liable to the punishment due to those who gave assistance to the enemies of the King.

The governor's vanity was flattered about this time, by an embassy which came from the Pope, to present him a consecrated hat and sword. This sort of present, which used to be bestowed only upon princes, was conferred on the duke of Alva, as an illustrious defender of the popish faith ; and it contributed to confirm him in the pursuit of those sanguinary measures, which had procured him such a distinguished honour.

But there was now almost no occasion for employing measures of this kind in his government of the Netherlands. All persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to his displeasure, had either been put to death, or had gone into a voluntary banishment ; while those who remained had shewn themselves ready to yield an implicit and entire obedience to his will. The new bishops, the decrees of the council of Trent, the rites and ceremonies of the Romish church, were received and established throughout all the provinces.

This success of the duke of Alva's arms and counsels gave great uneasiness to some of the neighbouring princes, and particularly to the queen of England. That wise princess had from the beginning of her reign beheld with anxiety the growing power of the Spanish monarchy. She knew how much Philip was inclined to disturb her government, and was sensible of the advantage which the vicinity of his dominions in the Netherlands afforded him, for carrying any scheme which he might form against her into execution ; especially at the present period, when, instead of the limited preroga-

1568.
The
Nether
lands
deserted by
great num
bers o
the
people.

The rest
entirely
subdued.

Anxiety of
the queen
of Engla

1568. tive which he had hitherto enjoyed in these provinces, he had acquired an absolute or despotic power, and established a military force, which was formidable to the neighbouring nations, as well as to the people whom it had been employed to subdue. Prompted by these considerations, Elizabeth had granted her protection to the Flemish exiles ; and, if we may credit some historians, she had given secret assistance in money to the prince of Orange. The situation of her affairs at home, where she was disquieted by the machinations of the partisans of the queen of Scots, rendered it inexpedient for her to come to an open breach with the Spanish monarch ; but notwithstanding this, she had resolved to lay hold of the first proper opportunity that should occur of counteracting his designs.

She seizes money belonging to Philip. It was not long before an occasion of this kind offered, which she readily embraced. Some merchants of Genoa having engaged to transmit certain sums of money for Philip's use into the

Netherlands, had put four hundred thousand crowns on board five small vessels, which, being attacked on their way to Antwerp by privateers belonging to the prince of Conde, were obliged to take shelter in the harbours of Plymouth and Southampton. The Spanish ambassador at the court of London immediately applied for a safe-conduct, that he might send the money by the nearest way to the Low Countries ; and at first Elizabeth seemed willing to grant his request ; but afterwards she ordered the ambassador to be told, that, as she understood the money was the property of the Italian merchants, she had resolved to detain it for some time in her own hands, and would take care that the owners should not have any reason to complain. The ambassador endeavoured to make it appear, that the money belonged to the King his master ; and he was seconded in his applications for it by letters addressed to the Queen from the duke of Alva. Elizabeth lent a deaf ear to their remonstrances, and discovered plainly, that she had resolved to keep the money. Alva was not of a temper to bear patiently this insult. It was ever more agreeable to his nature, to conquer difficulties, than to attempt, by negociation, to elude them. Without regard to treaties subsisting between the English and the Flemings, and without consulting either the States or council of the Netherlands, he ordered all the English merchants at Antwerp to be cast into prison, and their effects to be confiscated. He did not consider, or he was not moved by the consideration, that the Flemings had at that time a much greater quantity of goods in England, than the English possessed in Flanders. Elizabeth had no reason therefore to be sorry for what had happened. But she dispatched an ambassador to Philip, to complain of the injury done to her ; and not receiving satisfaction, she proceeded to make reprisals, and seized effects, belonging to Spanish and Flemish merchants, by which her subjects were more than compensated for all the losses which they had sustained in Flanders. Alva came at last to perceive his error, and sent over Christopher Assonville to England, to negociate an agreement with the Queen. Elizabeth, who took pleasure to mortify the pride of Alva, refused to admit Assonville into her presence, because he had not credentials from Philip. Alva, more enraged than ever by this affront, prohibited the people in the Low Countries from holding any commercial intercourse with the English ; but at last, after various negociations, the matter was adjusted by treaty, and

the trade put upon its former footing, in the year one thousand five hundred and seventy four.^d

In the mean time Elizabeth gained her end, and did a most material prejudice to Philip's interest in the Netherlands. This prejudice was indeed much greater than she intended, and was accompanied with more important consequences than she could possibly foresee. Great arrears were due to the Spanish troops, and Alva had contracted a considerable debt by building citadels. Philip's treasury, although the richest in Europe, was exhausted by the expensive wars in which he had been engaged against the Turks and Moors ; nor could he at present afford the money requisite for the maintenance of his forces in Flanders. In this situation, the governor found it necessary to have recourse to the Flemings, whom he believed to be so thoroughly subdued, that they would not refuse to comply with any demand which he could make upon them.

The absurdity and folly, added to the oppression and tyranny, into which his arrogance, together with his ignorance of the interests of a commercial people, betrayed him on this occasion, may justly be regarded as the chief cause of all the difficulties which he afterwards encountered, and of all those astonishing exertions which the people made to free themselves from the Spanish yoke. It may appear surprising, that the imposing of taxes, however burdensome, should have wrought more powerfully on their minds, than the cruel persecutions which had been exercised with such unrelenting fury on account of religion. But the reason is obvious. The persecutions extended only to a certain number of individuals ; whereas the taxes affected all men alike, and must have proved the source of universal and perpetual oppression.

The people in the Low Countries had in no period been accustomed to be taxed by their princes. The power of imposing taxes belonged, by the constitution and constant practice, to the assembly of the States. And when the prince had occasion for money, he had been accustomed, from the earliest times, to petition the States for a supply, which they either granted or refused, as they were satisfied or displeased with the reasons for demanding it. At certain periods, and particularly in the beginning of the present reign, they had carried their jealousy of this important privilege so far, as to appoint commissioners of their own to receive the money from the people, and to see it applied to the purposes for which it had been granted. The duke of Alva paid no greater regard to this than he had done to their other privileges. He resolved by his own authority to establish taxes, sufficient not only to supply his present necessity, but to serve as a perpetual fund for defraying all the expences of his government.

The manner in which these taxes were imposed was not more arbitrary, than the taxes themselves were oppressive. They were three in number. The first was a tax of one *per cent.* on all goods, whether moveable or immoveable. The second, of twenty *per cent.* to be paid annually, of all immoveable goods, or heritage. And the third, of ten *per cent.* of all moveable goods, to be paid on every sale. It was enacted, that the first of these taxes should be paid only once ; but it was ordained, that the other two should continue as long as the public exigencies should require.

1569.
Taxes of
the 10th
and 0th
pennies.

^d Meteren, p. 80. Strada, p. 252. Bentivoglio, p. 80.

1569.
Excite- uni-
versal dis-
content.

Intimation was made of these demands, in the name of the King, to an assembly of the States ; and it is impossible to describe the astonishment which they excited. The deputies knew not what answer to return ; and therefore desired time to consider of the governor's requisitions, and to transmit an account of them to their constituents. They were received every where with grief and indignation ; and there was nothing to be heard but the bitterest lamentations over all the provinces.

" It was not enough, they complained, for the King to have stripped the country of infinite numbers of the people ; to have filled the provinces with foreign soldiers, and to have wreathed the yoke about the necks of the inhabitants, by garrisons and citadels ; but they must likewise bear the charge of supporting those instruments of their oppression ; and for this purpose, instead of the voluntary and moderate contributions which they had been wont to pay under former princes, be loaded for ever with the most violent and oppressive taxes. Notwithstanding the injustice with which they had been treated from the beginning of the governor's administration, yet, during his contest with the princes of Nassau, they had remained unshaken in their fidelity to the King, and even co-operated with his forces against the enemy ; but it now appeared that their most implacable enemy was the King himself ; who seemed to desire nothing so much, as to reduce them to a state of the most wretched slavery ; and in order to accomplish an end so cruel and inglorious, had sent among them the duke of Alva, whose conduct seemed rather as if he had come to extirpate the inhabitants, than to govern or protect them. But they had already borne too much. It was time to shew that they had not been insensible of the treatment which they had received, and that they were not altogether unworthy of their illustrious ancestors, to whose wisdom and valour they were indebted for those invaluable privileges, of which the King, and the odious instruments of his tyranny, now wanted to deprive them.

When the States found that the new taxes were so universally disagreeable to their constituents, they took courage, and represented their own sentiments concerning them to the governor. They reminded him of the disturbances which had arisen from an attempt to establish the tax of the hundredth penny, in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-six ; when persons of all ranks discovered an irreconcilable aversion to it, not only on account of the exorbitancy of the tax itself, but because it reduced them to the disagreeable necessity of laying open their private affairs. There was still greater reason, they observed, for being dissatisfied with the other taxes ; and especially that of the tenth part of moveable goods, to be paid at every sale. This was not only such a tax as had been never known in the Low Countries, but would prove a burden which it would be utterly impossible to support. It would amount, in many cases, nearly to the value of the commodities themselves ; since the same commodities were often transferred from one person to another, and from him to a third, a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, before they came into the hands of the consumer. In woollen manufactures this was unavoidable ; the wool was purchased by one set of manufacturers ; the yarn by another ; the cloth, before it was dyed, by a third ; then it was sold to the merchant ; by him, to the

retailer ; and by the retailer to his customers for use ; and thus the tax proposed would amount to six or seven tenths of the full value of the commodity. Several consequences, fatal to the prosperity of the people, would ensue. Foreigners would no longer purchase their manufactures, because they could not sell them at the usual prices. The manufacturers and merchants would fly from a country where they were so grievously oppressed ; and the Flemings would be obliged to have recourse to foreign nations for those commodities with which foreigners had hitherto been supplied by them. Thus the sources of their wealth would in a little time be dried up ; and, as they would not have any manufactures of their own, so they could not long possess the means of purchasing them from others. To these reasons they added another, taken from the great expence and difficulty with which the collection of the tax proposed must be attended. A multitude of tax-gatherers must be employed ; the people would still find it practicable, in numberless cases, to elude the tax ; and the tranquillity of the provinces would be continually disturbed with altercations and disputes.

In answer to this remonstrance, Alva, with much ignorance and haughtiness, replied, that nothing could convince him that the taxes required would be so oppressive as had been represented ; since it was evident, that he demanded only one part of ten for the King, and left the remaining parts to the people. That in his town of Alva in Spain, the tax of the tenth penny was actually paid, and yielded him an yearly rent of between forty and fifty thousand ducats. That if such a revenue as he expected should arise from it in the Netherlands, he would deliver the people from all their other taxes. That he had often heard the late Emperor complain of the difficulty of procuring money from his subjects in the Low Countries ; and that, in order to obtain it, he had been constrained to grant them privileges greatly prejudicial to his authority. But at present there was no room for remonstrances. Great arrears were due to his troops ; several new forts must be built without delay for the security of the country ; money for these purposes must be immediately procured, and he could not devise any more effectual means of raising it, than the taxes which were proposed ^f.

Such was the governor's reply to the assembly of the States ; but being sensible of the difficulties which attended his plan, he laid it before the council, and desired the counsellors to consider of the most effectual method of carrying it into execution. There were some of them, who, in order to ingratiate themselves with the Duke, exhorted him to persist in his design. And these men advised him to endeavour first to gain over such of the provinces as had distinguished themselves by their loyalty ; saying, that *their* example would soon be followed by the other provinces, who would dread incurring the imputation of disaffection.

But most of the counsellors were of a contrary opinion, and particularly the president Viglius ; a minister of long experience in the Netherlands, and of undoubted fidelity to the King. "The objections," said he, "which had been urged against the taxes were unanswerable ; for there was the widest difference between the kingdom of Spain, and the Low Country provinces. The wealth of Spain consisted in the great extent of its territory and the fertility of its soil. It was divided from other kingdoms, either by inaccessible mountains, or by the ocean.

^f Meteren, p. 89.

1569. It was complete within itself, and independent of any connexion with other countries. Whereas the Netherlands were of such small extent, as to be utterly insufficient to support the inhabitants. They were situated in the heart of Europe, and had so many different nations bordering upon them, that, if trade were discouraged or oppressed, the manufactures and merchants could easily, and would certainly, transplant themselves, together with their arts, to the countries which lay around them. This consequence was to be dreaded from much less burdensome impositions than those that were proposed ; which were such as had never taken place in any commercial state, and to which, he was confident, the people of the Low Countries would never be persuaded to submit. I speak thus (continued he) prompted by a concern for the interest of the King, as well as by a regard to the prosperity of the Netherlands ; for there is the greatest reason to apprehend, that if the governor shall not depart from his resolution, trade will soon be reduced so low, that the people will be disabled from furnishing the supplies requisite for the purposes of government.^g"

This speech of Viglius served rather to incense the duke of Alva than to convince him. Without regarding either the dignity of the speaker, or the strength of his arguments, he vouchsafed to make no other answer, but that, long before this time, he had resolved upon the taxes in dispute, and had communicated his resolution to the counts Barlaimont and Noircarmes, before he came into the Low Countries. His purpose was unalterably fixed, and those who were friends to the King must, without any further altercation, exert their endeavours to bring the States to a compliance with his will.

When the States found that the governor was equally deaf to the remonstrances of the president, as he had been to theirs, they began to dread the effects of his displeasure ; and in order to sooth his resentment, they gave their consent to the tax of the hundredth penny ; intreating him, at the same time, to pass from the other taxes, and representing again, in the strongest terms, the ruinous consequences which would attend them. But he was still as inexorable as ever ; although he condescended on this occasion to make a trial of some softer expedients, before he should have recourse to those of a more violent nature, which, in case of necessity he was determined to employ.

1570. In the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, Philip, with the advice of the inquisitors at Madrid, had pronounced a general sentence against his subjects in

^{Act of indemnity.} the Netherlands, finding them obnoxious to justice, and depriving them of their fortunes, rights, and privileges. By this extraordinary sentence, which, from the nature of it, was incapable of being executed, he had kept this unhappy people in perpetual anxiety ; but at last, believing their spirits to be thoroughly subdued, and dreading the utter desolation of the provinces, he had resolved to publish a general indemnity ; and, some months before the present period, had transmitted it to the duke of Alva, together with a confirmation of it by the Pope. The Duke thought that he could not publish this indemnity at a more seasonable juncture ; and he flattered himself that it would serve to conciliate the favour of the people, and make it easier for him to overcome their aversion to the taxes. It was first made public in the city of

^g Meursii Albanus, p. 35. Bentivoglio, p. 83.

Antwerp ; where the governor, seated on a lofty throne, surrounded with a degree of pomp which no former governor had assumed, ordered it to be read in the presence of a prodigious concourse of people, who had come from all quarters to hear it, full of the most anxious expectation. It was afterwards printed and dispersed over all the provinces. But it was extremely ill-calculated to promote the purpose designed ; and was clogged with such a number of exceptions, as tended rather to awaken the fears of the people, than to allay or remove them.

From the benefit of it were excluded, not only all the preachers of the reformed religion, but likewise all those who had ever lodged or entertained them in their houses ; all who had been concerned in breaking the images, or in violating the monasteries and churches ; all who had subscribed the compromise, the petition of the nobles, or any other such bond of association ; and, lastly, all those who had given assistance, or shewn favour, by word, deed, or writing to the enemies of the King. Such were the exceptions that regarded individuals ; and with respect to cities and communities, it was declared, that if any of them should be found to have been accessory to the late disorders, on the pretence of maintaining their privileges, the King reserved to himself the power of punishing or forgiving them, as he should judge expedient.

It is not surprising that an act of indemnity such as this, should have failed to produce any salutary effect. Persons of How received. all ranks were highly offended with that open declaration which it contained, that they had forfeited their privileges. There were many who, although they themselves had ever been zealously attached to the Catholic religion, were connected by the most endearing ties with those who had forsaken it. Prompted by natural affection, gratitude, or humanity, they had done offices of kindness to their friends and neighbours, for which they were now made equally liable to punishment, as if they had been guilty of the most enormous crimes. Their minds therefore were thrown into a greater ferment than ever ; and they were disposed to regard the pardon which had been proclaimed, rather as an insult added to the injuries which they had received, than as an act of clemency and mercy ^b.

The duke of Alva considered it in a light extremely different, and soon afterwards resolved to make trial, whether it had produced the desired effect. With this view he ordered the several governors to inform the States of their respective provinces, that the situation of his affairs required an immediate and large supply, and that they must proceed to the raising of the tax of the tenth penny, without any further remonstrance or delay. With the different provinces, however, he thought proper to employ very different means of persuasion. As the inhabitants of Namur, Artois, and Hainault, had, from the beginning, been extremely submissive to his will, he desired the counts Barlaimont and Noircarmes to acquaint them, that he wished to obtain their consent to the tax, more for an example of obedience to the other provinces, than from any intention to levy it upon *them* ; who had deserved so well of him by their fidelity. But he delivered his orders in a much more peremptory tone to the other provinces. He would take care, he said, in levying the tax, to prevent the consequences which they appre-

^b Meteren, p. 84. Bentivoglio, p. 85.

1570. hended might arise from it ; and would abolish it, if he found it hurtful to their trade. In the mean time it was the will of the King that it should be imposed. The King had invested him with power to exact it ; and he was unalterably determined to employ that power for the purpose for which it had been conferred. He concluded with reminding them of the guilt which they contracted during the late commotions ; and bid them esteem it a happiness that they were now allowed to atone for their folly, by giving a *part* of their substance, when the King might in justice have seized the *whole*.

By these promises and threats an assent was at last extorted ; The General States intimidated. but it was given upon two conditions, that all the provinces, without exception, should agree to the taxes ; and that the governor should, according to his promise, moderate them in such a manner, that no prejudice could arise from them to the trade or manufactures of the Netherlands. The only provinces which rejected these conditions were those of Utrecht and Brabant. And the former of these discovered, in the progress of this affair, a firmness and intrepidity that deserves to be recorded.

Soon after the governor's orders were communicated to the States of Utrecht, they sent ambassadors to represent, that having taken his demand under their most serious consideration, they were unable to conceive how it could possibly be granted. The resolute conduct of the States of Utrecht.

The territory of Utrecht, they said, was small ; the inland parts of it were barren, and the other parts were preserved from the fury of the waters at an immense expence. Although they had but lately become subject to the house of Austria, yet, in order to raise the tributes imposed upon them by the late Emperor and the present King, they had been obliged to contract a very large debt, which they had never been able to repay. During the late disturbances, they had suffered more than the other provinces ; their city had been forsaken by its most industrious inhabitants, and their trade, which was never great, almost annihilated. But as they knew the necessity of the governor's affairs, and were sensible how much they had been indebted to him for restoring tranquillity to the Netherlands, they were willing to assist him to the utmost extent of their ability, and would engage to pay him yearly a hundred thousand florins for six years ; provided they were freed from all other burdens during that time.

This offer the governor rejected with scorn and indignation. The States then sent another embassy to inform him, that they had considered fully of what they could afford ; they had flattered themselves that their offer would have met with a favourable acceptance ; they were conscious of having given the strongest proof of an inclination to comply with his desire ; but, whatever should be the consequence, they must now declare, that it was beyond their power to offer more. And in this declaration, the presidents of the five churches concurred ; protesting, that they could not agree to the taxes proposed, without incurring the censure of excommunication, which was denounced in the Pope's bull ⁱ, *in cæna Domini*, not only against those who imposed taxes on the revenues of the church, but against those likewise who submitted to them. But the governor paid no greater regard to this protestation of the ecclesiastics, than to the remonstrances of the States. It provoked him

exceedingly, to meet with such obstinate resistance from so inconsiderable a province as Utrecht. He had threatened to employ force, and he now resolved to put his threat in execution.

1570.

He began with sending to the city of Utrecht a regiment of infantry, consisting of two thousand four hundred men ; who, besides exacting the same number of florins a week for their pay, lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants, and knowing the governor's design in placing them there, indulged themselves in every species of outrage. He summoned the magistrates of the city, and the States of the province, to appear before the Council of Tumults, to answer for their conduct in the year one thousand five hundred and fifty-six, when they ceded to the Protestants one of the churches of the city for their religious assemblies. It did not avail them to allege in their defence, that only a few individuals were concerned in this deed ; that these few had acted with the best intention towards the King and the Catholic religion, and had made that concession, of which the whole city was now accused, in order to prevent the most unhappy consequences, which would otherwise have arisen from the intemperate zeal of the reformers. These defences made no impression on the duke, or on the council. And sentence was passed with very little hesitation, at the same time against the ecclesiastics, the nobles, and the several cities of the province. The ecclesiastics were deprived of their right of voting in the assembly of the States ; the nobles were stript of all their honours and immunities ; the cities of Utrecht, Amersfort, Wyck, and Rhenen, were declared to have forfeited their privileges ; and, as Utrecht was supposed to have been more particularly guilty, it was enacted, that all the territory and revenues belonging to the city and corporations should be confiscated.

The States were so far intimidated by this iniquitous sentence, and their patience so much exhausted by the oppressive rapacity of the soldiers, that they were induced to raise the offer which they had made of one hundred thousand florins, to one hundred and eighty thousand. But neither what they had already suffered, nor what they dreaded from the governor's resentment, could induce them to yield their consent to the taxes of the tenth and twentieth penny.

This resolute conduct of the people of Utrecht was attended with the most important consequences. It annulled the obligation under which the other States had come, when they consented to the taxes, on condition that all the provinces should concur ; and it confirmed the people in their resolution strenuously to oppose the levying of the taxes.

The governor was aware how difficult it would have been, in their present temper, to carry his plan into immediate execution ; and although it does not appear that he ever entertained the remotest thoughts of dropping it, yet, as his occasions for money were extremely pressing, he called an assembly of the States to Brussels, and demanded, that, besides the hundredth penny, to which they had formerly consented^k, they should, in place of the other taxes, pay two millions of guilders yearly, for six years. The States endeavoured to make him sensible of the exorbitancy of this demand, but in vain. He gave them a month to consider of it, and at last, from their dread of his tyranny, they agreed to his request.

^k This amounted to 4,000,000 guilders.

1570.
Conduct of
the prince
of Orange.

The prince of Orange was not an unconcerned spectator of these transactions. He had gone, as was mentioned before, at the end of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, to join the Protestants in France. He was present, and had a considerable share in the several actions which passed between the Calvinists and Catholics, at la Charité, Koch-la-ville, and Poictiers. But being too deeply interested in the affairs of the Netherlands, to remain long at so great a distance from them, he had left his brother count Lewis to command the German forces in France ; and having returned in September one thousand five hundred and sixty-nine, to his county of Nassau in Germany, he had been employed for some time in making preparations for trying his fortune once more against the Spaniards.

In Germany he received particular intelligence of every thing that had happened in the Low Countries since his departure. He was informed how much the duke of Alva had increased the hatred which the people entertained against his person and government. He received the strongest assurances of their disposition to revolt ; and was solicited by the Catholics, as well as Protestants, by those who still remained in the country, as well as those who had been forced to leave it, to take up arms in their defence. But he had not forgotten the cause of the failure of his first attempt ; and he resolved not to begin any military operations, nor even to levy forces, till he should be better provided than formerly with the means of their support.

Soon after Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, many of those ^{The exiles} <sub>at sea ac-
knowledge his autho-
rity.</sub> who had left the country on account of the persecutions, had united together, and fitted out a great number of armed vessels, with which they seized all the Spanish ships which they could

meet with on the Flemish or English coast. These adventurers had lately, through the violence of Alva's administration, received a great increase of number ; and had been joined by many persons of rank, who had acquired an ascendant over them. They were all strongly attached to the prince of Orange from whose wisdom alone they had any hopes of being restored to their native country ; and they desired nothing so much as that he would undertake the direction of their affairs. They agreed, therefore, as soon as it was proposed by their leaders, to receive commissions from him, and to pay a fifth part of the value of all their prizes to certain officers, to be appointed by him to receive it.

As their fleet was greatly superior to any which the duke of Alva possessed, they did incredible mischief to the Spanish, and sometimes too to the Flemish merchants ; and if their prizes had been sold to advantage, the proportion which they allowed to the prince of Orange would have amounted to a considerable sum.

William had recourse, at the same time, to another method ^{Intrigues of} <sub>the prince
of Orange.</sub> of improving his finances. He empowered some of the inferior nobility to grant commissions, in his name, to the Protestant

preachers, who went throughout the provinces in disguise, and procured contributions from all those who were disaffected either to the Catholic religion or the Spanish government. These men not only knew better to whom it was proper to apply, but by their piety and eloquence, they had greater influence over the people, than any other persons whom the prince could have employed. By their means too, he acquired a thorough knowledge of the disposition of the people, and formed a correspondence with many of the principal inhabitants, which contributed

not a little to advance his views. These transactions were carried on chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the reformed religion had made greater progress than in the southern provinces ; and where, from the nature and situation of the country, intersected by navigable rivers, canals, and branches of the sea, the people dreaded less, and were in reality less exposed to, the power of the Spaniards. It was in these provinces, formed both by nature and art to be the seat of liberty, that the prince of Orange had wisely resolved to make his first attempt to gain a footing in the Netherlands. And, accordingly, intrigues were formed, and plans concerted, between his agents and some of the principal inhabitants, for delivering the maritime towns into the hands of the Protestant exiles. Attempts were made to get possession of Enchuyzen, and other cities in North Holland ; but from different causes they proved abortive at this time, and were laid aside till fortune should be more propitious. The persons concerned in them had little reason, it may be thought, to flatter themselves with the hopes of secrecy ; yet so universally odious was the Spanish government become, to the Catholics as well as the reformers, that none, even of those by whose means the plots of the Orange party were defeated, could resolve to give information of them to the governor. They were averse from gratifying a man whom they had so much reason to detest ; and abhorred the thoughts of that cruelty, which they knew would, in case of a discovery, be exercised against the guilty.

The duke of Alva, therefore, remained entirely ignorant of all that passed ; nor does it appear that he entertained the least suspicion of the machinations of his enemies, till the taking of the fort of Louvestein. This fort stands in the island called Bommel, which is formed by the Maese and the Waal ; and, though weakly fortified, was of great importance on account of its situation. It was taken by surprise at this time, by Herman de Ryter, a native of Bois-le-Duc, who wished to signalize himself by some gallant exploit in the service of the prince of Orange. He had carried with him no more than fifty men, and with this small number he hoped to be able to defend the fort till his associates should arrive, but unfortunately they were prevented from advancing by some unforeseen accident ; and in the mean time the fort was invested by a superior force, which had been sent from Bois-le-Duc, by Roderigo de Toledo. The besieged defended themselves long with the most obstinate valour ; but they were at last over-powered by numbers, and de Ryter himself was slain¹.

The duke of Alva was greatly alarmed by this event. He considered the cause more than the effect, and apprehended that this first enterprize of his enemies, which had been so easily frustrated, would ere long be followed by other attempts in different parts of the provinces. It excited in his fiery temper a degree of rage and indignation equal to his anxiety. And his resentment was inflamed by the opposition which the people had made to his raising the tax of the hundredth penny ; especially in the maritime provinces, where he had never been able either to levy that tax, or their proportion of the two millions of guilders, which the General States had consented to pay him yearly. This opposition might have opened his eyes, and shewn him the necessity of embracing milder expedients than he had

Surprise of
the fort of
Louvestein.

1571.
Indignation
of the duke
of Alva.

¹ Meteren, p. 86. Bentivoglio, p. 87.

1571. hitherto employed ; but instead of this, it served only to fix him in his first purpose of having recourse to open force and violence. And he was resolved, whatever should be the consequences, to compel the people to submit, not only to the tax of the hundredth penny, to which the States had given their consent, but likewise to that of the tenth and twentieth, to which they had refused it^m. To give a colour to his conduct, he asserted in the council, that the States had consented to the two latter taxes as well as the former. Viglius, and some others of the counsellors, reminded him, that the consent obtained had been granted upon a condition which did not yet subsist. But Alva was not in a temper of mind, at this time, in which he could either listen to the truth, or bear with contradiction. They were no better than rebels, he said, who durst affirm, that the States had not consented. The King's honour, as well as his interest, required, that the taxes should be levied without delay ; and he would suffer himself to be cut in pieces, rather than allow the States to break the promise which they had given him.

His edict requiring payment of the taxes. He accordingly issued an edict, requiring all the inhabitants of the Low Countries to make immediate payment of the tenth and twentieth, as well as of the hundredth penny, to the officers appointed to receive them. But, as he had promised to moderate the two former taxes in such a manner as to prevent the pernicious consequences that were apprehended, an immunity from the tenth penny was granted to foreign merchants, on the first sale of goods imported ; and they were permitted to export them again, without paying this tax, provided the goods had not been transferred from one person to another during their continuance in the country. The same immunity was likewise granted on the first sale of cattle, corn, and fruits, the produce of the Netherlands.

The consequences of this measure. These immunities, which the governor considered as proofs on his part of the greatest condescension, had no effect towards reconciling the people to the taxes, which they believed would, notwithstanding these concessions, be attended with the ruin of their commerce and manufactures. Their aversion to them, and their resolution to oppose the levying of them, were as strong as ever. In many towns the people began, almost as soon as the edict was published, to feel a scarcity of the common necessaries of life. Provisions were not brought to market, nor did the merchants expose their goods to sale as formerlyⁿ. These inconveniences were felt in no place more than in Brussels, where the governor resided. There was an entire stagnation in that city of every species of commercial intercourse. Neither food nor drink could be purchased in it. The shops and workhouses were shut up. The lower sort of people were reduced to despair ; and the whole city was overwhelmed with grief and consternation.

His barbarity. In this situation, Alva formed the barbarous resolution of putting to death, before their own houses, seventeen of the principal inhabitants. His soldiers were under arms ; the gibbets, the ropes, and the executioners, were prepared ; when happily, only a few hours before the time fixed for the execution, a messenger arrived with information that the exiles had made a descent on the island of Vorn, and got possession of the Brille.

^m Bentivoglio, p. 87.

ⁿ Ibid.

Alva, thunderstruck with this intelligence, recalled his bloody orders ; and resolved, though with much reluctance, to suspend for a time the levying of the taxes. He was deeply sensible of the advantages which the exiles might derive from their acquisition of a place, which, on account of its situation at the mouth of a great river, and in the neighbourhood of many important cities, had always been considered as one of the chief keys of the Netherlands. He knew likewise how extremely disaffected the people in the maritime provinces were to his person and government ; and he dreaded that other places would follow the example of the Brille, and open their gates to the enemy.

1571.
The Brille taken by the exiles.

He had the greater reason to be uneasy at this event, as he had not exerted himself with proper vigour to prevent it. He had neglected to form a naval force sufficient to contend with the exiles ; and had thereby not only suffered the trade of the Netherlands to be ruined, but had left his government almost defenceless on that side, where, from the nature of the power which the Protestant exiles possessed, it was in the greatest danger of being attacked. He had not even put garrisons into the cities that were most exposed ; but, at the very time when the exiles were hovering on the coast, kept a numerous body of troops quartered in Utrecht ; which, if they had been distributed among the sea-coast towns, might have baffled all the attempts of the enemy. Of this supine negligence in a person of so great vigour and abilities as Alva, no account can be given, but the extreme contempt in which he held the Protestant exiles ; whom he considered as fit only to exercise piracy upon merchant ships, but utterly incapable of conducting any important enterprise.

But although he had not taken the necessary precaution to secure himself against their attempts, he had not been altogether inattentive to their motions. He had complained to the queen of England, of her permitting them to sell openly, in her dominions, the goods of which they had robbed the subjects of the King his master. This was in effect giving assistance, he said, to the King's rebellious subjects, and was a violation of the treaties which subsisted between the Spanish and English crowns. Elizabeth was secretly a friend to the Flemish exiles ; and she had little reason, and as little inclination, to gratify the desires of Philip, or the duke of Alva. She knew that, for some time past, they had maintained a correspondence with her Catholic subjects, and had used their endeavours to disturb her government. But she did not judge it proper at this time to come to an open rupture with Philip. She therefore complied with Alva's request ; ordered all ships belonging to such of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, as had withdrawn their allegiance from the king of Spain, to leave her harbours ; and forbade her subjects to furnish them with shelter or provisions.

This unlooked-for compliance of Elizabeth, which was matter of great triumph to the duke of Alva, and of equal mortification to the exiles, was attended, in the issue, with consequences very different from those which were expected. It reduced the exiles to despair ; and as they were now thrown off by the only foreign power from which they had received protection, they resolved, if possible, to acquire possession of some place of strength in their native country. Having with this view assembled at Dover, they set sail with twenty-five ships under William de Lumey count de la Marck, who held the chief command

1572. among them, by commission from the prince of Orange. In their voyage they had the good fortune to meet with two Spanish vessels richly laden, which was no small consolation to them in their present forlorn situation. They intended to have made an attempt upon Enchuyzen, in North Holland ; but the wind being contrary, they were obliged to put into the Maese, where they cast anchor before the town of Brille, on the first of April one thousand five hundred and seventy-two. The count de la Marck immediately landed his troops, and sent a messenger to summon the inhabitants, in the name of the prince of Orange, to surrender. But as they hesitated for some time what answer they should return, he began to suspect that they were preparing to make resistance, and therefore ordered the gates on the north side to be burnt down. This was done accordingly ; and he entered, and took possession of the town without opposition, at the head of only two hundred and fifty men.

So accidental and so easily accomplished was the first event of that war, which rendered the Netherlands a scene of horror and devastation for more than thirty years ; but which, whilst it proved the source, on many occasions, of extreme distress to the people, called forth an exertion of virtue, spirit, and intrepidity, which seldom occurs in the annals of history. Never was there a more unequal contest than this which was now begun between the inhabitants of the Low Countries and the Spanish monarch ; and never was the issue of any dispute more contrary to what the parties had reason to expect. On the one side, a people, consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long continued exercise of tyranny and oppression ; on the other, the richest monarch of the age, who was master of the most numerous and best disciplined forces, commanded by generals distinguished above their contemporaries by their consummate skill in the art of war. Nothing but despair could have made the people of the Low Countries enter the lists with an adversary so much superior to them. And it could hardly be supposed that they would not be quickly overwhelmed. But from the sequel it will appear, how rash it is to conclude with confidence, that because an event is improbable, therefore it will not happen.

On the next day after the Protestants had made themselves masters of the Brille, they began to convey their booty on board their ships, with the design of proceeding on their voyage to West Friesland ; but one of their number, a native of the place^o, having represented that they could not reasonably expect to find a more commodious settlement elsewhere, the count de la Marck, and all the rest, entered readily into his opinion ; and they resolved without delay to fortify the town with the cannon belonging to the fleet.

They had just time to put themselves into a posture of defence, when the count de Bossut ^p, to whom the duke of Alva recover the had given orders to attack them, arrived in the island with a Brille.

body of Spanish troops, collected from Utrecht and other places in the neighbourhood. The count de la Marck, whose forces were much inferior in number to the enemy, remained within the town, with a resolution to defend it to the last. The Spaniards advanced to the walls, and began to batter them with their artillery ; when one of the townsmen leaped into a canal, and swimming a little way till he came to a sluice, which Bossut had neglected to secure, he broke it down, and let in such a quantity of water, that, in a few hours, a great part of the

country was overflowed. This did not deter Bossut from the prosecution of his enterprise ; although it obliged him to remove his forces to the south side of the town, where the ground which led to the principal gate was still uncovered by the water. La Marck had planted there his heaviest cannon ; and the Spaniards had little prospect of being able to carry their point soon. In the mean time, two of the boldest leaders of the exiles sallied out with a part of the soldiers from the opposite gate and marching along the dykes to the place where Bossut had left his ships, they burnt some of them, sunk others, set the rest adrift, and then returned safe to the city. When the Spaniards were advertised of this disaster, and perceived the water round them rising higher and higher, they were struck with a sudden panic, and betook themselves with the utmost precipitation to the shore. Most of them made their escape to the opposite coast in some vessels, which the enemy had not time either to let loose or destroy ; and others by swimming, till they reached the ships that had been set adrift ; while a considerable number was swallowed up in the mud and water. Had they been pursued by the enemy, they must all have perished. But la Marck, who was doubtful of the affections of the citizens, thought it dangerous to quit the town, lest they should shut the gates, and turn his own artillery against him.

From this success, the Protestants derived an increase both of strength and courage. The citizens declared openly in their favour, and they were immediately joined by numbers who flocked to them from all parts of the island. The names of the inhabitants were registered ; and they all swore allegiance to the prince of Orange, as the only legal governor of Holland ; engaging to defend the town and island in *his* name, and that of the King, against the duke of Alva and the Spaniards^q.

Their example quickly diffused the spirit by which they were actuated, and served as a signal of revolt to other places. Of this the count De Bossut soon received a convincing proof. Having with great difficulty passed over from Vorn to Beyerland, he led his troops towards Dort, where he intended to refresh them after the fatigue which they had undergone. But the inhabitants having heard of his repulse at Brille, and dreading, that he might compel them to pay the taxes, they resolved, whatever should be the consequence, to refuse him admittance into the city. As he was not in a condition to employ force, he marched directly to Rotterdam.

There too he found the people equally averse to the admission of the Spaniards ; but after assuring the magistrates that he meant only to lead them through the town, and not to lodge them in it, he persuaded them to suffer the several companies to pass through it, one by one. The magistrates had reason quickly to repent of this concession. No sooner had the first company entered the city, than Bossut, without regard to his engagement, ordered them to keep the gates open, till the other companies should arrive.

Bossut's
massacre of
the people of
Rotterdam.

^q This first victory of the Protestants was sullied by that savage ferocity, of which there are many instances in the present war. The monks knowing how obnoxious they were to the conquerors, endeavoured to make their escape from the island ; but they were seized in their flight, treated in the most cruel and contumelious manner, and afterwards put to death. The exiles were too much inflamed by the barbarous treatment which they themselves had received, to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, or to listen either to the dictates of humanity or that of religion, for which they professed such ardent zeal. Having been treated as wild beasts by their enemies, they had now become such, and tore in pieces every thing that fell in their way.

1572. The citizens reproached him with his treachery, and attempted to shut the gates by force. He had hitherto been held in esteem for his moderation ; but being chagrined, on this occasion, by the mis-carriage of his attempt against the Protestants at Brille, and incensed by the affront which had been offered him, first by the people of Dort, and since by those of Rotterdam, he resolved to wreck his vengeance upon the latter, and shewed his soldiers what he wished them to do, by killing with his own hand one of the citizens, who was endeavouring to shut the gate. His troops, eager to follow his example, drew their swords, attacked the city-guards, slew some of them, and drove the rest out of the city ; then giving a loose to their fury, they spread themselves over the town, and butchered more than three hundred of the inhabitants^r.

This shocking deed was no less impolitic, than it was savage and barbarous ; and added fuel to that flame which Bossut, as governor of the province, ought to have been at the utmost pains to extinguish. It required but little discernment to perceive the necessity of employing the mildest expedients with the maritime provinces. There were no citadels or Spanish garrisons in the towns of these provinces. The soldiers who had been quartered in them, had been drawn off at different times, for the punishment of the people of Utrecht. The situation of most of the towns, surrounded by the sea, or by the rivers and canals, rendered it extremely difficult to besiege them ; and the Protestants, who could have easy access by water to every part of the country, were greatly superior to the Spaniards in naval force. The people were not ignorant of these advantages ; and they resolved to avail themselves of them on the present occasion. The massacre at Rotterdam made them regard Bossut and the Spaniards with horror ; and even those who wished to maintain their allegiance to the king of Spain, were determined to guard against the entrance of his troops within their walls, with the same vigilance which they would have employed against an open foe.

This spirit appeared first at Flushing ; which, on account Revolt of Flushing. of its situation near the mouth of the Scheld, has long been reckoned one of the most important towns in the Netherlands. Among the last instructions which the Emperor delivered to his son, when he resigned his dominions, he advised him to make this place an object of his particular care, and to spare no expence to secure it against the attempts of his enemies. Alva had not bestowed that attention on it, which a place of so much consequence deserved. He had weakened the garrison, by ordering all of them but eighty Walloon soldiers to take up their quarters in Utrecht. The loss of the Brille, which was owing to the same cause, had made him sensible of his error. He now therefore resolved to finish a citadel at Flushing, of which he had laid the foundation some time before ; and with this view he ordered eight companies of Spaniards to go there, under the command of an experienced officer. The citizens beheld the chains which were thus forging for them, with deep concern. They dreaded the consequences which might arise to their trade. They were not entirely free from apprehensions of being treated in the same manner as the people of Utrecht and Rotterdam. They doubted not that, sooner or later, the garrison, which was about to be stationed in the town, would be employed to compel them to make payment of the taxes ; and they were em-

^r Meursii *Auriaecus*, p. 75.

Bentivoglio, p. 91.

boldened by the success of the Protestants in the isle of Vorn. While their minds were in this agitation, there arrived among them some partisans of the prince of Orange, who had come on purpose to exhort them to assert their liberty. Instigated by these men, the populace ran to arms, and obliged the feeble remains of the garrison to quit the city. 1572.

On the next day, the Spanish forces arrived in the harbour. The people were assembled in the streets, and upon the walls ; and were still in some measure unresolved as to their future conduct. The Protestants, and other friends of the prince of Orange, remonstrated to them on the absurdity of hesitating, after they had begun hostilities. "By expelling the garrison," cried one of them, "you have already done what the Spaniards will undoubtedly interpret to be high treason against the King. Consider well to whose mercy you expose yourselves. Remember the fate of the counts Horn and Egmont, and consider whether either your merit or your innocence has equalled theirs." The Protestants employed another method to impress the minds of the vulgar. They caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that the Spanish garrison was at hand, and that all the citizens must hold their effects, their wives and daughters, in readiness for their use*.

When men are balancing between contrary resolutions, the smallest weight is sufficient sometimes to turn the scale. A man in liquor, who had mingled with the crowd, offered for a small reward to fire one of the great guns upon the Spaniards ; and he did it accordingly, on receiving three guilders from one of the Protestants who stood near him. From that instant the people were fixed in their purpose. The Spaniards, astonished at their reception, and utterly unprepared to employ force, let slip their cables, and sailed for Middleburg.

In that city resided Anthony de Burgoin, lord of Wackenè, the governor of the province ; who, as soon as he was informed of what had happened, set out for Flushing, and on his arrival there, having called together all the inhabitants into the most public part of the town, he employed every argument addressed to their hopes and fears, to persuade them to return to their allegiance. But they could not listen now to any thing but the passions by which they were inflamed. Their abhorrence of the Spanish tyranny was now wrought up to the greatest height ; and the governor, apprehensive of danger from their unbridled fury, immediately left the town.

Soon after his departure they pulled up the foundations of the new citadel, and drove out the persons to whom the charge of building it had been committed. In a few days afterwards they gave a still stronger proof of their resolution never to return under the Spanish government. Don Pedro Pacheco, who had been appointed governor of Flushing, having been detained some days behind the troops, was ignorant of what had passed, and entered the harbour under a belief that his soldiers were in the town to receive him. The people ran to arms, and having seized and plundered his ship, they cast him and his attendants into prison. Among papers which were found in his possession, it is said, that they met with evidence of his having come with a design to exercise in Flushing the wonted tyranny of the Spaniards ; and this discovery, added to the circumstance of his being nearly related to the duke of Alva, prompted them to form the barbarous resolution of putting him to death.

* Reidanus, p. 10.

1572. He offered to pay them a rich ransom for his life, and to remain their prisoner ; but they rejected his proposal. He then begged that they would respect the nobility of his birth, and put him to death by the sword, rather than by the halter. Even this request was denied him. Their minds were grown savage, from the bloody scenes which had of late been so often acted before them ; and they rejoiced in the opportunity which they possessed of wrecking their vengeance on the duke of Alva, by inflicting a disgraceful punishment on his kinsman.

They were aware of the consequences with which this conduct, so violent and hostile, must be attended ; and, as they knew that it would quickly draw upon them the whole weight of the governor's resentment, they omitted nothing in their power to secure themselves against it. They laboured incessantly to strengthen their fortifications. They imported privately from Antwerp, ammunition and provisions, which they laid up in store ; and they applied to the prince of Orange, and to the Protestants in France and England, for assistance. Some troops were immediately sent them from France, by count Lewis of Nassau ; and five hundred Flemish exiles came from England, who were soon afterwards followed by two hundred Scotch and English volunteers, under the command of two adventurers, Morgan and Balfour. Their fleet received an augmentation where they did not expect it. The duke of Alva having, some months before, fitted out a number of vessels to cruise upon the coast, the commanders of these vessels now declared in favour of the party which they had hitherto opposed ; and, setting sail for Flushing, enlisted under the banners of the count de Tserart, to whom the prince of Orange had given the chief command of all the forces in the province.

Revolt of other towns in Zealand. Tserart soon found himself possessed of sufficient strength, not only to defend Flushing, but likewise to attempt the reduction of the other towns in Zealand. With most of these

towns, there was very little occasion for employing force. The inhabitants of Campvere, Aimuyden, and some other places, were no less inclined to revolt than the people of Flushing ; and in a few days the whole province, except Middleburg and the castle of Rammekins, declared against the Spanish government, and received garrisons from Tserart.

In Middleburg too, the greatest part of the inhabitants would gladly have followed the example of the other towns ; but they were overawed by the garrison. Tserart laid siege to this city, and expected soon to have got possession of it. The garrison was weak ; and as the exiles were masters at sea, he hoped, by their means, to intercept any reinforcement which might be sent from the continent. The duke of Alva was sensible of the great importance of the place, and resolved, if possible, to relieve it. For this purpose, he ordered Sancio D'Avila, one of his bravest officers, to carry thither a thousand select soldiers, partly Walloons and partly Spaniards, whom he mingled together, as he did on many occasions afterwards, that he might the more effectually excite their emulation ; and to these a great number of officers and persons of rank joined as volunteers, that they might partake of the glory of so dangerous an enterprise.

D'Avila left Bergen-op-zoom in the end of April, and had a prosperous navigation down the Scheld. He was desirous to land his troops on the nearest part of the island, as from thence he would have had the shortest march to Middleburg. But the enemy having received intelli-

gence of his design, had drawn together a powerful fleet to oppose him. He was obliged therefore to keep out to sea on the north side of the island, and to fetch a compass round, till he came to that part of it which is washed by the ocean. The landing there was difficult by reason of the flats, and shallows, which made it necessary for him to march a great way in the water; but, as he met with no opposition from the enemy, he at last brought his men all safe on shore. Then having immediately set out with a chosen band, to examine the situation of the enemy, and having found that, trusting to the fleet, they had taken no precaution for their defence, he ordered all his forces to advance. They ran forward to the attack with the utmost impetuosity. The besiegers were overwhelmed with astonishment. The garrison at the same time sallied out upon them from the city. They abandoned their trenches almost without resistance; and being hemmed in on every side, all of them, except a few, who escaped to Flushing and Campvere, were put to the sword^t.

Raised by
D'Avila.

In this manner was the siege of Middleburg raised. But as the Protestants still retained their superiority at sea, they hoped, that by surrounding the island with their ships, and intercepting the supplies which might be sent to it, they should soon be able to compel the garrison to surrender. Their fleet consisted of no less than one hundred and fifty armed vessels, manned with sailors who were much more expert than any whom the duke of Alva could procure. Their maritime enterprises were for this reason almost always attended with success, and they did incredible mischief to the Spaniards at sea; while at land, having only raw troops to oppose to regular and well-disciplined forces, they were seldom able to look them in the face.

At this time, when the sea was covered with their ships, and almost every entrance to the ports of the Low-Countries blockaded up, the duke of Medina-coeli arrived upon the coast. This nobleman had been sent by Philip to succeed the duke of Alva, who, on account of his health, had applied for liberty to return to Spain. Medina-coeli had brought with him fifty-ships, having two thousand Spanish soldiers on board; but as he knew nothing of the late transactions in the maritime provinces, and had no suspicion that the Protestants possessed such a considerable naval force, he fell unawares into the midst of their fleet. Twenty-five of the largest of his ships were taken. Some of them escaped to Rammekins and Middleburg, and he himself got with difficulty into Sluys, in Flanders. The exiles found on board the ships which they took, two hundred thousand guilders in specie; and the ships, with the effects which they contained, were valued at five hundred thousand^u.

Success of
the exiles
at sea.
July 10th.

Their next success was in an attack upon a fleet of twenty ships, which the duke of Alva intended to send to Middleburg, with troops, ordnance, pikes, and gunpowder, for the use of the garrison. The exiles attacked these ships before they had left the harbour, and having taken them all, they carried them, together with the military stores, to Flushing.

Another fleet, fitted out for the same purpose at Sluys, was equally unfortunate. The Zealanders being informed by their partisans of the destination of this fleet, and of the time fixed for its departure, took three

^t Bentivoglio, p. 93.

^u Meursii Auriacus, p. 88.

1572. ships, in the short run betwixt Sluys and the isle of Walchern, and had the courage to pursue the rest into the harbour of Rammekins, where, notwithstanding the fire of the garrison, they took some, and burnt the rest.

They were not so successful in their next adventure. It had been the chief object of their desire, for some time, to make themselves masters of Middleburg ; because, while that city remained in the hands of the Spaniards, the whole island was subject to perpetual alarms. They had, as we have just now seen, defeated several attempts which the duke of Alva made to introduce supplies, and now the town of Tergoes was the only channel by which they could be conveyed. Tergoes is the capital of South Beveland, and was defended at this time by a garrison of eight hundred Walloons and Spaniards, under the command of Isidore Pacheco, a Spanish officer.

To this town Tserart, general of the Zealanders, had, some time after his repulse from Middleburg, laid siege ; but upon a false report of the approach of the Spaniards, he had hastily raised the siege, and left the island. He now returned to it, with an army of near eight thousand men, most of whom were German, French, and English Protestants.

Siege of Tergoes. Towards the end of Summer. As the garrison was no match in the field for so great a force, Tserart had landed in the island without opposition, and, having immediately invested the town, he pressed forward the siege with great vigour. The besieged made several brisk sallies to retard his approach ; but notwithstanding their most vigorous efforts, Tserart had opened his batteries, and made some breaches in the wall. The siege had lasted for several weeks, and Pacheco began to perceive that it would not be possible for him to hold out much longer.

Of this he had given early notice to the duke of Alva ; nor was the duke less intent upon relieving him, than he had reason to expect. The distinguished bravery of the garrison and their commander ; the reproach which would accompany the suffering them to fall a prey to the enemy ; above all, the great importance of the place, the loss of which would draw after it that of Middleburg, and the whole province of Zealand ; these considerations excited all the governor's attention, and determined him to apply with ardour to prepare the succour which Pacheco had solicited. He ordered several regiments of his best troops to assemble from different quarters at Bergen-op-zoom, from whence there is a short run down the Scheld to Beveland. He likewise sent thither a sufficient number of transports with stores of ammunition and provisions ; and appointed D'Avila and Mondragone^x to conduct them to the garrison of Tergoes.

These men exerted themselves strenuously in the execution of the trust that was committed to them ; and attempted several times to force their way through the enemy's fleet. But the Zealanders watched their motions so attentively, were so much more expert in sailing, and possessed a naval force so much superior to theirs, that all their attempts were baffled ; and, to save their ships from being sunk, they were frequently obliged to return, without being able to effectuate their purpose. D'Avila once flattered himself that he had discovered an expedient that would prove successful. He planted batteries of cannon along the banks of

^x Two of his most experienced officers.

the Scheld ; hoping to keep the enemy at a distance from the shore, and thus to give Mondragone, with the troops, an opportunity of passing. But the event did not answer his expectation. The banks were wet, and did not allow of his coming near enough to annoy the enemy.

The Spanish general began to despair of being able to execute their design, when Plumart, a native of the province, but zealously attached to the Spanish interest, proposed another method of transporting the forces, which at first appeared impracticable, although it was afterwards embraced. In order to form a clear conception of Plumart's proposal, it is necessary to attend to the situation of the country, and the change which some years before it had undergone. The isle of South Beveland, to which the Spanish general found it so difficult to transport their troops, is only seven miles distant from a tract of land, to which they could have had easy access from Bergen-op-zoom. This tract of land, which is divided from Brabant by the Easter Scheld, and from Flanders by the Hondt, or Wester Scheld, was once a part of Beveland, and was separated from it by a dreadful inundation in the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-two ; when the sea broke down the dykes, and burst violently across the island, cutting off from it the corner which lay nearest to Brabant, and covering it from north to south, that is, from the Easter to the Wester Scheld, with water, which the inhabitants were never able to exclude. The space overflowed was, at the narrowest, seven Italian miles broad. It could not be crossed in boats even at high-water, by reason of the flats and shallows ; and at low-water it was thought unfordable, on account of the miry bottom, and the channels of several rivulets, which many persons still remembered to have seen in it, before it was overflowed.

It was there, however, that Plumart thought it practicable for the troops to pass over on foot, to the relief of the garrison of Tergoes ; and he offered to lead the way, and conduct them in their passage. The character of the man, whose prudence and fidelity were well known to the commanders, was the only circumstance that prevented them from regarding his proposal as chimerical. No person had ever attempted to pass that way before. They themselves were unacquainted with the face of the country before the inundation. They only knew the length of space over which the troops must pass ; and no troops, they believed, would be able to support the fatigue of so long a march in water, and perhaps too in mud and clay. Besides, that, by accidents which could not be foreseen, they might be retarded in their passage, till they were overtaken by the rising tide, and buried in the waves ; and, even although this should not happen, yet the enemy might be apprised of their design, and be ready to fall upon them, as soon as they should reach the land.

Plumart was not discouraged by these objections. He desired that no mention might be made of this proposal, till he should know with certainty whether there was not in reality such a ford as he imagined. He then went to make the trial, accompanied by two Spaniards, and a peasant who was well acquainted with the face of the country before the inundation. He found the ford which he sought for ; arrived safe on the other side, and returned, without encountering any greater difficulties than he expected.

D'Avila and Mondragone did not hesitate after this to comply with his advice. They immediately prepared a number of small bags, which

Plumart's proposal for raising the siege.

1572. they filled with biscuit, gunpowder and matches ; and transported three thousand of the best troops, Germans, Walloons, and Spaniards, from Bergen-op-zoom to Aggar, a village which lies near the entrance of the ford. Mondragone took upon himself the conducting of this extraordinary expedition. When the time proper for entering upon it was arrived, he ordered the troops to advance towards the ford ; and having distributed the bags among them, he then disclosed his intention ; gave them an account of the discovery which had been made by Plumart and his companions ; and represented the glory which they would acquire by performing, in the service of the church and of the king, such an exploit as had never been atchieved by any army in the world before. The soldiers, full of that intrepid spirit by which the Spanish troops were so highly distinguished in the present war, and proud of being selected from their companions for so dangerous an enterprise, received this unexpected information with every symptom of joy, and called out to Mondragone to lead them forward without delay.

That they might have the more time for their passage, they began to enter the water when the sea was going back. The Spaniards, with Plumart and Mondragone at their head marched first, the Germans next, and last of all the Walloons. They were ordered to keep as close as possible to each other, that they might the more easily succour one another, if any of them should fall into deeper water, or be entangled in the mud. They were not without apprehensions of the tide returning upon them, and therefore they moved forward as fast as the surrounding element and the slimy bottom would allow. Nine men only perished through fatigue, or their neglect of the order which had been given them to keep close to their companions. All the rest arrived safe at the dyke of Yersichen, a village only four miles distant from Tergoes. There Mondragone ordered them to repose themselves during the night, and resolved to lead them, at break of day, to the relief of the besieged.

But he had already done all that was necessary for this purpose, and had no occasion to expose either himself or his men to further danger. When the besiegers were informed of his arrival, they were filled with consternation. Under that amazement into which they were thrown by so unexpected an event, they regarded the Spaniards as more than men. They did not take time to enquire into their number ; but having immediately raised the siege, they left their baggage and artillery behind them, and betook themselves precipitately to the shore. Eight hundred were killed in their flight by the garrison, and many more perished in the water, in attempting to get on board their ships. Mondragone then entered Tergoes ; where he was received by the garrison, with every demonstration of gratitude for their deliverance ; and, having remained there till he had given directions for strengthening the fortifications of the place, he left a part of his troops with the governor, and returned with the rest to Brabant, to join the duke of Alva.

^y Bentivoglio, 110. Meursii *Auriaeus*, p. 89.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XI.

WHILE the transactions that have been related passed in Zealand, the same spirit of revolt, by which the people of that province were actuated, made rapid progress in some of the other provinces. The inhabitants of Enchuyzen were the first in North Holland who had the courage to plant the standard of liberty upon their walls ; and those of Medinblinc, Edam, Purmerend, and other towns, quickly followed the example. In some of these places, part of the people were averse to this revolution ; but these were few, compared with their opponents, and were obliged either to yield to the majority, or to secure themselves by flight from their resentment.

1572.
The revolt
o. Holland.

The same measures were pursued, at the same time, in the southern parts of the province. That flame which had been kindled some time before, burst out at once in a thousand different places. And in a few months, Leyden, Gouda, Dort, Haerlem, and all the other towns in Holland, Amsterdam excepted, had openly declared against the Spaniards, and avowed their resolution to acknowledge no other authority in future, but that of the prince of Orange, and the States. The same resolution was formed in several of the cities of Overyssel, Friesland, and Utrecht.

This revolution, so favourable to William's views, was not a little promoted by intrigues, which, although he himself was absent, were carried on in his name, and by his authority. In letters to the principal inhabitants he had allured them to his interest, by flattering them with the hopes of having all their privileges secured ; of enjoying full freedom to exercise their religion, whether protestant or catholic ; and of being for ever delivered from that oppressive load of taxes with which they had been overwhelmed. In order to enforce these exhortations, he sent his agents throughout the provinces ; and most of these were

1572. persons either of great address, or of great authority and influence among the people ^a.

His military preparations. William's military preparations were at this time far advanced, and he hoped soon to begin his march, with the probability of a more prosperous issue than had attended his former expedition. He had already collected a formidable army of well-disciplined forces. Considerable sums had been transmitted to him by the friends of his cause ; and the strongest assurances had been given him, that some of the principal cities in the southern provinces would open their gates to receive him. But no circumstance contributed more to inspire him with a confidence of success, than the new measures which, a little before the present period, had been embraced by the court of France.

The affairs of France. In the bloody contest which had subsisted for several years between the catholics and protestants in that kingdom, the former had generally been victorious. But the latter, roused by their leaders, aided by foreign powers, animated by zeal for their religion, and inflamed with resentment on account of the cruel persecutions which had been exercised against them, continued to make such vigorous efforts, as created in their enemies the most alarming apprehensions with regard to the issue of the war. The court had, at different times, offered them advantageous terms of accommodation ; and peace had oftener than once been established between the contending parties. But their pretensions, their interests, and their religious principles, were incompatible ; and they remained quiet only till they were in a condition to renew hostilities. The court never had more reason to entertain hopes of being able to extirpate their opponents, than towards the end of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-nine. Their brave and active leader, the prince of Conde, had been killed in the battle of Jarnac ; they had afterwards received a dreadful overthrow in the battle of Montcontour ; and the admiral Coligni, with the young princess of Bourbon, had been obliged to retire, with the feeble remains of their shattered army, to the mountains of Gascony and Lanquedoc. There, however, they exerted themselves strenuously in making preparations for trying once more the fortune of war ; and in a few months, they drew together a force sufficient to enable them to leave their retreat, and to enter the lists against the royal army.

Queen-mother's plot against the protestants. When intelligence of this was brought to the Queen-mother, who exercised at that time an unlimited authority in the government, she was equally exasperated and alarmed ; and she resolved to employ other means than open force to be avenged upon her enemies. She communicated her plan only to the king, the duke of Anjou, the cardinal of Lorrain, the duke of Guise, and Alberto Gondi, count of Retz ; who all engaged to maintain the most inviolable secrecy. Time only brought to light their dark design. The protestants, they now believed, were not to be overcome by the force of arms ; and it was resolved to have recourse to fraud and circumvention.

In pursuance of this plan, a new treaty with the princes of Navarre and the admiral was set on foot, and soon afterwards concluded at St. Germains. By this treaty, the protestants received a free pardon of all

^a In Holland, the revolution was chiefly owing to the activity of Sonoy, whom the prince had sent thither as governor substitute till he himself should arrive : and in Guelderland, Utrecht, and Friesland, to the count of Berg, a nobleman of interest in those parts, who was married to William's sister, and acted in every thing by his direction.

their past offences, with liberty to make public profession of the reformed religion ; and the princes and admiral were allowed, for their security, to retain possession of Rochelle, Cognoc, La Charité, or Montauban, on condition, that if the articles of the peace were observed, these places should be delivered to the king within the space of two years from the date of the present pacification.

The protestant leaders entertained the same distrust of the sincerity of the king and queen-mother in this, as in all their former negotiations. They were still afraid of putting themselves in their power, and remained at a distance from court, in the places of strength which had been assigned them. In order to remove their suspicions, every species of artifice was employed. All the articles of the peace were punctually fulfilled. Strict orders were issued to allow the protestants in all places to celebrate openly their religious assemblies ; and in all the disputes which happened between the catholics and them, the latter were treated with indulgence, while the former had, on many occasions, reason to complain of injustice or severity. Charles embraced every opportunity to express the pleasure which he now enjoyed, in having restored tranquillity to his kingdom ; and even when none but zealous catholics were present, he often declared how unalterably fixed his purpose was, to perform, with strict fidelity, his engagements with the protestants. He had sufficiently experienced the folly of attempting to subdue men's consciences by force ; and no consideration would make him return to his former unhappy measures ; which he had found to be no less ineffectual for accomplishing the end intended, than they were destructive of his own repose, and pernicious to his subjects. All his counsellors, except those who were partners in the bloody secret, believed him to be sincere ; and, by the accounts which they gave of his discourse, added to the displeasure which they expressed at his change of conduct, they contributed to complete the delusion of the protestants. The admiral, however, still retained his wonted diffidence ; and when urged by the king to come to court, and receive in person every proof that could be given him of sincere attachment, he declared, that it was impossible for him to think himself secure, where his mortal enemies of the family of Guise were possessed of so much power.

To have gratified the admiral by so great a concession as the immediate removal of the Guises, Charles knew would have had a suspicious aspect ; and therefore he went no further at this time, than to assure him that his fears were groundless, and that his enemies were not masters as formerly. But soon after the duke of Guise and his brother left the court, seemingly much disgusted with the measures which were there pursued. At the same time, other means of delusion were employed, more likely to produce the desired effect. Charles offered his sister in marriage to the king of Navarre ; and an ambassador was sent to England, to negotiate a match between the duke of Anjou and queen Elizabeth. But of all the instruments of deceit which he employed, there was none more efficacious, than the declaration which he made of his resolution to enter into war with the king of Spain. Philip had refused, he said, to grant him reparation for certain injuries, which his subjects had received from the Spaniards in America ; and he was determined to take vengeance on that prince, by invading his dominions in the Netherlands. He offered the command of the army, which he talked of sending thither, to the admiral, and assured him that he would be entirely governed by his counsels, and those of the prince of Orange and count Lewis, in carrying on the war.

1572. No proposal could be better calculated than this to blind the admiral's penetration. Conscious of superior military talents, he was naturally fond of war ; sincere in his profession of the reformed religion, he was zealous to propagate and defend it ; and he was strongly attached by sympathy of manners, as well as religious principles, to the princes of Nassau. Count Lewis was with him at Rochelle, when the proposal was delivered, and he contributed not a little to banish from his mind the remains of those suspicions, which he still retained for the king's sincerity. Soon afterwards they both set out for Paris, where they were received and treated with so much esteem and confidence, as gave the admiral a full conviction that the sentiments both of the king and the queen-mother were in reality what they seemed.

Charles thought it necessary for his purpose to wear the mask for some time longer ; and as he found that nothing had served so effectually to lull the admiral's suspicions as this last device, he affected to be extremely solicitous about making preparations for the war ; and in the mean time desired count Lewis to repair to the frontiers of the Netherlands, to communicate his design to the malecontents, and to hold them in readiness for the admiral's arrival with the troops. There was nothing farther from his intention than to begin hostilities. But no sooner were the Huguenots informed of the design on which count Lewis had set out, than great numbers of them, prompted by their religious zeal, and by the restless military spirit of the age, flocked after him, and offered to assist him in any enterprise he should undertake.

Lewis was himself of too active a temper to suffer them to remain long without employment. It was of the utmost consequence, he knew, towards the success of that expedition on which his brother was about to enter, as well as of the French invasion of the Netherlands, to acquire possession early of some fortified town in the frontier provinces. With this view he had maintained a secret correspondence with some of the inhabitants of Mons ; and he made himself master of that important city by the following stratagem :

Having left the confines of France, he arrived in the evening with five hundred horse and a thousand musqueteers at a wood in the neighbourhood of Mons, whence he sent forward ten or twelve of his soldiers, whom he selected on account of their superior address and resolution. They entered Mons in the evening, and lodged together in the same inn. They gave out that they were dealers in wine ; informed their host, that their servants were bringing a quantity of that liquor, and inquired at what hour the gate of the city, by which it was to be brought in, would be opened. They were told, that, for a small reward, the keeper would open it at any time ; and early next morning, having bribed the keeper to open it, they seized upon the keys, and dispersed the guards. Count Lewis, who was at hand with a hundred horse, immediately rushed in, and having taken possession of the gate, with a part of his troops, he traversed the principal streets of the city with the rest, and proclaimed to the inhabitants, that he was not come as an enemy, but as a friend ; and that the prince of Orange was approaching with a powerful army, to assert their liberty, and to deliver them from all those oppressive taxes which had been imposed upon them by the duke of Alva.

All the citizens still remained within their houses, except a few who were privy to his design ; but he began to grow uneasy when he reflected on the small number of men that were with him, and to wonder that the rest of his troops were not come forward. It was to no purpose, he knew, to attempt keeping possession of so great a town with so small a

force. He rode out therefore as fast as he could towards the place where he had left his troops, who had lost their way, and were wandering in the wood. He conducted them immediately to the city ; not without anxiety, lest he should find the gate shut against him on his return. But such was the consternation of the citizens, and their ignorance of what had passed, that none of them had ventured to stir without their houses. The gate was still open, and every thing in the town as quiet and motionless as when he left it. He then placed his guards at the several gates, and on the ramparts ; and calling the magistrates together, explained to them his own, and his brother's designs ; giving them the strongest assurances that no violence should be committed by his soldiers. After which he commanded such of the citizens as he could not trust, to deliver up their arms ; and ordered all of them to proceed as formerly in the pursuit of their customary occupations. His troops did not amount to more than fifteen hundred men ; but he soon acquired a much greater force by the accession of many protestants, who hastened to his assistance from Picardy and Champaign^b.

The loss of Mons affected the duke of Alva in the most sensible manner ; and it gave him the greater uneasiness and concern, as it was altogether unexpected. Being no stranger to count Lewis's enterprising genius, he had kept an anxious eye upon all his motions, during his abode in France ; especially after the peace of St. Germain, and the kind reception he had met with from the king. The latest account which he had received of him from his spies at Paris was, that he was playing at tennis ; by which piece of intelligence, they meant to insinuate that he was more attentive to amusement, than to any serious pursuit. When the duke therefore was informed of his success at Mons, he discovered the utmost impatience and chagrin. In the rage which it excited in him, throwing down his hat, and trampling upon it, “ I have been deceived, he cried, by a Tuscan woman (meaning Catherine of Medicis), but ere long, instead of Tuscan lilies she shall feel the smart of Spanish thorns.”

His vexation was much increased by his knowledge of the great importance of the place which he had lost. He considered that Mons was not only the capital of the province of Hainault, but one of the largest and most populous cities in the Low-Countries ; that, being situated in a marshy soil, it might easily be rendered impregnable ; that although it was not in the line of the barrier towns, yet it was removed at so small a distance from the frontier, that the possession of it must greatly facilitate the entrance of foreign troops into the provinces ; and that either the French king, whose conduct had for some time past had so hostile an appearance, or the prince of Orange, could easily furnish it with supplies.

These considerations made him resolve to attempt the recovery of it without delay ; but while he was making the preparations necessary for this purpose, he received intelligence of the revolution in Holland ; and at the same time was informed, that the prince of Orange, having already collected a numerous army, was about to begin his march. Alva, far from shrinking at the view of so many impending dangers, exerted himself with great activity and vigour to repel them. He carried on his levies with the utmost diligence, and in a very short time found himself possessed of between five and six thousand German horse and eighteen thousand foot of the same nation ; besides fifty companies of Spaniards, and one hundred and fifty of Walloons, and other natives of the Nether-

^b Bentivoglio, p. 95. Meursii Auriacus, p. 79. Meteren, p. 95.

1572. lands. He would gladly have sent a part of these forces to recover the revolted cities in the maritime provinces, and the rest to the siege of Mons ; but when he reflected on the difficulty which he must encounter in either of these two enterprises, he apprehended that his army, numerous as it was, could not with safety be divided. He resolved therefore to employ it, whole and entire, against his enemies on one hand of him, before he should turn it to the other.

Still, however, he remained in great perplexity, finding it difficult to determine whether it was most expedient to begin with the siege of Mons, or the recovery of the maritime provinces. And to assist him in deciding this important question, he called a council of his principal officers ; when the marquis of Vitelli, one of the first in rank, as well as in military merit, advised him earnestly to begin with the latter, and supported his opinion by observing, “ That although the interior provinces were liable to be invaded from the side of France or Germany, yet it would not be difficult to recover whatever cities should be lost in those provinces, as the inhabitants were in general more loyal than those of Holland and Zealand, and much less infected with the spirit of innovation in religion. That the Huguenots under count Lewis were destitute of means to support themselves, and must soon be dispersed ; for he could not be persuaded that the French king, who had hitherto shewn so much zeal for the true religion, would ever debase himself so far, as to favour the attempts of his rebellious subjects to subvert it. The German forces under the prince of Orange, undisciplined and tumultuary, were actuated in their present warfare, by no other motives but those of pay and plunder. And if they were disappointed in their expectation of these, there was little ground to doubt that they would choose rather to return home, after taking vengeance on their leaders, than expose themselves to the fatigue and danger of besieging towns and fortresses. “ We may therefore, without anxiety,” continued he, “ put off the siege of Mons, and the defence of the inland frontier, till a more convenient season shall arrive. But the state of the maritime provinces admits not of the least delay. The people there are universally infected with heresy. They have conceived a degree of phrenzy, and indulged themselves in the most extravagant excesses against the church and the king. Their situation, strong by nature, will soon be rendered impregnable. Every passage of a river and canal will require an army to force it, and every siege, a campaign to finish it. By the sea, and by the rivers, they can be always richly furnished with provisions ; they can every hour receive succour from France, Germany, or England ; and will be able, by their naval force, to prevent the king’s army from receiving supplies from Spain. It is there too, the prince of Orange, for many years, was governor. There he possesses several large estates ; and he has formed there numerous and close connexions with persons of the greatest influence in the country. As it was in these provinces he first erected the standard of rebellion, it is in them he intends to fix the seat of that usurped dominion which he is so ambitious to maintain. Let us attack our enemy first in his strong hold ; and when we have driven him from thence, we shall find it much easier to prevent him from establishing himself in any other quarter.”

Such were the reasons which Vitelli gave for advising the duke of Alva to postpone the siege of Mons ; and, if his advice had been followed, it is probable that the republic of the United Provinces would never have been formed. The people had not yet had time to put the cities into a proper state of defence, and they could not have long resisted so great a force as the duke of Alva might have employed to subdue them. Am-

sterdam and Middleburg were still unshaken in their allegiance. 1572.
With the ships belonging to these two wealthy cities, and those which he would have received from Spain, a fleet might have been equipped superior to that of the protestants ; who must have been soon reduced to the necessity of submitting to whatever terms Philip might have thought fit to impose.

No such pernicious consequences as those which were foretold by Vitelli, could have followed from allowing the enemy to remain for some time in possession of Mons ; nor even from the conquest which the prince of Orange might have made of other places. In an open country, such as the interior provinces, the fate of towns must depend entirely on the number and discipline of the armies employed to attack or defend them ; and in both these respects, the duke of Alva had reason to believe that he would be at all times able to maintain his superiority ; especially if, by first reducing the maritime provinces, he could keep open his communication by sea with Spain.

But it is infinitely easier for men to judge concerning matters of such nice deliberation, after the event has happened, than when they are about to enter upon action. It ought to be considered, that Alva had not yet experienced the difficulties attending the siege of towns, situated in a country so much intersected by the sea, by rivers and canals, as the maritime provinces ; and could not foresee those amazing exertions which the people made, first in their preparations for war, and afterwards in the defence of their cities when attacked. He had likewise reason to entertain suspicions of the hostile intentions of the French king. He dreaded the havoc which would be made by the army of the prince of Orange, in the richer and more fertile provinces ; and thought it would bring an indelible stain upon his honour, if he did not endeavour to prevent it. Besides these motives, it is not improbable, considering the natural violence of his temper, that he was in some degree influenced, in the resolution which he formed, by his personal jealousy of the prince of Orange, and his desire of disappointing a second time the attempts of one who had formerly rivalled him in the favour of his prince.

Whatever were his motives, he resolved to begin his operations with the siege of Mons ; and to delay the reduction of The siege of Mons. Holland till he should disengage himself from his enemies on the southern frontier. In order to increase the number of his forces, he commanded the garrisons of Rotterdam and Delfshaven, the only towns in Holland in which he had any garrisons left, to join him ; and immediately sent off his son Frederic de Toledo, accompanied by Noircarmes and Vitelli, with a part of the troops, to form the blockade of Mons.

The inhabitants of that city, though suspicious at first of count Lewis's intentions, were now well satisfied with his government, and were solicitous to provide for their defence against the Spaniards. They assisted him with great alacrity in completing their fortifications. They were active in laying in military stores and provisions ; and having repeatedly sallied out for this purpose, after Toledo's arrival in their neighbourhood, they had several encounters with his troops.

Lewis had, some time before, sent the Sieur de Jenlis to Paris, to inform the king of his success, and to solicit the speedy march of the troops which he had promised to send to his assistance. Charles received Jenlis in the most gracious manner, affected to be extremely happy with the accounts which he had brought him, and gave him authority to levy forces ; hoping that before they could take the field, he

1572. would be able to put an end to the scene of dissimulation which he had so long been acting. But the admiral, who was allowed to exercise an unlimited power in the administration, pushed forward the levies with greater vigour than the king intended ; and, in a few weeks, Jenlis was ready to set out with between four and five thousand foot and four hundred horse. The admiral and count Lewis concurred in advising him to direct his march by the way of Cambray, that he might avoid being intercepted by the enemy, and join the army of the prince of Orange. But Jenlis refused to comply with this wholesome council. He vainly hoped to be able, with his own forces alone, to oblige the Spaniards to quit the siege ; and he wished to secure this honour to himself, rather than leave it to be reaped by the prince of Orange. Notice was sent privately to Toledo, from the court of France, of the route which he was to take, and of the time of his departure. Toledo immediately drew off his forces from the blockade, and advanced to meet him on the frontier ; being desirous to engage at a distance from the town, lest count Lewis should sally out, and attack the Spaniards in the rear, when they were engaged in battle with Jenlis. Toledo had reached a village called St. Ghislain, at the distance of a few miles from Mons, when he was informed that the enemy had entered a neighbouring wood, and that upon their coming out from it he might attack them with great advantage. He ordered his cavalry to march first, and followed as fast as he was able with the infantry. The cavalry had almost reached the borders of the wood, when they perceived a hundred of the enemy's horse that had been sent before to reconnoitre. These the Spaniards instantly attacked, and drove back into the wood, pursuing them closely till they reached the main army, which was thrown into confusion by the precipitate flight of the fugitives. In a very little time the whole Spanish army arrived, and began the attack, before Jenlis had time to draw up his men in order of battle. The French made resistance, however, for two hours with great bravery ; but at last they gave way, and endeavoured to save themselves by flight. Upwards of twelve hundred fell on the field, and many were killed in the pursuit, partly by the Spaniards, and partly by the country people, who took cruel vengeance for the injuries which they had received from them in their march. Jenlis himself was taken prisoner, and conducted to the citadel of Antwerp ; where, having died suddenly, his death was ascribed to poison. The loss sustained by the Spanish army was inconsiderable.

Toledo returned to Mons in a few days after this distinguished victory ; and soon after the duke of Alva arrived.

^{Alva's arrival before Mons.} This cautious general having drawn a double trench and rampart round his army, by which it was rendered secure on one side against the sallies of the besieged, and on the other, against any sudden attack that might be made upon it by the prince of Orange, he immediately erected several batteries, and began his fire in different quarters with great fury. The besieged discovered no less vigour in their defence ; which was conducted with great prudence, as well as the most indefatigable activity, by count Lewis, seconded in all his operations by the celebrated La Noue, who had gained distinguished renown in the civil wars of France.

^{Arrival of the prince of Orange in the Netherlands.} But although the besieged displayed the utmost skill and intrepidity, they had no hopes of being able to raise the siege, without the assistance of the prince of Orange. William had already penetrated into the Low Countries, and advanced as far as Ruremond. There he stopped, and demanded a

supply of provisions for his troops. The government of the town was in the hands of zealous catholics, who not only rejected his request, but accompanied their refusal with a degree of haughtiness and insolence by which the Prince and his army were highly exasperated. There were many of the citizens, however, with whom he had formerly held intelligence. Having at this time renewed his correspondence with them, he made a brisk attack upon one of the gates. The catholics sustained it with spirit ; but while they were thus employed, the protestant inhabitants snatched the opportunity, and introduced the assailants by another gate into the city. It was not then in the power of the prince of Orange to restrain the fury of his soldiers. They plundered many of the citizens, violated the churches, and put to death, with great barbarity, several priests, and other religionists. By some popish historians, William himself has been blamed on account of these enormities. But these writers seem neither to have known that he published an edict to prevent them, nor to have considered, that as he could not but perceive that violent measures were calculated to hurt his cause, by alienating the affections of the people in other cities, so his conduct, on innumerable other occasions, furnishes the strongest proof of his utter aversion to all cruelty and outrage.

William's acquisition of Ruremond was of great importance, as it put him in possession of a commodious passage over the Maese ; he therefore left a garrison to defend it, and hastened afterwards to Hainault. The citizens of Mechlin having been gained over to his interest by the Sieur de Dorp, opened their gates to receive him. There he likewise left a garrison. The citizens of Louvain refused to admit him within their walls ; but, on his preparing to employ force, they consented to grant him a contribution ; of which he accepted, in order to save the time which the siege would have cost him. Nivelle, Diest, Sichem, Tillemont, and several other towns surrendered to him ; some through fear, and others through the affection which they bore to his cause or person. Dendremond and Oudenarde were taken by surprise, and great irregularities were committed by the soldiers in both these places, especially in the latter, where, notwithstanding their leader's prohibition, they once more indulged that ungovernable fury with which their bigotry inspired them against the ecclesiastics of the Romish communion.

William made his stay at each of these places as short as possible. He did not, however, arrive in Hainault till the beginning of September, when his army amounted to more than twenty thousand men.

So great an army could not be supported long without more ample funds than he possessed. The States of Holland had sent him a considerable sum. The exiles had transmitted to him a part of the money that arose from their captures. His other friends had raised contributions proportioned to their abilities. But so great had been the expence of levying, equipping, and maintaining his troops, and such immense sums had been laid out in purchasing artillery and military stores, that he had occasion still for all the supplies which had been promised him by the court of France.

But his hopes of relief from that quarter were now utterly extinguished. The plan of treachery above-mentioned, which had been carried on for two years, with a degree of perseverance as well as of dissimulation that has not its parallel in history, was at this time brought to a conclusion. The artifices employed to delude the protestant leaders had at length succeeded, and they were almost all caught in the net which had been prepared for their destruction.

The admiral had remained at court for several months, during which

1572. time Charles gave him every day fresh marks of affection and esteem. That deceitful monarch had shewn likewise a particular attachment to the admiral's friends, and was perpetually surrounded with them at council, in his own apartments, and when he went abroad: With his permission, the admiral had left Paris, and gone to Chatillon, where he staid for some time to settle his private affairs. This indulgence was calculated to create in him the most assured confidence; since it could hardly be supposed, that if the king had intended him any harm, by enticing him to court, he would have allowed him to depart from it. To such a height was the admiral's security now risen, that when Charles expressed his desire of having all grounds of enmity between him and the Guises removed, he readily consented that they should come to Paris, and agreed to refer the several points of difference between himself and them to the king's decision. In a few days after, the duke of Guise arrived, attended by a numerous train of dependants; and a formal reconciliation was made in presence of the king. But it soon appeared how little sincerity there was on one side, in the professions which were uttered on that occasion.

As a prelude to the final catastrophe, the queen of Navarre, a princess who by her spirit and magnanimity had long been formidable to the catholics, died, after a short illness, which was generally ascribed to poison. And an attempt was made, by a partisan of Guise, to assassinate the admiral. By this last event the protestants were greatly alarmed; but the king and queen-mother, by redoubling their dissimulation, and assuming, with consummate artifice, the appearance of deep concern for what had happened, prevented the admiral from suspecting *them* to have been privy to it, and diverted him and the other protestant leaders from forming any vigorous resolution of providing for their safety. They were all found therefore defenceless and unprepared.

In that horrid scene which passed on the night of the twenty-fourth of August, the duke of Guise was the principal actor. But his savage spirit quickly diffused itself into every breast; and no catholic declined to assist him in the execution of his bloody purpose. The admiral, to whom, not many days before, he had pledged his friendship, was among the first who fell a sacrifice to his fury. This great man died with a fortitude and tranquillity suitable to his character. "Young man," said he to La Besine (who was sent into his apartment by the duke of Guise, while Guise himself remained without till the deed was perpetrated), "you ought to reverence grey hairs; but proceed to the execution of your design; you can shorten my life but a very little." While he was saying this, the assassin plunged his sword into his breast. At the same time all his domestics and friends were murdered; among whom was the brave Guerchy, his lieutenant, and his son-in-law, the amiable Teligny, who had won even the savage heart of Charles, and whose engaging aspect suspended for some time the lifted hands of his murderers. But it does not belong to this history to enter more particularly into the detail of this transaction. Upwards of ten thousand protestants were massacred in Paris alone; and in the other cities of the kingdom, between fifty and sixty thousand.

Of this horrid massacre, the first idea is said to have been suggested to the queen-mother by Philip, through the duke of Alva, at conferences held at Bayonne in one thousand five hundred and fifty-nine; and it is certain, that intelligence of it was received at Madrid with the utmost joy. Philip offered public thanksgiving to heaven for the destruction of his enemies; and wrote to Charles a congratulatory letter on the subject. On the other hand, it filled the protestants in the Low Countries with horror and consternation. Their hopes of obtaining deliverance from the Spanish yoke,

through the powerful aid of France, had been raised to the greatest height, and their dejection now was in proportion to their former expectations. 1572.

Nothing could be more galling to the prince of Orange than the news of this disaster. Besides the cruel disappointment of finding a powerful monarch his mortal enemy, whom he had so much reason to believe to be his friend, he knew not what dangerous effect this unexpected revolution might produce upon his troops, especially as some of them were subjects of France, and had entered into his service, under a belief that their king was to support them in their present enterprise.

Perceiving, therefore, the necessity of pushing forward his operations with the utmost vigour, and being persuaded, that, without some signal instance of success, he could not long support his army, he advanced without delay towards Mons ; being resolved to try every expedient, not only to raise the siege, but if possible to bring on a general engagement.

The duke easily penetrated into his design, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. After the arrival of several German auxiliaries in his camp, his army was superior in number, as it had always been in discipline, to that of the prince ; and he could not have much reason to dread the event of a battle, in case he should find it unavoidable. But knowing that the fate of battles is decided sometimes by accidents, against which no human prudence can provide ; and considering, that the prince's army, through the scantiness of his funds, would probably soon fall to pieces of itself, he resumed the principles on which he had acted in the time of William's former expedition, and resolved to avoid exposing his troops to any unnecessary risk ; hoping, that, by tiring out the enemy, he should be able to triumph over them without fighting. With this view, while he invested the town on every side, and prevented any supplies from being thrown into it, he entrenched his camp so strongly, as to render it entirely impracticable for the prince of Orange to force his lines. He fortified the several passes by which the town might be approached in the strongest manner ; watched over every operation himself, with indefatigable attention ; and forbade his men to engage in the slightest skirmish with the enemy, whatever provocation they might receive.

After having taken these precautions, he sent out five hundred horse to reconnoitre. They were met by nearly the same number of German horse, commanded by count Henry, William's youngest brother, who being ambitious to distinguish himself in this his first campaign, attacked the Spaniards with uncommon fury, and after killing many of them, broke their ranks, and drove them back in great confusion. The Prince himself followed soon afterwards with all his army, and drew it up in battle array before the duke of Alva's camp.

But Alva, more determined than ever since the repulse of the cavalry to adhere to his plan, kept all his men within their entrenchments. The prince of Orange omitted nothing in his power to induce him to change his purpose. He shifted his ground, intercepted the convoys of provisions, attacked foragers, and sent out parties on every side, with a view to entice the enemy to quit their lines.

There were persons in the Spanish camp who condemned their general's conduct on this occasion, and exhorted him to put to proof that courage of which the enemy were so extremely ostentatious. Among these was the archbishop of Cologne ^a, whose ardent spirit breathed nothing but war and

Operations
of the prince
of Orange.

1572. battle, and who could not relish those cautious maxims by which the duke of Alva had resolved to regulate his conduct. Alva remained equally firm against the importunities of his friends, and the arts that were practised by the enemy. It was a maxim often in his mouth, that as all human events are precarious, the most precarious of all is a battle : to which he added, that it ought not to be the aim of a general to fight, but to overcome ; and that there were other means by which this aim might be accomplished more effectually than by fighting.

But although his conduct was not approved by the archbishop of Cologne, he had the satisfaction to know that it gave the greatest uneasiness to the prince of Orange ; who perceived, that if an opportunity did not offer soon of striking some important blow, by which he might raise the siege, it would not be possible for him to keep his army together. His finances did not enable him to bring provisions from a distance, and all the country round had been plundered by the Spaniards. Being driven therefore to despair, he made a bold effort to break through the enemy's entrenchments ; but this adventurous attempt, which nothing could justify but the urgent motive that incited him, was attended with such an issue as he had reason to expect. His men were bravely repulsed, and a considerable loss sustained.

He now relinquished all hopes of either raising the siege, or forcing an engagement ; and he resolved to leave Hainault, after attempting to introduce such supplies into the town as might enable the garrison to hold out till winter, when the duke of Alva would be obliged to retire. For this purpose, he made choice of two thousand horse and one thousand foot, the flower of his army. There was only a single pass by which they could have access to the town, and at that place Alva had built a strong fort, of which he committed the defence to a select body of Spanish troops, under the command of Sancio d'Avila and Julio Romero. Notwithstanding this precaution, which left hardly a possibility of success, the troops destined for the relief of Mons advanced towards the pass with the utmost intrepidity. Romero and d'Avila received them with equal intrepidity ; and were seconded by the guns of the fort. The combat was hot and furious. There was a brisk cannonading during the time of it from the two armies, and from the town ; but the fire from the fort did the greatest execution ; and the Germans, after several hundreds of their number had fallen, were at last obliged to abandon their attempt.

The prince of Orange, now convinced of the impossibility of relieving the besieged in opposition to so powerful an army, immediately decamped. The duke of Alva followed him next day with most of his forces, and in every movement discovered the

The Prince is obliged to leave Hainault.
most consummate skill ; so that he at once prevented the Prince from returning towards Mons, and avoided being reduced himself to the necessity of fighting. It was not long before he learned that there was not the same good order in the Prince's army, which had hitherto been observed in it. William's authority over his troops had suffered greatly by the failure of his late attempts ; and he was unable any longer to maintain that perfect discipline, without which no army, however numerous, can be formidable.

Alva readily embraced the opportunity which this circumstance afforded him. Having taken a view in person of the enemy's quarters, he resolved to attack them in the night. He committed the charge of this enterprise to Julio Romero, and gave him two thousand chosen infantry, who were ordered to be ready to march in the middle of the night, each with a shirt over his armour, to enable them to distinguish one another. They fell with great fury on the Germans, who were stationed to guard the camp ; and as most

of them were fast asleep, they made dreadful havoc among them, till the alarm was communicated to the rest, who were soon roused by the groans and shrieks of the wounded. At first, believing that the whole Spanish army had attacked them, they fled precipitately. The assailants had in the beginning set fire to the tents, and many of the Germans perished in the flames. But this circumstance, by which the horror of the scene was augmented, saved the German army from destruction. It discovered the number of the Spaniards, and made it easier for the prince of Orange to draw up his men, and to know in what quarter he might find the enemy. But the assailants, perceiving that the whole camp was up in arms, made their retreat in time, and eluded the vengeance which they saw approaching. By the favour of the night they escaped with little loss, after having put to the sword near five hundred of the Germans.

The consequences of this disaster were more pernicious to the prince of Orange than the disaster itself. It filled his troops with consternation, and gave them a formidable idea of the Spaniards, whom, on account of their having so often declined fighting, they had been accustomed to despise. Without waiting for orders, they hastily decamped with one consent, and left a part of their baggage a prey to the enemy. They had not candour to acknowledge, that the misfortune which had befallen them on the preceding night was owing to their negligence in obeying orders. They were disposed to throw the blame of it upon their general, and began to complain, that instead of enriching them with spoil, he had brought them into the Low Countries, only to expose them to perpetual hardships and distress. He found means, however, at this time, to quiet their minds, and in some measure to rectify their opinion of his conduct.

The duke of Alva was on this occasion urged by his officers to pursue the Prince till he should drive him entirely out of the Netherlands; but he repeated the old maxim, That it is wiser to make a bridge for a flying enemy, than to reduce them to despair; and returned to the siege.

The prince of Orange led his troops to Mechlin; and having remained there for some days to recruit them after their fatigue, he continued his march northwards, till he had brought them as far as Orsoy in the dutchy of Cleves. At that place their ill-humour broke out afresh with greater violence than ever, and they began to hold private meetings, in which they deliberated, whether, in order to procure payment of their arrears, they should not deliver him up to the duke of Alva. The principal officers received this ungenerous proposal with horror and indignation. They were convinced that the Prince had done every thing that could have been done by a general of the most consummate abilities. They knew that he had begun his enterprise with the highest probability of success, and that his failure in it had been almost entirely owing to the treacherous dealings of the French king; by trusting to whom, he had engaged in a very different plan of operations from that which he would otherwise have adopted. By these considerations the officers were entirely satisfied; and through their influence, the common soldiers were persuaded to relinquish their perfidious design. The army was immediately disbanded; and William set out for Holland, where the people longed for his arrival.

His retreat from Mons gave his brother, count Lewis, who was naturally of a sanguine temper, the deepest affliction. And this, joined to the extreme fatigue which he had undergone for several months before, threw him into a violent distemper, which prevented him for some time from attending to the siege. But during his confinement La Noue conducted the defence with so much skill and intrepidity, that Alva, despairing of being able before winter to take the town by force,

He disbands his army.

The surrender of Mons.

1572. was willing to agree to such terms of capitulation, as count Lewis thought it not dishonourable to accept. These were, that the French, count Lewis, the Flemish nobility, and all who were not inhabitants of the place, should leave it with their arms and baggage ; and that such of the inhabitants as had borne arms might leave it with their effects, but not their arms. That such of them as were catholics might remain in the town unmolested ; but that all the protestants should not only depart from the town, but from the Netherlands ; and that all persons, whether citizens or foreigners, should take an oath, that they would not carry arms for the space of a year, either against the king of France or the king of Spain ; from which oath count Lewis alone was exempted. This capitulation was signed by the dukes of Alva and Medina Cœli, by Frederic de Toledo, and the baron de Noicarmes ; and all the conditions of it were punctually fulfilled.

In this manner was Mons recovered from the protestants, after it had been more than three months in their possession. Enormities of the Spaniards at Mechlin.

The duke of Alva felt no anxiety with regard to the recovery of the cities which had received the prince of Orange. They were neither strongly fortified nor sufficiently provided with garrisons to defend them. The first against which he turned his arms was Mechlin ; and he ordered his son to lead thither the Spanish troops, who having received no pay for some time, advanced like so many famished wolves, with a resolution to satiate their rapacity by plundering the inhabitants.

On their arrival, the garrison which had been left in the town by the prince of Orange seemed determined to make resistance ; but finding the citizens averse from co-operating with them, and despairing of being able, without their assistance, to hold out long, they deserted the place in the night ; and next morning all the priests and ecclesiastics went in solemn procession to Toledo's tent, to deprecate his vengeance. When they were pleading the cause of the unhappy anxious inhabitants, and representing that only a small number of them had been guilty, while by far the greatest part had preserved their allegiance ; the soldiers, apprehensive that Toledo might listen to this apology, and disappoint them of their prey, rushed forward to the city, and broke into it, some by the gates, and others, by the help of scaling ladders, over the walls. Then spreading themselves like a deluge, they gave a loose to every species of violence ; butchering some, and plundering all without mercy. There was no distinction made of age, sex, or condition. Virgins and matrons were violated before the eyes of their parents and husbands. The churches and convents were pillaged as well as private houses ; and the nuns were not exempted from that brutal lust and fury, which the Spaniards indulged without control.

Justified by the duke of Alva. The duke of Alva was sensible how great an odium must attend such a barbarous treatment of a city, which had hitherto been distinguished for its fidelity ; yet he chose to justify what had been done, and in a few days afterwards published a manifesto, in which he declared, that the citizens had suffered no more than their rebellion deserved ; that justice was not yet entirely satisfied ; that their crime merited a still severer punishment, than barely to be deprived of their effects ; and that other cities which had already imitated, or should afterwards imitate, their example, might expect, sooner or later, to meet with the same fate. Of the sacrilege that had been committed on the churches and convents, and the shocking treatment of the weaker sex, no mention was made in the manifesto, and no excuse was ever offered for passing over these enormities with impunity. Great arrears, said the apologists of Alva, were at that time due to the soldiers ; and, as he could not

satisfy them, he either thought it reasonable to allow them to take a compensation for their pay ; or, being well acquainted with their ferocious tempers, he was afraid to exercise his authority. The Spanish soldiers themselves, though little scrupulous with respect to crimes contrary to the laws of nature, justice, and humanity, were afterwards, agreeably to the character of their nation, touched with remorse on account of their violation of the churches ; and in order to atone for their guilt, they hearkened to the dictates of superstition, and laid out a portion of their plunder in building a house for the jesuits in Antwerp^e.

Alva having gone to Maestricht, where he dismissed his German horse, went from thence to Brussels, while the Spaniards were permitted to remain at Mechlin for several days, which they employed in collecting their plunder, and in sending it off in boats to Antwerp, to be exposed to sale. Toledo then led them against the other cities which had received German garrisons. These garrisons fled on his approach ; and the people agreed to pay exorbitant contributions to save their cities from being sacked : nor did he meet with any opposition in his progress, till he came to Zutphen, which was at that time a place of considerable strength. It was defended with a wall flanked with bastions, and surrounded with a deep ditch. The Issel washes the fortifications on one side, the Berkel on another ; and the ground on the other two sides is so extremely wet and marshy as to render the place, for the greatest part of the year, almost inaccessible. But unfortunately for the protestants in garrison, they could not avail themselves of these advantages at this juncture ; the frost having set in with uncommon severity several days before the arrival of Toledo. He found no difficulty therefore in approaching the place with his batteries, and he soon made a breach in the wall. He was preparing for an assault, when he received intelligence, that the garrison, and all such as had rendered themselves obnoxious had gone out of the town by the opposite gate ; and that the citizens who remained were now, when left at liberty to act agreeably to their inclination, willing immediately to surrender at discretion. But Toledo having, by the small resistance which the garrison had made, got a pretext for plundering this unhappy people, refused to listen to any terms of accommodation, and ordered his troops to advance. They entered the town without opposition, and repeated there the same shocking barbarities which they had exercised in Mechlin, with this difference, that as there was much less booty in Zutphen, to satisfy their rapacity, they indulged their cruelty so much the more. They put to the sword all the citizens who fell in their way, men and women without distinction ; and when they were tired with slaughtering, they cast great numbers into the Issel, and indulged themselves in the horrid joy of beholding the unhappy sufferers perish in the stream. By the sword and water, above five hundred perished ; and the rest were obliged to redeem their lives by the most oppressive contributions, which were so cruelly exacted, that the living had reason to envy the fate of those whom death had delivered from such intolerable misery^f.

Cruelty of the Spaniards at Zutphen.

^e Meteren, p. 107. Campana, p. 97. Bentivoglio, p. 114.
^f Meteren, p. 110. Bentivoglio, p. 115. Meursii Auriacus, p. 98.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XII.

1572.
Transactions
in Holland and
Zealand.

WHILE the Spanish army was employed in the siege of Mons, and in subduing the other revolted towns in the southern provinces, the people of Holland and Zealand improved the leisure which was afforded them, by taking every precaution in their power to secure themselves from being again reduced under the Spanish yoke. They increased the number of their ships of war, completed their fortifications, and levied so great a number of forces, as, with the great advantages of their situation, they hoped would be sufficient for their defence.

Philip passes
from the taxes
of the 10th and
20th penny in
June.

Before the duke of Alva set out for Mons, he had, agreeably to orders transmitted to him from Spain, read, in presence of the States of Brabant, Artois, Hainault, and Flanders, a declaration, that he would pass from the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies, on condition that the States would devise some other means by which the money necessary for the king's service might be raised. Intimation was made of this concession to the States of Holland, by the count of Bossut ; who, in the name of the governor, commanded them to assemble at the Hague, to consider of what other taxes they would substitute in the room of those which had been formerly imposed.

His concession
disregarded by
the States.

This concession, which, if it had been made sooner, might have prevented the revolt of the maritime provinces, was not attended with the desired effect. It excited in the minds of

the people the highest degree of joy and exultation ; but they did not think themselves indebted for it, either to the king or the duke of Alva. They ascribed it wholly to the dread that was entertained of the prince of Orange, to whom alone they thought themselves bound for this first instance of attention that had been shewn to their inclination or interest since Philip's accession to the throne. They could not doubt, that if his apprehensions of the German army were removed, Alva would be again permitted to resume the pursuit of that plan of tyranny which he had been obliged to suspend. They were well acquainted with the vindic-

tive spirit which animated Philip's councils. They knew that, for much slighter offences than those of which they had been guilty, many thousands of their countrymen had suffered the most cruel death ; and they believed, that whatever assurances might be given them of pardon, the memory of their guilt would never be extinguished but in their blood. By the unrelenting cruelty which had been exercised against the protestants, added to the contempt which had been shewn to their fundamental rights and laws, the people were entirely alienated from Philip's person and government. They were convinced that he had resolved to treat them henceforth, not as subjects but as slaves ; and they had long repined and murmured at their fate.

From the time of Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, all the protestants who had escaped from the cruelty of the inquisitors, had carefully concealed their sentiments, and conformed to the established worship ; but having of late received a great increase of number, by the return of many of the exiles, they had thrown off the mask ; and it now appeared, that by far the greatest part of the inhabitants, and even of the deputies of the States, were strongly attached to the reformed religion. Their religious zeal co-operated with their abhorrence of the Spanish tyranny ; and both together inspired them with a fixed unalterable purpose to defend their liberty to the last.

Prompted by these motives, the States paid no regard to the order for assembling at the Hague, transmitted to them by Bossut ; They meet
at Dort, and that they might the more strongly express their contempt of the Governor's authority, they appointed an assembly to be held at Dort. Of this assembly they gave early notice to the prince of Orange, and intreated him to send one of his most faithful friends, properly instructed, to assist them in their deliberations. The person whom the Prince made choice of for this purpose, was the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, the author of the compromise, who had long been well acquainted with William's most secret views and sentiments.

St. Aldegonde readily undertook the task imposed upon him ; and at the first meeting of the States, gave them thanks, in the name of the Prince, for the intimation which they had sent him, of their resolution to vindicate their liberty under his direction. "The Prince was conscious, he said, of being seriously interested in the welfare of all the provinces, and of none more than those of Holland and Zealand, which for several years had been the objects of his particular attention. From time to time he had heard with indignation and grief, of the distress and misery to which they had been reduced through the Spanish tyranny ; and there was nothing which he desired more ardently, than to be instrumental in recovering for them those invaluable rights, which for ages past had proved the source of their prosperity. In order to accomplish this end, he had spared neither expence nor labour. He had failed in his former attempt for their deliverance, not (he hoped, they would believe) through any negligence or misconduct, but through the superior power and more copious resources of the enemy. In his present armament, he had already expended all that remained of his once ample fortune ; and as in levying his army, he had trusted in a great measure to the assistance which they had promised him ; now was the time to fulfil that promise, and to enable him to begin his military operations without delay."

The States, who knew the truth of what St. Aldegonde had represented, and were sensible how much the success of William's enterprise depended on his receiving an immediate supply, sent him without delay a

and enter
into en-
gagements
with the
Prince of
Orange.

1572. hundred thousand florins, which they borrowed from the more wealthy citizens ; and promised to send him more as soon as it could be raised, either from the ordinary taxes, or from the revenues of the monasteries, which were at that time converted into a fund for carrying on the war. After this transaction, a solemn declaration in writing was delivered to St. Aldegonde, in which they engaged to acknowledge the prince of Orange as the only lawful governor or stadtholder of the province ; appointed him commander in chief of all their forces by sea and land ; and engaged, that, without his consent, they should not listen to any terms of peace which might be offered : St. Aldegonde, on the other hand, engaging in the name of the prince, that he would not lay down his arms, nor enter into any accommodation or treaty, without the knowledge and approbation of the States ^g.

Their distress. The States exerted themselves strenuously to perform their promises of supplies. They sent him two hundred thousand florins, which he received at Ruremonde, in his way to Mons, and gave him security for three hundred thousand. When the news were brought them of his retreat, and the necessity under which he found himself of disbanding his army, they were exceedingly dejected ; and were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions, when they considered that the duke of Alva, having no enemy in the field to oppose his progress, was now at liberty to employ all his forces united in taking vengeance on them for their contempt of his authority.

Amsterdam adheres to the Spaniards. Their distress was much increased by the inflexible obstinacy of the city of Amsterdam, in adhering to the Spanish interest : which did not proceed so much from the general inclination of the citizens, as from the care which the duke of Alva had taken to preserve the government of that city in the hands of the most rigid catholics. By an order of the States, Lumey, count de la Marc, had besieged it with a considerable body of troops ; but after making some progress in his operations, he despaired of success, and suddenly raised the siege. He ascribed the miscarriage of his attempt to the negligence of the States, in supplying him with provisions. The States, on the other hand, threw the blame entirely upon the count. They had been for some time past extremely dissatisfied with his conduct, on account of the cruelties which he had allowed his troops to exercise against the catholics ; and they believed that they should never be able to persuade the people of Amsterdam to unite with the other cities in the province, while their army was under the command of a person who had rendered himself so exceedingly obnoxious ^h.

Outrages committed by their troops. Loud complaints of the outrages of the soldiers were heard in every quarter, and many of the people began to lament the revolution to which they had given their consent. The States dreaded the consequences of so much ill-humour. But they were not possessed of power sufficient to remedy the abuses complained of ; and la Marc, who was naturally violent and ferocious, paid no regard to their commands. In this distress they had no resource, but in the prudence and authority of the prince of Orange ; who, they hoped, would, notwithstanding his late misfortunes, be able to repress the insolence of the soldiers and their general. They sent him notice of the critical situation to which they were reduced ; and they intreated him to come, as soon as possible, to take the government of the province, and the command of the forces into his own hand.

William could not, either with safety or honour, have left his army sooner than he did. From Orsoy, where it was disbanded, he went, attended only by his own domestics, and a company of horse, to Campen in Overyssel, and from thence he passed over the Zuider Sea to EnchuySEN ; where he was joyfully received, and all his directions for the greater security of the place were carried immediately into execution. After staying there for some days, and visiting the other towns in the province, he set out for Haerlem ; having appointed a convention of the States to be held in that city, to consider of the present situation of their affairs.

His arrival excited in persons of all ranks the most unfeigned joy ; but this joy, he perceived, was greatly allayed by their apprehensions of being unable to resist an enemy, before whom he himself, at the head of a powerful army, had been obliged to retire. The first object of his attention was to raise their drooping spirits, by making them sensible of the advantages which they possessed in the nature and situation of their country ; which, while they retained their superiority at sea, and acted in concert, would render abortive all the attempts of the Spaniards to reduce them. The magnanimity which he displayed diffused itself into every breast ; and the deputies unanimously declared, that they would be entirely governed by his councils in all their conduct, and would lay down their lives sooner than abandon that invaluable liberty, without which they thought life itself was not desirable.

In the present temper of their minds, William might have ruled the people of the maritime provinces with an absolute sway ; but he knew there was a much safer, as well as a more effectual, method of exercising power, and wisely resolved to consult the States in every matter of importance, and to take upon himself only the execution of their commands. For this purpose he frequently convened them ; and in order to give greater weight to their decisions, he persuaded them to admit into their number the deputies of twelve other cities, besides those of whom their assembly had been hitherto composed : a measure which was no less gracious and popular, than it was wise and prudent. It flattered the vanity of those towns on which the new privilege was bestowed ; engaged them to contribute with greater alacrity their share of the public expences ; and drew the several districts of the province into a state of more intimate union with one another.

With the States, thus increased in number, the Prince applied himself to rectify the disorders which had prevailed, and to put the province into a posture of defence against the Spaniards. It had been deserted during the late commotions by many of the principal inhabitants, by several members of the courts of justice, and by the officers of the revenue, and others who held public employments ; which they had been induced to abandon either by their attachment to popery, or the diffidence in the duration and stability of the present government. The numerous vacancies which were thus occasioned, were supplied with protestants ; and no catholic was admitted into any office, or allowed to take any concern in the administration of public affairs.

The exercise of the Romish religion was prohibited in the churches ; and the only worship permitted to be exercised publicly, was the protestant, as taught by Calvin, and practised in Geneva, and the Palatinate. Thus far the prince of Orange complied with the inclination of the people, by a great majority of whom the principles of the reformers had been embraced. But all persecution on account of religion, he discouraged to the utmost of his power. His

1572.
Arrival of
the prince of
Orange in
Holland.

His magna-
mimity.

His modera-
tion, and sa-
lutory re-
gulations.

Establish-
ment of the
reformed
religion.

1572. reasonings for toleration were more successful now in favour of the papists, than they had been formerly with the dutchess of Parma, in behalf of the reformers. The States, by his persuasion, resolved that no person whatever should be molested on account of his religion, provided that he lived quietly, kept no correspondence with the Spaniards, and gave no disturbance to the established mode of worship¹.

William found greater difficulty in restraining the licentiousness of the army, than in settling either the courts of justice or the church. When we reflect on those horrid scenes which were exhibited in the Netherlands by the duke of Alva and his associates, it will not appear surprising, that the protestants should have conceived the most violent animosity against their bloody persecutors. They had seen their dearest relations and friends, besides many persons whom they revered on account of the innocence and sanctity of their lives, treated like the most flagitious malefactors : and many of themselves had, in order to avoid the same fate, been obliged to abandon their habitations, and to wander from place to place, forlorn and indigent. In the bitterness of their distress, they had forgotten the spirit of that religion for which they suffered ; and on many occasions, wreaked their vengeance against their enemies with a brutal fury. To the Spaniards who were taken prisoners at sea, the protestants on board the fleet gave no quarter ; while the ecclesiastics, and many others whose only crime was their adherence to the religion of their ancestors, were treated by the protestant soldiers with equal inhumanity.

The count of la Marc, commander in chief of the forces, was Lumey de la Marc. so far from opposing these enormities, that he encouraged his sol-

diers in committing them. This nobleman's principal virtue was intrepidity, and under the cloak of zeal for liberty, and the reformed religion, he seems to have intended nothing so much as the gratification of his avarice or revenge. The prince of Orange, who, from his natural humanity, and a prudent regard to future consequences, was utterly averse to every species of violence, attempted to make him sensible of the folly and iniquity of his conduct. But finding that he was not likely to succeed, and that the soldiers still indulged themselves without control in their wonted excesses, he referred the matter to the cognizance of the States, and desired them to consider coolly what was proper to be done. The States, who were highly incensed against the count, for his contempt of their authority, deprived him of his command, and ordered him to be apprehended. William, unwilling to forget the services which the count had performed in the beginning of the revolt, soon after interposed in his behalf, and prevailed upon the States to release him. But la Marc could not digest the affront which had been offered him. He complained loudly of the States for their ingratitude ; boasted of his authority in the fleet and army, and attempted to excite a spirit of sedition among the people. The States were meditating to seize him a second time, in order to bring him to his trial. But the prince of Orange, prompted by tenderness for his relations, and a sense of his former services, dissuaded them from executing their design, and advised them to suffer him to leave the province. The States listened, though with some reluctance, to this advice, and the count having left the Netherlands, died soon afterwards in the city of Liege.

The command of the forces was conferred on the count of Battenburg, by whom they were brought under proper discipline ; and all such of the catholics as chose to remain in the country, delivered from those alarms and apprehensions with which they had been hitherto disquieted. One cause

of the great irregularities which had been committed by the troops, was the want of proper funds for their subsistence. The States now supplied this defect, as well as the present circumstances of the province would allow. To the payment of the army, and other public purposes, they appropriated the demesnes which the king had enjoyed as count of Holland, the revenues of the Romish priests and monasteries, and the estates of all such catholics as had gone over to the enemy, besides a certain proportion of the captures made at sea ^{1572.} ^k

While the prince of Orange and the States were thus employed in providing for the security of Holland, Frederic de Toledo had made rapid progress in reducing the towns which had revolted in the other provinces : nor did he find much difficulty in subduing them ; for so great was the terror which they had conceived from his late success, that of all the towns which had declared for the prince of Orange in Groningen, Overyssel, Utrecht, and Friesland, there was none that did not send ambassadors to Toledo, to deprecate his vengeance, and to make profession of unreserved submission to his will. He placed garrisons in the most considerable towns, and inflicted no other punishment upon the people but pecuniary fines. Had he maintained the same moderation in his conduct afterwards, he would not perhaps have encountered much greater difficulty in the recovery of some of the towns of Holland and Zealand, than he had met with in recovering those of the interior provinces ; but from natural temper, he rejoiced infinitely more in rigour and severity, than in lenity and moderation ; of the truth of which he gave a signal proof in his barbarous treatment of the inhabitants of Naerden.

This town was then neither large nor strongly fortified, yet the citizens, prompted by some foreign protestants who resided in it, were bold enough to refuse admittance to a company of horse, sent by Toledo before his main army, to require their submission ; but, having quickly repented of their rashness, they dispatched a deputation of the most respectable inhabitants, among whom was Lambertus Hortensius, a man eminent for his learning, to Amersfort, where Toledo had arrived in his way to Naerden. He declined hearing the ambassadors himself, and desired them to apply to Julio Romero, who had power, he said, to grant them such terms of reconciliation as he should judge to be reasonable. By Romero it was agreed, that the lives and fortunes of the citizens should be spared on the following conditions : That the town should be immediately delivered into the hands of Toledo ; that all the inhabitants should renew their oath of allegiance to the king ; and that one hundred Spanish soldiers should be permitted to seize as much booty as they could carry at one time out of the city. In ratification of this agreement, Romero, having given his right hand three several times to Hortensius, entered the town, attended by so small a number of Spaniards as banished from the minds of the citizens all apprehensions of fraud or violence ; and when he summoned them to meet in one of the churches to take the oath of allegiance, they ran thither unarmed, and presented themselves a defenceless prey to their bloody murderers. Whether Romero acted in concert with Toledo does not appear from the cotemporary historians. This only is certain, that while the former was employed in administering the oath ; the latter, who had brought forward his troops to the gates of the town, led them directly to the church in which the citizens were assembled, and ordering the doors, which till then had been kept shut,

Progress of the Spanish arms.

Massacre of the people of Naerden.

1572. to be thrown open, he rushed into it at the head of his troops, and immediately killed with his own hand the principal magistrate. The Spaniards were not backward to imitate the example of their general. They fell with savage fury on the astonished, defenceless citizens, and after butchering all that were in the church, spread themselves over the city, and put every person whom they met to the sword. They made no distinction between the innocent and the guilty ; the catholics, as well as protestants ; those who had preserved their allegiance, as well as those who had thrown it off, were all involved in one promiscuous ruin. The soldiers then entering into the houses, where they found the wives and daughters of the slain overwhelmed with anguish, instead of being softened by the sight of so much unmerited distress in that tender sex, their savage hearts only prompted them to indulge their avarice, their cruelty, and their lust. Even virgins under age they violated, and others they tortured in the most inhuman manner, either from a wanton pleasure which they took in cruel deeds, or to extort from the unhappy sufferers a discovery of the treasure which had belonged to their murdered husbands or parents. They strangled some, embrued their hands in the blood of others, turned all the rest of the city into the open fields, and then throwing fire into the houses, reduced the town to ashes.

The accounts transmitted to us by the protestant writers of the horrid cruelty which the Spaniards exercised on this occasion, would be incredible, if they were not confirmed by the catholic historians. There was an hospital in the town for old men, and at that time there were several in it above eighty years of age ; even these were butchered ; nor did persons confined to the bed of sickness and distress escape their fury. The life of Lambertus Hortensius was saved by the interposition of the count de Bossut ; but the Spaniards made him suffer what was worse than death ; by murdering the son, and tearing his heart out of his body before the father's eyes. There is another instance of their cruelty recorded, which is, if possible, still more inhuman. After having tortured in the most shocking manner one of the citizens, to make him discover where he had concealed his wealth, they dishonoured his wife in his presence, and upon his reproaching them with their barbarity, they put him to death ; then having tied the woman's hands behind her, they bound her by the feet to a beam of the house, with her head downward, and left her to die in that posture, with her little son, whom they likewise bound and placed beside her, to aggravate the misery of that dreadful death to which their cruelty had doomed her¹.

From this horrid massacre, Toledo led his army to Amsterdam, where he remained for some time in expectation that, from the dread of his vengeance, the other towns of the province would be induced to make a tender of their submission ; but the cruelty and treachery which he had exercised at Naerden, were not more contrary to the laws of religion and humanity, than inconsistent with the maxims of sound policy, and were calculated not so much to excite terror as revenge and indignation. From the fate of Naerden, the people were convinced, that there was at least as much to be dreaded from submission as from resistance, and they thought it no less absurd than dangerous, to enter into terms of agreement with men who had shewn themselves so cruelly perfidious.

Of this they soon gave a conspicuous proof in their vigorous and obstinate defence of Haerlem. To gain over the inhabitants of that city, Toledo had employed the mediation of the catholics

¹ Meursii Auriacus, p. 98. Thuani, lib. liv. Bentivoglio, p. 115.

of Amsterdam, and some of the magistrates of Haerlem had sent privately three of their number to Frederic to treat with him of a surrender. This was no sooner known, than Riperda, a Friesland gentleman, to whom the prince of Orange had committed the government of the town, called together the principal inhabitants, and informed them of what had passed. “ By a solemn oath,” said he, “ the magistrates were lately bound not to listen, without your permission, to any proposals, or to engage in any design or enterprise by which the general interest of the city might be affected ; yet, not only without your permission, but even without your knowledge, they have sent an embassy to treat with Toledo about delivering the city to the Spaniards. We are unable, they pretend, to withstand so great a force as will be brought against us, and must be involved in all the miseries of a cruel siege, unless we avert them by a timely application for peace and pardon. But have the Spaniards treated with greater lenity those who have trusted to their faith, than those who have opposed them ? Have the people of Mechlin and Zutphen been dealt with more mercifully than those of Mons ? Does not the melancholy fate of Naerden sufficiently instruct you how little regard is due to the promises of those men, who have now shewn themselves no less devoid of faith than we have ever found them of humanity ? Are not the streets of that unhappy city still reeking with the blood of those who confided in the faith and mercy of the Spaniards ? By standing on our defence we may elude their fury ; but if we receive them into the city, we rush headlong upon destruction. They will either butcher us like sheep, after they have stripped us of our arms, or reduce us to a state of ignominious slavery and bondage. Do not flatter yourselves with the hopes that they are willing to be reconciled to you. They intend only to take advantage of your simplicity, and to get you into their power, without exposing themselves to danger. Have you not already sworn to act the part to which I now exhort you, to defend your walls against the Spaniards, and to preserve your allegiance to the prince of Orange, whom you have acknowledged as the only lawful governor of the province ? And in order to save ourselves from the hardships of a siege, shall we imitate that vile example of treachery, which in our enemies appears so odious ? Let us derive courage, my friends, from the justness of our cause ; and rather than submit to such an enemy, let us resolve to die, fighting gloriously in defence of our religion, our liberty, and laws.”

This speech was received with shouts of high applause by all the audience. They cried out with one voice ; “ No peace with the Spaniards ; we will shed the last drop of our blood, rather than open our gates to so perfidious an enemy.” Riperda then sent information to the prince of Orange, who was at this time in Delft, of the resolution which they had formed. And in return, William encouraged the citizens to persevere, by assuring them that the other cities in the province would exert themselves with vigour in their behalf. Immediately after which he reinforced the garrison with four companies of Germans ; and sent St. Aldegonde with a commission to put the administration of the town in the hands of such as were sincerely attached to the reformed religion. Of the three ambassadors who had treated with the Spaniards, one remained with Toledo, and the other two were, upon their return to Haerlem, put under arrest, and sent to Delft, where, after being tried, they were condemned as traitors. One of them died in prison, and the other was executed publicly : an instance of severity, with which the prince of Orange was not displeased, as it tended to deter the catholics in the other cities from holding correspondence with the enemy.

Riperda's speech.

1572. The news of these unexpected events excited, in the fiery tempers of Toledo and his father, the highest degree of wrath and indignation. They immediately gave orders for the march of the troops to Haerlem, and exerted themselves strenuously in making preparations for carrying on the siege with dispatch and vigour.

Haerlem was, at the time of this memorable siege, the most considerable town in Holland, next to Amsterdam. It was surrounded with a deep ditch and a strong wall, but was of so great extent, that it required a numerous garrison to defend it. It stands beautifully in the midst of an extensive plain, having a wood on one side, and a branch of the river Sparen on the other ; and the other branch of that river passes through the town, and then falls into the lake, or as it is sometimes called, the sea of Haerlem. Amsterdam and Leyden are nearly at the distance of between three and four leagues from it ; the former laying towards the east, and the latter towards the south. From Amsterdam and Utrecht, Toledo proposed to furnish his army with provisions ; and the people of Haerlem expected to derive the same advantage from the neighbourhood of Leyden ; where, in order to assist them more effectually, the prince of Orange now fixed his residence.

The nearest way by which the Spanish army could approach to Haerlem, was by the fort of Sparendam, the rampart of which stood on the dyke along which the troops must pass. In this fort Riperda had placed a garrison of three hundred men, and had begun to employ the country people in breaking down the dyke, in order to lay the country under water. But the frost having set in with uncommon severity, rendered all their labour fruitless, and gave the Spaniards easy access to the fort. The garrison made a vigorous resistance for some time ; but being attacked on every side, and overpowered by superior numbers, they were at length compelled to retire to Haerlem.

Toledo followed soon after with his army, which consisted of between twelve and thirteen thousand men ; six thousand of whom were natives of Spain, and the rest Walloons and Germans.

Toledo begins the siege. He had just begun to assign them their several stations, when he received intelligence that a body of troops, amounting to near three thousand men, with cannon and provisions, were upon their march from Leyden, with an intention to enter Haerlem, before the blockade was formed. He set out immediately to intercept them, and had the good fortune, during a fall of snow, to come upon them unawares, near the village of Berkenrode. His troops being greatly superior in number to the enemy, broke their ranks at the first onset, and having killed between six and seven hundred, put the rest to flight. Their officers endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. They fled precipitately, and left their cannon and provisions a prey to the victorious army.

Flushed with this success, Toledo returned immediately to the progress of the siege. Having stationed the Walloons and Germans on the great road which leads to Leyden, he himself, with the Spaniards, took possession of an hospital, which lay near the gate of the cross. At this place he resolved to begin his operations, although the gate was covered by a strong ravelin, and the wall on that side could be more easily defended than in any other quarter. Into this blunder he was betrayed, not so much by ignorance or inadvertence, as by the contempt which he entertained for the besieged. After the success with which his arms had every where been attended, he did not expect to meet with the smallest difficulty in his present enterprise ; and flattered himself that Haerlem, like the other revolted cities, would, as soon as he should begin his attack, open her gates to re-

ceive him. From the same presumption, he neglected all the precautions which are usually taken in sieges ; and, without opening trenches to cover his men from the enemy's fire, he planted his battery, and began to cannonade the gate and ravelin. He had no sooner made a breach, than he resolved to storm it, and for this purpose ordered one hundred and fifty men to cross the ditch, by means of a portable bridge. This detachment was ordered to return, in case the breach should be found impracticable. But the rest of the soldiers, who were not less confident of success than their general, and were impelled by their avidity for plunder, without waiting for the word of command, ran forward to the bridge, and passed over it in great numbers. They soon perceived their error. The breach was not near so considerable as they had imagined, and their scaling-ladders were too short. The narrowness of the bridge, which permitted only three men to march a-breast, threw them into confusion. They stood on the brink of the ditch, crowded together, and exposed to the musquetry as well as cannon of the besieged. Still, however, the foolish ardor with which they were inspired, made them unwilling to retire, till Romero, an officer whom they highly respected, advanced towards them, and reproached them with the madness of their attempt. "Do you not perceive," he cried, "that the smallness of the breach renders your assault impracticable ? Is this the discipline which you have learnt in the school of the duke of Alva ? Thus, without orders, to expose yourselves a defenceless prey to these rebels, who insult and butcher you, while they themselves are out of the reach of danger ? You will soon find an opportunity to take vengeance on them. At present it is not in your power." At length he persuaded them to retire, but not till he himself was wounded, and near two hundred private men, and a great number of officers, had fallen.

This disaster served to undeceive Toledo with regard to the facility of his enterprise ; and he resolved not to expose his troops to any further danger, till he should be fully provided with every thing necessary for conducting the siege, with less expence of blood, and a better prospect of success. For this end, he gave the proper instructions to his agents in Utrecht and Amsterdam ; but all the roads which led to his camp, were so much infested by the Hollanders, that a whole month elapsed before he was in a condition to renew his operations against the town.

The prince of Orange was more successful in his attempts to secure it. He could not indeed collect a sufficient number of troops, either to raise the siege, or to force his way through the enemy's entrenchments. But the frost having continued for several weeks, not only men, but even loaded carriages, could be conveyed over the lake with greater facility than by land. The reader need not be told with what agility the Hollanders transport themselves from one place to another, over the ice, with scates. They exerted all their dexterity on this occasion, and introduced into the city fifteen companies of soldiers, together with a great number of sledges, loaded with provisions, and ammunition.

Supplies sent
to the town
over the ice.

In the mean time Toledo had prepared every thing requisite for resuming the operations of the siege ; and he now hastened to repair the faults which he had committed in the beginning : proceeding with greater caution than before, but with the same activity and vigour. Having by trenches secured his troops against the fire of the besiegers, he began to batter the town with his artillery ; and at the same time employed his miners, of whom the duke of Alva had sent him three thousand from the bishopric of Liege, in working mines, and sapping the foundation of the walls. Neither

1572. labour nor danger was avoided. But the boldness and vigilance of the citizens and garrison were in proportion to the means employed to subdue them. By countermes, they either prevented, or rendered ineffectual, the mines of the besiegers ; and no sooner was a breach made in the fortifications, than ditches were dug, or some sudden bulwark raised behind it, by which all access was rendered as difficult as ever. Not satisfied with acting on the defensive, they often sallied out upon the besiegers, destroyed their works, and fell upon them sword in hand, when they were the least prepared to repel their attacks.

While the Spaniards were thus kept in perpetual occupation and anxiety, the prince of Orange laboured assiduously to increase their difficulties, by sending out flying parties to intercept their convoys of provisions. Some of these attempts proved successful ; and as they made it necessary for Toledo to send large detachments from his army to guard his convoys, they facilitated the introduction of supplies into Haerlem, and retarded the progress of the siege.

Useless cruelty exercised by both parties. Almost all the supplies of the Spanish army came from Amsterdam, and there was but one road by which they could be conveyed. In order to take possession of an important pass on that road, the prince had sent a detachment of troops under Antony le Peintre, who had a principal concern in the surprise of Mons. The catholics of Amsterdam having received information of this design, dispatched a number of forces, sufficient not only to secure the pass, but to engage with the enemy. The two parties came to blows ; the protestants were routed, and many of them slain ; among whom was le Peintre their commander. In derision of the besieged, the Spaniards having cut off the heads of le Peintre, and of another officer killed in that encounter, whose name was Coning or King, they threw them over the walls into the city, with an inscription tied to the head of Coning, which bore, besides his name, upon which they jested awkwardly, that he was come with two thousand auxiliaries to raise the siege. Of this insult the Haerlemese shewed their resentment, by an action equally barbarous. They beheaded twelve of their Spanish prisoners ; and then put all their heads into a cask, which they rolled down into the trenches, after writing upon it, " The tax of the tenth penny to the duke of Alva, with the interest due to him on account of the delay of payment." In revenge for this barbarity, the Spaniards hung up by the feet and neck, a number of prisoners, in sight of the besieged ; who, in return, put to death some more of *their* prisoners, in the same ignominious manner, in the view of the Spaniards. Such instances of barbarous and useless cruelty were often practised in the beginning of the present war ; nor were they discontinued, till the duke of Alva and his son, who by their example contributed much to the spreading of this savage spirit, had left the Netherlands.

Toledo assails the town. The operations of the siege were in the mean time carried on by Toledo with as much celerity, as the difficulty under which he laboured in furnishing himself with provisions, and the numberless diseases which the severity of the season occasioned among his troops, would allow. By undermining the ravelin which defended the gate of the cross, he obliged the garrison to abandon it ; and after a cannonading, which had lasted for many days, by which he laid a great part of the wall in ruins, he at last resolved to storm the breach with all his forces. For this purpose he drew them together from their several stations in the night ; and that he might find the besieged unprepared, he began the assault before day-break. No precaution was neglected to insure success. The orders were explained to all the soldiers, particularly and distinctly.

Each man had his station and part assigned him. Some were appointed to stand at a proper distance from the walls, to annoy the enemy in case they should appear ; and those who were destined for the assault were enjoined to observe the most profound silence, till they should make themselves masters of the breach. So well was this last injunction observed, that several of the Spaniards had mounted the breach, and even scaled the walls, before the besieged were apprised of their approach. But when they had advanced thus far, they were perceived by the guards, who immediately sounded the alarm, and tumbled them all headlong, before they had time to put themselves into a posture of defence.

This assault was made near the ravelin of which the Spaniards had got possession some days before ; and in order to second the assailants, many Spanish officers and soldiers were standing upon the ravelin, and a great number round it. The townsmen having resolved to render this fortification useless to the enemy, had wrought a mine under it, and lodged there a quantity of gunpowder, and other combustible materials. They saw with joy, and seized instantly, the opportunity presented to them, of executing their purpose with signal damage to the enemy. A part of the ravelin, with the ground adjoining to it, was blown up ; and many of the Spaniards perished. The rest of the army stood aghast at this unforeseen disaster. The citizens left them no leisure to recover from their astonishment, but rushed out impetuously, attacked them with irresistible fury, and compelled them to retire with the loss of a great number of officers, and upwards of three hundred private men.

The failure of this attempt, in which Toledo had exerted his utmost force and skill, gave him great anxiety with regard to the issue of the siege ; and some of the principal officers advised him to raise it without delay. "All the miseries of a siege," they said, "were felt more by the royal army, than by the rebels who were besieged. Through the difficult communication between the camp and Amsterdam, the troops laboured under a perpetual scarcity of provisions ; and suffered more from the severity of the season, than from the sword of the enemy. They would either never be able to take the place, or it would cost them infinitely more than it was worth. In the end, the conquerors would find themselves in as deplorable a condition as the conquered ; and no army would remain, sufficient to subdue the other cities which had rebelled."

This opinion was warmly opposed by other officers, who represented, that their success in the further prosecution of the war, would depend on the issue of the present siege. "If we raise it," said they, "we shall confirm all the other cities in their obstinacy ; if we persevere, we shall render easier every future enterprise. The season cannot remain long in its present severity. One night may dissolve the ice, of which our enemies have so often availed themselves. Our loss of men will be speedily repaired by the levies which are making in the Netherlands, and by the troops which we expect from Spain. We shall soon be able to cut off the town from all communication with the other revolted cities ; and when we have done this, can we doubt that the besieged will open their gates and throw themselves upon our mercy ?"

Between these opposite opinions Toledo would not take upon himself to decide, but referred the matter to the duke, whose answer, carrying in it the appearance of authority more than of counsel, shewed that he was not a little dissatisfied with his son for deliberating on the subject. "You must prosecute the siege," said Alva, in the letter which he wrote to him, "till you bring it to the desired

He mediates the raising of the siege.

Alva's letter to his son.

1573. issue ; unless you would prove yourself unworthy of the name you bear, of the blood from which you are sprung, and of the command with which I have intrusted you. The more difficult this enterprise, the greater glory may you derive from it. In a siege of such importance as the present, you ought not to consider the number of days which it detains you, but the consequences with which your success or failure will be attended. You must now endeavour to effectuate by famine, what you have been unable to accomplish by the sword. You must blockade the town, instead of storming it : and you will be enabled to render the blockade complete, by the reinforcement which will soon be sent you. But if still you shall entertain thoughts of abandoning your enterprise, I will either come myself to the camp, sick as I am, or if my increasing illness shall prevent me, I will send for the dutchess of Alva to command the army, rather than suffer it to withdraw."

Frederic was stung with this reproach, and resolved to prosecute the siege, regardless of all the difficulties and dangers which had induced him to deliberate. He proceeded slowly, however, on account of his want of a sufficient number of troops to form the blockade ; when, about the middle of February, the frost went off, and changed entirely the operations of the contending parties.

The prince of Orange had not neglected to provide for this ^{Battle on the lake.} event. A great number of vessels had been prepared, and as soon

as the ice was melted, and the wind favourable, they left Leyden with a large supply of provisions ; and sailing along the lake, entered into the Sparen, and got safe to Haerlem. In this way the besieged were frequently supplied ; nor could the Spaniards for some time procure a naval force sufficient to prevent it. At last the count de Bossut, assisted by the people of Amsterdam, collected a great number of armed vessels, with which he made his appearance on the lake. And thus the scene was almost entirely changed, and the operations of the siege converted, for several weeks, into the various encounters which passed between the fleets ; while the one party laboured to introduce supplies into the city, and the other was continually on the watch to intercept them. At first the actions were slight and unimportant, but at length the number of ships on both sides being greatly augmented, they came to a general engagement ; in which, after much bloodshed victory declared against the protestants. In this action the count de Bossut acquired great honour, and reduced the enemy's fleet to so low a pitch, that henceforth they could not venture with safety to come within his reach. He soon after made himself master of a fort in the mouth of the Sparen, and having stationed a part of the fleet there, he rendered all access to the town by water utterly impracticable.

^{The vigour and intrepidity of the besieged} During these transactions on the lake, the townsmen and garrison exerted the same activity and vigour as before. They gave the besiegers no respite, but harrassed them continually, by sallying out in strong bodies, sometimes in one quarter, and sometimes in another. In one of the sallies, they drove the German forces from their entrenchments, slew upwards of eight hundred of them, set on fire their tents and baggage, and carrying off a great number of cannon and military ensigns, returned to the town in triumph ^{m.}

But Toledo was soon afterwards in a condition to prevent these eruptions, from which the besieged derived so much glory. The reinforcement which his father had been preparing, at length arrived ; and his trenches were thereby secured against any attack that could be made upon them, either from within, or from without.

The besieged began to suffer greatly from a scarcity of provisions. There was no expedient for relief, however desperate, which they did not employ. They attempted frequently in the night, to force the enemy's lines, and to open a passage for the convoys, which, agreeably to concert, the prince of Orange sent forward, to be ready to enter the town, in case the garrison could dislodge the besiegers from their entrenchments. But they found the enemy every where prepared to receive them, and were repulsed in all their attempts. They had then recourse to another no less desperate expedient. They broke down the dyke of the Sparen, and laid all the ground between the lake and the city under water. The Spaniards being obliged, in consequence of this device, to quit the part of their entrenchments to which the water reached, some flat-bottomed boats passed into the town, with gun-powder and provisions. But the relief which the besieged received in this way was inconsiderable. Bossut being absolute master of the lake, the passage by which the Hollanders had entered was soon blocked up, and all access to the town rendered as difficult as ever.

The people of Haerlem had now no prospect of deliverance, but from a body of troops which the prince of Orange had for some months been employed in assembling, with a view to attempt the raising of the siege. He had solicited aid from the queen of England, and from the French and German protestants. But the former was averse at this time to declaring herself openly against Philip ; and both the latter were too much occupied at home, to have either leisure or power to afford their brethren in Holland any effectual assistance. In the mean time, the famine in Haerlem had risen to the most dreadful height. Every species of ordinary food was already consumed ; and the people subsisted on the roots of the coarsest herbs, and on the flesh of horses, dogs, and other animals, against which men commonly entertain the most irreconcilable aversion. William having got information of the extremity to which they were reduced, resolved to make an effort in their behalf, with the forces which he had already collected. They consisted partly of French German, and English protestants, but chiefly of raw troops, which had been levied hastily for the present purpose in the neighbouring cities ; amounting to four thousand foot, and six hundred horse. He intended to have conducted this little army himself, but was prevailed on by the States to give the command of it to the count of Battenburg. Notice was conveyed to the besieged, of the time when this armament would approach Haerlem, by letters tied to pigeons, which had been brought from Haerlem to Leyden, in order to be employed as messengers to the besieged, in case all other communication between the cities should be obstructedⁿ.

Battenburg set out from Leyden with his troops, several field-pieces, and a large convoy of provisions, in the beginning of July. His instructions were, to direct his attack against the quarters of the Germans stationed towards the plain of Haerlem. The besieged, it was expected, would sally out upon them at the same time, and while they were thus distracted by one enemy before, and another behind them, it was hoped that the convoy of provisions would find an opportunity of entering the town. But Toledo having received intelligence of their design, drew up a part of his forces within their entrenchments, to repress the sally intended by the besieged, and led out the rest to meet count Battenburg. His troops being greatly superior to the enemy both in discipline and number, broke their ranks, and threw them into confusion at the first onset. The general, and

1573.
Their distress.

1573. upwards of two thousand men, were killed ; and almost the whole convoy of provisions fell into the hands of the victors.

^{The besieged offer to capitulate.} This disaster entirely broke the spirits of the besieged, and made it necessary for them to propose a surrender without delay. They accordingly sent a deputation to Toledo, with an offer to deliver up the town, on condition that the inhabitants should not be pillaged, and that the garrison should be allowed to march out of it, with the honours of war. Toledo refused to listen to these, or any other conditions ; and informed them that they must leave it to him to determine, what treatment both the garrison and citizens should receive.

^{Their resolution.} The besieged were too well acquainted with his implacable spirit, not to shrink at the thoughts of exposing themselves to his mercy. They had not forgotten the dismal catastrophe of Naarden. They considered this answer as a declaration, that he had devoted them to destruction. The people ran in crowds from every quarter of the city, to the places of public resort, in order to learn the particulars of that fatal answer which the deputies had brought. The women, the aged, and all the more unwarlike part of the inhabitants, were overwhelmed with terror. As if their houses had been already in flames, or as if they had beheld the bloody sword of the Spaniard waving round them, there was nothing to be seen or heard, but tears, and shrieks, and groans. Their despair was soon afterwards converted into a degree of madness, by a resolution formed by the governor and garrison, to leave all such as were unable to bear arms behind them, and to force their way, sword in hand, through the enemy's lines. To prevent them from executing their purpose, the women hastened tumultuously (many of them with their children in their arms) to the gate where the garrison had appointed to rendezvous before their departure. It was a scene truly piteous and miserable ; the women either rolling in the dust, or clinging round the necks and knees of their husbands, fathers, sons, or brothers ; dissolved in tears, and imploring that they might be carried along with them, and suffered either to escape or perish together. The men were melted at the sight of so much anguish in persons so near and dear to them, and yielded at last to their entreaties. It was then agreed, that one half of all the military in the town should march in the front, the other half in the rear, and the women, children, and others unable to bear arms, in the middle between them. Drawn up in this form, they resolved to attempt a passage with their swords through the enemy's entrenchments. They knew it to be impossible but that most of them must perish. "But if we open our gates to the Spaniards," said Riperda, "must we not likewise perish ? And if we must die, (though still it is possible we may escape,) is it not better to die fighting bravely in the field ; we who have exerted ourselves so strenuously in defence of our religion and liberty ; than, after being stript of our arms, and bound like criminals, to receive an ignominious death upon a scaffold, or in a dungeon, from the hands of an ungenerous and unrelenting enemy ?"

^{Toledo offers more favourable terms.} They were upon the point of putting their design in execution, when intelligence of it was carried to Toledo. He considered, that if they were not diverted from it, he should, in consequence of his victory, instead of a great and important city, acquire possession only of a desolated ruin. He reflected too on the danger to which his troops might be exposed, from the fury of so many brave men animated by despair and vengeance ; and therefore, without delay, he sent a trumpet to the besieged, to give them hopes of favour and forgiveness. There was a violent struggle in their minds for some time

between their fears, and the hopes with which he thus inspired them. But from their knowledge of his character, their distrust and diffidence prevailed ; and they refused to hearken to his proposal, till he engaged, that, on condition of their paying two hundred thousand livres, the army should be restrained from plundering the inhabitants, and that all of them, except fifty-seven, whom he named, should receive a full pardon of their offences.

This exception of so great a number of citizens, who were the most considerable persons in the town, and had distinguished themselves by their bravery in its defence, would have prevented the accommodation from taking place, had not the German part of the garrison urged in the most determined manner, that the conditions offered should be accepted. The Walloons, on the other hand, and the Dutch, were extremely reluctant and averse ; because, as they were more obnoxious than the Germans, they believed that no mercy would be shewn them. The garrison being thus divided in their sentiments, and many of them having, with a view to make their escape, secretly withdrawn from their stations on the walls, the inhabitants began to dread that the Spaniards, observing them grown more remiss than formerly, might take the town by storm ; and therefore, without further delay, they sent a deputation of The surrender. their number, to make the surrender on the terms proposed.

A regiment of Spaniards was immediately sent to take possession of the place. All persons, whether inhabitants or foreign soldiers, were ordered to lay down their arms. The citizens were commanded to retire into certain churches, and the garrison to certain monasteries, where guards were placed over them to prevent their escape. On the same day, Toledo entered the town with the Spanish troops. In order to induce the foreign soldiers, of whom the garrison chiefly consisted, to concur with the inhabitants in the surrender, Toledo had given them particular assurances of safety. And although they were strictly guarded, and not suffered to depart, yet bread had been distributed to *them* as well as to the citizens ; and no violence was offered them till the third day, when the duke of Alva, who had recovered from his illness, came to Haerlem, on pretence of visiting the fortifications, but in reality to instruct his son with regard to his treatment of the prisoners.

It was then, but too late, that this brave, though now defenceless garrison, repented of having so tamely delivered up The preditions cruelty of Alva and his son. their arms ; and saw the folly of trusting in the mercy of an ungenerous enemy, whose revenge and hatred were implacable. A massacre, which had been concerted in the interview between the father and son, was begun, by putting to death three hundred Walloons. At the same time, the brave Riperda and other persons of note were beheaded. But the slaughter stopt not here. Several hundreds of French, Scotch, and English soldiers, besides a considerable number of the citizens who had been seized in attempting to make their escape, were likewise butchered ; and when the executioners were tired with slaughtering, they tied the unhappy victims two by two, and plunged them into the river. Even the sick and wounded were carried out into the court-yard of the hospital, where they lay, and put to the sword.

Historians differ as to the number of those who were involved in this dismal catastrophe ; and it is remarkable that some of the Spanish writers make it greater than the Dutch. By the lowest account, nine hundred brave men were executed like the vilest malefactors, who, trusting to Toledo's promise, had given up their arms, and thrown themselves upon his mercy.

1573.
Consequences
of the vigorous
defence of
Haerlem.

It would shock the reader's humanity to offer any excuse for such inhuman cruelty ; yet it must not be denied that Alva had ample matter of chagrin, when he considered how much the length of the siege, and the obstinate valour of the besieged, had cost him. By the inclemency of the season, by the scarcity of provisions, and by the sword of the enemy, he had lost four thousand five hundred men ; besides a great number whom their diseases or wounds rendered unfit for service. Nor was the diminution of his forces the only loss which he sustained from this siege. It was attended with an expence by which his treasury was exhausted. It sunk considerably the reputation of his arms, and inspired the insurgents with hopes, that an enemy, who had found it so difficult to conquer, might themselves be overcome. It afforded leisure to the other revolted cities to settle their affairs, and furnished them with the happiest opportunity of carrying on their conquests in Zealand, where the city of Middleburg still remained in the hands of the Spaniards ^o.

Of the several inconveniences which the duke of Alva suffered from the length of the siege, the draining of his treasury was not the least considerable ; as it occasioned his falling behind in the payment of his troops, and rendered abortive all the succeeding operations of the campaign. He intended that they should have gone from Haerlem into North Holland, to secure the town of Alcmaer. But when orders were given for their march, they refused to obey. They had been greatly exasperated by the conditions granted to the people of Haerlem, because they were thereby disappointed in their hopes of plunder ; and they resolved to make Toledo feel their resentment, by insisting on the immediate payment of their arrears. He represented to them the prejudice which the King's interest would suffer from their remaining inactive at the present crisis. But the more they perceived their importance, the higher was the gratification of their resentment. Without regard either to Toledo's remonstrances, or to the terms on which Haerlem had been surrendered, they fixed their quarters in that city ; laid the citizens, already exhausted by their sufferings, under contribution, and exercised over them the same tyrannical oppression as if they had taken the town by storm ; thus demonstrating to the inhabitants of the other cities, the absurdity of submitting to the Spaniards, whatever conditions might be offered ; since, even when their commanders were willing to observe these conditions, they were violated by the soldiers, whose rapacity the general was unable to restrain.

This incident affected the duke of Alva with the most sensible concern. He was aware of the pernicious effects that must arise from it. He had ever valued himself, and not without reason, on the exact discipline which he had hitherto maintained. Inclined, but at the same time afraid, to employ rigour and severity, lest still more pernicious consequences should follow, he resolved to make trial of persuasion ; and with this view he employed the intercession of the marquis of Vitelli, who was the most beloved as well as the most respected of all his officers. Vitelli exerted his utmost art and influence ; and at last, with infinite difficulty, he persuaded the mutineers to accept a part of their arrears, and to submit to the authority of their commanders ^p.

Much time having been employed in this negociation, the The siege of season was far advanced before the army could be led to Alcmaer. Alcmaer.

^o Bentivoglio, p. 117. Meteren, p. 110. Meursii Auriaenus, lib. viii.

^p Bentivoglio, p. 131.

This place (if they had attacked it sooner) must unavoidably have fallen into their hands. It had been the last of all the cities in North Holland in shaking off its allegiance to Philip. The catholic inhabitants were numerous, and had been able to keep possession of one of the principal gates of the town. They had earnestly solicited Toledo to hasten to their assistance. But the mutiny of his troops having prevented him from complying with their request till it was too late, the prince of Orange had improved the leisure which this incident afforded him ; and having sent forces to the assistance of the protestant inhabitants, he had wrested the gate out of the hands of the catholics, furnished the protestants with arms, and procured for them, from the neighbouring cities, supplies of provisions and military stores.

Toledo was aware of the disadvantages which must attend his entering on the siege of a place, situated like Alcmaer, in a marshy soil, so late in the year. But he hoped that, with so great an army as he now possessed^q, he would be able to reduce it before the rainy season should begin ; and he knew that the reduction of Alcmaer would greatly facilitate his conquest of the other towns in the province. He left Haerlem, therefore, as soon as Vitelli had quelled the mutiny of the troops, and marched directly towards Alcmaer^r.

Having planted a battery on each side of the town, he began a brisk cannonading, and in a few days made such considerable breaches, that he doubted not of being able to carry the town by storm. In order to divide the garrison, he resolved to make an assault on both sides at once. The inhabitants perceived his design, and prepared for their defence. The Spaniards having passed the ditch, by means of two portable bridges, advanced to the attack with The Spaniards
bravely repul-
sed.
loud shouts, and full of confidence that there was no force in the place sufficient to oppose them. But they soon found that courage, when grounded on despair, can in some cases supply the want both of discipline and numbers. The garrison, seconded by the townsmen, made so intrepid a resistance, as filled the Spaniards with astonishment. They renewed the attack several times ; but were at last obliged to retire with the loss of six hundred killed, and three hundred wounded. Toledo could not, either by promises or threats, persuade them to return to the assault. Soon afterwards the rains began to fall, and the Spaniards suffered greatly from the humidity of the air and soil. The duke of Alva too had received intelligence, that the Hollanders had formed the design of opening their sluices, in order to lay the country round Alcmaer under water. To save his army, therefore, from destruction, he sent orders to his son to raise the siege ; which Frederic did accordingly on the eleventh of October. He then marched to the southern parts of the province, and put his troops, greatly fatigued and exhausted, into winter-quarters^s.

Alva was not more fortunate at this time by sea, than he had been by land at Alcmaer. In revenge for the assistance which the people of Amsterdam had lent the Spaniards in the siege of Haerlem, the inhabitants of EnchuySEN, Horn, and other protestant cities, had fitted out against them a numerous fleet, which they stationed in the mouth of the river Ye. With this fleet they took or destroyed every vessel that attempted to pass from Amsterdam into the Zwider sea, and thus put an entire stop to the trade of that commercial city. To remedy this evil, which must soon have proved fatal to a people who subsisted wholly

^q It amounted to sixteen thousand men.

^r It lies at the distance of only one day's journey from Haerlem.

^s Meteren, p. 123. Thuanus, lib. lv. sect. 8.

The siege
raised.

1573. by trade, the duke of Alva had come himself to Amsterdam, where he had equipped with the utmost expedition a fleet, consisting of twelve ships of war, of a much larger size than usual, of which he gave the command to the count de Bossut. This fleet was much inferior in number to that of the enemy ; but this disadvantage, Alva hoped, would be compensated by the number of soldiers on board, added to the superior size of the ships, and the skill and bravery of the commander.

As soon as Bossut approached the mouth of the river, the <sup>The protest-
ants victo-
rious.</sup> Hollanders left their station, and retired towards Horn and En- chusen. Here they received a considerable reinforcement, and soon afterwards returned, under the command of Theodore

Sonoy, to watch an opportunity to encounter the enemy on advantageous terms. The two fleets for some time lay in sight of each other, and frequent skirmishes passed between them. Bossut hesitated long, whether he should venture to engage with a force so much superior ; and for this reason he kept his fleet in the open sea, and in the deepest water, where he could avail himself of the size of his ships. But the people of Amsterdam, impatient under the interruption of their trade, having transmitted a false representation to the duke of Alva of the strength of the Dutch fleet, persuaded him to send positive orders for a general engagement. Bossut, though extremely diffident of success, immediately steered towards the enemy, who lay in shallow water, prepared for his attack. The combat was begun with great spirit and intrepidity, but victory soon appeared on the side of the Hollanders, who having a much greater number of ships than the enemy, attacked them on every side ; and being much nimbler in all their motions, did them a great deal of mischief, while their own loss was inconsiderable. Of Bossut's fleet, one ship, with all the crew, was sunk ; three were stranded, and afterwards taken by the Hollanders ; and all the rest, except the admiral's galley, saved themselves by flight. Of this vessel, the cotemporary historians speak in the strongest terms ; and represent her as one of the largest, and the best equipped, that had been ever seen. She was surrounded by a number of the enemy's smaller vessels, which battered her furiously on every side, and at length drove her upon a bank. Bossut, still unwilling to suffer her to fall into their hands, continued to make the most obstinate resistance, till, of three hundred soldiers on board, two hundred and twenty were killed, and all the rest wounded but fifteen. In this situation, one of the Spaniards, who remembered the scenes of treachery and bloodshed in which he had been concerned in Naerden and Haerlem, advised the admiral to receive the enemy into the ship, and then to blow her in the air. But Bossut, conscious of having

done every thing that either his duty or his honour could require,

<sup>Bossut is
taken pri-
soner.</sup> refused to listen to so desperate a proposal, and chose rather to confide in an offer which was made him by the Hollanders, that if he would surrender without any further resistance, they would spare the lives of all that were on board. On this condition the ship was accordingly given up ; and Bossut, with such of the crew and soldiers as survived, was conducted to prison in the town of Horn.

Sonoy sent immediate notice of this victory to the States of Holland ; who being sensible how much their safety depended on maintaining their superiority at sea, had been extremely anxious with regard to the issue of the contest ; and they now appointed a solemn thanksgiving to be observed in all the churches of the province.

^s This engagement lasted for twenty-eight hours.

^t The admiral's ship called the Inquisition, carried only two and thirty guns.—*Thuanus.* lib. iv. sect. vii. *Meteren*, p. 125. *Bentivoglio*, p. 133.

Their joy on this occasion was not a little increased by the acquisition of San Gertrudenberg, which gave them the command of the Maese, and a free entrance into the province of Brabant. It was taken by a detachment of their troops, under the command of the Sieur de Payette, a French protestant, who entered it in the night by scalade, and put the garrison, consisting of a cohort of Walloons under a Spanish governor, to the sword.

1573.
The States
acquire San
Gertrudenberg.

This loss was in some measure compensated to the duke of Alva, by an advantage which a detachment of his army gained over the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, who had marched with a body of troops to check the excursions of the Spaniards in the southern parts of Holland. St. Aldegonde's forces were cut to pieces or dispersed, and he himself was taken prisoner. Alva would not have spared the life of a man, who, by his activity in rousing the spirit of liberty among his countrymen, had rendered himself so exceedingly obnoxious, had he not been restrained by his regard for the preservation of the count de Bossut; upon whom the prince of Orange had declared he would retaliate, for whatever severity should be used against St. Aldegonde ^u.

St. Alde-
gonde taken
prisoner.

Alva intended to have begun the next campaign with the siege of Leyden; and with this view he seized upon a number of stations in the neighbourhood of that city. But this siege, no less memorable than that of Haerlem, was reserved for his successor. Alva had, as mentioned above, applied to Philip for liberty to leave the Low Countries, on account of the bad state of his health, occasioned by the moisture of the climate, and the fatigues which he had undergone. This was believed by many to be only a pretence; while his request proceeded in reality from apprehensions that the king had listened to the representations of his enemies, and would soon confer his office upon another. There is very little reason, however, to suppose that Philip was in the smallest degree dissatisfied with his conduct, since he appears, in all his tyranny and violence, to have acted with strict conformity to his instructions. But Philip having at last become dissident of the success of those cruel measures which he had hitherto prescribed, had resolved, not from choice, but from necessity, to make trial of some more gentle expedients. He knew how unfit the duke of Alva was to be employed in the execution of this new plan of government; and he believed that no concessions would prove acceptable to the revolted provinces, that could be made by one who had rendered himself so much the object of their abhorrence. He had therefore readily consented that Alva should retire, and had, more than a year before the present period, appointed the duke de Medina Cœli, governor of the Netherlands, in his room. This nobleman having found upon his arrival, that the provinces were in a very different state from what he had expected, and that the charge which he had undertaken would probably be attended with much greater difficulty than glory, declined entering upon it, and afterwards obtained leave from Philip to return to Spain. He remained, however, in the Low Countries, till towards the end of the present year, when the new governor, Don Lewis de Zuniga, and Requesens, arrived. And soon afterwards the duke of Alva, who had come to Brussels to receive Requesens, having resigned the regency into his hands, set out with his son, by the way of Germany and Italy, for Spain.

Alva leaves
the Nether-
lands.

On this occasion men were affected variously. Even all the protestants did not entertain the same sentiments with regard to the effects which the

The new
governor.

^u Meursii Albanus, p. 270. Meteren, p. 125.

1573. duke's departure was likely to produce. While some rejoiced at it from the dread which they entertained of his abilities ; others considered, that for several months past his good fortune had forsaken him ; and they believed that the abhorrence which his tyranny had excited towards his person and government, would, by proving a powerful bond of union among his enemies, effectually prevent them from listening to any insidious terms of accommodation which the Spaniards might propose.

He was regarded both by the catholics and protestants, as the chief Alva's source of all the calamities in which the Netherlands had been involved. He had received his government from the dutchess of Parma, in a state of perfect tranquillity. By his tyranny, he had thrown it into the most terrible combustion, and kindled the flames of a destructive war which he was conscious of being unable to extinguish, and had therefore applied for liberty to retire. He is said to have boasted to count Koningstein^v, at whose house he lodged in his way to Italy, that, during his government of five years and a half, upwards of eighteen thousand heretics had suffered by the hand of the public executioner ; besides a much greater number whom he had put to the sword, in the towns which he took, and in the field of battle.

His govern- The situation of the Low Countries during Alva's administra-
ment. tion, was truly deplorable. His oppression was not confined to the protestants ; but great numbers too of the catholics were put to death, and their effects forfeited, on the pretence of their having given entertainment to heretics, or of having held a correspondence with them in their exile. Wives were punished with the utmost severity for affording shelter to their husbands whom the council of tumults had condemned ; children for performing the like kind offices to their parents ; and in Utrecht, a father was executed for allowing his son, who had returned from banishment, to lodge under his roof for one night. By forcing so many thousands of the most industrious inhabitants to leave the country, and by neglecting to provide a naval force to oppose the exiles at sea, commerce was almost entirely ruined ; notwithstanding which, he imposed upon the people more oppressive taxes than they could have borne if they had been in the most flourishing condition. In levying his taxes, the utmost rigour was employed. The people were often wantonly provoked, and tumults purposely excited, from which occasion was taken to punish them with confiscation of their goods, and sometimes both with death and confiscation. From the confiscations and taxes large sums were raised ; yet, by maintaining so numerous an army, and by building citadels to keep the principal towns in awe, as he received little assistance from the king, who was engaged in other expensive enterprises, he fell behind in the payment of his troops ; and in order to keep them in good humour, he permitted them to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants, against whom they exercised, on many occasions, the most cruel and oppressive rapacity.

^v Uncle to the prince of Orange.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIII.

PART I.

PHILIP could not have made choice of a more proper successor to the duke of Alva than *Requesens*, who had acquired some military fame in the battle of Lepanto, and had distinguished himself in the government of Milan, by his prudence and moderation ; qualities from which Philip now hoped for greater success in quelling the rebellious spirit of his subjects in the Netherlands, than had attended the violent administration of the duke of Alva.

1573.
Character of
Requesens.

To shew as early as possible, that a change of measures had been adopted by the court of Spain, *Requesens* began his government with demolishing Alva's statue above mentioned, and with repressing the insolence of certain garrisons, at whose enormities his predecessor had connived^a. He then applied with great industry to make the necessary preparations for the relief of Middleburg ; which, having been closely besieged by the Zealanders for more than a year and a half, was now reduced to the last extremity. Several vigorous attempts had been made, during the duke of Alva's administration, to raise the siege ; but through the superiority of the Dutch fleet, they had proved abortive ; and *Mondragon* the governor had given notice, that if he was not relieved in a few days, he would find it necessary to surrender.

1574.
He applies
himself to
raise the
siege of
Middle-
burg.

Requesens knew that nothing but the most pressing necessity would have drawn this declaration from an officer of so great spirit and fortitude as *Mondragon*. And he was sensible, that, upon the preservation of Middleburg depended *that* of all the other towns in Zealand which retained their allegiance. He therefore postponed every other object of his attention ; and having gone to Antwerp, he equipped there, and at *Bergen-op-zoom*, with the utmost expedition, a fleet consisting of more than thirty ships, besides transports, with provisions and military stores^b.

^a *Strada*, ab init. anno one thousand five hundred and seventy-four.

^b *Meteren*, p. 131.

^{1574.} This fleet he divided into two squadrons, one of which, commanded by the vice-admiral, the Sieur de Glimes and Julio Romero, he ordered to sail from Bergen, down the Easter Scheld ; and the other under Sancio d'Avila, to fall down the Hondt or Wester Scheld, from Antwerp. By this measure he intended to distract the enemy's attention, and to oblige them to divide their forces ; and he hoped that at least one of the two squadrons might effectuate its entrance into the canal of Middleburg.

But the prince of Orange, whose adherents were numerous in every corner of the maritime provinces, had received early information of the governor's design, and had likewise got intelligence of his plan of operations. Having passed over from Holland to the isle of Walcheren, and taken up his residence in Flushing in order to assist the Zealanders with his counsel, William stationed a part of his fleet on the south coast of the island, to lie in wait for d'Avila ; and sent all the rest, strongly manned, and well equipped for fighting, up the Easter Scheld, with orders, as soon as possible to attack the fleet under the command of de Glimes and Romero.

^{Battle of Sacherlo.} This fleet, with the greatest part of the transports, had already set sail from Bergen ; and Requesens, extremely anxious for its fate, had accompanied it as far as Sacherlo. There it cast anchor, and was waiting for the rising tide, when the Zealanders, commanded by Boisot admiral of Holland, arrived in sight. De Glimes soon perceived the superiority of Boisot's fleet, both in the size and number of the ships, and was of opinion that he ought not to proceed in the intended enterprise ; but he was over-ruled by Romero, who, prompted by his innate courage, and by that contempt, which, like the rest of his countrymen, he entertained for the Dutch insurgents, insisted that they should try the fortune of a battle. They accordingly weighed anchor, and advanced to the enemy. In the beginning of the engagement, De Glimes's own ship ran foul of a sand-bank, from which she could not be disengaged. The Zealanders perceiving her distress, attacked her on every side, and at length set her on fire. Romero hastened to her assistance ; but all his attempts to extinguish the flames proved ineffectual. In a few minutes she sunk ; after having communicated the flames to Romero's ship, that had come to her relief. Romero was obliged to jump overboard, and save his life by swimming ^{c.} The Zealanders had the same fortunate success against all the other ships of the enemy ; they sunk some, burnt others, and took the rest. Besides De Glimes, and several other officers, near a thousand Walloons and Spaniards perished. The victory was decisive. And Requesens had the mortification, from the dyke of Sacherlo, to be an eye-witness of this disaster, which was great in itself ; but was rendered still greater, and more afflicting to him, by the fatal consequences with which he foresaw it must be attended.

D'Avila in the mean time, with the squadron under his command, had sailed from Antwerp, and advanced as far as Flushing. Had he proceeded in his voyage without delay, he must have reached Middleburg, in spite of the Dutch fleet which had been stationed to oppose him ; for it is not probable that he would have met with great resistance from that fleet, as the flower of all the forces belonging to it had been sent with Boisot. The prince of Orange, who knew this, was extremely apprehensive of the issue, and anxiously longed for Boisot's return ; but he was soon delivered from his anxiety, by observing from a promontory near Flushing, that, instead of hastening forward, d'Avila had cast anchor, and seemed resolved to wait for the arrival of De Glimes and Romero. In a few hours d'Avila

received intelligence of their defeat ; after which, despairing of being able to relieve the besieged, he immediately set sail for Antwerp. He was pursued by the enemy ; but having betaken himself to flight in time, he arrived with very little loss at his destined port ^{1574.}

The prince of Orange conveyed intelligence to Mondragon of what had passed, by a Spanish officer whom he had taken prisoner, and at the same time threatened, that if he did not surrender the town in a few days, the garrison should be put to the sword without mercy. Great numbers of the besieged had already died of hunger, or of the unwholesome food to which they had been obliged to have recourse. Provisions of almost every kind, not excepting the flesh of dogs and horses, were consumed ; nor had they any other food, but bread made of flax seed ; and even this was nearly exhausted. Mondragon perceiving that the destruction of the garrison, as well as of the inhabitants, must be the certain consequence of his refusing to capitulate, consented to give up both the city of Middleburg and Armuyden, on condition that the garrisons should be allowed to depart with their arms and baggage, and that the ecclesiastics, and all such of the catholic inhabitants as inclined to withdraw, should have liberty to dispose of their effects, and be transported to the continent. William highly respected Mondragon on account of his gallant conduct during the siege, and agreed to these conditions ; but required that he should pledge his honour that he would procure the release of St. Aldegonde, and two or three more of the protestant leaders, or return into captivity. In the sequel, Mondragon shewed himself worthy of the confidence which was reposed in him. By his intercession with Requesens, St. Aldegonde and the other prisoners were set at liberty ^a.

Notwithstanding this signal triumph gained over Requesens in his first enterprise, the prince of Orange was not without apprehensions, that the difference between his character and that of his predecessor, added to the difference of measures which he seemed determined to pursue, might produce some alteration in the sentiments of the people. The high military talents, the vigour and activity of Alva, had been objects of dread and terror. They had overawed most of the provinces, and rendered the efforts of others ineffectual ; but as the oppressive violence of that tyrant had at first given birth to the revolt, so it had contributed more than any other cause to cherish and support it. Under a milder and more artful governor, William dreaded not only that the inhabitants of the interior provinces would acquiesce in the established government, but that even the people of Holland and Zealand would be enticed again to yield their necks to the Spanish yoke. And to prevent this, he employed every consideration that could work either on their hopes or fears.

The king had so far complied with their wishes, as to remove the duke of Alva ; but how little reason they had to flatter themselves, that any greater regard would be now paid to their rights than formerly, was manifest from his choice of the new governor, who had procured his master's favour, by the exercise of cruelty over the Moors in Granada ; and who, being a stranger and a Spaniard as well as Alva, could not be greatly interested in the prosperity of the provinces, nor have any other end in view, but to promote the tyrannical designs of the court of Spain. Requesens indeed had a more benign and placid countenance than Alva ; but the danger to which the provinces were exposed, was for this reason the more to be dreaded by every friend of his country. Amidst the

The surren-
der of Mid-
dleburg.

Apprehen-
sions of the
prince of
Orange.

He puts the
people on
their guard.

1574. governor's professions of concern for their prosperity, no mention had been made of freeing them from that enormous load of taxes under which they groaned ; or of delivering their consciences from that restraint and violence, which the former governor had imposed upon them ; or of restoring the laws which Alva had so wantonly trampled under foot ; or in short, of dismissing those foreign troops, from whose rapacity they had suffered such intolerable outrage. In order to accomplish these important purposes, the provinces of Holland and Zealand had taken up arms ; and although the fortune of the war had been various, yet in spite of the most vigorous efforts of the duke of Alva with a numerous army, to reduce them, these provinces were governed by their own inhabitants, and enjoyed the free and full possession of their religious and civil rights. The other provinces ought now to imitate the example of their countrymen, and they might reasonably hope that their endeavours would be attended with success ; the king having appointed a governor over them, inexperienced in the art of war, and unacquainted with the army under his command, which was at present strongly infected with a spirit of sedition and discontent. It might perhaps appear rash and daring for the inhabitants of so narrow a territory as the Netherlands, to enter the lists with so potent an enemy as the king of Spain ; but the power of that monarch was not in reality so formidable as it seemed. The great extent of his dominions served rather to embarrass and encumber him, than to add to his strength ; and considering the distance of his place of residence, and the difficulty of transporting troops either from Spain or Italy, there was little reason to apprehend that he would ever be able to subdue the people of the Netherlands, if they acted with that unanimity and spirit which became them, in a cause, wherein, not only their property, and their existence as a commercial state, but their religion and civil liberty, were at stake.

The last attempt of count Lewis of Nassau. By these and such other arguments, did the prince of Orange animate the people to co-operate with him, in asserting their liberty, in opposition to the plan formed by the court of Spain to enslave them.

Meanwhile, his brother count Lewis, who had resided in Germany ever since the surrender of Mons, was employed in attempting to persuade the protestant princes there, to assist him in his preparations for a new invasion of the interior provinces ; to which, notwithstanding the failure of his former enterprises, Lewis was prompted, partly by his knowledge of the mutinous spirit of the Spanish troops, but chiefly by the prospect of that assistance which it was now in his brother's power to afford him. It was concerted between the two brothers, that as soon as count Lewis had finished his levies, the prince should advance with a body of troops towards the interior provinces, either to make a diversion in his brother's favour, or to unite their forces.

Lewis found it extremely difficult to procure money to defray the expence of his intended expedition. His brother's fortune, as well as his own, were almost ruined by their former military enterprises. The States of Holland were involved in greater expence than they were able to support. They had, in conjunction with the prince of Orange, made application to the queen of England ; but this princess, being unwilling to embroil herself with Philip, had refused to assist them. Lewis had begun his preparations, in hopes of receiving supplies from some German princes, who had promised their assistance, but who were either not inclined, or unable to fulfil their engagements. To save himself from the affront of abandoning an undertaking, in which a great number of French and German protestants had engaged at his request, he opened a negociation with Schomberg, ambassador

of Charles the Ninth of France, who at this time courted the favour of the protestant princes in Germany, with a view to facilitate the election of his brother, the duke of Anjou, to the crown of Poland. Between Lewis and Schomberg, who met at Francfort on the Maine, it was agreed, That if Charles should, in behalf of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, declare war against the king of Spain, the provinces of Holland and Zealand should be immediately delivered into the hands of the French monarch ; on his engaging to maintain all their rights, and in particular, the free exercise of the reformed religion. But if Charles should not make open war, it was agreed, that count Lewis should have three hundred thousand livres to assist him in his present enterprise ; that the French king should have the sovereignty of Holland and Zealand, and that some of the German princes should be surety for the performance of this condition. A part of the money was paid, and Lewis was thereby enabled to complete his levies, which amounted to between three and four thousand horse, and seven thousand foot ^e.

He began his march, accompanied by his brother Henry, and Christopher, son of the elector Palatine, in the beginning of February ; and despising the rigour of the season, he advanced with great rapidity towards the Netherlands, in hopes of finding the governor unprepared. Having crossed the Rhine and the Moselle, he directed his course towards Guelderland, with an intention to pass the Maese at Maestricht, and to pursue his march through Brabant, till he should unite his forces with those which his brother had engaged to bring to his assistance.

With so great dispatch and secrecy had Lewis conducted his preparations, that Requesens remained ignorant of his design, till he was informed that he had begun his march. By this intelligence the governor was thrown into great perplexity. His troops had been lately so much reduced, that it was impossible for him to oppose both the brothers at the same time ; and he considered, that to unite his forces, and employ them against Lewis, would expose the maritime provinces an easy prey to the prince of Orange. His anxiety was increased by the discovery of an intrigue, which had been formed by William's adherents, for the surprise of Antwerp. Nor was he entirely free from apprehensions that his troops might refuse to quit the towns in which they were stationed, till they should receive payment of their arrears. Having convened a council of his principal officers, and heard their opinions of the measures which they thought most proper to be pursued, he resolved to remain, together with the Marquis of Vitelli, in Antwerp, to watch the secret machinations of the prince of Orange ; and such troops as could be soonest drawn together, were immediately sent off under Sancio d'Avila, to oppose the passage of count Lewis over the Maese. The rest followed soon after ; having been persuaded to leave their quarters, by a promise that their arrears should be paid, as soon as the provinces were delivered from the impending danger.

Lewis in the mean time advancing towards the frontier, had arrived within a few miles of Maestricht, where he pitched his camp ; in expectation that his friends in the place would be able to make themselves masters of one of the gates. But Requesens having discovered his intention, had dispatched several companies of light armed troops before the main army, to secure the town. These troops arrived in time to prevent the friends of Lewis from executing their design ; and in a few days afterwards they were joined by d'Avila with the rest of the forces.

^e Thuanus, lib. iv. Meteren, p. 133.—Charles died soon after, and the treaty had no other consequences.

The governor's perplexity.

1574. Lewis was not prepared for undertaking the siege of a place so completely fortified as Maestricht ; and after some trials of strength in two or three skirmishes with the Spaniards, he decamped, and marched down the East side of the river, till he came to Ruremonde ; but there too, as well as in Maestricht, the protestants were intimidated and overawed, and not a single person ventured to declare in his favour. He continued his march in the same direction, resolving to hasten forward till he should join his brother, who was advancing to meet him in the country which lies between the Maese and the Waal.

D'Avila aimed at nothing for some time, but to prevent Lewis from transporting his army over the river, and with this view he had marched as near him as possible, having the river between them ; but receiving a reinforcement of two thousand veteran troops, and finding, by the information of his spies, that Lewis had laid aside his first design of crossing the Maese, and was on full march towards the prince of Orange, he considered that it was of the highest importance to prevent their junction ; and that for this purpose it was necessary to compel Lewis as soon as possible to engage. With this intention he proceeded with the utmost celerity down the river, and having crossed it by a bridge of boats at the town of Grave, he thus got between count Lewis and his brother's army. Lewis, anxious to prevent this, had avoided every unnecessary delay ; but his troops, chagrined at being refused admittance first into Maestricht, and afterwards into Ruremonde, had proceeded in their march with much less alacrity than the Spaniards. He received the first intelligence of d'Avila's having crossed the Maese when he arrived at Mooch, a village at the distance of only one league from the Spanish army, and on the same side of the river. He soon perceived the necessity to which he was reduced, either to give the enemy battle, or to retire. To retire, he saw, must be extremely difficult and dangerous, on account of the disorder and consternation which commonly attend a retreat ; and therefore he did not hesitate to try the fortune of a battle, although he knew how much inferior his undisciplined forces were to the Spaniards, who were select veteran troops, animated by the consciousness of superior prowess, and commanded by d'Avila, a person of extraordinary abilities, who, by merit alone, had raised himself from the station of a common soldier to the rank of general.

To enable him to resist so formidable an enemy, Lewis resolved to remain in his present situation at Mooch, and to cover his infantry with a strong intrenchment. His cavalry, though reduced by desertion, was still superior to that of the enemy ; but from this superiority, the nature of the ground, which rises into hills at a little distance from the river, did not suffer him to derive any considerable advantage. He drew them up as well as the unequal face of the country would permit, on the right of his camp ; and upon a hill behind his main army, he placed a squadron of chosen troops, with which he intended either to fix the victory, if it should appear doubtful ; or, in case of a defeat, to open a passage through the enemy to his brother, who had now advanced as far as Nimeguen to meet him. He had just time to put his troops in order of battle, when d'Avila arrived, having his infantry on the right, and on the left his cavalry, flanked by a body of musqueteers, designed to support them against the superior numbers of the German cavalry.

D'Avila began the engagement by sending three hundred men to attack the enemy's lines. The troops which had been appointed to defend them, advanced briskly towards the Spaniards, and gave them a gallant and resolute reception : but they were soon compelled to retire. The Spaniards followed, and attempted to enter the camp along with them. The action

there was bloody and obstinate, and fresh succours hastened from both armies to the assistance of the combatants. But the cotemporary historians differ so widely from each other in their accounts of this engagement, that it is impossible to know the truth. Some authors affirm, that the Germans acquitted themselves with honour, and made a bold and vigorous resistance. Others say, that only the French troops in count Lewis's army performed their duty, while the Germans refused to advance unless their arrears were paid, and remained obstinately in their camp till the Spaniards broke into it, and, after making prodigious havoc among them, put them to an ignominious flight. In the beginning of the action, the German cavalry proved an overmatch for their antagonists, and having fallen with great fury on that part of the enemy's horse that was nearest them, they drove them to a distance from the field of battle; but when they were forming themselves again for a new attack, some fresh squadrons of the Spanish cavalry advanced, and threw them into disorder. The Spanish musqueteers, who had been placed to support the horse, were then of signal use. With their shot they galled the Germans in flank, and greatly augmented their confusion. Count Lewis and the Palatine attempted, but in vain, to rally them. These princes did every thing to restore the battle that could have been done by the most expert commanders, while they endeavoured to animate their troops by their example, and gave conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valour. Their efforts might have been crowned with success, if a body of Spanish lances had not arrived when the German reiters had begun to give way. The reiters were overpowered; above five hundred of them were killed, and of the infantry between three and four thousand. The victory was decisive, and the value of it to the conquerors was greatly enhanced by the deaths of count Lewis, his brother Henry, and the Palatine; all of whom the cotemporary historians describe as having exerted the highest degree of vigour and intrepidity, although none of these writers were able to procure information of the manner in which they fell. Their death was matter of great lamentation to the protestant confederates, and especially the death of Lewis, who had made so many great exertions in their behalf.

As soon as the prince of Orange received the melancholy news of this disaster, he began to return towards Holland, being convinced that now, when he was deprived of his brother's aid, it would be in vain for him to attempt to keep the field.⁵

William expected that they would have immediately followed him, in order to improve their victory, whilst the terror which it inspired was recent; and they would probably have done so, had not the Spanish troops sullied the glory which they had acquired, by rebelling against their officers on the next day after the battle. D'Avila could not instantly fulfil his engagement to pay their arrears. Almost three years pay was due to them. Even before the present expedition, their patience had been worn out, and it appears to have been the hopes of plunder, or the dread of consequences fatal to themselves, that induced them to march against the Germans, more than their confidence in the promise which d'Avila had made them. Being now freed from their apprehensions of personal danger, and disappointed in their expectations of being enriched by the spoils of the enemy, who were still poorer than themselves, they demanded from their general the immediate performance of his promise; and when they only received new assurances of the same kind as those with which they had been amused before, they threatened to take vengeance on him for his falsehood and

Lewis defeated and slain.

Mutiny of the Spanish troops.

1574. deceit. He and the other officers endeavoured to appease them, but in vain. In order to avoid their fury, he was obliged to make his escape secretly from the camp ; and immediately after his departure, they ran to arms, expelled their officers, and having from among themselves elected other officers and a commander in chief, they quickly left Mooch, and directed their march to Antwerp, with an intention to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants of that wealthy city, till they should extort payment of their arrears.

Requesens having received intelligence of their design, had remained at Antwerp ; and, if he had complied with the counsel of Champigny, governor of the town, and taken precautions

They take possession of Antwerp. for securing a part of the fortifications which was unfinished, he might have frustrated their attempt ; but being extremely diffident of the Spanish part of the garrison, which had the same ground of discontent with the mutineers, and flattering himself with the hopes of being able to appease them, he suffered them to enter the city without resistance, to the number of three thousand men. They had no sooner entered, than they formed themselves in order of battle. The citizens were overwhelmed with terror, and many of them fled precipitately out of the city. Requesens rode up to the mutineers, and remonstrating to them on the pernicious tendency of their conduct, he prayed, entreated, and threatened them ; but could not, by addressing either their hopes or fears, draw any other concession from them, but that they would abstain from plunder, on condition that they should receive immediate payment of their arrears, and that the Walloons and Germans under the command of Champigny, should be ordered to quit the town. With this last request, the governor thought it expedient to comply ; and thus the mutineers were left in full possession of the place, without any force to control them. The first object of their attention was to secure the gates, after which they dispersed themselves over the city, and took up their quarters in the houses of the principal inhabitants, where they studied to create expence, and night and day to give disturbance and uneasiness. They were perpetually calling on the governor to fulfil his engagements ; and as they daily threatened to sack and plunder the town, if he did not speedily comply with their requests, the people were disquieted with continual apprehensions and alarms. The mutineers required payment not only of their own arrears, but of those too which had been due to such of their companions as had died of diseases or fallen in battle. At length, the sum of one hundred thousand florins was raised by the inhabitants ; and the governor was obliged to pledge his jewels and furniture for the remainder, and to grant a pardon confirmed by a solemn oath, to all concerned in this sedition ; after which the mutineers returned

May 30. under their former officers, and went to join the rest of the army which was now in Holland, and had already begun the siege of Leyden.

From this mutiny, Philip's interest in the Netherlands suffered destruction of the king's fleet. greatly in several respects. In the time of d'Avila's expedition against count Lewis, Requesens having exerted his utmost vigour and activity, had equipped a numerous fleet, which he intended to employ in the recovery of Zealand. When the mutineers arrived at Antwerp, this fleet, which was not yet of sufficient strength, lay under the walls of the city. Adolphus Hanstede, the commander, anxious for his charge, and apprehensive that the seditious soldiers might, in order to extort compliance with their demands, take possession of the ships, had removed them to a place at some distance from Antwerp, where they were out of the reach of the Spaniards. But, in avoiding this danger, he fell

into a greater. The Zealanders, whose partisans were continually on the watch, quickly received intelligence of his change of station, and resolved to improve the opportunity which was thus presented to them. Having attacked him when he was utterly unprepared for defence ; they took forty of his ships ; sunk and destroyed several others ; and rendered all the rest unfit for service. By this severe blow, the plan which *Requesens* had projected for recovering the maritime towns, was entirely disconcerted. The fleet, now destroyed, was to have acted in conjunction with another, which Philip had been preparing in the ports of Spain. But as the Spanish fleet was deemed too weak to contend singly with the enemy, the design was laid aside for the present ; and no future governor of the Low Countries ever found it practicable to revive it^g.

Whilst the Zealanders availed themselves of the sedition in the Spanish army by sea, the prince of Orange had been equally intent on deriving advantage from it by land. On receiving information of the fate of his brothers, he had begun his march towards Holland ; but when intelligence was brought him that the Spaniards had mutinied, he resolved to improve the opportunity which this afforded him, by making some new acquisition. Passing over into the isle of Bommel, which is formed by the confluence of the Maese and the Rhine, he engaged the chief town in it to espouse his interest ; and having fixed his head-quarters there for some time, he gave support to his friends in the island, and reduced to great extremity such of the people as still adhered to the Spanish government. The marquis of Vitelli was dispatched by *Requesens* to oppose his progress. That able commander rendered abortive a design which the prince had formed on Bois-le-duc ; and the prince, on the other hand, took measures which prevented the town of Bommel from falling into the hands of Vitelli. But the attention of both was soon after this engrossed by a more important and interesting object, the siege of Leyden, to the relation of which I shall proceed, after mentioning an attempt of *Requesens* to put an end to the war, by publishing a new act of indemnity in the name of the king.

Although several persons were excluded from the benefit of this indemnity, yet it was much more comprehensive than that which had been published some time before by the duke of Alva. It did not, however, produce the desired effect. The people were not conscious of that guilt which Philip's pompous deed of clemency imputed to them ; they believed that they had suffered wrong, instead of having done it ; and they could not be grateful to him for dispensing with a punishment, which they thought it would have been in the highest degree tyrannical to inflict. Besides this, the pardon was clogged with a condition, by which almost all the inhabitants of Holland and Zealand, amounting to many hundred thousands, and great numbers too in the other provinces, were excluded. This was, that the protestants should renounce their religion, and return into the bosom of the church ; a condition from which Philip's bigotry would never suffer him to depart, nor the zeal and sincerity of the reformers permit them to accept. *Requesens* could not be ignorant of this, yet he entertained some hopes at this time of bringing about an accommodation, by means of St. Aldegonde, who had not as yet obtained his liberty. The governor sent Champigny and Junius de Jong to treat with him ; but when St. Aldegonde informed them that no peace would ever be agreed to by the maritime provinces, unless the question concerning religion were left to the decision of the States, *Requesens*, who knew that Philip would never consent to that condition, ordered the conference to be immediately dissolved^b.

^g Bentivoglio, p. 149. Meteren, p. 187.

^b Bentivoglio, p. 150.

1574. He now bent his whole attention to the siege of Leyden. He
 The siege of had blockaded that city for several months in the winter season,
 Leyden. and reduced the inhabitants to great distress ; but he had been
 obliged to desist from his undertaking, and to call off his troops to oppose
 the German army. They left their stations in the neighbourhood of Ley-
 den on the 21st of March, and resumed them on the 26th of May.

In order to form a just conception of the operations of this memorable
 siege, it is necessary to remember that Leyden lies in a low situation, in
 the midst of a labyrinth of rivulets and canals. The city was large and
 populous ; and at the time of the siege was surrounded with a deep ditch,
 and a strong wall, flanked with bastions. That branch of the Rhine which
 still retains its ancient name, passes through the middle of it ; and from
 this stream such an infinity of canals are derived, that it is difficult to say
 whether the water or the land possesses the greater space. By these
 canals, the ground on which the city stands is divided into a great number
 of small islands, united together by near a hundred and fifty stone bridges,
 that are equally subservient to the beauty of the place, and the convenience
 of the inhabitants. Leyden is at the distance of a few hours journey from
 the Hague, Delft, and Gouda, and only a little farther from Rotterdam on
 the one hand, and Haerlem on the other. On account of its situation, as
 well as on its own account, it was deemed a place of the first importance,
 and a prize worthy of all the ardour which was displayed by the contend-
 ing parties.

The prince of Orange, who had received notice of the governor's inten-
 tion to renew the siege, communicated his intelligence to the citizens ; and
 exhorted them to furnish themselves with stores of provisions, and to send
 out of the town all such persons as would be useless in defending it. They
 were not sufficiently attentive to these injunctions. The prince complain-
 ed of their remissness, and informed them, that for three months at least it
 would not be in the power of the States to raise the siege.

To retard the approach of the Spaniards, he ordered ten companies of
 English adventurers, under the command of colonel Edward Chester, to
 take possession of two forts, one at the sluice of Gouda, and the other at
 the village of Alphen, by which the enemy must pass in their way to the
 city. These troops did not answer the expectation which William had con-
 ceived of their behaviour. The five companies which were placed at the
 sluice of Gouda, after a short resistance, betook themselves to flight ; and
 the other five, after a skirmish in which no person fell on either side, base-
 ly imitated the example of their countrymen, and retired under the walls
 of Leyden. The citizens, who from their ramparts had beheld their igno-
 minious behaviour, and suspected them of treachery, refused to admit them
 within the town. The English ascribed their conduct to the insufficiency
 of the fortifications which they had been appointed to defend ; but not be-
 ing able to wipe out the suspicion entertained of their fidelity, they all de-
 serted to the enemy, but a few whom the people of Leyden received with
 open armsⁱ.

The prince of Orange having intended that the English forces, after
 being obliged to quit their first stations, should have retired into the town,
 had not provided any other troops to defend it. The inhabitants were
 therefore reduced to the necessity of trusting, for their defence, to their
 own valour and conduct : a circumstance, which at first had a formidable
 aspect, but which in the end proved the cause of their preservation ; since it
 was thereby much longer before they were reduced by famine, than it

ⁱ Meteren, p. 139.

would have been, if, besides themselves, they had had a numerous garrison to support.

The government of Leyden was committed on this occasion to Janus Douza^k, a person of noble birth ; and well known in the literary world, by his poetical productions. By his example, and his eloquence, this illustrious patriot kindled in the minds of his fellow-citizens, such a zeal for liberty, and so great an abhorrence of the tyranny of Spain, as rendered them superior to every distress, and in a great measure supplied their want of military skill. They must, however, have been found inferior to the Spaniards ; and if Valdez, the Spanish commander, to whom Requesens committed the conduct of the siege, had pushed his operations with proper vigour, he must certainly have made himself master of the town. But whether he wanted to save his men, and to carry his end without bloodshed ; or despaired, with the skill and force which he possessed, to be able to reduce so strong a place by sack and storm, he did not think of any other expedient for subduing it, but that of blocking it up on all sides, so as to prevent the entrance of supplies. To this one point all his operations were directed. By a circular chain of more than sixty forts, which communicated with each other, and ran quite round the city, he invested it on every side, and not only rendered it impossible to introduce supplies, but even cut off all intelligence between the besieged and their friends in the other cities, except what was conveyed by pigeons, in the manner to which the protestants had recourse during the blockade of Haerlem^l.

By one of the forts called Lammen, the besieged having been deprived of the benefit of pasturing their cattle in the neighbouring meadows, they sallied out with great fury upon the Spaniards, and almost got possession of the fort ; but after an obstinate and bloody contest, they were at last obliged to retire. The Spaniards fortified themselves in that station more strongly than before ; and the besieged now despaired of being able, either in that, or any other quarter, to remove them to a greater distance from the city. Instead of this, they apprehended daily their nearer approach to it ; and expected that they would soon open their batteries, in order to prepare for taking it by storm. This belief served to quicken the inhabitants ; and the women as well as the men were employed day and night, without ceasing, in strengthening the fortifications. An account was taken of the stock of provisions within the town ; and in order to make it hold out as long as possible, they began to husband it betimes. They were perpetually exhorting and animating each other, and expatiating upon the cruelty and perfidy of the Spaniards, and the unworthy fate of the people of Zutphen, Haerlem, and other places, who had trusted to their faith and mercy. When they were solicited to turn to their allegiance by Lanoy, De Lique, and other natives of the Low Countries, they made answer, in the words of a Latin poet,

Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps.

To other letters, in which they were desired to reflect on the misery to which they must ere long be reduced, they replied, that they had, upon the most mature consideration, resolved rather to die of hunger, or to perish with their wives and children in the flames of the city, kindled by their own hands, than submit to the tyranny of the Spaniards^m.

^k Or Jean Vander Does, lord of Noordwick.

^l These pigeons were embalmed, and are still preserved in the town-house of Leyden, *Les delices des Pays Bas.*

^m Another saying, still more ferocious, is recorded by some historians ; That rather than submit to so perfidious an enemy, they would feed on their left arms, and defend themselves with their right. *Van Meteren, ut supra.*

Janus Douza,
chief magis-
trate of Ley-
den.

The blockade
is formed.

Conduct and
resolution of
the inhabi-
tants.

1574.
Their dis-
tress. That misery which, during the first two months of the siege, existed only in idea, was at last realized. Their whole stock of ordinary provisions being consumed, they were obliged to have recourse to the flesh of dogs and horses. Great numbers died of want ; and many by the use of this unnatural food. The resolution of the people at length began to fail, and they now believed their present calamities to be superior even to those they should experience under the Spanish government. Some of them conceived a design to deliver up the town, and formed a secret association for this purpose. But their plot being detected, means were taken to prevent them from putting it in execution. A great number of people having come one day in a tumultuous manner to a magistrate whose name was Adrian, exclaiming that he ought either to give them food, or deliver the town into the hands of the enemy, "I have solemnly sworn," he replied, "that I will never surrender myself, or my fellow-citizens, to the cruel and perfidious Spaniard ; and I will sooner die than violate my oath. I have no food, else I would give it you. But if my death can be of use to you, take, tear me in pieces, and devour me ; I shall die with satisfaction, if I know that by my death I shall for one moment relieve you from your direful necessity."

By this extraordinary answer, the people, struck with astonishment, were silenced, and their fury was for sometime appeased.

The States resolved to lay the country under water. The prince of Orange, who was not ignorant of the extreme misery to which the besieged were reduced, had done every thing in his power to accomplish their relief. He had already collected large supplies of provisions ; but could not, with all his activity and address, raise a sufficient force to open a passage into the city. When he found that the situation of the besieged would not admit of longer delay, he convened an assembly of the States of the province. And the deputies, after considering the strength of the enemy, and the amount of their own forces, perceiving it to be impracticable to relieve the besieged, either by land, or by the river and canals, agreed to have recourse to an expedient, which was dictated by despair, and was the only one at present in their power to employ. They resolved to avail themselves, against the Spaniards, of that furious element, from which their country had often suffered the most dreadful devastation ; to open their sluices, to break down the dykes of the Maese and the Issel, and by thus laying all the country round Leyden under water, to get access to the besieged with their fleet. Nothing could be more repugnant to the ideas of this people, than such a resolution. To drain their lands, to exclude the water, and preserve their dykes, were then, as they are still, objects to the Dutch of almost continual attention, and which cost them annually an immense expence. But they were at present animated by objects still more important and interesting ; and their love of liberty, joined to their dread of popery and the Spanish yoke, prevailed over every other consideration. The damage which it was supposed would arise from the measure adopted, was estimated at six hundred thousand guilders. But they considered, that if the Spaniards should succeed in their present enterprise, not only the region to be overflowed, but all the rest of the province, would fall under their subjection. This the States regarded as infinitely worse than either poverty or death ; and in their present disposition, they would have chosen to ruin the country altogether, rather than leave it to be enjoyed by an enemy whom they held in such abhorrence. They now applied themselves to the demolition of those mounds, upon which their existence as a nation depends, with a degree of industry and ardour equal to that which they were accustomed to employ in repairing them, after the ravages of an inundation.

The water, after its barriers were removed, diffused itself over all the adjacent fields ; and in a few days, almost the whole region which lies between Rotterdam, Gouda, Delft, and Leyden, was overflowed. The Spaniards were thrown at first into the utmost dread and terror ; but when they understood the cause of this unexpected inundation, and observed that the water did not rise above a certain height, they recovered from their astonishment. They were obliged to abandon such of their forts as were situated in the lower grounds, and to retire to those which stood higher ; but of these last they hoped to be able to keep possession, and to continue the blockade, till the famine, which they knew raged in the town with dreadful fury, should conquer the obstinacy of the citizens, and bring the siege to a conclusion.

The prince of Orange, in the mean time, was employed in preparing every thing necessary to carry into execution the measure which the States had adopted. He ordered to be built, at Rotterdam and other places, near two hundred flat-bottomed vessels, having each of them ten, twelve, fourteen, or sixteen oars ; and these he mounted with guns, and manned with eight hundred Zealanders ; a rude and savage, but a brave and determined band, animated at once by religious zeal, and the most implacable hatred against the Spaniards ; and whose appearance was rendered horrid by the scars of innumerable wounds, which they had received in their late naval engagements. They were brought from the fleet by Boissot, the admiral of Zealand, to whom the conduct of the present enterprise was committed ⁿ.

With such of the vessels as were already equipped, Boissot left Delft in the beginning of September, and directed his course towards Leyden. But the water had not as yet risen to a sufficient height, and the banks of the rivers and canals, in which only there was a proper depth of water, were so strongly fortified, as to render his approach to the city impracticable. From some of their forts he obliged the Spaniards to retire, but others were of sufficient strength to withstand the most vigorous attacks. In order to avoid these, he broke down more dykes as he advanced, and in his progress, had several bloody engagements with the enemy. The blockade, however, remained still as close as ever. Boissot began to be apprehensive of the issue. Heaven seemed not to favour his design. The north wind continued much longer than had been ever known at the present season, and retarded the water in its ascent. The prince of Orange, when Boissot entered upon this expedition, had been confined to his chamber by a dangerous illness. He was now recovered, and came to visit the admiral's disposition of his ships, which he found to be exactly conformable to the directions which the States had given him ; but their design, the prince perceived, must prove abortive, and all their labour and expence be lost, unless the wind should change soon to another quarter, and the autumnal tides rise as usual.

With extreme impatience they now expected the approach of these tides, which are commonly the subject of their dread and terror. The situation of the besieged was become the most deplorable and desperate. During seven weeks there had not been a morsel of bread within the city ; and the only food had been the roots of herbs and weeds, and the flesh of dogs and horses. Even all these were at length consumed ; and the people reduced to live on soup made of the hides of animals which had been killed. A pestilence succeeded to the fa-

The anxiety
and misery
of the citi-
zens.

ⁿ The spirit by which these men were actuated, may be conceived from their method of distinguishing themselves ; which was by wearing a half moon on their caps, with this inscription, Turks rather than papists. Meteren, p. 140.

1574. mine, and carried off in a few weeks some thousands of the inhabitants. Those who survived, overwhelmed with anguish at the dismal scenes which they daily beheld, were scarcely able to perform the mournful office of burying the dead. In this dreadful situation, they saw from their walls, the sails and flags of the vessels destined for their relief ; but had the mortification to perceive, that it was utterly impossible for them to approach. It is not surprising that some of the people, finding their misery greater than they were able to endure, should have entertained the thoughts of surrendering the town to the enemy. Some conspiracies were again formed for this purpose ; but they were discovered and defeated by the vigilance of Douza, supported by a great majority of the people, to whom neither the pestilence, nor famine, nor death, in its most hideous forms, appeared so dreadful as the tyranny of the Spaniards.

But the time of their deliverance was at hand ; and Heaven in-
^{Their deliverance.} terposed at last in a conspicuous manner in their behalf. Towards the end of September, the wind changing from the north-east to the north-west, poured the ocean into the mouths of the rivers with uncommon violence ; and then veering about to the south, it pushed the water towards the plains of Leyden, till they were converted into a spacious lake, in which the Spanish forts were seen scattered up and down, and many of them almost covered with the water.

Boissot seized with ardour the opportunity which was thus presented to him. And though several of the enemy's fortifications still lay in the way by which it was necessary for him to advance, he soon obliged the Spaniards to abandon them. The Zealanders pursued them, sometimes on foot along the dykes, and sometimes in their boats ; and had several fierce encounters with them, in which, from the advantage which their boats afforded them, they were every where victorious. The situation of the Spanish troops at this time was truly deplorable. Some were swallowed up in the mud and water ; and others, attempting to march along the dykes, were either killed by the fire from the boats, or dragged down with hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, and put to the sword without mercy. Fifteen hundred perished in their retreat.

All the forts were now forsaken, except the fort above mentioned, called Lammen, of which, if the Spaniards had kept possession, they might have retarded the approach of the fleet for several days. This fort was much stronger, and stood higher than the rest. But when the garrison understood that their general had fled, and that the Zealanders on the one hand, and the besieged on the other, were preparing to begin an attack, they abandoned their station, and by torch-light effectuated a junction with the rest of the forces, in the middle of the night.

In this manner was the siege of Leyden raised, in the beginning of the fifth month after the blockade was formed. Boissot advanced without delay to the gates of the city. The people, pale and meagre, ran, as their small remains of strength would allow, to meet him ; and many of them so greedily devoured the food which he distributed, that what was intended for their relief, proved the cause of their instant destruction ; for provisions of every kind in the city had been entirely exhausted, and the besieged were so weakened, that if the blockade had continued two days longer, they must all have perished ^o.

^o They escaped still more narrowly from falling into the hands of the enemy. In the night immediately preceding and at the very time when the Spaniards were making their retreat from the fort of Lammen, a great part of the wall of the city having fallen down, the noise reached the ears of the Spaniards ; who, if they had known the cause, might have entered the town without resistance. But their dread represented the noise to their imaginations at the approach of the enemy, and served only to precipitate their flight.

When they were somewhat refreshed with the food which Boissot had brought, they accompanied the magistrates to one of the churches, to render thanks to the Almighty. Never was any assembly more deeply agitated. By the consideration of their signal and unexpected deliverance, when they were upon the brink of ruin ; joined to the remembrance of the dismal scenes which they had witnessed, and of the many friends and fellow-citizens whom the famine and pestilence had carried off, their minds were overpowered at once with gratitude and sorrow. They were dissolved in tears ; and mingled together the voices of praise and of lamentation.

The cotemporary historians have further recorded, that when the prince of Orange received information of the raising of the siege, being engaged in public worship in one of the churches at Delft, he stood up, and read to the audience the letters which contained the intelligence ; after which the States being convened, a day of general thanksgiving was appointed.

The Spanish army took their route by the way of Amsterdam and Utrecht, and attempted to get possession of the last of these places by surprise ; but the gates being shut against them, and a contribution of money offered, they were prevailed on to pursue their march towards Maestricht, where they were put into winter-quarters ^{p.}

^p Meteren, p. 130. Meursii Auriacus p. 130. Bentivoglio. p. 151.

The Spaniards threw all the blame of the failure of their enterprise upon their general ; whom they accused of having been remiss in his operations against the town, on account of a bribe of two hundred thousand florins, which they alleged he had accepted, either from the States of Holland, or from the people of Leyden. Whether there was any ground for this accusation, does not appear with sufficient evidence. But the soldiers flew to arms, seized his person, and confined him, till he agreed to pay them the two hundred thousand florins, which, they said, he had received from the Hollanders.

PART II.

1575.
Negociations for peace. THE difficulties which the Spaniards encountered in the several enterprises that have been related, gave Philip a very different idea of the spirit, vigour, and resources of the malcontents, from what he had hitherto entertained ; and determined him to listen to an offer, which his cousin the emperor Maximilian made at this time, of mediating a reconciliation. Maximilian was prompted to interpose his influence, partly, perhaps, by concern for the interest of his kinsman, but chiefly by his apprehension, that through the close connexion which subsisted between the Dutch and German protestants, the flame which raged with so much fury in the Low Countries, might at last diffuse itself into Germany. Having therefore interceded with Philip to grant the insurgents favourable terms, and obtained powers to negotiate an agreement, he transferred these powers to count Schwartzenburg, whom he sent into Holland, in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-five, attended by several German nobles. On the count's arrival in Dort, he had an interview with his kinsman the prince of Orange ; with whom he employed all his own influence, and that of the emperor, from whom he brought a confidential letter to the prince. From the respect due to the emperor, William consented to a congress in the city of Breda. But as he could not be persuaded, that Philip would be ever brought to offer conditions which the States could accept with safety, he believed, that the treaty proposed would prove abortive, and therefore he exhorted the States to keep themselves in a posture of defence, and to prosecute with vigour their preparations for renewing the war, when the congress should be dissolved. The prince himself was not of the number of the deputies ; nor did those who were appointed, though less obnoxious to Philip's resentment, think it safe to trust themselves in the power of the Spaniards in Breda, till Romero, and Mondragone, and two other persons of distinction, were sent into Holland as hostages.

From the proceedings at this congress, and the mutual distrust which the deputies discovered, the reader will easily perceive the causes which rendered ineffectual, not only the present attempt, but likewise all the endeavours which were afterwards employed, during the space of forty years, to reconcile the contending parties.

March 14th. The demands of the States of Holland and Zealand consisted of two articles ; that the governor should immediately dismiss the foreign troops ; and that a general assembly of the States of all the provinces should be held to determine the several points in controversy, whether civil or religious.

In answer to these requests, the Spanish deputies observed, that it was unreasonable to call the Spaniards by the name of foreigners, since they were equally the subjects of the king as the people of the Netherlands, and had done him the most signal service in that very country from which he was now requested to expel them. That the Germans, French, and English, in the service of the States, might with much greater propriety be denominated foreigners. That the king did not intend, in case peace were established, to retain the Spanish troops in the Low Countries longer than necessity should require ; but that it would be highly improper to urge him

any further on this subject, as he could not, consistently with honour, dismiss the forces in the present posture of his affairs. They added, ^{1575.} that after tranquillity was restored, the king would not be averse to the convocation of the States, nor oppose their deliberating concerning such affairs as properly belonged to them. That he would be ever ready to listen to their counsel, and would regulate his conduct agreeably to it in every thing that was just and reasonable. And that, in the mean time, he was graciously pleased to make them an offer of a full indemnity of their past offences, upon the following conditions : That all cities and forts, with their artillery and stores, should be delivered into his hands ; that every heretical form of worship should be proscribed ; and that all such persons as were unwilling to forsake their errors, should dispose of their effects and leave the country.

To these declarations and offers of the Spanish deputies, those of the States replied, that notwithstanding what had been said, they must still adhere to their first request, of having the provinces delivered from the oppression of the Spanish and other foreign troops. These troops were indeed subjects of the king of Spain ; but they were not subjects of the duke of Brabant, or the earl of Flanders, Holland, or any other of the provinces, in which therefore they could not be suffered to remain, without a violation of a fundamental law of the constitution. It was true, that the French and English troops were foreigners ; but these troops had come into the Low Countries at the desire of the States ; they had never assumed to themselves any share in the government, and were deemed necessary by the States for their defence against the Spaniards ; whereas the Spaniards had, from their first entrance into the Netherlands, treated the inhabitants as enemies and slaves ; had arrogated to themselves every important branch of the administration, and had, on many occasions, exercised the most unrelenting cruelty, indulging, in the most abandoned manner, their lawless lust and avarice, to the utter ruin of great numbers of the innocent and faithful subjects of the king. It would be impossible to restore tranquillity to the provinces while these men were allowed to remain, nor were they friends to the king or the peace proposed, who advised him to retain them. If the service which the king had received from his Spanish troops, were compared with the mischief of which they had been the authors, it would be found that they had done infinitely greater harm than good : and that, by the lawless rapine which they had exercised, they had received much more than a sufficient compensation for all their services. The inhabitants of the Low Countries were conscious of having often contributed to advance the glory of the Spanish crown. Nor could even their late conduct, if justly considered, be interpreted as a breach of their duty to the king, since they had never opposed his exercising any rights which appertained to him as sovereign of the provinces ; and although they had taken up arms, they had never employed them but in vindicating those rights and privileges which the king himself had sworn to maintain, or in defending their lives and fortunes, their wives and children, against the violence and lawless tyranny of the Spaniards.

It gave them much concern to find, that the king would not agree to summon an assembly of the States till peace should be restored, as they were convinced that no other means so effectual could be devised for establishing peace on a firm and permanent foundation. It gave them still greater concern to hear the deputies, in the name of the king, express themselves, as if they looked upon the States only as counsellors, whose advice he would or would not follow, according as he should judge expedient. This they could not help considering as an intimation, that the States were to be limit-

1575. ed in the exercise of their authority ; and if this was intended, no useful purpose could be served by calling them together. With the conditions annexed to the proffered indemnity, it was impossible they could comply. They could not deliver the cities and forts into the hands of the Spaniards, without being apprehensive of the fraud exemplified in the fable of the war between the wolves and the sheep, in which the latter were persuaded to give up their auxiliaries, the dogs, into the hands of their crafty foes. For they had not forgotten the fate of the counts Egmont and Horn, and many others, who repented, when it was too late, of putting faith in promises which their enemies could violate with impunity. And with respect to the other condition, that all heretics should quit the country ; as they could not believe the religion now established in Holland and Zealand to be heretical, so if all who had renounced the popish faith were to be deemed heretics, and expelled from the Netherlands, there would not be a sufficient number left to keep the dykes in repair ; the country would be stript of the greatest part of its inhabitants, and ere long be buried in the waves. They concluded with intreating the deputies to take the representation they had made in good part, as proceeding from their zeal for the interest of the king as well as of the provinces ; and with praying Almighty God to inspire the king and his ministers with milder sentiments than those which they had hitherto embraced.

In the reply which was made to this remonstrance, the Spanish deputies, after complaining of the spirit in which it was composed, said that the king would so far comply with the request relative to the foreign troops, as to send them away immediately after the terms of peace were settled ; provided the States would at the same time dismiss the foreigners in their service, and deliver up the cities and other fortified places. He would likewise summon the assembly of the States, as soon as the present disturbances had subsided ; but he could not, consistently with his dignity, submit to their decision, the conditions on which peace was to be established ; since this would be to abandon what he regarded as his peculiar prerogative, and to allow them to prescribe where it was their duty to obey. In particular, he was determined never to refer to their decision the important question concerning religion. The States, as well as the king, had sworn to maintain the catholic faith ; and no consideration would ever prevail on him to suffer them to depart from it in the smallest article. He was not afraid of depopulating the maritime provinces by the expulsion of heretics ; on the contrary, he believed that these provinces would flourish more, for that tranquillity which unity of faith would ensure ; and if the heretical ministers were removed, he doubted not that the people would soon perceive the folly into which they had been betrayed, and return into the bosom of the church.

May 31st. Final an-
swer of the States.

The deputies of Holland and Zealand, after consulting their constituents, gave the following as their ultimate reply. That they were willing to refer the several points of difference, the dismissal of the Spanish troops, the delivering of the cities, forts, and military stores, the nature of the security to be given for fulfilling the conditions of the peace, and even the article of religion, to the general assembly of the States of all the provinces : and they were willing, they said, to make the last of these concessions, not from any intention of giving up their religion, which no consideration would induce them to forsake ; but from the deep concern which they felt on account of the long continued calamities of their fellow-citizens ; to put an end to which, they were ready to abandon their native country, if the States should find it necessary to es-

tablish a religion, with which their consciences would not suffer them to comply. 1575.

COUNT Schwartzenburg now perceived that no greater concession could reasonably be expected. He represented to the governor, that considering how deep the protestant religion had struck its roots in the maritime provinces, the extirpation of it could not be speedily accomplished ; and he urged him to grant a truce for six months, during which time the exercise of that religion should be permitted, and every lenient measure employed to sooth and conciliate the minds of the people. But Requesens had not authority from the king to agree to this request ; and he refused to grant even a truce of two months, except on condition that the protestants should abstain from their mode of religious worship, and oblige their ministers immediately to quit the country. With this condition Count Schwartzenburg knew that the maritime provinces would never be persuaded to comply. He therefore despaired of being able to bring his negociation to the desired issue, and soon after set out for Germany. The congress was dissolved. The hostages were restored ; and the contending parties, having their resentment more inflamed than ever, applied themselves to the prosecution of the war^q.

The deputies had no sooner left Breda, than Requesens published an edict, prohibiting all communication with the malcontents ; and immediately afterwards sent his troops, under the count de Hierges, to lay siege to the town of Buren ; which they soon obliged to capitulate. From Buren they marched to Oude-water, and in spite of a brave and vigorous defence, they took it by storm ; exercising at this place their wonted fury, and putting the garrison and all the inhabitants to the sword, without distinction either of sex or age. Hierges proceeded next to Schowen upon the Leck. The prince of Orange made haste to send a reinforcement to the garrison. But the inhabitants, dreading the same fate as that of the people of Oude-water, obliged the garrison to surrender. After which, Hierges directed his march towards Crimpen. Vitteli, in the mean time, with the forces under his command, reduced a number of places which lie between the Leck and the Vahal ; and Mondragone was no less successful in the quarter of Holland, which borders upon Brabant.

But Requesens did not incline that his troops should push their conquests in Holland any further at present. In compliance with his instructions, he resolved to bend his whole attention to the reduction of some of the principal towns in Zealand, which Philip was desirous of acquiring, for the reception of a fleet to be sent from Spain. In order to accomplish this design, Requesens drew off his troops from Holland ; and had, some time before, prepared a number of flat-bottomed vessels, proportioned to the depth of the gulfs and canals. In these vessels he intended to have transported his troops to Zealand ; but the prince of Orange having received intelligence of his design, and collected a naval force of the same kind, much superior in number, he relinquished his first plan, and adopted another that seemed equally difficult and dangerous. This was to imitate what was done by Mondragone, when he raised the siege of Tergoes, and to make the soldiers wade through an arm of the sea, which was five miles broad.

In the north-east parts of Zealand, there are three islands much larger than the rest ; Tolen, Duveland, and Schowen. Tolen, which lies nearest to Brabant, was in the hands of the Spaniards ; and between this island and Duveland, lies the little

The confe-
rences dis-
solved.

The war
renewed.
July 12th.

The gover-
nor under-
takes the
conquest of
Zealand.

Bold and
singular enter-
prises of
the Spa-
niards.

1575. isle of Philipsland, which is separated from Duveland by the canal, or arm of the sea, over which Requesens intended that his forces should pass on foot. It was known from some experiments which had been made, that this canal was fordable ; nor was it quite so broad as that which Mondragone's troops had passed over to the relief of Tergoes. But there was still much reason to suspect that the attempt would be found impracticable.

Such of the officers as were of this opinion, observed, that there was a wide difference between the enterprise in question, and that of Mondragone, whose men had no other obstacles to encounter but those of the passage, and needed only strength and patience to ensure success ; whereas, in the present case, the enemy having taken the alarm, were continually upon the watch ; and the ford was in a manner besieged by their numerous vessels, which were ready to attack the Spaniards, when they would be unable to defend themselves. And even allowing that they should surmount these difficulties, and effectuate their passage, yet what remained for them, on their approach to the opposite shore, but to be attacked by a fresh and vigorous enemy, advantageously posted, before they could disentangle themselves from the mud and water ?

By these considerations, some of the principal officers were induced to remonstrate against the intended enterprise, as too hazardous and desperate ; and they were of opinion, that no attempt ought to be made on Zealand till the fleet from Spain should arrive. But this prudent counsel was not suited to the bold intrepid spirit which animated the greater part of the Spanish officers. The remembrance of their former victories, joined to their contempt of the malcontents, inspired them with confidence of success ; and they were unwilling to divide the glory of their conquests with their countrymen, who were supposed to be on their way from Spain. If this enterprise, said they, be impracticable in the day, why may we not undertake it in the night ; when we shall either elude the vigilance of the enemy ; or, if they get information of our design, yet we shall have little reason to dread their efforts, as they will be obliged to fire their guns at random, and spend their force in air. The troops posted on the other side to oppose our landing, will act as their countrymen have often done on similar occasions. The boldness of our adventure, and the daring countenances of our men, will overwhelm their dastardly spirits with dismay and terror.

Requesens was not naturally fond of rash or daring enterprises ; but being exceedingly desirous to carry his scheme of subduing Zealand into speedy execution, he transported three thousand select troops, composed of an equal number of Spaniards, Walloons, and Germans, to the isle of Philipsland. Then having ordered d'Avila to attend him with the fleet, on board which he put one half of these forces, he gave the command of the other half, destined to attempt the passage, to Osorio d'Ulloa, a Spanish officer of distinguished courage, who had warmly exhorted him to undertake this bold and singular expedition.

On the 28th of September, as soon as it was dark, and the tide had begun to retire, Ulloa entered the water at the head of his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were followed by two hundred pioneers ; and the rear-guard was formed by a company of Walloons, commanded by an officer of the name of Peralta. They could march only three men a-breast, on the top of a ridge of earth or sand, and were often obliged to wade up to the shoulders, and to bear their muskets on their heads, to preserve them from the water. They had advanced but a little way, when the Dutch and Zealanders approached, and began a furious discharge of their small arms and artillery. And not satisfied with this, many of them leaped

into the water, and with hooks fastened to the ends of long poles, laid hold of the soldiers, oppressed with the weight of the element through which they toiled ; massacring some, and plunging others in the waves. Nothing but the darkness of the night, which prevented the two squadrons of the enemy's ships from acting in concert, could have saved the royalists from destruction. But, notwithstanding the difficulties under which they laboured, they persisted bold and dauntless in their course, exhorting and assisting one another ; and without quitting their ranks, repelling the enemy, and defending themselves as well as their desperate circumstances would allow. Their calamities increased as they approached to the opposite shore. For besides that their vigour was impaired, they had deeper water to pass, and the enemy's ships could come nearer to the ford. At last, however, they reached the land in time to save themselves from destruction. The banks were lined with a numerous body of troops ; and if these troops had behaved with an ordinary degree of resolution it is impossible that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water, and exhausted with fatigue, could have stood before them. But unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their commander was killed, by an accidental shot of one of his own men. Consternation seized his troops, and they fled in the most dastardly manner, before an enemy unable to pursue.

This extraordinary adventure, though it succeeded beyond what could justly have been expected, was not executed without loss. The pioneers were all either overtaken by the tide, or destroyed by the enemy. The rear-guard under Peralta saved themselves by returning back. Of the troops under Ulloa, a considerable number was killed or drowned, and others wounded. But among the killed there was only one person of distinction, named Pacheco ; concerning whom it is recorded, that being wounded by a musket-shot, and unable to advance, and some of his men urging him to suffer them to bear him on their shoulders, he replied, “ *That would serve only to retard your march. My wound is mortal : I die, and not without some honour, in so glorious an enterprise.* ” Saying this, he sunk down into the water^q.

When the Dutch and Zealanders saw that, in spite of their opposition, the royalists had accomplished their design, they quitted the canal, and went to give notice of what had happened to the inhabitants of the sea port towns, which they supposed the enemy intended to attack. Requesens immediately laid hold of the opportunity which their departure afforded him, to transport the rest of his forces to Duveland ; where they joined their companions, and soon compelled all the protestant troops on the island to fly over to Ziricsee, the capital of Schonen.

The reduction of that city was the immediate and principal object of the present expedition. For besides that Requesens hoped, by possessing Ziricsee, to be able to disturb the communication between Holland and Zealand, he considered it as the fittest place for the reception of the reinforcement which he expected from Spain ; and he intended to make it the seat of his strength in that quarter, till he should collect a naval force sufficient to ensure the conquest of Middleburg, Flushing, and the other towns in Walcheren. Towards Ziricsee, the army now commanded by Mondragone proceeded without delay. Before they could reach it, they found it necessary

^q Bentivoglio, p. 168. This historian gives the same authority for the above-mentioned particulars, as for those of the passage at Tergoes ; the testimony of Rivas, governor of Cambrai, who was an actor in both.

The Spaniards were not a little encouraged by an appearance then rare, but since familiar and common, an Aurora Borealis, or northern light ; which shone all the time of their passage, and which they interpreted as a sign wrought by Heaven in their behalf.

1575. to pass over the canal, which separates Duveland from Schowen, and on the opposite side of which they saw the enemy preparing to dispute their passage. This did not deter them from the prosecution of their design. Animated by the example of their leaders, they leaped without hesitation into the canal, which was near a league over, having the bottom full of mud, and advanced forward with such undaunted intrepidity, that the enemy, regarding them with astonishment, abandoned their station, and left the passage free and undisputed.

Mondragone would have immediately begun the siege of Ziericsee, but thought it necessary before-hand to make himself master of certain posts, which the Zealanders had fortified, in order to secure the communication between the inhabitants of that town, and their friends in the other islands and on the continent.

The desperate defence of Bommene. These forts were three in number ; one on the south near Borendam, and the other two called Browershaven and Bommene, on the north and east. Through the imprudent confidence of the Spaniards, who made an assault on the first of these forts too soon, it cost the lives of sixty of that nation, with Peralta their commander ; besides a considerable number of Germans and Walloons. The fort of Browershaven submitted without resistance ; but that of Bommene, which was better fortified, was likewise more valiantly defended than the other two. Du Lis, a French officer, commanded the garrison, consisting of Germans, French, and English ; into whose breasts he had infused the same generous and dauntless spirit with which he himself was animated. The behaviour and fate of this brave determined garrison deserves a place in history. At the time of high water their fortification was impregnable, as at that time the sea filled both the ditch which surrounded it, and a canal which passed through it ; but at low water and for some hours before and after that time, the ditch was fordable, and the enemy could advance to the very foot of the wall. Both Requesens and Vitelli had come to direct the operations of the siege. Agreeably to their commands, the royalists, after approaching as near as possible to the ditch, by means of trenches, opened a large battery, which continued firing upon the fort for two days incessantly, till a sufficient breach was made. Then waiting till the water had retired, they made a furious assault ; but the besieged withstood their most vigorous efforts, and at last obliged them to retire, with the loss of a hundred and fifty killed, and twice that number wounded. The Spaniards, enraged on account of their repulse and loss, returned to the assault next day, and began to storm the fort on different sides at the same time. Both parties were highly agitated with fury and despair, and both were alike determined either to die or conquer. The prospect of the returning tide wrought equally on the fears of the assailants, and the hopes of the besieged. The former knew, that if they did not carry their point soon, they must a second time suffer the shame and slaughter of a repulse ; and the latter considered, that if they could hold out a few hours longer, the water would deliver them for the present, and the enemy be perhaps deterred from renewing the assault. Incited by these reflections, the combatants on both sides exerted all their vigour, and displayed a degree of fortitude and prowess, which seldom occurs in the annals of history. Each person regardless of his safety, and intent only upon annoying the enemy, the conflict was as bloody and desperate, as the time was critical and important. It had lasted for near six hours, and many of the bravest on both sides had fallen. At last, the assailants, perceiving the quick approach of the tide, and collecting and exerting at once their whole force, overpowered the besieged with their numbers, and burst forward irresistibly within the walls of the fort ; in which the garrison still conti-

nued to resist, till there was not a single person left to enjoy the glory of so illustrious a defence. The royalists paid dear for their victory ; above two hundred men, besides those who had fallen in the first assault, were killed upon the spot, and a much greater number wounded ^{1575.}

They now proceeded to the siege of Ziricsee ; and in this undertaking their difficulties were greatly augmented. and the ^{The siege of Ziricsee.} siege prolonged by a resolution of the inhabitants, who had broken down the dykes of the canal, and laid the adjacent country under water. This measure, of which the States of Holland had lately set the example during the siege of Leyden, shewed how firmly determined the citizens were to make a vigorous defence, and rendered impracticable all the ordinary methods of conducting sieges, by trenches, batteries, and assaults. Mondragone perceived, that the reduction of Ziricsee must be a work of considerable time, and that the only expedient which he could employ, was to block it up on every side, so as to prevent the entrance of supplies. These it could receive only by the way of a small canal dug from Ziricsee, to the great one above mentioned, which separates Schowen from the isle of Duveland.

In order to secure the communication between these canals, the Zealanders had fortified the banks of the smaller, where it is joined to the greater ; and while they retained possession of the batteries which they had planted there, they secured a free entrance to the ships which were sent from Holland and Walcheren with supplies. To deprive them of this resource, and lock up the mouth of the small canal, was the first and principal object of Mondragone's attention. For this purpose he stationed his ships in those parts where the water was deepest ; and formed in the most shallow parts an estacade. a work of a prodigious labour, which employed his troops for several months, and was attended with considerable bloodshed. By perseverance, however, he brought it at last to a conclusion ; and then having drawn another stacado of the same kind, from an island which lay in the entrance of the canal, he joined the two stacados together by strong iron chains, and thus rendered all access impracticable.

During the progress of these operations, the protestants embraced every opportunity of introducing supplies into the city ; and they were greatly favoured by the season, which was so much milder than usual, as to leave the river and canals navigable through the whole of winter. But in the beginning of February, the enemy's works were completed, and from that time, all attempts to relieve the besieged, by the way of the small canal, proved ineffectual. Their friends were therefore obliged to turn to another quarter.

In the beginning of the siege several cuts had been made in the dyke of the great canal, on the side of Schowen, in order, as was mentioned above, to overflow the country. Through one of these cuts, near the village of Dreischer, the prince of Orange proposed to convey supplies to Ziricsee across the inundation ; and he committed the execution of his design to count Hohenloe, a German nobleman of the most unquestionable spirit and resolution ; but a storm arising, and the Spaniards having encamped most of their forces, and planted batteries on the dyke, close by the cut, they obliged Hohenloe to retire. The prince, not discouraged by this check, prepared to make a second attempt with a more powerful armament. And in order to animate his troops, he resolved to conduct the enterprise himself.

He reached Dreischer, and approached the cut, at the time of high water. In the beginning of the attack he threw the enemy into confusion, made considerable slaughter among them, and car-

^{The prince of Orange attempts in vain to relieve it.}

1575. ried off some pieces of cannon from their batteries. But the Spaniards, roused by the danger which threatened them, quickly recovered their stations, and made a bold and vigorous resistance, till the tide began to retire ; when the prince perceiving it to be impracticable to advance, was obliged, in order to save his fleet from destruction, to return into the great canal. Boissot the admiral, whose ship was much larger than the rest, did not retreat in time ; and his ship having stuck against the bottom, he himself, and about three hundred of his crew, either perished in the waves, or were killed by the enemy. This was the last attempt for the relief of the besieged ; who being at length overpowered with their miseries, agreed to surrender the town into the hands of Mondragone ; and that general, desirous to put a period to so tedious an enterprise, granted them such favourable terms as they were willing to accept^s.

This siege had lasted near nine months, and during all that time had occupied the greatest part of the Spanish army.

But before the surrender of Ziricsee, other events had happened ^{Death of Vitelli} which rendered those that have been related of small importance to either party ; and which, while they disappointed the hopes entertained by the Spaniards of completing the conquest of Zealand, in a great measure delivered the confederates from those disquieting apprehensions which the late success of the Spanish arms was calculated to excite. The first of these events was the death of Vitelli, who was, without controversy, the ablest and most experienced general at that time in the Netherlands.

^{Death of Requesens.} Vitelli's death was quickly followed by that of Requesens. In carrying on the siege of Ziricsee, much greater sums had been necessary than he was able to supply. From Spain, he knew that, considering the exhausted condition of the king's finances ^t, occasioned by his war with the Turks, no money could be expected ; and the States of such of the provinces as retained their allegiance, were either unwilling, or unable to comply with his demands. Thus, great arrears were due to his troops, and they had already begun to mutiny, and to exercise the most intolerable oppression on the people ; to whom he had been obliged to grant the liberty of wearing arms for their defence, from a well-grounded apprehension, that if he had not permitted them to do this, they would have done it without his authority^u.

Requesens had too much sensibility, and too little strength of mind, either to endure patiently the mortifications, or to encounter resolutely the difficulties, to which he was exposed. His vexation and chagrin preyed incessantly on his health and spirits and at length brought on a fever, of which he died in a few days ; leaving behind him a much higher character for civil, than for military accomplishments, in which he was confessedly much inferior to his predecessor the duke of Alva^w.

^s Meteren, p. 155. Bentivoglio, p. 170.

^t Meteren, p. 156.

^u This liberty had been taken from them by the duke of Alva.

^w Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 464. Strada, tom. ii. p. 35,

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIV.

AFTER the death of Requesens, who had been prevented from nominating his successor by the violence of his disease, the council of state assumed the reins of government ; and as the king hesitated for some time in his choice of a governor, he found it necessary to confirm their authority.

1576.
The govern-
ment in the
hands of the
council of
state.

This revolution afforded great satisfaction to the people of Holland and Zealand ; who flattered themselves with hopes, that now, when the administration was lodged in the hands of their fellow-citizens, the war would not be carried on with the same animosity and ardour as before. At first, however, the council entered heartily into the late governor's designs, and prosecuted, with vigour, the plan of operations which he had left unfinished. And they continued to do so till their attention was called to objects of a still more interesting nature, than the reduction of the maritime provinces.

The Spanish cavalry had, as already mentioned, begun to mutiny before the death of Requesens. During the siege of Ziricsee, the infantry remained obedient to their commanders, partly from being kept in perpetual employment, and partly from the hopes of enriching themselves by the plunder of that city ; but being disappointed in these hopes by the articles of the capitulation, and large arrears being due, to the payment of which even the contributions of the people of Ziricsee were not applied^a, they flew to arms, deposed their officers, elected others, and a commander in chief from among themselves ; and then, having sworn mutual fidelity over the sacred host, they abandoned all their conquests which had cost them so much labour and blood, and passed over to Brabant ; intending to take possession of some considerable fortified place, from whence they might make excursions, and plunder the neighbouring towns and villages.

Mutiny of
the Spanish
troops.

The council of state sent count Mansvelt to appease them ; but no offers or promises which the count was empowered to make, could divert them from their design. They hoped, by the rapi-

They seize
on Alost.

^a Meteren says, that the Walloons laid hold of the money, and with great dexterity excluded the Spaniards from the town.

1576. dity of their march, to have entered Brussels by surprise ; but both the inhabitants and garrison were prepared to oppose them. They failed likewise in an attempt on Mechlin. Then leaving Brabant, they turned suddenly towards Allost in Flanders ; and made themselves masters of that town, by climbing over the walls in the middle of the night, when the citizens were off their guard. They could not have acquired possession of a place more suitable to their design ; as it was situated in the midst of a rich and fertile country, and lay at nearly an equal distance from Brussels, Ghent, and Antwerp. They had no sooner displayed the standard of rebellion in Allost, than they were joined by most of the other Spanish troops in the Low-Countries ; after which, they began to exercise every species of violence and outrage, both against the citizens and the inhabitants of the country round.

The prince of Orange remained not idle or unconcerned in this critical conjuncture. He had too much sagacity not to discern, and too much zeal and dexterity not to avail himself of so favourable an opportunity of advancing his designs. By his letters, and emissaries, he endeavoured to rouse the spirit of the people, and to persuade the council, “ That now was the time when they might deliver themselves for ever from the tyranny of Spain. By the good providence of God, the government had fallen into their own hands. It ought to be their unalterable purpose, to hold fast the power which they possessed, and to employ it in delivering their fellow-citizens from that intolerable load of misery under which they had so long groaned. The measure of the calamities of the people, and of the iniquities of the Spaniards, was now full. There was nothing worse to be dreaded than they had already suffered ; and nothing to deter them from resolving either to expel their rapacious tyrants, or to perish in the glorious attempt.”

These exhortations, enforced by accounts which were propagated of the enormities committed by the Spanish troops, found an easy admittance into the minds of persons of all ranks. The

They are declared rebels by the council. council of state were no less inflamed than the people ; and resolved to publish an edict, declaring the Spaniards to be rebels against the king. Barlaimont, Mansvelt, Viglius, even the Spanish officers of the highest rank, and Rhoda, president of the council of tumults, seemed at first inclined to concur with the other counsellors ; but perceiving that their resentment was not confined to the mutineers, but extended likewise to all the friends of the Spanish government, they began to alleviate the outrages of the soldiers, and openly opposed the publication of the edict ; alleging, that troops which had mutinied on account of not receiving their pay, could not justly be considered as rebels ; and that the edict would serve only to exasperate them still more against the people, while the council was not provided with force sufficient to restrain their excesses. But these reasons were held in great contempt by a majority of the council ; who, having expelled the dissenting members, accused them of holding correspondence with the mutineers, and threw them into prison. Then having elected the duke d'Arschot for their president, in the room of Viglius, they published an edict in terms strongly calculated to increase the odium against the Spanish troops ; calling on the people to concur with them in driving out that lawless and rapacious crew, who, under the pretext of procuring payment of their arrears, would, if they were not speedily prevented, bring utter ruin upon the Netherlands.

Hostilities between the Spaniards and Flemings. Nothing could have been more consonant to the general spirit of the Flemings, than the sentiments contained in this edict. It served as fuel to that flame which was already kindled, and which now burst out with redoubled violence. To give greater weight to the measures which had been already taken, and to those which

they intended to pursue, the council called an assembly of the States ; and all the provinces, Luxemburg excepted, sent deputies to attend. This assembly had no sooner met than hostilities were begun. The citadels of Antwerp, Ghent, Valenciennes, and Utrecht, were in the hands of the Spaniards. Romero commanded in Lieres ; and Maestricht was garrisoned by some companies of German infantry. To acquire possession of these important fortresses, and to prevent the Spanish troops from uniting themselves into one body, were the objects upon which the States bestowed their first and principal attention. They were successful in gaining over to their side the regiments of Walloons in the Spanish service ; and they raised so great a number of militia of the country, as, when joined with the Walloons, formed a considerable body of troops.

The Spaniards, on the other hand, prompted by Rhoda, and animated by the brave and active d'Avila, exerted themselves no less strenuously in counteracting their designs. An officer of the name of Vargas, having drawn together eight hundred horse in the neighbourhood of Maestricht, had advanced as far as Visenach, in his way to Allost, in hopes of prevailing on the mutineers to act in concert with him. At Visenach he was met by two thousand foot and six hundred horse, which the States had sent to oppose him. But the Spaniards were not so much inferior in number, as they were superior in military discipline. Vargas supplied his want of infantry by making a company of Burgundians quit their horses. The Flemish troops, though they began the attack with great impetuosity, fell soon into disorder ; and the Spaniards broke in upon their ranks, and put them to flight, with considerable slaughter.

Vargas continued his route to Allost ; and was seconded in his application to the mutineers, by d'Avila and Romero ; but neither the importunity of their officers, nor a regard to the honour of their nation, or to their personal safety, could overcome their obstinate resolution to remain in Allost, till they should receive payment of their arrears. From Allost, Vargas led his troops, with the utmost expedition, to Maestricht, which he was informed, the Germans in garrison there had agreed to deliver to the States. The execution of their design had been retarded by some companies of Spaniards, a part of whom were in possession of one of the gates, and the rest stationed in the town of Vich. This town lies on the east side of the river, and is connected with Maestricht by a bridge over the Maese. Vargas, having transported his troops, and joined his countrymen at Vich, had a sharp engagement with the townsmen upon the bridge ; but as they were not supported by the Germans, he soon compelled them to retire. They paid dear for this attempt to assert their liberty. The Germans, instead of acting as their friends, united with the Spaniards, and both together plundered the town without mercy ^b.

But the memory of the calamities which the people of Maestricht experienced on this occasion, was effaced by those which soon afterwards befel the citizens of Antwerp. The States had laboured in vain to persuade the Spanish garrison in the citadel to deliver it into their hands. They now resolved to compel them ; and, with this view, they had brought into the city a numerous body of Walloons and other troops. They had much reason for that solicitude with which they desired to get possession of this important fortress ; which, on the one side, communicated with the town, by a spacious esplanade, and on the other, with the adjacent country. The States were not sufficiently aware of the danger to which, from these two circumstances united, the city

The sacking
and plunder
of Antwerp
by the Spa-
niards.

^b Meteren, p. 164. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

1576. of Antwerp was exposed. Champigny^c the governor had endeavoured to rouse their attention to this danger, and had earnestly exhorted them to block up the esplanade by batteries and trenches ; and, at the same time, to order all the troops that could be spared, to encamp without the town, so as to prevent the Spaniards at Allost and other places from entering the citadel. But they wholly neglected the latter part of this advice, and they were too late in beginning to put the former in execution. They believed that the garrison would not venture to sally out upon the town, in which there was so great a number of troops to oppose them ; and they flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to compel them to surrender, before they could receive assistance from their countrymen. For this purpose, two strong batteries were planted on the esplanade ; while the townsmen were employed, either in pushing forward the trenches, or in raising mounds for the security of the town.

The siege of the castle of Ghent was carried on at the same time, and the States had conceived the most sanguine expectations of success ; when the noise of the artillery reached from both places to the mutineers in Allost ; and, awaking in them some sparks of their native warlike ferocity, produced a more powerful effect upon their minds, than all the exhortations and entreaties of their commanders.

Navarese, their leader, seized dexterously this opportunity which their present disposition afforded him ; and, calling them together, exhorted them to reflect upon the folly of suffering the fortresses besieged to fall into the hands of the Flemings. “ That artillery,” said he, “ which is now thundering in our ears, is levelled against us, no less than against the garrisons of Ghent and Antwerp. When the Flemings shall have subdued the rest of our countrymen, can we doubt that they will next turn their arms against us, who are the principal objects of their resentment ? Can you imagine that the States will then lend a more favourable ear, than at present, to your requests ? Believe me, they will ere long extinguish the debt which they owe you, in your blood. Let us march instantly to the relief of the citadel of Antwerp. We shall soon oblige the enemy to raise the siege. We shall, in spite of the townsmen, and the raw troops which they have brought to their assistance, make ourselves masters of the richest city in the world, and take ample revenge for the unworthy treatment we have received.”

He would have proceeded ; but was prevented by shouts of applause, and exclamations from every quarter, to arms ! to arms ! They were now as impatient to leave Allost, as they had formerly been reluctant. On the third day of November, and only a few hours before sun set, they began their march ; hoping to reach the citadel of Antwerp early next morning, unobserved by the enemy. Having found greater difficulty in passing the Scheld than they expected, they did not arrive till noon ; notwithstanding which, being joined by four hundred horse, under Vargas and Romero, who had acted in concert with Navarese, they entered the citadel, without meeting with the least opposition. The citizens were no sooner informed of their arrival, than they suspected their design, and were filled with the most dreadful apprehensions. Champigny the governor, whose advice had been so unfortunately disregarded, saw the approaching storm, and did every thing in his power to avert it.

But the impetuosity of the mutineers did not leave him time for completing the arrangements which he intended. These men, impelled at once by avarice and revenge, rejected with disdain the invitation given by d'Avila

^c He was brother to cardinal Granvelle, and was as averse from the Spanish interest as his brother was attached to it.

to repose and refresh themselves after their march. With rage and fury in their countenances, they demanded the signal to advance ; calling out, that they were determined, before night, either to perish in the conflict, or to fix their quarters in the city. They were in number between two and three thousand, and the garrison, together with the troops brought by Vargas and Romero, amounted nearly to the same number. Navarese led on the mutineers, and the remainder were commanded by Romero. Nothing could exceed the intrepidity with which these two determined bands, vying with each other, attacked the trenches. The citizens displayed, at the first onset, great bravery and resolution ; but, being unable long to withstand the impetuous attack of the Spaniards, and being galled at the same time by the artillery of the citadel, they at length gave way, and fled with precipitation along the two streets which lead from the parade into the centre of the city. The Spaniards were seconded by their cavalry, which bore down all before them, and followed close upon the rear of the vanquished, till they reached the great square in the centre of which stands the Guildhall or Palace. There the fugitives, being joined by some fresh troops, made a halt, and rallied ; but they were soon broken a second time, and would have been all cut to pieces, if they had not taken shelter in the palace, and in houses of the square. From the windows they kept, for some time, a brisk fire upon the enemy, and did considerable execution ; but the Spaniards, who were accompanied by the retainers of their camp, set fire to the houses, with hay, straw, and other combustible materials, not sparing even the palace itself, which was esteemed one of the richest and most magnificent in the world. It was quickly reduced to ashes : and of those who had taken refuge in it, some perished in the flames, and some by the sword, in attempting to escape, while others, frantic with despair, flung themselves headlong from the windows.^d

The Spaniards then dispersed themselves over the city ; overpowering all opposition with irresistible impetuosity. Had their number been sufficient either to murder, or to overtake the multitude that fled before them, the carnage of that memorable day would have been still more dreadful. Of the citizens near seven thousand perished ; while the loss of the Spaniards amounted only to two hundred men. So great is the superiority in battle, of regular discipline, and prompt obedience to command. For though the citizens fought with extraordinary courage, like men whose all was at stake, they acted not in concert ; and although they had been marshalled by Champigny, as well as the time would allow, yet, from want of practice, they were soon thrown into confusion, and, from the same cause, they were unable to recover their ranks, or return to the charge.

Justice would oblige us to bestow on the Spanish troops the praise due to the most heroic valour, if, besides the rapacity which impelled them, they had not disfigured the lustre of their victory by exercising a degree of barbarous cruelty, of which, at that period, the Spaniards alone, of all the nations in Europe, seem to have been capable. Antwerp, at the time of this catastrophe, was in the most flourishing condition. Companies of merchants from almost every commercial nation, resided in it, possessing store-houses and factories filled with the most precious commodities. Great numbers of the citizens too were the wealthiest in Europe. Their magnificent houses were adorned with the most costly furniture ; and their shops and warehouses stored with gold and silver stuffs, and all other kinds of valuable effects, collected from every corner of the globe. Upon these the Spaniards seized, without any discrimination of the owners, and without consi-

1576. dering whether the persons whom they pillaged, were friends or enemies. The plunder that lay open and unconcealed was immense ; but was far from being sufficient to satiate the avarice of the Spaniards. They exercised the most unrelenting cruelty upon all whom they suspected to have concealed their treasures ; and nothing was to be heard in the city, but either the shrieks and groans of the sufferers, or the lamentations of those whom they compelled to behold the torments of their husbands, wives, or children. Cotemporary historians have described some of the several species of torture which they inflicted ; but the reader's modesty would be offended, and his humanity shocked, by the recital ^e.

In this manner were these men, for three days and nights, employed in plundering and butchering by turns, a people who were subjects of the same prince as themselves, and from whom (whatever ground of complaint they might pretend against the council of state) they had never received the smallest injury or provocation. Nor does it appear that their officers interposed to moderate their excesses, till the soldiers, exhausted with fatigue, were about to give over of themselves.

The money in specie which was extorted, amounted at least to eight millions of guilders, besides an immense quantity of gold and silver, in plate, stuffs, and furniture, which the owners were not able to redeem. The loss which the people of Antwerp sustained by the burning of so many buildings, was not less than what they suffered by the rapacity of the soldiers. The most beautiful part of the city was burnt to the ground ; and great numbers of shops and warehouses, containing the richest goods, were consumed to ashes ^f.

Whilst the barbarity exercised against the inhabitants of Antwerp excited sentiments of compassion towards the unhappy sufferers, it greatly augmented that abhorrence which the Flemings already entertained towards the Spaniards, and made them more solicitous than ever to deliver themselves from a yoke which was now become intolerable. But the great superiority which the Spanish troops discovered on every occasion over the raw undisciplined forces of the States, created much anxiety with regard to the success of their endeavours. The council of state perceived the necessity of having recourse to foreign aid ; and they willingly accepted an offer, which was made them at this juncture by the prince of Orange, of some cannon, ammunition, and troops, with which they pushed forward the siege of the citadel of Ghent, and soon obliged the garrison to capitulate.

This seasonable assistance contributed not a little to advance the prince's views. Immediately after the death of Requesens, he had projected a scheme of uniting all the provinces, and had exerted himself with great activity and address, in carrying it into execution. The States entered readily into his ideas. Deputies were appointed, and invested with proper

^{The confederacy of Ghent. November 3th, 1576.} powers, by the several provinces ; and in the congress, which was held at Ghent, a treaty of confederacy was concluded, under which all the provinces, except Luxemburg, were comprehended.

In this confederacy, so well known in the history of the Netherlands by the name of the Pacification of Ghent, it was agreed between the Catholic provinces on the one hand, and those of Holland and Zealand, with the prince of Orange, on the other, that there should subsist between them an inviolable alliance, peace, and friendship ; that all past injuries should be buried in oblivion ; that all prisoners, and in particular the count de Bossut,

^e Thuanus and Meteren. ^f Meteren, p. 164. Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 471. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

should be set at liberty without ransom ; that the contracting parties should, to the utmost of their power, assist each other in expelling the Spaniards from the Netherlands ; that as soon as the provinces should be delivered from these bloody oppressors, and tranquillity established, a general assembly should be held of the States of all the provinces, for redressing grievances, reforming abuses, and restoring the constitution to its ^{1576.} primæval state ; that the prince of Orange should remain high admiral and governor of the maritime provinces ; and that he, and all others, whose property had been confiscated, should be reinstated in their possessions and dignities ; that all the decrees of the duke of Alva, relative to the tumults and heresy, should be abolished ; but that in the Catholic provinces, only the Roman catholic religion should be exercised ; while in those of Holland and Zealand, all matters, whether civil or religious, should remain on their present footing, till a general assembly of all the States should be held^f.

The deputies who were now convened, whom the historians call likewise by the name of the States, entered immediately upon ^{Arrival of} ^{Don John} ^{of Austria.} the execution of the articles of this confederacy, by transporting to the frontier of France such of the Spaniards as had been taken prisoners in the citadel of Ghent : and they had begun to make preparations to dislodge them from other places, when they were informed that Don John of Austria, whom Philip had made choice of for governor, had arrived in the province of Luxemburg. In some respects Don John was admirably qualified for this new station, to which his brother had appointed him. His affable and insinuating manners were fitted to conciliate the affections of the people whom he had been sent to govern ; and his military accomplishments qualified him to pursue the war with vigour, against the revolted provinces. But in the critical situation into which the late enormities of the Spaniards had brought the Netherlands, other talents besides these were requisite ; such as prudence, patience, and self-command, together with skill and dexterity in managing the passions and the prejudices of men ; qualifications which Don John possessed not in an eminent degree.

His conduct upon his first arrival was ill calculated to allay ^{His prudence.} those suspicions which the Flemings entertained of the king's design in sending him to the Netherlands. Having stopt at Luxemburg, he wrote letters to the council and the States, in which he informed them, that he would not come to Brussels, the usual residence of their governors, unless hostages were given him for their peaceable behaviour, a guard appointed for the security of his person, and the same unlimited command of the fleet and army conferred upon him, which the preceding governors had enjoyed. He lamented the outrages which had been committed by the Spanish troops ; and promised, that if the States and people should maintain their obedience to the king, and their profession of the catholic faith, the injuries which they had sustained, should not pass unpunished. But he added, that if they failed in either of these respects, they should, in that event, find him no less prepared for war, than he was inclined to peace^g.

The States and council were ignorant, till they received these letters, of the light in which their late conduct was considered by the court of Spain. They believed that, as the steps which they had taken were necessary for the preservation of the people, it was impossible they could be offensive to the king ; and they were extremely surprised thus to meet, not only with distrust, but even threats,

^{The States}
apply for
advice to
the Prince
of Orange.

^f Meteren, p. 169. Bentivoglio, l. 9. sub sine. Thuanus, l. 62. sect. 13.

^g Meteren, p. 174.

1576. and a defiance, where they were conscious of having merited approbation and applause. They trembled, therefore, at the thoughts of putting themselves in the power of the new governor, and were greatly at a loss to determine what answer they should return to his demands. On this occasion, they had recourse to the prince of Orange for advice. And William readily embraced the opportunity, which was thus presented to him, of confirming his countrymen in those suspicions to which the governor's conduct had given rise.

<sup>His advice,
dated
Nov 30,
1576.</sup> "As it was but too manifest," he said, "from the strain of Don John's letter, that he intended to tread in the footsteps of his predecessors, the States and council had much need to exert all their

firmness, prudence, and circumspection. They ought seriously to consider the important charge with which they were entrusted ; and to remember, that, upon their present conduct, it depended, whether they, and their wives, and children, and fellow-citizens, should for the future enjoy those rights which belonged to them as natives of the Low Countries, or should be again exposed to the lawless tyranny of the Spaniards. They ought to exercise with vigour the power which they possessed, and resolutely reject all terms of agreement with the governor, by which the fundamental laws of the State might be brought into danger, or their own authority abridged. Enter not, said he, into any accommodation with him, till the Spaniards, and all other foreign troops, be actually dismissed. Trust not to any soothing promises which he may give you, of dismissing them at a more convenient season. Remember how the king himself, when he went to Spain, assured you, that the troops which he then left behind him, should, in three months afterwards, be withdrawn, and yet they were suffered to remain for more than a year and a half ; and would, notwithstanding your solicitations, have still remained, if the calamity which befel his army in Africa, had not made it necessary for him to remove them. Let no consideration persuade you to listen to Don John's request of the unlimited command of your forces. By granting this, you will furnish him with weapons against yourselves. Nothing can express his distrust more strongly, than his unprecedented requisitions of hostages, and a guard for the security of his person. If you comply with these demands, you will enable him to annihilate your authority, and to trample under foot your most sacred rights and laws. It is impossible to believe that one who discovers so much solicitude to strip you of your power, can seriously intend your welfare. Is it not more reasonable that the governor should trust the States, than that the States should lay themselves at the mercy of the governor ? Such demands were never made even by your princes themselves ; whose practice always was, to come unarmed to your assemblies, and to take an oath to maintain your privileges, before they received from you any promise of obedience. Consent not to put yourselves under the power of John of Austria, upon easier terms than have been ever insisted upon with your native princes. Require him, previously to his admission, to interpose his authority for the immediate departure of the Spanish troops ; and solemnly to engage to govern the State according to its fundamental laws ^h. To these conditions, your late fatal experience will justify you, if you add, that you shall have the power of assembling yourselves twice, or even thrice a year, if you shall judge it to be expedient ; that the citadels shall be razed to the ground ; that the right of appointing the governors and magistrates shall be vested in you ; and that, without your consent, no military force shall be levied and no garrisons stationed in the towns or

^h Here the prince mentions the particular privileges to which he alludes, and the times when they were obtained. Meteren, p. 175.

forts. At present, it little imports you to consider whether or not this conduct will give offence to the king, for it is mere delusion, if you flatter yourselves that you have not already offended him. Promises, soothing speeches, and professions of affection on his part, will not be wanting; but you will discover the last degree of weakness, if, after what you have experienced for several years past, you are not sensible, that nothing now remains for you, but either miserably to bend under the yoke from which you have so happily escaped, or to employ with vigour and fortitude the means with which Providence has furnished you; and which, I doubt not, may yet prove effectual for your security, provided you maintain harmony and concord among yourselves¹."

This letter, in some measure, produced the desired effect.

It put to silence all those who were for receiving Don John on his own terms; and the States, more suspicious than ever of his design, resolved to insist upon the dismission of the troops, and the confirmation of the pacification of Ghent, as conditions without which they would never agree to acknowledge his authority. And that they might not be found unprepared, in case of his refusal, they gave orders for making new levies; drew together an army at Wavre, between Brussels and Namur; and dispatched ambassadors to solicit assistance from foreign courts.

The States apply for aid to foreign powers.

In Germany, where they were powerfully seconded in their applications by the prince of Orange, they engaged in their interests John Casimire, count palatine of the Rhine. In France they did not confine their application to the Calvinists, but likewise prevailed upon the duke of Anjou, the king's brother, to espouse their cause, by setting before him the prospect of an establishment in the Low-Countries, more suitable to his rank than he could expect to obtain in his brother's dominions. From the queen of England, their envoy met with the most gracious reception. It was matter of the highest satisfaction to this sagacious princess to see her inveterate enemy thus embroiled with his Flemish subjects; but, as she was still desirous to avoid an open rupture with Philip, she chose to assist them with money rather than with troops, and gave them forty thousand pounds, with a promise of continuing her favour, on condition (which she added in order to save appearances) that they should adhere to the pacification of Ghent, and not throw off their allegiance to their legal sovereign.

While the States were making these preparations to vindicate their rights by force of arms, they sincerely desired to attain their end, by negociation with the governor. For they had too long groaned under the calamities of war, not to wish most earnestly for peace, provided that blessing could be secured without making a sacrifice of their liberties. Don John, on the other hand, discovered an extreme reluctance to comply with the conditions which they required of him; but he endeavoured to dissemble his sentiments, and attempted, by fair speeches, to cajole and deceive them. Still, however, he continued to shew his diffidence, by insisting upon having a numerous guard for his person; and by refusing his consent to the departure of the Spaniards, unless the States should at the same time dismiss the foreign troops in their service, and give hostages, to remain in the hands of a neutral power, till their engagements should be fulfilled.

The States, whose jealousy was kept alive by the repeated warnings of the prince of Orange, easily penetrated into Don John's designs; and

Their nego-
ciation with
Don John.

ⁱ Meteren, p. 175, 176. Bentivoglio, lib. ix. ab initio. Thuanus, l. lxii. 15.

1577. they resolved, if possible, to convince him by one decisive step, that it was in vain for him to expect that they would ever depart from the terms proposed. In their assembly at Brussels, on the fifth of January one thousand five hundred and seventy-seven, they drew up a new deed of union, in which they engaged in the most solemn manner, to maintain inviolably for ever the pacification of Ghent; to spare neither their goods, their persons, nor their lives, in order to fulfil it; and to regard as perjured traitors, all those who, participating in the present union, should by word, deed, or counsel, counteract it. A copy of this deed, subscribed by the governor and deputies of all the towns and provinces; by the nobility, prelates, and other dignified ecclesiastics; and by the members of tribunals, councils, colleges and chapters, together with a solemn ratification of it by the council, was sent by the States to Don John, as their final answer to his demands^k.

This measure contributed not a little to promote the end proposed. It gave Don John a proof of firmness on the part of the States, which he little expected, and shewed him the necessity of either agreeing to the conditions which they so earnestly required, or of resolving instantly to have recourse to arms. Inflamed by ambition and the love of war, he would not have hesitated a moment what part to act, had not his instructions from the king required that he should avoid coming to an open rupture with the Catholic provinces. He considered likewise, that the States had got the start of him, and were already well prepared to repel force by force. Nor was he ignorant of the encouragement which they had received, to hope for succour from the neighbouring powers; or of the danger to which great numbers of the Spanish troops, surrounded by their enemies, were exposed, of being reduced by famine. Influenced by these considerations, and trusting that ere long, after quieting their suspicions, opportunities would offer of depriving the States by degrees of that power of which they were at present so tenacious, he entered into a negociation with their deputies at Marche en Famine, a city in Luxemburg; and after many obstructions and difficulties, concluded a treaty with them, which they fondly

March 12th termed the perpetual edict

In this treaty he engaged, that all the foreign troops in the service of Spain should leave the Netherlands, and never return thither without the consent of the States; that the Spaniards and Italians should depart within the space of forty days, and the Germans immediately after receiving satisfaction with regard to their arrears; and that all the cities and forts possessed by these troops should as soon as they were relinquished, be delivered to the States, together with the stores of ammunition, arms, and provisions. He ratified the pacification of Ghent. He consented that all prisoners detained on account of the late disturbances, should immediately be set at liberty, except the count of Buren^l. And he promised that diligent inquiry should be made, concerning the outrages lately committed by the troops; that justice should be executed against the guilty, and a reasonable compensation made to the sufferers, either in the Netherlands, or in Spain, according as the king should be pleased to determine.

The States, on the other hand, engaged to preserve inviolable their allegiance to the king; to maintain the profession of the Roman Catholic faith throughout all the provinces; to receive Don John as governor-general of the Netherlands; and immediately to furnish him with six

^k Meteren, p. 179.

^l Son of the prince of Orange.

hundred thousand florins, for the payment of the Italian and Spanish troops, in order to prevail on them the more easily to depart for Spain or Italy.

1577.

As soon as this treaty was concluded, ambassadors were despatched by the Catholic States, who alone were concerned in it, to the prince of Orange and the States of Holland and Zealand, to desire their concurrence. It might easily have been foreseen, that this application could not be attended with success. For although the maritime provinces had consented, in the pacification of Ghent, to submit the question of religion to the decision of a general assembly, to be held after the departure of the Spaniards; yet in that assembly they knew that they would have leisure to employ all their influence in behalf of their religion, and to offer such reasons against proscribing it, as they hoped would prove a sufficient counterpoise to the religious zeal of the popish States. Without this expectation it can hardly be supposed that protestants, whose sincerity in their profession was so unquestionable, would ever have agreed to leave to others the determination of a matter in which they were so deeply interested; and therefore it is not surprising, that they declined acceding to the treaty now presented to them, in which this important point had, without obtaining their consent, been so hastily decided. But lest they should alarm the bigotry of the Catholic provinces, they took no notice, in their answer, of this, which was their principal objection. They began with saying, that they could not enough praise that generous zeal which the States had displayed, in delivering their country from the tyranny of the Spaniards; and they rejoiced to find that they still persisted in their resolution of adhering to the pacification of Ghent. But after considering attentively the treaty which had been transmitted to them, they were sorry to observe, that it was extremely ill calculated to answer the laudable intentions of the States. For besides several other objections of great weight, there was no proper provision made, in this treaty, for the regular calling of assemblies; in a convention, held on purpose to restore and secure their rights, an open infraction of them was ratified, by their consenting to the unjust detention of the count of Buren; the States had failed in the respect and gratitude which they owed to the queen of England and the duke of Anjou; and certain articles of the treaty were derogatory to the honour of the Netherlands; particularly that article, by which, instead of insisting upon a restitution of those invaluable effects, of which the Spaniards had plundered the inhabitants, they had promised money to those men, notwithstanding their having been solemnly declared traitors and rebels by the States themselves, and by the council of State, when clothed with the authority of the King.

The Catholics could not but be sensible of the strength of these objections. Their impatience to be delivered from the Spanish troops, and their eager desire of peace, had betrayed them into that precipitation of which they had been guilty. They could not avail themselves now of the superior penetration of the prince of Orange. The treaty was already concluded, and nothing remained for them, but to watch the governor's motions with an attentive eye, till the troops were removed to such a distance, that they could not easily be recalled. Don John was at great pains to dispel their suspicions. For that purpose he employed all his influence to persuade the Spaniards to depart; and he at length prevailed, though not till he had distributed among them the money which he had received from the States. This brave, but ferocious and savage band, then set out upon their march for Italy, like an army in triumph; loaded with the spoils of their fellow-

The States of Holland refuse to concur.

Departure of the Italian and Spanish troops.

1577. subjects, and without compunction for the rapacity and violence which they had exercised^m.

Don John's admission to the government. Their departure diffused universal joy throughout the Netherlands, and the people indulged the flattering hope, that the king having been at last touched with their calamities, had resolved to

treat them with greater lenity and moderation than they had experienced since the beginning of his reign. Their satisfaction was heightened by the popular character of the governor, who was in the prime of life ; elegant and graceful in his person and deportment ; lively, facetious, and affable, and who gained exceedingly from the comparison which men naturally formed of his insinuating manners, with the reserve and austerity of the king. He was received in Brussels with such marks of respect as had never been shewn to any former governor ; and persons of all ranks flattered themselves with the prospect of a just and mild administration.

His impolitic conduct. They did not long enjoy this soothing prospect. Although Philip himself had ratified the perpetual edict, and Don John had,

before his admission to the regency, sworn in the most solemn manner to observe it, it soon appeared that nothing was farther from the intentions of either. The limitations which that edict imposed upon the sovereign's authority, were utterly repugnant to Philip's temper, as well as to the plan which he had formed for the government of the Netherlands ; nor would he ever have empowered his brother to make so many concessions to the States, as the perpetual edict, or pacification of Ghent, contained, but in order more effectually to strip them afterwards of that very power which he now consented they should enjoy. But Don John was, from his natural impetuosity, incapable of executing this scheme, which required a much higher degree of circumspection and experience, as well as patience and dissimulation, than he possessed. His court was perpetually filled with Spaniards, and other foreigners, who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the natives ; nor were any of the Flemings admitted into his confidence, but such as had shewn themselves devoted to the Spanish interest ; while those who had discovered an attachment to the liberty of their country, were kept at a distance, and treated with indifference or contempt. This circumstance contributed not a little to revive that jealousy of his designs, which he had been so solicitous to allay. But the States were still more alarmed, when he made them the following proposals : that they should not any longer withhold from him the authority which his predecessors had enjoyed, but allow him to act as captain-general, as well as governor of the provinces : that they should empower him, without waiting for the determination of the general assembly of the States, to execute the two articles of the late treaty, which related to the obedience due to the king, and the re-establishment of the Catholic religion ; and that, if the prince of Orange would not immediately agree to accede to the perpetual edict, the States should break of all correspondence with him, and reduce him and the maritime provinces to obedience, by force of arms. With these proposals the States refused to comply, but expressed their refusal in the softest terms ; and without taking notice of his demand to be allowed to act as captain-general, they represented to him that, by the pacification of Ghent, both he and they were bound to wait for the meeting of the general assembly of the States ; to whose decision the prince of Orange, and the States of Holland and Zealand, had engaged to submit.

Don John perceiving that he was not likely to persuade them, grew more impatient than ever under his present restraints, and resolved now to em-

^m Thuanus, lib. lxiv. sect. vi.

ploy either force or fraud, as opportunities should offer. The States could not thoroughly penetrate his design, but they perceived how much he was dissatisfied with his situation, and what difficulty they would find to obtain the performance of his engagements in the perpetual edict. This served to render them more than ever solicitous for the departure of the German troops, which, it had been agreed, should remain in the Netherlands till they received payment of their arrears. These arrears amounted to a very great sum, which the States were utterly unable to raise at the present juncture. But, having raised a part of it, they made an offer of that to the Germans, and desired they would accept of goods and security for the rest. In order to make a further trial of Don John's sincerity, they entreated him to employ his influence, to procure their consent. Don John readily agreed to this request; and declared that, if the Germans should refuse to comply, he would, at the hazard of his life, compel them. Having summoned their commanders to meet him at Mechlin, he went thither, as if on purpose to persuade them; but in reality, to inflame their minds against the States, and to exhort them to remain in the Netherlands, in the service of the king. Having had the success which he desired with some of the principal officers, and judging it necessary now to redouble his hypocrisy with the States, he wrote to them, lamenting that a much greater sum was necessary to satisfy the German troops, than could be procured in the Low Countries; and offering to send his secretary Escovedo to represent their situation to the king. This artifice was not altogether without effect. The States could not believe that Don John was capable of so great deceit, as he was now practising against them. They agreed to his proposal, and, as an expression of their gratitude, they settled a pension of two thousand ducats on Escovedo, who set out immediately for Spain; but with a design extremely different from that which was pretended.

Don John in the mean time carried on his intrigues with the German officers, and hoped soon, by their means, to get possession of the fortified towns in which they lay. But before any of the plans which he had formed with this view were put in execution, he judged it necessary to withdraw from Brussels, and, if possible, to make himself master of some place of strength near the frontier, where he might remain in safety till he should find himself in a condition to take the field. Of all the frontier towns, Namur appeared the fittest for his purpose; being conveniently situated for the reception of the troops, to which he expected the king would soon give orders to return from Italy. It happened that Margaret de Valois, queen of Navarre, intended at this time to pass through Namur in her way to Spa. On pretence of paying his respects to Margaret, he left Brussels, and arrived in Namur, with a great number of the nobility and others, who were favourable to his design. But as the governor of the castle was a person of strict fidelity, Don John was obliged, in order to accomplish his aim, to have recourse to the following stratagem. Feigning to set out in the morning for the chace, he took his way by the castle; where having stopt, and inquired for the governor, he pretended a curiosity to see the fortifications of the place. The governor, flattered with his visit, and suspecting nothing hostile from men who seemed equipped only for hunting, readily admitted, not only Don John himself, but his attendants; some of whom having arms concealed under their apparel, immediately seized upon the gate.ⁿ

July 21.

John having thus secured possession of the castle, the town was, by the

^{1577.}
His duplicity.

^{He seizes on}
the Castle of
Namur.

ⁿ Bentivoglio, lib. x. p. 192. 195. Meteren, p. 185.

1577 assistance of count Barlaimont, governor of the province, soon subjected to his authority. He observed with triumph, that the day on which this event happened, was the first day of his regency. It might with greater propriety have been said, that it was the first of those calamities which pursued him to the grave.

After such an open violation of his faith, there could be little room for any future negociation with the States. Yet, in a letter which he wrote to them on this occasion, he regretted that the plots which had been laid to deprive him of his life or liberty, had obliged him to have recourse to so hostile an expedient, and he affirmed, that he was still ready to observe the conditions of the perpetual edict ; but declared, that he would not quit his present situation, till they should make provisions for the security of his person against the machinations of his enemies.

The States and council were greatly astonished, when they received intelligence of this event. They had wished for nothing so much as to preserve the provinces from being plunged afresh into the calamities of war. They considered that some of the principal cities in Brabant were in the hands of the Germans. They knew not what part these troops might act, if hostilities with the governor should take place ; and they could not imagine that he would have ventured on so manifest a breach of the perpetual edict, without the prospect of some powerful support. They immediately dispatched ambassadors to remonstrate with him on the nature and consequences of his conduct, and to request him to return to Brussels. They promised to make the most serious inquiry into the machinations of which he complained, desired that he would name the persons guilty, and assured him, that nothing should be wanting on their part to provide, in the most satisfactory manner, for the security of his person.

Of the reality of these machinations he could produce no other evidence, but some anonymous letters, which, he said, had been transmitted to him. But as no person was named in these letters, and the authors of them were utterly unknown, all men believed them to be a forgery of his own, or of his courtiers, designed to serve as a pretext for his present treachery.

The answer which he made to the States shewed clearly, that, in the steps which he had taken, he had been influenced by a motive very different from that which he pretended—That the States should put him in full possession of the authority, which the preceding governors had exercised ; that they should give him the entire command of the army ; break off all communication with the prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and Zealand, and compel them to accede to the perpetual edict ; these were some of the conditions, to which if they did not agree, he acquainted them, that he was unalterably determined not to return. The States represented the inconsistency between the former of these demands, and the perpetual edict ; and reminded him of the utter impossibility, under which they found themselves, of complying with the latter, without violating their faith, which in the pacification of Ghent, they had pledged to the maritime provinces. He still persisted in his resolution ; and the States were equally inflexible.

They were confirmed in their purpose, by some letters writ by Don John and Escovedo to the king, and Antonio Perez, his secretary, which were intercepted in Gascony by the king of Navarre, and sent by him to the prince of Orange, who transmitted them to the States. In these letters, the necessity of the speedy return of the Italian and Spanish troops was urged with the utmost earnestness and importunity. The diseases of the Netherlands, said Don John, admit of no

other cure, but lopping off the parts affected: and to the same purpose, 1577: Escovedo observed, That fire, and the shedding of blood, were the only means by which the disorders that prevailed could be remedied. For no man here, said he, whether among the nobility or people, performs the duty that he owes either to God or the king. Opinions the most abominable universally prevail; and every man lives as he lists, without law or rule. To which he added, That if the king did not send the necessary troops and money soon, he was afraid that Don John, who could not endure his present situation, would quit the Netherlands, and try his fortune elsewhere.

While these letters served to alienate the Flemings more than ever from Don John, they raised to the greatest height their admiration of the penetration and sagacity of the prince of Orange, who had given them early warning of the governor's duplicity, and whose predictions were now so remarkably fulfilled. They entered with greater ardour than ever into his views, and in conformity with his advice, they resolved to lose no more time in negotiating, but without delay to put the provinces into a posture of defence, before the return of the Spanish forces. Whilst their levies, and other military preparations, were going on, they laboured with great solicitude to persuade the Germans to deliver up the towns in their possession. Their success was in some measure retarded by the governor's intrigues with the officers; but the States, having at this time greater facility than Don John, in employing either money or force, according as the one or the other was most likely to prove effectual, had greater influence with the soldiers; who not only refused to listen to their officers, but put some of them under arrest, and gave them up to the States, together with the towns and citadels. In this manner the States recovered Bergen-op-zoom, Tolen, Breda, Bois le-duc, and several other places; and they had the good fortune likewise to defeat a body of Germans, in the governor's interest, who were upon their march to surprise the citadel of Antwerp. After which, prompted partly by the apprehensions which this attempt, though unsuccessful, had excited, and partly by the remembrance of the many calamities which the citadels, in other places as well as Antwerp, had occasioned to the inhabitants, they resolved to demolish these fortresses; and gave orders for this purpose, which were executed by the people with inexpressible alacrity.

The States
get a num-
ber o' towns
into their
possession.

Don John, in the mean time, endeavoured to make himself master of some places in the neighbourhood of Namur; and he succeeded in his attempts upon Marienburg and Charlemont. But, being forsaken by the duke of Arschot, and almost all the other nobility who had attended him to Namur; and perceiving that the States were much farther advanced than himself in their military preparations, he sent them word that he had solicited the king for liberty to leave the Netherlands; and would immediately retire to Luxemburg, to wait the issue of his application, provided the States would agree to desist from hostilities till the king's instructions should arrive. But the States, suspecting from their former experience that he intended nothing by this proposal but to render them more remiss in their preparations, replied, that before they could listen to any terms of accomodation, he must deliver up the city and castle of Namur. To this Don John refused to consent; and thus the negotiation was broken off, and all hopes of terminating the dispute amicably were extinguished.

The States, considering war now as unavoidable, resolved to invite the prince of Orange to reside at Brussels; and accordingly

The States
invite the

^o Meteren, p. 187. Bentivoglio, tom. ii. p. 212.

P Bentivoglio, p. 198

prince of
Orange to
reside at
Brussels.

five of their number were appointed to carry him an invitation, couched in terms so flattering and respectful, and so expressive at the same time of their gratitude for his former services, that

it was impossible he could hesitate to comply with their request. Having obtained the consent of the States of Holland and Zealand, he went first to Breda, and thence to Antwerp and Brussels. His reception in the places through which he passed, was such as might be expected from a people, by whom he was held in the highest respect and veneration. Ardent to behold him, after an absence of several years, during which he had undergone so many labours, and been exposed to so many dangers in their service, they poured out in multitudes, to the distance of several miles, to

meet him. In his passage from Antwerp to Brussels, one side of His recep-
tion the canal was lined by the inhabitants of the former of these places, and the other, by those of the latter ; while the banks resounded with the joyful shouts of a grateful people, who saluted him with the glorious appellations of the Father of his Country, and the Guardian of its liberty and laws. Nor were these demonstrations of joy confined to the vulgar, who are always sincere, but often precipitate and inconstant in their applauses ; persons of all ranks vied with each other in testifying their respect and gratitude ; and immediately after his arrival, the States of Brabant and the States-general concurred in electing him governor of the province of Brabant^q ; a dignity which had been hitherto bestowed only on the viceroys, or governors-general, of the Netherlands.

By his wisdom and moderation, as well as by his vigilance and The promis-
ing condi-
tion of the
Nether-
lands. and industry, William fulfilled the most sanguine expectations of his countrymen. But, notwithstanding his address and prudence, and skill in managing the minds of men ; qualifications which he

possessed in the most eminent degree ; he could not preserve that unanimity among the Flemings, which it was of so much consequence for them, in the present juncture, to maintain. At no period had they enjoyed so fair a prospect of securing their liberty on a firm and permanent foundation. Besides the advantage of having a person of so great experience and abilities to guide their counsels, the Spanish troops were entirely withdrawn ; the king's finances were greatly exhausted with the wars in which he had been continually engaged ; almost all the fortified places were in the hands of the States ; and the people were animated universally with the most violent abhorrence of the Spanish government. But the States were prevented from improving the opportunity which this fortunate concurrence of circumstances afforded them, by a spirit of division and animosity, which sprung up, partly from the jealousies of the nobility, and partly from the intemperate religious zeal and bigotry of the people.

Philip de Groy duke of Arschot, the marquis of Havrée Sources of ani-
mosity and dis-
co id. his brother, the count de Lalain, and several others of the catholic nobility, had since the death of Requesens, distinguished themselves as strenuous asserters of the liberties of their country. They had promoted with all their influence the pacification of Ghent, and had concurred with their countrymen in the invitation given to the prince of Orange to reside at Brussels. But when they reflected upon the extraordinary marks of attachment which William had received, and saw him vested with an authority and dignity in Brabant which only the sovereign or his viceroys had hitherto enjoyed ; above all, when they contemplated his great abilities and experience in the conduct of affairs ; they foresaw that they must content themselves with acting a subordinate part in

the government, and that the States would, in every branch of administration, be directed by the prince of Orange, who must therefore reap the glory of whatever should be achieved, and without the name of sovereign, exercise a supreme and sovereign authority. Stung with envy, and desirous to conceal the motive of their conduct, they began to affect an extreme anxiety at the danger to which the catholic faith was exposed, by the States reposing such unreserved confidence in one who was an avowed friend of the new religion. On this pretence, which never received any colour from the prince's conduct, they formed themselves into a confederacy, with a design to counteract him. And in order to give their party consistency, weight, and influence, they resolved to invite the archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to take upon him the government of the provinces.

This resolution they not only formed, but executed, without the knowledge or authority of the States, and they dispatched a messenger to Matthias with the greatest secrecy, to intreat him to leave Vienna without delay.

Nothing could exceed the temerity of those who gave this invitation, but the imprudence of Matthias in accepting it. For, besides that he was called only by the least powerful of the two parties into which the Flemings were divided, he could not be ignorant how injurious and affronting his conduct must be thought by his kinsman the king of Spain. It is some alleviation of his folly that he was only twenty-two years of age ; and that considering the numerous progeny which his father left behind him there was little probability of his obtaining any settlement in Germany, suitable to his rank. At the time of the death of Requesens, he had made an offer of his service to the States, and he accepted greedily of the present invitation. His enterprise being of such a nature that he durst not discover it to the emperor, he set out from Vienna in the middle of the night, with a small number of attendants. No sooner was his brother apprised of his design, than messengers were dispatched to bring him back, and letters sent to the princes whose States he must pass through, intreating them to stop him ; but Matthias travelled faster than the messengers, and, in a few days, reached the town of Lierres in Brabant.

The States, astonished at the news of his arrival, and highly incensed against those who had invited him, complained loudly of the insult offered to their authority ; and would have instantly formed the resolution of rejecting him, had they not been dissuaded from it by the prince of Orange. William foresaw the advantages which might arise from that rivalship, into which Matthias had entered with his kinsman Don John, and from the seeds of enmity which were thereby sown between the German and Spanish branches of the house of Austria. He reckoned it rather fortunate, that Don John had received so unpardonable an offence from the Catholic nobility ; and he considered how fatal to the general interest of the provinces all divisions must necessarily prove, in the present critical conjuncture of their affairs.

Influenced by these considerations, he exhorted the States to overlook the injurious treatment which they had received, and persuaded them to agree, not only to receive Matthias with all the respect due to his high rank, but even to elect him governor, on such conditions as they should judge proper to require. This conduct, the most prudent that could have been adopted in the present circumstances, furnished no sort of triumph to the to the duke d'Arschot, and the other Catholic nobility. On the contrary, it mortified them exceedingly, to observe that Matthias owed his election not to them, but to the prince of Orange ; whose authority, which they intended to have controlled, was now considerably augmented, and more firmly established than before.

The Flemish nobles give an invitation to Matthias.

His arrival.

He is admitted governor by the States.

1577.
Mortifica-
tions o. the
nobility.

Soon after this, they received a still more sensible mortification. The duke d'Arscot having lately been appointed governor of Flanders, had gone to the city of Ghent, to take possession of his government. Not long after his arrival, a deputation of the inhabitants having urged him with much importunity to reinstate them in their ancient privileges, of which they had been deprived, in the time of Charles V. he was heard to declare, that that seditious multitude, which made so much noise about their privileges, should ere long be punished as they deserved, notwithstanding their being supported by the prince of Orange. This saying being repeated by some who heard it, and circulated all over the city, inflamed the minds of the people with rage and indignation. They ran to arms, surrounded the governor's house, and threw him, and his friends and attendants, into prison. The prince of Orange, dreading the consequences of so violent a procedure, and believing the duke to be now sufficiently humbled, interceded with the Ghentese, and procured his liberty ; but no solicitations could induce them to release his adherents. In this manner was the duke d'Arscot's importance in the Netherlands almost annihilated. Matthias perceiving this, saw it to be his interest to connect himself with the party of which the prince of Orange was the head ; and readily accepted the government, with a condition to which the States required his consent, that the prince should be his lieutenant general in all the branches of administration.

1778. Matthias made his joyful entry into Brussels in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-eight, when both he and the prince of Orange were admitted to their respective offices, after taking an oath to maintain the laws, and to regulate their conduct according to the instructions which should be given them by the States^r.

Application
of the States
to Philip. Don John sent an ambassador to protest in his name against these proceedings. But the States had some weeks before this time declared him an enemy to the Netherlands, and paid no regard to his protestation.

These proceedings. But the States had some weeks before this time declared him an enemy to the Netherlands, and paid no regard to his protestation. As they were persuaded, however, that they had done nothing but what was authorised by the fundamental laws of the constitution, they wrote an account of their proceedings to the king, declaring that they still held their allegiance to him inviolable ; and praying, that he would confirm their election of his kinsman Matthias, as the most likely means of restoring tranquillity to the provinces. They had very little reason to expect that Philip would listen to this request. He looked upon their conduct in a light extremely different from that in which they themselves regarded it ; and considered their presumption in rejecting the governor whom he had appointed, and still more that of nominating another without his consent, as an act of the most audacious rebellion. The States were too well acquainted with his character, not to entertain some apprehensions that such might be his sentiments ; and therefore, while they omitted nothing in their power to assuage his resentment, they endeavoured to secure themselves against the effects of it, by interesting the neighbouring powers in their behalf, and by establishing unanimity between the religious parties into which the provinces were divided.

In order to accomplish this last and most important object, a new treaty of union was concluded, in which, besides confirming the pacification of Ghent, the Catholics and Protestants promised mutually to support each other ; and engaged, that they would join together in opposing all persecution on account of religion, from whatever quarter it should come^s.

^r Meteren, p. 196. 200.

^s Meteren, p. 197.

The neighbouring powers were not unconcerned spectators of these transactions. The emperor^t saw with much anxiety, that those flames which had burnt so long in the Netherlands, were now likely to burst out with greater violence than ever. But having been educated at the court of Madrid under Philip, with whom he wished to live on amicable terms, he had shewn himself exceedingly displeased with the conduct of Matthias; had given Philip entire satisfaction with regard to his own intentions; and had resolved to take no other part in the dissensions of the Netherlands, but that of employing his intercession and advice. He did not however oppose the levies which the count Palatine was making for the service of the States, either because he knew that his prohibition would not have been regarded, or because he desired to preserve a strict neutrality between the contending parties.

Henry III. of France was too much occupied in his own dominions, to have leisure to enter deeply into the affairs of the Netherlands. For many ages, France had seen no king, of whose reign the people entertained more sanguine expectations. Having, in his early youth, been appointed commander in chief by his brother Charles, he had given signal proof of uncommon abilities. The French had flattered themselves with the hopes of seeing their kingdom restored by him to its ancient splendor; his fame was universally diffused, and the Polish nobility had, with general applause, conferred upon him their elective crown. But when, upon his brother's death, he left Poland, and succeeded to the crown of France, it is inconceivable how great a change he seemed to have undergone. Irresolute, inconstant, indolent, and voluptuous, with a mixture of the most ridiculous superstition, he lost the confidence of the Catholics as well as Protestants, whom he favoured and betrayed by turns. The unsteady and unskillful hand, with which he held the reins of government, added daily new force to the virulence of faction, till every member of the state, and almost every individual in the kingdom, was infected. The Queen-mother employed all her art and influence to support his authority, but could not restrain her younger son, the duke of Alençon, now duke of Anjou, from putting himself at the head, sometimes of one party, and sometimes of another, in opposition to the king. To this prince, who was now the presumptive heir of the crown, the Flemings addressed themselves, after having in vain applied to the king himself for protection. Anjou listened with much pleasure to their application; and having conceived hopes of obtaining the sovereignty of the provinces, he made them the most flattering promises of assistance. Henry, far from opposing the duke's designs, considered his leaving France as the most fortunate event that could happen; since he would be thereby delivered from a great number of restless intriguing spirits, by whom the tranquillity of his kingdom had been disturbed. But as he declined on this occasion to assist his brother in levying forces, partly from inability, and partly from the dread of embroiling himself with Philip, Anjou was not in a condition, till some time after the present period, to fulfil his engagements.

The Flemings mean-while received the most seasonable assistance from the queen of England. Don John had, some months before, endeavoured to prepossess Elizabeth in his favour; by representing, that the disturbances in the Netherlands were entirely owing to the prince of Orange, and his adherents, who had broken the pacification of Ghent, and by their intrigues prevailed upon the States

1578
The emperor.
Henry III.
of France.
The States
apply for aid
to the duke
of Anjou.

They re-
ceive assist-
ance from
Elizabeth.

258. to violate the perpetual edict. Elizabeth pretended to give credit to this representation, and ordered her ambassador to reproach the States with their infidelity, and even to threaten them with her resentment, in case they should refuse to adhere to their engagements. Thus far this artful princess went, in order to persuade Philip, that she seriously desired his subjects in the Netherlands to maintain their allegiance. But in reality she wished for nothing less. In a political light (that light in which the conduct of Elizabeth ought almost always to be considered) nothing could be more desirable to her, than that the troubles of the Low Countries should continue ; and, if either of the two contending parties should finally prevail, that victory should fall rather on the side of the people, than of the king. But when she considered the inequality of the dispute between him and the Flemings, she dreaded that the latter, if left to themselves, must soon be compelled, either to relinquish their pretensions, or to throw themselves for protection into the arms of France. She had therefore resolved to watch carefully over their conduct, and to afford them, from time to time, such assistance as their circumstances should require. She lent a favourable ear to the defence which was made by the prince of Orange and the States against Don John's accusations ; and she admitted of their justification the more willingly, as in the representation given her of Don John's conduct on this occasion, she found reason to believe that his intentions were no less hostile with regard to herself, than with respect to the States and the prince of Orange. For William had taken particular care to inform her of some intercepted letters of Don John's, from which it appeared, that he entertained a secret correspondence with the queen of Scots ; that he had formed a plan, to which the pope was privy, for setting that princess at liberty ; and that he was incited to attempt this, not only by the desire of distressing Elizabeth, but likewise by the wild ambition of marrying the Scottish queen, and attaining, through her, possession of the British crowns.

After this discovery, Elizabeth resolved no longer to keep any measures with Don John, but to exert herself with vigour in opposing his re-admission into the government of the Netherlands. With this intention she gave the most gracious reception to the marquis d'Hayrée, the ambassador of the States, and entered readily into a treaty, by which she engaged to furnish them with an immediate supply, both of money and troops ; upon condition, that the commander of these troops should be admitted into the council of state ; and that, during the continuance of the war, no step should be taken, nor any alliance formed, without her consent.^u

Elizabeth had no sooner subscribed this treaty, than being still desirous to avoid an open breach with Philip, she dispatched an ambassador^w to Madrid, to represent to him, that in her late transaction with the States, it was far from her intention to encourage them to withdraw their allegiance ; that, on the contrary, she had employed the only means likely to prove effectual to prevent them from casting themselves in despair into the hands of some other power. She was deeply interested, she acknowledged, in saving her neighbours from oppression ; especially the Flemings, with whom the commercial interests of her subjects had long been, and still were so closely connected. This she hoped would plead her excuse for exhorting him to substitute in the room of his brother, a governor, in whom the people could repose greater trust and confidence ; and with whom she herself could maintain a more friendly intercourse, than she could ever hold with Don John, after having discovered his design to invade her dominions.

^u Meteren. p. 197. Bentivoglio, p. 202. Camden, anno 1577, &c.

^w Thomas Wilkes, clerk of the council.

She concluded with intreating him to redress the grievances of his Flemish subjects ; offering to mediate between him and them, if her mediation could be of use ; and declaring, that if they should refuse to fulfil their late engagements, or attempt to make any innovation contrary to the pacification of Ghent, she would assist him in reducing them to obedience by force of arms ¹⁵⁷³ x.

Elizabeth could not mean any thing by this embassy, but the fulfilling of an empty ceremonial, which was received by Philip, and performed by her, with equal insincerity. She did not wait for a return to her embassy, but proceeded instantly to carry into execution her treaty with the States. Both the troops and money which she engaged to furnish, were immediately sent over ; and the latter was remitted by the States to prince Casimire, to enable him to complete his levies

The States had collected a considerable body of forces, which they stationed in the neighbourhood of Namur ; and if they had followed the counsel of the prince of Orange, who exhorted them to lay siege to that important fortress, they might have made themselves masters of it, and prevented the return of the Spanish troops. But many among them being still unshaken in their allegiance to the king, as well as in their attachment to the popish faith ; nothing but their remembrance of the cruelties of Alva, and the late enormities of the Spaniards, could have induced them to concur in the measures which the majority had adopted. These men fondly imagined, that Philip would be moved with their calamities, and persuaded to comply with their requests. Being for this reason unwilling to begin hostilities, they urged strongly the expediency of a defensive war : and thus the army was suffered, for several months, to remain inactive, and time imprudently given for the arrival of the Italian and Spanish troops y

Although Philip did not entirely approve of his brother's conduct, and desired to have obtained his ends by negociation and artifice ; yet having failed in this way, he resolved, without hesitation, to employ force ; and he had accordingly sent orders to Alexander Farnese, the prince of Parma, to lead back the troops from Italy, to the Netherlands, without delay. On their arrival at Namur, being joined by other troops, which Don John had levied in the neighbouring provinces, they composed an army of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse ; while that of the States amounted only to ten thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse ; and was no less inferior to the enemy in discipline, than in number. The States now saw their folly in having neglected to make themselves masters of Namur, as an entrance had thereby been secured for the Spaniards into the centre of the Netherlands.

The situation in which Don John found himself at this time, was much more suitable to the talents which he possessed, than those negotiations and treaties in which he had been hitherto engaged. He had longed with extreme impatience for the arrival of the forces, and ardently desired to be revenged upon the States for the injurious treatment which he imagined he had received. Having got information that their army, commanded by the Sieur de Goignies, had left their camp in the neighbourhood of Namur, and were retiring towards Brussels, he resolved to attack them on their march. With this intention he sent his cavalry before, under the prince of Parma, and followed them himself, as quickly as possible, with the foot. Farnese executed the trust committed to him with great valour. At the head of his battalion he attacked the Flemish cavalry

Imprudent delays of the States.

The return of the Spanish troops.

^x Carte, book xviii. Camden.

^y Meteren, book viii. ab initio.

1578. with uncommon fury ; and though they gave him a spirited reception, he soon compelled them to retire. In the mean time Don John came forward with a chosen body of infantry, and afforded him such a powerful support, as enabled him to drive the enemy's horse before him, till he entered along with them into the ranks of their main army. The Flemings believing the whole Spanish forces to be at hand, and being utterly unprepared for so sudden an attack, were soon thrown into confusion and dispersed. About three thousand were killed, and a great number, with the commander in chief, were taken prisoners. The loss on the side of the conquerors was inconsiderable.

January 31. After this victory Don John reduced Gemblours, Louvain, Sichem, Nivelles, and several other places, both in Brabant and Hainault. He desired likewise to have laid siege to Brussels ; but his council of war were of opinion, that his strength was not adequate to so great an enterprise, and thought it more expedient to aim at easier conquests, till his army should be reinforced.

The States in the mean time received an abundant compensation for their losses in the southern provinces, by the acquisition of Amsterdam. To this wealthy city, which even then was the greatest in the northern provinces, the duke of

Amsterdam accedes to the confederacy. February 8. Alva had, as mentioned above, given the most particular attention ; having expelled the protestants, and put the government entirely into the hands of rigid Catholics. These men, supported by a numerous garrison, had baffled all the attempts which had been made by the States of Holland to reduce them. But being now hemmed in by their countrymen both by sea and land, and their trade almost ruined, they at last consented to accede to the pacification of Ghent, and agreed to disband the popish garrison, to recal the protestant exiles, and to allow them to hold their religious assemblies without the city. It was not long before they repented of these concessions. The protestants being inflamed with zeal for their religion ; impatient under the restraints in which the late agreement had been laid upon them, fired with resentment for former injuries, and suspicious that the Catholics were again meditating schemes for their expulsion, they flew to arms, and having suppressed the exercise of the popish faith, they drove all the priests, and others whom they suspected of malignant designs, out of the city ^z.

Philip's answer to the States. In the midst of these transactions John de Noircarmes, Baron de Selles, arrived from Spain, with Philip's answer to the application which the States had made to him some months before.

It was such as they had reason to expect, and contained an absolute denial of their requests, with regard to the removal of Don John, and the ratification of the election of Matthias.

The States prosecute the war. Convinced by this denial, of the folly of those hopes which they had entertained, that the king would yield to their intreaties, and sensible that they had suffered considerable loss, from that want of dispatch and secrecy which is incident to the procedure of a numerous assembly ; they enlarged the powers of Matthias and the prince of Orange, and invested them, and the council of state, with authority to conduct the operations of the war, without having recourse on every occasion to the assembly of the States.

No time after this was unnecessarily lost. The troops which had been dispersed at Gemblours were collected, and of these, and the new levies, an army was composed, amounting to eight thousand foot and two thousand

horse, partly Flemings, and partly Scots and English. This army was stationed in the neighbourhood of Lierres, in the centre of Brabant, under the command of the count de Bossut. Don John's army, after he had put garrisons into the towns which he had taken, was still superior in number; and therefore he resolved to march towards Bossut, before the auxiliaries, which the States expected from France and Germany, should arrive. But he soon found that he had now to contend both with troops and a general much superior to those whom he had encountered at Gemblours.

Bossut, from a sense of the inferiority of his forces, had pitched his camp near the village of Rimenant, in a situation extremely advantageous for preventing the enemy from penetrating further into the provinces. On the one side it was defended by the Demer, and on the other, by a wood; and was fortified both before and behind with strong intrenchments. Notwithstanding this, Don John resolved to attack it, unless he could provoke the count to quit his lines, and give him battle. The prince of Parma, who from his early youth was no less wise than brave, remonstrated against this resolution, as being dangerous and desperate. But Don John, being confirmed in his purpose by the other officers, gave orders for his army to advance, after having sent before a select body of troops, to attack an important post, without the camp, which was guarded by some English and Scotch forces, under colonel Norris. Among the assailants was Don Alphonso Martinez de Leyva, at the head of a company of two hundred men, whom he maintained at his own expence, and who were all either gentlemen, or soldiers who had distinguished themselves in former wars. These men attacked the British troops with uncommon fury. After a short resistance, the latter began to retreat, but in good order, and with their faces turned towards the enemy. The Spaniards, to second whom Don John had sent several battalions of fresh troops, not suspecting any artifice, and believing the enemy to be intimidated, followed them with much precipitation, till they had passed a narrow defile within reach of the artillery of the Flemish camp. Norris then returned to the charge, and the combat was renewed with greater fury than ever. He was reinforced with troops sent him from the camp, and both parties, being nearly equal, seemed determined to die or conquer.

This gallant Englishman animated his army by his own example, and had three horses killed under him. The Scots, impatient of the heat fought in their shirts, and astonished the enemy with the singularity of their appearance. In the mean time, a body of troops, which had been placed in ambush, attacked the Spaniards in flank, and Bossut continued to fire upon them incessantly with his artillery. They must all have perished, had not the prince of Parma obtained liberty from Don John to advance at the head of the cavalry to their relief. By his superior prudence, he would have prevented this inconsiderate enterprise; and now, by his prudence and bravery united, he saved the troops from those fatal consequences, to which, through their own and the general's confidence, they had been exposed. About nine hundred men, however, fell on the field of battle, and a considerable number were taken prisoners.

Don John having thus failed in his attempt, and being sensible that he could not, with his present army, keep the field against the numerous forces that were ready to pour in upon him from France and Germany, retreated with the resolution of acting for the future on the defensive only, and pitched his camp under the fortifications of Namur.

Battle of Rimenant.

The prince of Parma.

The Spaniards repulsed by the English.

August 1st.

^a Bentivoglio, book x. Strabo, l. iii. Meteren, p. 225. Thuanus, lib. lxvi. sect. xii.

1578.
Treaty of
the States
with Anjou.

The States concluded about this time their treaty with the duke of Anjou, which consisted of the following articles :—That, under the title of protector of the Netherlands, the duke should furnish, at his own expence, ten thousand foot and two thousand horse : that all the conquests which he should make on the Flanders side of the Maese, should belong to the States ; and those on the other side, to himself : that for the accommodation of his troops, Landrecy, and Quesnoy in Hainault, and Bapaume in Artois, should be put in his possession : that the States should not enter into any agreement with Don John, without the duke's consent ; and that, in case they should hereafter think proper to elect another sovereign, they should make choice of the duke ; but that in the mean time the government should remain entire in the hands of the States.

Agreeably to the first article of this treaty, Anjou had assembled a considerable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Mons, to which place the States sent a solemn embassy to intreat that he would quicken his march into the interior provinces. They intended, that their own army should unite with his, and that of Casimire, and that all the three armies should act in concert with one another, in expelling Don John, before he should receive a reinforcement from Spain or Italy. Nor was it without apparent reason that they entertained the hopes of accomplishing this design. Prince Casimire had passed the Rhine and the Maese, and advanced as far as the town of Diest, in Brabant. His army, when joined with that of the States, amounted nearly to forty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and was greatly superior to any which Don John could muster to oppose it.

But a variety of causes concurred in rendering almost useless these mighty preparations ; and a spirit of division arose, by which the people in the more fertile provinces lost for ever that liberty, for which they had so strenuously contended, at the very time when it was most in their power to secure it on a firm and permanent foundation. For although, according to the testimony of the catholic, as well as the protestant historians, nothing could exceed the prudence and moderation with which the prince of Orange conducted the affairs of government, it soon appeared, that no human wisdom was sufficient to preserve harmony and concord, where there were so many grounds of jealousy and discontent. Of this discontent and jealousy, religious bigotry was the principal, but not the only cause. Ambition and interest joined their influence to that of religion, and not only divided the people themselves into factions, the most inveterate and hostile, but created suspicion and discord between them and the foreign powers which they had called to their assistance.

The queen of England had heard, with great uneasiness, of the late treaty between the States and the duke of Anjou. She knew not, at this time, how far Henry was concerned in his brother's enterprise, nor what schemes of conquest these two princes might have formed. She considered what great advantages their neighbourhood afforded them for the execution of these schemes ; and foresaw the prejudice which might accrue to the English nation, if the Netherlands were to fall under subjection to the crown of France. In order to prevent this, and counterbalance the power and influence of Anjou, she had made such ample remittances of money to prince Casimire, as had enabled him to augment the number of his army, which consisted wholly of protestants, considerably above what the States had either expected or desired. This alarmed the jealousy of all the catholics in the Low Countries, who dreaded the approach of so great an army of re-

formers, and suspected that Casimire, in concert with Elizabeth, had conceived the design of extirpating the popish faith. They did not conceal their apprehensions. Even the prince of Orange, and other moderate protestants, joined in remonstrating with Casimire, on the necessity of his dismissing a part of his forces. But this remonstrance served only to alienate him from the prince of Orange and the council, and to render him less attentive to their instructions with regard to the conduct of the war. He was likewise highly offended with the preference which the States had given to the count of Bossut, by appointing him commander in chief of the army ; and he made them feel his resentment, by the slowness of all his military operations, and his continual demands of supplies for the payment of his troops ^b.

But the intemperate zeal and ambition of the protestants were productive of still more pernicious effects. Not satisfied with the security from persecution which they had enjoyed since the pacification of Ghent, they took courage from the great number of protestants in the army, and petitioned Matthias and the States, to be allowed to hold their religious assemblies openly in churches, and to be admitted, on the same footing with the catholics, to the several offices of government. They ought certainly to have remained silent, as they had done hitherto, till the common enemy had been expelled, and the public tranquillity established. Yet their conduct admits of some apology ; their party had greater influence now than it was likely to possess, if the catholics were delivered from their dread of the Spaniards, and they could not foresee those fatal consequences with which their application was afterwards attended.

Intemperate
zealand am-
bition of the
protestants.

But whatever judgment may be formed of their discretion, the States thought it necessary, lest the army should have proved refractory, to comply with their requests. The pacification of Ghent required that religion should remain on the same footing on which it stood at the time of that treaty, till the States of all the provinces should be assembled ; yet the States, now partially assembled, consented, not only that the protestants should have access to all public offices, but likewise that they should have churches allowed to them in every place where a hundred families resided ; upon this condition that in Holland and Zealand the same indulgence should be granted to the catholic inhabitants. To this decree they gave the name of the Peace of Religion ; and each of the provinces was left at liberty to accept or reject it as they should judge expedient.

In some cities it proved a salutary remedy for the disorders with which they were distracted ; but, in many others, it added malignity to that poison, which raged in the minds of the more violent religionists, and was the source of the most pernicious animosity and discord. It gave no contentment to the zealots of either party, but contributed to inflame them more than ever against each other, by adding fresh materials to that inveterate jealousy and rancour which their bigotry inspired, but which had been laid asleep for some time past, by their apprehensions of the common danger. The Catholics every where, but in a few cities of Flanders and Brabant, opposed the execution of this decree ; and the reformers derived little advantage from it, except in those places where they overpowered their antagonists by superior numbers. In the provinces of Artois and Hainault, where the Reformation had never made any considerable progress, the people rejected the decree with the most determined obstinacy, and refused to allow the exercise of any other re-

The un-
happy con-
sequences.

1578. ^{Discord be-} ligion but the Catholic within their territories ; while the people of Ghent and other places, in which the majority were protestants, actuated by the same intolerant and bigoted spirit, expelled the popish ecclesiastics, seized their effects, and spoiled the churches of their ornaments.

^{between the Walloons and Flemings.} Between the people of Ghent and the Walloons ^c a particular ground of enmity had subsisted, ever since the former had cast the duke d'Arscot and his attendants into prison. For most of these were persons of rank in the Walloon provinces ; and the Ghentese had not only rejected every solicitation in their behalf, but had even treated them with severity during their confinement. The Walloons were, for this reason, the more readily incensed by the accounts which they received of the late enormities committed against the catholics, which they justly regarded as a violation, on the part of the protestants, of their late engagements. Forgetful therefore of the danger which threatened them, and listening only to the voice of indignation and resentment, they began to separate themselves from the other provinces, and refused to contribute their share of the money necessary for the payment of the troops. " We took arms," said they, " to vindicate our liberty ; but what will it avail us to be delivered from the Spanish yoke, if we must submit to a yoke no less galling and intolerable, imposed upon us by our countrymen ; who, under the pretext of zeal against the tyranny of the Spaniards, shew now that their only design has been to tyrannize over us themselves ? " The other provinces represented to them the mischievous consequences with which their conduct must be attended, and accompanied their representations with prayers and threats ; but the Walloons remained inflexible, and soon afterwards they gave a striking proof of their hostile disposition, by refusing to deliver the towns of Landrecy, Quesnois, and Bapaume, to the duke of Anjou, in conformity to the treaty above recorded. Not satisfied with this, they began to prepare openly for war, and employed the contributions which had been raised for paying the army of the States, in levying forces against the Flemings. The Flemings quickly armed themselves in their defence, and several encounters happened between the Walloons and them, that were equally pernicious to both.

^{The effects of that discord} Prince Casimire's troops and those of the States had been for some time past united, and Don John was not possessed of a force sufficient to oppose them ; but the factious and refractory spirit of the Walloons and Flemings had diffused itself into almost every

part of the Netherlands, except the provinces of Holland and Zealand. Many cities withheld their contributions, and the army was extremely ill provided with every thing necessary to render the operations of the campaign effectual. Bossut's principal object was to compel the enemy to a general engagement ; and for this purpose, after taking two or three towns of little consequence, he led his troops within view of the camp in which Don John had entrenched himself under the fortifications of Namur. With an army so much superior in number to the enemy, the count might have forced the entrenchments ; but being neither furnished with pioneers, cannon, or a sufficient quantity of ammunition, and finding Don John unalterably determined to keep within his camp, he was obliged to retire. His troops, in the mean time, were highly discontented, on account of their want of pay. His discipline was unavoidably relaxed. The country was oppressed and plundered. Casimire accepted of an invitation from the Ghentese to assist them with a part of his forces against the Walloons. It became dangerous to keep the remainder of the army any longer in the

^c The natives of Artois, Hainault, and the other southern provinces.

neighbourhood of the Spanish camp, and it was soon afterwards found impracticable to support it. A part of the troops therefore was disbanded, and the rest were put into garrison in the fortified towns 1578.

The duke of Anjou's army was not better provided with the means of subsistence than that of the States, and its operations were equally insignificant. Conscious of his inability to fulfil his engagement, Anjou grasped at those pretexts for eluding them, which the conduct of Casimire, and that of the Walloons, afforded him. He complained bitterly of the treatment which he received from the latter, who not only refused him admittance into the towns which the States had promised for the accommodation of his troops, but shewed themselves no less unwilling to furnish him with provisions, than if he had come to invade, and not to protect and defend them. He seems likewise to have suspected, and not without some reason, that Casimire had formed some private designs, inconsistent with that establishment which he himself had in view in the southern provinces ; and that he had carried his troops to the assistance of the people of Ghent, in order to pave the way for executing those designs. He therefore refused to join his army with that of Bossut, unless Casimire should return to it ; and when Matthias and the prince of Orange failed in their endeavours to prevail on Casimire (to whom the Ghentese had advanced a considerable sum of money, to induce him to remain with them), Anjou broke up his camp, and suffered a part of his army to go over to the baron de Montigny, who was commander in chief at that time of the forces of the Walloons^d.

Such was the conclusion of this campaign, and such the issue of all the mighty preparations which the States had made for a vigorous prosecution of the war. The people themselves, instead of uniting their efforts against the common enemy, wage war with one another, in violation of the most solemn engagements, into which they had entered only a few months before ; and the princes, who had undertaken to deliver the Flemings from the Spanish yoke, enlist themselves, in opposition to each other, under the banners of those inveterate factions, which threaten this unhappy people with destruction.

Casimire went over to England to justify his conduct to Elizabeth, and Anjou sent an ambassador to the States to make an apology for his, by representing, that his troops had joined those of Montigny without his consent ; but that the States had no reason to dread the consequences of that step, since the Ghentese would be thereby more easily restrained from their excesses. The States, thinking it prudent to dissemble their resentment, admitted of his apology ; and, that they might still remain on friendly terms with him, they assured his ambassadors, that they had a just sense of gratitude for the efforts which the duke had made in their behalf ; that, as soon as possible, they would refund his expences ; and that, if they should ever find it necessary to elect another prince, in the place of the king of Spain, they would make him an offer of the sovereignty.

During the course of the transactions that have been related, Don John had kept his troops within their camp at Namur. They might now have left it without danger ; but Don John had been seized, some weeks before, with a violent illness, which cut him off before he had reached the thirtieth year of his age. His death was by some ascribed to poison ; but, according to others, it was owing partly to disease, and partly to that chagrin which he conceived from the negligence with which his repeated applications for money and troops were treated by the Spanish ministers. Fond to excess of military glory, and conscious of

Conclusion
of the cam-
paign.

^d Meteren, p. 233. Grotius, p. 60.

Death of
Don John
of Austria.

^{1578.}
October. talents which would probably have ensured success, he lamented bitterly the necessity which the weakness of his army imposed upon him, of remaining so long inactive, and solicited his brother for a reinforcement with the most earnest importunity. Nor was it only because Philip was averse to a vigorous prosecution of the war, that he deferred complying with his request. After that renown, which Don John acquired in the battle of Lepanto, his conduct, as above related, contained so clear a discovery of his views, as could not but alarm the suspicious temper of the King, who thenceforth kept a watchful eye upon all his brother's most secret motions ; and when he sent him to the Netherlands, resolved never to intrust him with such a numerous army as might enable him to execute any ambitious design. Philip's suspicions, during his brother's residence in the Low Countries, were kept perpetually awake, by reports of his having formed a design of marrying the queen of Scots. To these reports Philip gave credit, perhaps too easily. By his orders, Don John's secretary Es- covedo, who had fomented his master's ambition, was privately put to death. It was believed by many, that he issued the like orders with regard to his brother, and that this young heroic prince died of poison, given him by certain popish ecclesiastics, instigated by the court of Spain. But whatever ground there was for this persuasion, there is little room to doubt that, from jealousy of his brother, more than any other cause, Philip withheld the supplies necessary for carrying on the war. And to this circumstance the troops of the States were indebted for their preservation from that ruin, to which their divisions had exposed them^d.

^d Meteren, p. 234. Grotius, &c.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XV.

DON JOHN having on his death-bed appointed the prince of Parma to succeed him, his choice was soon afterwards approved, and ratified by the king.

1578.
The prince
of Parma
governor.

This young prince had, on many occasions since his arrival in the Netherlands, given proof of consummate prudence, and the most intrepid valour. Temperate, vigilant, and indefatigable, he could descend to the most minute detail in all military operations, and was always the first to expose himself to toil and danger, and the last to retire. Pliant in his manners, and insinuating in his address ; he could speak most of the European languages, and accommodate himself to the soldiers of all the different nations of which the army was composed. He possessed a vigour of bodily constitution equal to that of his mind, joined with an elevated martial air and aspect, which served, in time of battle, to fill the enemy with terror, and to inspire his own troops with courage and confidence of success.

His charac-
ter.

He had no sooner performed the last offices of his friend and kinsman, than he applied himself assiduously to fulfil the duties of that important station to which he was now advanced. While the army of the States remained in the field, he was obliged, through the smallness of his numbers, to follow the same plan which his predecessor had pursued, and to keep his little army strongly fortified within their camp ; but when, from the causes above explained, not only the army of the States, but likewise the Germans and French under Casimire and Anjou, were all either disbanded, or put into winter-quarters, Farnese, considering this as the proper season for action, resolved to undertake the siege of some important place, by the acquisition of which he might increase his resources for carrying on the war.

He hesitated for some time, whether he should enter first upon the siege of Maestricht, or that of Antwerp. The benefit which he would have derived from the possession of the latter of these places, was greater than any which could arise from that of the former ; as Antwerp was the prin-

1579. Capital seat of wealth and commerce in the Netherlands, and was situated in the most advantageous manner for prosecuting the conquest of the maritime provinces ; but having weighed attentively the difficulties to be surmounted in the siege of a place of so great extent and strength as Antwerp, he wisely resolved to begin with the siege of Maestricht, in which he could engage with fewer forces, and a greater probability of success ^a.

In order to conceal his design from the States, he directed his march towards Antwerp, and had a sharp encounter with a body of French and British forces, which were sent out to obstruct his approach. These he forced to retire under the fortifications of the city ; immediately after which he turned back suddenly, and invested Maestricht, before the States had time to furnish that town with the necessary supplies of stores and provisions.

The inhabitants were not numerous in proportion to the extent of the place ^b ; but it was strongly fortified, and the want of numbers was abundantly supplied by the martial spirit

^{He lays siege to Maestricht.} of the people, who, being exposed by their situation to frequent invasions from foreign enemies, were well accustomed to the use of arms. About fifteen hundred of them were enrolled ; and by these, and a thousand regular troops, together with two thousand of the country people, who served as pioneers, Maestricht was defended for almost four months, against an army of fifteen thousand foot and four thousand horse, the best disciplined and bravest troops in Europe, whose operations were directed by the greatest military genius of the age. Amongst the besieged there were two persons, Schwartzenbourg de Herle, a Fleming, and Tappin, a Frenchman, who conducted the defence with a degree of wisdom and intrepidity that excited universal admiration and applause.

The prince of Parma, having arrived before the town in the beginning of March, sent Mondragone, with a part of the army,

^{Conduct of the siege.} to the east side of the river, to invest the town of Vich ; whilst he himself remained on the other side, where he intended to make his principal attack. His first object was to prevent the States from introducing any supplies or reinforcements. With this view, he shut up the Maese with two bridges of boats, one above and the other below the town, and drew quite round his camp, on both sides of the river, strong lines of circumvallation. Immediately after taking this precaution, he began to make his approach to the walls by trenches. The garrison had the courage to make several sallies, by which his operations were retarded. At length, however, when by perseverance, and the power of superior numbers, his trenches were sufficiently advanced, he planted two batteries, one against the gate of Tongres, and the other against the curtain, between the gate of Hoxter and that of the Cross. While the batteries were played off with great success, the Royalists pushed forward the trenches, and were ready to enter into the ditch. The breach at the gate of Tongres was the first made practicable, and Farnese resolved to assault it with a select body of troops, drawn from the several nations of which his army was composed. By thus mingling them together, he inflamed their ardour and emulation ; but they met with equal ardour on the part of their opponents, and, after an obstinate and bloody conflict, were obliged to retire.

^a Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

^b It is five Italian miles in circumference.

The prince, believing that this first attempt had failed through the smallness of the breach, renewed the fire of his batteries with redoubled fury, and prepared for a second attack. In order to weaken the garrison by dividing it, he resolved to make an assault at each of the two breaches at the same time. His troops advanced in the face of the enemy's cannon, with the most undaunted intrepidity. The besieged stood undismayed till they approached, and nothing could exceed the fury with which both parties began the combat. Their fire-arms soon ceased to be of use to them ; for they came immediately to close fight, in which they could employ only their pikes and swords. In one of the breaches De Herle, and in the other Tappin, gave the most splendid proofs of capacity and valour. The assailants, enraged at meeting with such obstinate resistance from an enemy so much inferior in number, exerted their utmost vigour to overpower them. The action was furious and desperate. The ruins of the wall, and the ground on both sides, were strewed with the dead and dying. Stones hurled down from the bulwarks, and artificial fires, which the besieged launched among the assailants, increased the confusion. Those fires happened to lay hold of the barrels of gunpowder which stood near for the use of the combatants. The explosion was terrible, and many on both sides perished by this fatal accident. The air resounded with cries, and shrieks, and groans. The earth was covered with mangled carcasses ; yet those who survived still maintained their ground with the same unconquerable obstinacy as before, and, from the horrid scene which lay around them, seemed only to derive fresh rage and fury. The prince of Parma gave orders at last, with much reluctance, for sounding a retreat. The resolution and fortitude of the besieged, he perceived, were not to be overcome. Even if he could have mounted the breach, and kept possession of it, this would not have availed him, as other fortifications had been raised within, which rendered the town almost as impregnable as before.

Upon reviewing his troops, the prince found that many of his best officers had fallen, and that the regiments of Spanish veterans were extremely diminished. He soon completed his numbers, by making draughts from the garrisons of the towns in his possession. But when he reflected on the character of the besieged, he perceived the necessity of laying aside all thoughts of taking the town by storm, and resolved to content himself with the slower method of undermining the fortifications, employing for this purpose a prodigious number of pioneers, and taking effectual care, in the mean time, to render it impossible for the besieged to receive any reinforcement or supplies.

The States were not neglectful of the preservation of a place, where both the garrison and inhabitants had shewn themselves so worthy of their attention. Having some time before received the celebrated La Noue into their service, they had appointed him governor of Maestricht, and given him the charge of conducting thither the reinforcements which they intended for the relief of the besieged. Nothing was omitted by La Noue to fulfil their expectations ; but so pernicious were the consequences of that spirit of discord, which still raged as furiously as ever, between the protestants and Catholics, that, although the council of state, seconded by the prince of Orange, gave him all the assistance in their power, he was never able to collect a force sufficient to execute his purpose. The situation therefore of the besieged was become extremely deplorable. The garrison, which in the beginning of the siege consisted of a thousand men, was now reduced to four hundred, and the citizens and country-people had suffered a proportionable diminution.

1579.
Brave defence
of Maestricht.

The States
attempt in
vain to re-
lieve it.

1579. Their provisions began to fail, and their store of gunpowder was nearly exhausted.

Their distresses were much augmented towards the middle of June, by their loss of a ravelin, which had enabled them to give great annoyance to the enemy. To acquire possession of this ravelin had been the chief object of the prince of Parma's operations for several weeks ; and, though he met with the most spirited resistance, he at length accomplished his design, and could, with a large cavalier which he constructed, overlook the walls, and scour the town with his guns, almost from the one end to the other. Still however the besieged, animated by the hopes of relief, refused to capitulate.

But the siege was brought to a conclusion much sooner than either of the two contending parties had reason to expect. On the 29th of June, it was suspected by some Spanish soldiers, that

Maestricht taken by surprise. the wonted vigilance of the garrison was relaxed. In order to know the truth with certainty, these men crept silently to the top of the rampart, and found that the defendants were not only few in number, but overpowered with fatigue and heat, and buried in sleep. Of this they carried information to the general ; who, without delay, ordered such of his troops as were nearest, to ascend the rampart with as little noise as possible. They were immediately followed by all the rest of the army. The garrison were thus suddenly overwhelmed, and almost all of them were put to the sword. The inhabitants fought desperately ; but they sunk at last under the superior force of the assailants, who spared neither sex nor age ; and continued the slaughter, till of eight thousand citizens, only three hundred remained. De Herle escaped by disguising himself in the habit of a menial servant ; and Farnese issued strict orders to spare the life of the valiant Tappin ^c.

The prince of Orange labours to quell the tumults in Ghent. During the siege of Maestricht, various political negotiations were carried on by the opposite parties. The prince of Orange had at this time the chief direction of all the measures that were pursued by the States and council ; Matthias having, from a consciousness of his own want of experience, left the entire administration in his hands. The dissensions between the Walloons and Flemings had from the beginning given him deep concern, and he had omitted nothing in his power to heal them. Among the Walloons he had little influence, by reason of their abhorrence of his religion, and the jealousy which they had conceived of his designs. On the other hand, the Ghentese, who in that age, were noted for their turbulent and seditious spirit, had been wrought up by certain factious leaders to a degree of madness, and were long deaf to all the remonstrances which he could employ. St. Aldegond, whom he sent to deal with them, exerted, but in vain, all the address and eloquence for which he was so highly celebrated. The interposition of Matthias and the States was equally ineffectual. Nor did they pay any greater regard to the representations and threats of Elizabeth, who sent over an ambassador ^d on the purpose to persuade them. At length the prince of Orange went himself to treat with them. They had lately inveighed against him, with great severity, for his moderation towards the catholics ; and had suffered some of their preachers to arraign him on this account, as insincere in his religious profession. But, being flattered with that regard and confidence of which his present visit was expressive, they resumed their wonted affection to his person ; and, after he had staid among them some weeks, they complied with the several requests

^c BENTIVOLIO, part. ii. lib. i. Meteren, lib. ix.

^d MR. DAVIDSON.

which they had hitherto rejected. They consented to make restitution of the goods of which they had plundered the popish ecclesiastics ; permitted the re-establishment of the rites and ceremonies of the Romish church, forbade all abusive language, whether in the pulpit or in private assemblies, and engaged to yield a more prompt obedience for the future to the authority of the States. 1579.

It soon however appeared, that nothing but William's personal influence had induced them to make these concessions. In a few months afterwards, being incited by the same factious leaders to whom they had formerly listened, they indulged themselves in the most unjustifiable excesses ; they plundered the churches and monasteries, expelled the ecclesiastics from the town, and seized their effects, which they distributed among the Germans, whom they had called to their assistance against the Walloons. These and other enormities occasioned the prince of Orange to visit the Ghentese a second time ; when they made him an offer of the government of the province. He prudently declined accepting this offer ; but having again employed all his influence to quash the present dissensions in the city, he succeeded so far as to be able to compel Imbise the chief magistrate, together with his factious adherents, to leave the city. He likewise put the magistracy into the hands of the more moderate reformers, set at liberty such of the Walloon nobility as were still in prison, and procured for the catholic inhabitants, liberty of private worship, and security from molestation ^f.

William laboured with no less earnestness to assuage the resentment of the Walloons, who, although they had not been the first aggressors, persisted in their hostile disposition, with the most unconquerable obstinacy. By the artifices of Matthew de Moulard, bishop of Arras, the count de La Lain, the marquis de Roubais, and others of the nobility, who beheld with deep malignity William's unrivalled credit and authority, the people had conceived the most incurable suspicions, that, far from being actuated by a disinterested attachment to the civil or religious liberty of the provinces, he intended only his own exaltation, and was preparing to establish it upon the ruins of the catholic faith. They lent a deaf ear therefore to every plan of accommodation that was proposed, either by the prince himself, or by Matthias and the States ; who, they knew, were entirely directed by his counsels ^g.

The prince of Parma was too sagacious not to discern the advantage which this disposition of the Walloons afforded him, for drawing them back to their allegiance. Soon after the death of Don John of Austria, he had, for this purpose, begun a negotiation with their leaders ; upon which he had bestowed particular attention, in the midst of those military occupations in which the siege of Maestricht had engaged him. In order to frustrate his endeavours, the prince of Orange and the States remonstrated to the Walloons on the infidelity which would be justly imputed to them, if they should enter into any separate terms of agreement ; and represented to them the danger to which they would thereby expose *themselves*, as well as the other provinces, of being again enthralled by the Spaniards. The Walloons could not entirely divest themselves of the scruples, which these remonstrances were calculated to excite ; nor were they free from those apprehensions of the Spanish tyranny, by which the other provinces were so much disquieted. They had not forgot the scenes of treachery and violence, of which they had been so often witnesses ; and found it difficult to rely on the promises of those,

The prince
of Parma
gains over
the Wal-
loons.

^e Thuanus, lib. lxvi.

^f Grotius, lib. iii.

^g Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 20.

1579 whose insincerity they had so frequently experienced. On the other hand, their bigotry, joined with the inveterate jealousy which the nobility entertained of the prince of Orange, formed an insurmountable obstacle against any agreement with the Flemings. That hatred with which they had been long actuated against the Spaniards, began to yield to a more implacable aversion against the protestants ; and in this they were confirmed by the address of the bishop of Arras, and the other agents of the prince of Parma ; whose proposals of accommodation they were now inclined to embrace, provided it could be done consistently with those solemn engagements, under which they had lately come to the other provinces. To these engagements, according to the sense in which they themselves understood them, they adhered with inflexible fidelity ; and persisted to the last in requiring that all foreign troops should be immediately dismissed ; that the pacification of Ghent should be fully executed ; and that Philip should recognise their right to form alliances either within or without the Netherlands, in case of any infraction, on his part, of the articles of this pacification.

The Spanish
and Italian
troops sent
out of the
Netherlands.

Of their several demands, there was none which the prince of Parma found it so difficult to digest, as that of sending away the foreign troops. Their place, he knew, could not be supplied by the undisciplined forces of the country : and he dreaded that he should be obliged to abandon the plan which he had formed, for subduing the maritime provinces. The king, to whom he applied for precise instructions, was no less averse to this concession. But Philip, considering the recovery of the Walloons (the most warlike of all the inhabitants of the Netherlands) as a matter of the last importance ; especially in the present juncture, when his exchequer was drained by the expence which he had incurred in the conquest of Portugal ; and hoping, that by the indulgent measures which he had resolved to espouse in his treatment of the Walloons, he should be able ere long to obtain their consent to whatever he should require of them, he sent orders to Farnese to hasten the conclusion of the treaty ; and it was accordingly concluded in the following terms : That all foreign troops in the service of the king, should leave the Netherlands in six weeks, and never return thither without the consent of the Walloon provinces : that an army of national troops should be levied, to the payment of which the king might apply the subsidies to be granted by the States. that all persons in public offices should take an oath to maintain the catholic religion : that all the privileges of the provinces should remain inviolate : and that the government should be preserved in the same form in which it had been left by the late emperor when he resigned his dominions^b.

May 17th. This treaty was signed, on the part of the provinces, only by the deputies of French Flanders, Artois, and Hainault. The other provinces were not called, as Luxemburg had never concurred in any of the late transactions ; and the greatest part of Limburg and Namur had already submitted to the king's authority.

The union
of Utrecht.

The prince of Orange, no stranger to the secret motives of the leading men among the Walloons, having foreseen that this agreement would certainly take place, had, in order to provide a counterpoise against it, set on foot a new treaty of alliance among the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Guelderland, Friesland, Brabant, and Flanders. This alliance was called the Union of Utrecht, from the place where it was brought to a conclusion. It may justly be considered as the

^b Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

first foundation of the republic of the United Provinces. It is still regarded as containing the fundamental laws of the constitution, and proves its author, by the wisdom, moderation, and extensive views which it discovers. It contains neither any avowal, nor any express renunciation of their allegiance to Philip ; but the provinces tacitly assume to themselves the sovereign authority, and lodge it partly in the general assembly of the States, and partly in the States of the several provinces. The principal articles of this confederacy are those which follow : “ That the several provinces contracting, unite themselves together in one political body, renouncing for ever the power of separating from each other ; but reserving each to itself all the rights which it possessed before.

“ That the said provinces shall assist each other to repel the attacks of any foreign power ; and, in particular, to repel whatever violence may be offered to any of the contracting parties, in the name of the king of Spain, under the pretext of establishing the catholic religion, or on account of any transaction in the Netherlands since the year 1558 ; leaving it always to the generality of the union to determine in what proportion each province shall be obliged to furnish its supplies, either of money or of troops.

“ That in Holland and Zealand, no religion but that which is already established shall be openly professed ; and that the other provinces shall be at liberty to allow either of the protestant religion, or the catholic, or both, as they themselves shall judge expedient : that restitution shall be made of the effects which belonged to the convents and churches ; in all the provinces, except those of Holland and Zealand ; and in these, that pensions shall be appointed to the popish ecclesiastics, to be paid them wheresoever they reside

“ That all frontier and other towns, which the general and provincial States shall think proper to fortify, shall be fortified at the joint expence of the generality, and of the particular province in which they lie : but if the General States shall on any occasion think proper to build new forts, without the consent of the particular province in which they lie, the generality shall furnish the whole expence.

“ That all fortified towns shall be obliged to receive such garrisons as the generality shall appoint, on condition that the troops shall, besides their oath of allegiance to the General States, take a particular oath to the province and town in which they are stationed.

“ That the General States shall not conclude any peace or truce, nor undertake any war, nor impose any taxes, without the consent of the majority of all the provinces and towns of the union ; and that on the other hand, no town or province shall enter into any alliance with any foreign prince or power, without consent of the generality.

“ That in case any Prince or State shall incline to accede to this alliance, he may be admitted, with the consent of all the members of the confederacy.

“ That all the male inhabitants of the provinces, from the age of eighteen to that of sixty, shall, in a month after the publication of the present treaty, inscribe their names in a register to be laid before the General States at their first assembly, to assist them in judging what forces each province is able to furnish.

“ That, in order to procure the money necessary for the support of the forces, all the taxes shall be farmed out publicly, to those who shall make the highest offer ; and lastly, that the said taxes shall be heightened or lowered, according as the General States shall judge the exigencies of the confederacy to require.”

This confederacy was not immediately attended with those advantages

1579. which it was designed and calculated to produce. It behoved the religious parties to experience, for some time longer, the mischievous effects of their intemperate zeal and bigotry, before they could live at peace. In several places, the people were still agitated by the most violent animosity against one another. In Bois-le-duc, the protestants and papists took arms, and coming to blows, had several hundreds of their number killed. Soon after this, the protestants, being seized with a sudden panic, abandoned the town to their enemies, who immediately submitted to the Spaniards.

Violence of
the protest-
ants.

In Antwerp, where the protestant party was the most powerful, the people insulted the popish ecclesiastics, when employed in one of the solemn processions of their religion ; and in spite of Matthias and the prince of Orange, who interposed their authority to protect them, they obliged them to leave the city.

Count Eg-
mont's at-
tempt on
Brussels.

These violences, which the reformers, impelled by their religious zeal, exercised in Antwerp and other places, served only more easily to reconcile the catholics to the Spanish government ; and contributed not a little to make several of the nobility forsake the party of the States. Among these was count Egmont, son of the great unfortunate count Egmont. This young nobleman had hitherto distinguished himself by his zeal against the Spaniards : but resolving now to make his peace with them, he attempted, with a regiment of Walloons, to render himself master of Brussels. in order to deliver it to Farnese ; and he succeeded so far in his design, as to get possession of one of the gates, and introduce his troops into the city. The citizens ran instantly to arms ; and, being joined by some regular forces in the service of the States, they quickly recovered the gate by a singular stratagem. Having driven violently towards it some waggons loaded with hay and straw, they set fire to these combustible materials, and the wind blowing the flame and smoke towards count Egmont's soldiers, they were obliged to betake themselves to flight. The whole inhabitants had, in the mean time, got under arms, and Egmont, with the rest of his men, was shut up in the market-place, hemmed in on every side, and without any prospect of deliverance. There they remained during that day and the night following ; neither of the two parties being inclined to begin hostilities. The citizens mean while indulged their resentment, by reproaching the count with his treachery, in forsaking those who had taken arms to revenge his father's death ; calling out to him, that only eleven years before, on the same day of the year, and in the very place where he then stood, his father had died a martyr for that cause, which he now wanted so basely to betray. This bitter remembrance drew tears from the young man's eyes. The people were moved with that compassion for the son which they owed to the memory of the father, and consented to suffer him and his troops to leave the town.

Conferences
for peace at
Cologn.

During the course of these transactions, conferences for reconciling the Netherlands to Philip were held in the city of Cologn, at the request and under the mediation of the emperor, the pope, and the electors of Treves and Cologn.

thither Castagna, archbishop of Rossano, who afterwards attained the papal dignity, and assumed the name of Urban VII. The chief of the emperor's embassy was count Schwartzenburg. Philip named the duke de Terra Nuova for his ambassador, and the duke d'Arschot was at the head of the deputies from the States. From this nomination of persons of so great eminence and distinction, superficial observers were apt to imagine, that the negociation committed to them could not fail to be brought to the

desired conclusion, but this was not the judgment of persons of greater penetration. They considered, not only that the prince of Orange, and the other popular leaders by whom the States were governed, had already gone too far to expect forgiveness from the unrelenting temper of the king ; but that the opinions of the reformers were more widely diffused, and their zeal, if possible, more ardent than ever. And as there was no reason to believe that they would ever be persuaded to abandon their religion, so there was little ground to hope that Philip's bigotry would suffer him to agree to any terms of peace, whilst they adhered to it. It was in reality this cause chiefly, by which the present negociation, as well as all preceding ones, was frustrated. Philip acted on this occasion with his usual duplicity, and gave private instructions to his ambassador, of very different import from those which had been communicated to the emperor^k. At first, he seemed willing to ratify the pacification of Ghent ; and by one of the articles of that treaty, religion was to remain on its present footing, till a general assembly of the States should alter it. But in the course of the conferences it appeared, that the re-establishment of popery was a condition without which he would agree to no accommodation. Neither would he consent to the convoking of the assembly of the States, nor to the ratifying the election of Matthias ; and he still insisted peremptorily, that all cities, forts, and military stores, should be immediately delivered into the hands of the prince of Parma. In a word, the terms offered on this occasion were, in every material article, the same with those which had been formerly rejected by the provinces of Holland and Zealand, when they stood alone, and unsupported by the other provinces ; and therefore it is difficult to suppose that Philip could, from the beginning, have intended any thing by the present negociation, but to gratify the pope and emperor, at whose desire it was begun.

Before the dissolution of this congress, however, he humbled himself so far as to make private offers to the prince of Orange. These were, the payment of his debts, the restitution of his estates, a compensation for the losses which he had sustained during the war, and the liberty of his son the count of Buren, upon whom, if the prince himself should incline to retire into Germany, the king promised to bestow the government of Holland and Utrecht. These offers were made in Philip's name by count Schwartzenburg, who pledged his faith for the strict performance of them. William could not but be flattered with the testimony which was thus given, by an enemy so great and powerful, of the dread that was entertained of his abilities. But being superior to the allurements of interest, he preferred the glory of saving from slavery a people who confided in his integrity, to all the advantages which he or his family could have derived from the favour of the king. "He would listen to no proposal," he said, "that related to himself only. He was conscious, that, in all his conduct, he had been animated by a disinterested affection towards the public good ; and no consideration would induce him to enter into any agreement, from which the States and people were excluded : but if *their* just claims were satisfied, he would not reject any terms for himself, which his conscience and honour would suffer him to accept !."

Soon after this the congress was dissolved ; and no other effect was produced by it, except that the duke d'Arschot, and some other deputies of the States, embraced the opportunity with which it furnished them, of reconciling themselves to the king.

Philip attempts to gain over the prince of Orange.

Dissolution of the congress.

^k Strada, lib. v.

^l Reidanus, p. 29. Grotius, p. 66.

^{1579.} The negociations for peace did not entirely interrupt the operations of the war. By the assistance of the catholic inhabitants, the prince of Parma acquired possession of Mechlin ; and some time afterwards of Villebrock. These losses were compensated to the States, by some acquisitions which their forces made under the count of Renneberg ; who, besides reducing the province of Friesland, made himself master of Deventer and Groningen. In the southern provinces, the Flemings and Walloons were engaged in perpetual hostilities against one another ; but no exploit was performed by either party, sufficiently interesting and important to deserve to be recorded.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVI.

DURING the course of the preceding transactions in the Netherlands, Philip was assiduously employed in preparing to assert his State of Portugal claim to the kingdom of Portugal, an object fitted to inflame a more moderate ambition than that of Philip, and worthy of all the attention and expence which he bestowed in order to acquire it. Under a succession of kings, who placed their glory in promoting commerce among their subjects, and in making discoveries in the remotest regions of the globe, the Portuguese had attained a degree of consideration among the European nations, from which the narrow limits of the kingdom, and the neighbourhood of the Spanish monarchy, seemed for ever to exclude them. Besides establishing settlements in Africa, and the adjacent islands, they had doubled the Cape of Good Hope, which no European mariners had ever attempted, and had penetrated boldly into almost every corner of the great eastern ocean, discovering lands till then unknown, and founding cities, with a view to the advancement of their trade. And not satisfied with their acquisitions in the East, they had turned their arms towards America, and planted in Brasil that valuable colony of which they still retain possession.

John the Third, the last of those great kings under whose government the Portuguese performed such mighty achievements, died several years before the present period, leaving his throne to Sebastian, his grandson, who was then only three years old. This young prince gave early indications of many splendid accomplishments, which excited in the minds of the Portuguese the most sanguine hopes of a prosperous and happy reign; but unfortunately for himself, as well as for his people, he was animated with the most chimerical ambition, which led him not to imitate the example of his illustrious ancestors, by studying to promote the true happiness of his subjects, but prompted him to extend his dominions, in order to propagate the Romish faith.

This passion was cherished in him by Don Alexis de Menezes, his governor, and Lewis de Camarra, a jesuit, his tutor or instructor; the former of whom was perpetually celebrating the praises

Don Sebastian.

His roman-
tic ambi-
tion.

1579. of his predecessors, on account of their victories over the Moors in Africa and the Indies ; while the latter impressed his young mind with a persuasion, that it was the first duty of a Christian king, and the most acceptable service which he could perform to the Deity, to extend the knowledge of the true religion. By these means, his ambition was inflamed to a degree of madness ; and, in order to accomplish that design which appeared so meritorious and honourable, he once resolved to sail with a fleet and army to India : nor could his courtiers persuade him to relinquish that romantic project, till they proposed that, in place of it, he should undertake an expedition against the Mahometans in Africa. From this enterprise likewise his wisest counsellors laboured with much solicitude to divert him ; but their exhortations proved ineffectual. Sebastian adhered to his purpose with inflexible obstinacy and exerted himself, with great activity, in making preparations for carrying it into execution.

In the midst of these preparations an opportunity presented State of Morocco. itself, which he considered as a declaration of Heaven in favour of his design. On the death of Abdalla, king of Morocco, his son, Muley Mahomet, had seized upon the crown, in contradiction to an established law of succession, that the kingdom should devolve to the brother of the deceased king. A civil war ensued, and Mahomet, after having lost several pitched battles, was compelled to leave his uncle, Muley Moluc, a prince of great abilities and virtues, in possession of the throne. After attempting in vain to engage Philip to espouse his cause, Mahomet applied to Sebastian, and offered, if he would reinstate him in his dominions, to put certain towns into his hands, and to become tributary to the crown of Portugal.

Sebastian resolves to invade Morocco. Sebastian listened to these offers with the utmost pleasure, and readily engaged to pass over himself to Africa with a fleet and army.

To enable him to fulfil this engagement, he solicited assistance in troops from his uncle the king of Spain, from some Italian powers, and (which shews how anxious he was to insure success) from the prince of Orange.

In answer to the application which he made to Philip, that monarch proposed an interview with him, in the town of Guadaloupe in Castile. Sebastian agreed to this proposal ; and the Spanish historians relate, that, in the interview which was held soon afterwards, Philip endeavoured to dissuade him from his intended enterprise ; but that, having found him inflexible, he promised, before they parted, to assist him with fifty gallies and five thousand men. They add, that not long after, Philip dreading that the great number of Turks in the service of Muley-Moluc might reduce Morocco under the dominion of the Sultan, made an offer of his friendship to that prince, who, being likewise under apprehensions of danger from the Turks, gladly accepted of it, and entered into the proposed alliance. The same historians inform us, that about this time Philip obtained, through the intercession of the Venetians, a truce of three years from the Sultan ; and that he was prompted to humble himself so far, as thus to treat with the inveterate enemies of Christianity (which he had never vouchsafed to do before), by the anxiety which he entertained with regard to the transactions in the Netherlands ^a.

The prince of Orange was not less anxious concerning the issue of these transactions, yet his conduct was extremely different from that of Philip ; whether it proceeded from his native magnanimity, joined with a desire of giving proof, in the sight of all Europe, of the strength of the confederate

provinces, or from the hopes of securing Sebastian's friendship to the confederacy in some future period ; by whichsoever of these motives William was influenced on this occasion, he gave the kindest reception to Da Costa, the Portuguese ambassador, and afterwards sent three thousand Germans to the assistance of Sebastian ^b.

These troops, with ten thousand Portuguese, and some Italians and Spaniards that were sent him by Philip, notwithstanding his ^{His army.} late treaty with Muley-Moluc, made up an army of fifteen thousand men. With this army, and a great number of pioneers, Sebastian set sail from Portugal in the beginning of summer one thousand five hundred and seventy-eight, and landed them all safe at Arzile and Tangiers, where he was joined by Mahomet, the exiled king, with a body of Moorish ^{He arrives in Morocco.} troops.

Muley-Moluc, having received early intelligence of his design, had endeavoured to divert him from it, by offering him certain territories adjacent to those sea-coast towns in Africa which belonged to the crown of Portugal. This heroic prince had been the more solicitous to prevent Sebastian's invasion, because he laboured under an inveterate disease, which he believed would soon prove mortal ; and he was desirous to leave his dominions in peace to his brother, whom he considered as his rightful heir. But when he found Sebastian deaf to his proposal, he had exerted all his native vigour in preparing for his defence, and had drawn together an army consisting of more than sixty thousand horse and foot.

With this army he advanced towards the enemy, and when he had arrived within a few miles of their camp, as he doubted the fidelity of a part of his troops who had formerly been attached to the interest of his nephew, he published a proclamation, giving liberty to all, who should incline, to pass over to the Portuguese. But few of them embraced this opportunity which was offered them. His magnanimity, and other virtues, had overcome their attachment to Mahomet, and determined them faithfully to support their present sovereign.

Sebastian was earnestly intreated by his most experienced officers, and by Mahomet, who was greatly discouraged at seeing so small a desertion from his uncle's army, to keep within his intrenchments, near the sea-coast, and not to expose his troops to the risk of a battle ; but that obstinate, imprudent prince rejected with disdain this wholesome counsel, because he thought that it savoured of timidity, and not only led out his army from the camp which he had fortified, but marched into the centre of the country to meet the enemy.

Moluc's distemper, in the mean time, had made the most rapid progress ; yet the strength of his mind was unabated. If he had not dreaded the quick approach of death, he would have been satisfied with cutting off Sebastian's communication with the ships, and as the Portuguese were badly furnished with provisions, have brought the war to a conclusion without fighting ; but he dreaded the effect which his death might produce upon his troops, and therefore resolved to bring on, as soon as possible, a general engagement. Sebastian's rashness rendered it easy for him to execute this resolution. Without regard to the great superiority of Moluc's forces, that infatuated prince ventured to advance into an open country, where the whole Moorish army, horse as well as foot, could be employed. Moluc improved with great dexterity the advantage which was thus afforded him. Having drawn up his army in the form of a half-moon, he went in his litter through all the ranks, exhorting his troops to remember, that their religion

^{Imprudence of Sebastian.}

1579. and liberty were at stake ; and assuring them, that by whatever pretext Sebastian had offered to justify his present unprovoked invasion, his real design was, to reduce the Moors to slavery, and to extirpate their religion. Then after he had given all the instructions which he thought necessary to ensure success, finding his strength almost quite spent, he committed the command of the army to his brother, and retired to a little distance from the field.

The battle was begun with a furious discharge of the artillery ;
 Battle of but the two armies came soon to close fight, and the Portuguese
 Alcazar. infantry repulsed the Moors in different places with great slaughter. In the mean time the Moorish cavalry, amounting to thirty thousand, having wheeled round from both wings, had inclosed the enemy on every quarter ; immediately after which, they attacked them on the flanks, and in the rear, while they where pursuing the advantage which they had gained over the Moorish infantry. By the Portuguese horse, a body of the Moors was repulsed, and driven towards the place to which Moluc had retired. Fired with indignation at the sight, he threw himself out of his litter, and having got on horseback, by the assistance of his attendants, he rallied his flying troops, and was about to lead them back to the field of battle. But by this exertion the small remains of his strength were entirely exhausted. His officers seeing him unable to support himself on his horse, carried him to his litter, where he fainted, and only recovered to desire that those about him would keep his death secret till the battle should be decided ; immediately after which, putting his finger on his mouth, as a further injunction of secrecy, he expired.

Death of Muley-Mo-
 luc. His charac- ter.

A more striking display of strength of mind occurs not in the annals of history. Moluc was besides endued with every amiable and respectable accomplishment, being no less conspicuous for justice and generosity, and (which were rare endowments in a native of Africa) integrity and candour, than for prudence, vigour, magnanimity, and fortitude. By his bravery and conduct he delivered his kingdom from the oppression of a tyrannical usurper ; and if he had lived, he would have advanced it to a degree of prosperity and glory to which it has never attained.

His troops remained under a persuasion, that he was still a spectator of their behaviour. Great numbers of them fell. The Portuguese, the Spaniards, and Germans, fought with the most undaunted intrepidity ; but the horse being driven upon the foot, broke their ranks, and threw them into confusion. The Moorish cavalry then passed forward in thousands on every side, and made dreadful havoc among them, till almost all of them were either slain or taken prisoners.

Sebastian himself, who still survived the fatal catastrophe, had, in the arrangement of his troops and in the beginning of the engagement, acted the part of an expert commander ; and he gave afterwards many conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valour, flying from rank to rank, encouraging and exhorting the troops ; exposing himself to every danger ; and often inpling sword in hand with the thickest of the enemy. Having had three horses killed under him and his standard-bearer slain, his soldiers, in the confusion of battle, mistook another standard for his, which they flocked round, and left their king almost alone. The Moors called out to him, that if he would surrender, they would spare his life ; " but you cannot," replied he, " preserve my honour." Then accompanied only by the count of Vimioso, Christopher Tavora, and Nunno de Mascaregnas, he threw himself into the midst of the enemy, and fought desperately, till Vimioso and Tavora fell by his side, and he himself, breathless and exhausted, and

unable any longer to wield his sword, was seized, and disarmed by the surrounding Moors. 1579.

These men quarrelled with one another concerning their royal prisoner, and from words they had recourse to arms ; when a Moorish officer coming up, put an end to the dispute, by discharging a furious stroke of his sabre on the head of the king^c.

Death of Sebastian.

In this manner perished the brave, but rash Sebastian ; whose fate affords a striking instance of the pernicious tendency of courage and ambition, when they are not tempered with prudence and moderation. About eight thousand of his troops were killed, and all the rest, except a few who escaped to Arzile and Tangiers, were reduced to slavery. Of the nobility the greatest part were slain ; and several of the most illustrious families in Portugal became extinct^d.

Don Henry, grand uncle of Sebastian, a cardinal and a priest, succeeded to the throne ; but being of a weak and sickly constitution, and far advanced in years, there was little probability either that he would live long, or that he would leave any issue behind him : and his short reign served only to give the several pretenders to his kingdom an opportunity of preparing to assert their claims to the succession.

Don Henry king of Portugal.

The candidates were seven in number : the dutchess of Braganza, the king of Spain, the duke of Savoy, Don Antonio Prior of Crato, the duke of Parma, Catherine of Medicis, and the sovereign pontiff.

Candidates for the succession.

The four first were grand-children of Emanuel the Great, father of Henry. The dutchess of Braganza was daughter of prince Edward, Emanuel's second son ; Philip was son of the empress Isabella, his eldest daughter ; the duke of Savoy, of Beatrix his younger daughter : and Don Antonio was a natural son of Lewis, who was a younger son of Emanuel, and brother to the present king. The duke of Parma was great grandson of Emanuel, by a daughter of the above-mentioned prince Edward. The Queen-mother of France founded her claim on her supposed descent from Alphonso III. who died about three hundred years before the present period ; and the pope pretended that Portugal was feudatory to the see of Rome, and belonged to him, since the male-heirs in the direct line were extinct. Gregory had conceived a violent desire to make his natural son a king, and he had once flattered himself with the hopes of making him king of Ireland, through the assistance of Philip. But as it is inconceivable how he could ever expect to persuade Philip to quit his claim, so nothing but folly or dotage could have determined him to prosecute his own, in opposition to so powerful an antagonist.

The pretensions of Catherine of Medicis, and her hopes of success, if she entertained any, were not less chimerical than those of the pope. It can hardly be believed, that this political princess, could in her present competition, have any other end in view, but to obstruct the ambitious designs of Philip, and to furnish the court of France with pretence for opposing him.

From the dukes of Savoy and Parma, Philip knew that he should not meet with opposition ; since besides that his claim was better founded than theirs, these princes were in close alliance with him, and depended much

^c The account of Sebastian's death rests entirely on the testimony of Don Nunno de Masecargas, who was an eye-witness ; nor did De Thou think there was any reason for calling it in question ; though some other authors insinuate, that Sebastian laid violent hands upon himself.

^d Mahomet, the exiled king, was drowned in attempting to make his escape ; and Hamet, Muley-Molue's brother, succeeded to the throne of Fez and Morocco.

1579. upon his support and protection. Could Don Antonio have proved his mother's marriage, his right to the throne would have been unquestionable. He attempted to prove it, but in vain. Still, however, he persisted in his purpose, and with some address and great activity, he gained over a considerable party among the people. Most of the nobility, on the other hand, and the king himself, who knew the vanity of Antonio's pretensions to legitimacy, were inclined to support the claim of the dutchess of Braganzae, whose right, they thought, was clearly preferable to that of Philip, not only because she was descended from Emanuel by a male, and Philip by a female; but because an ancient and fundamental law required, that the crown should not be inherited by a stranger.

Philip's agents at the court of Lisbon allowed, that if the dutchess of Braganza's father had been alive, his title would have been indisputable; but they maintained, that since he had died without attaining possession of the throne, nothing but the degree of consanguinity to Emanuel ought to be regarded; and that as the dutchess and he were equal in that respect, the preference was due to a male before a female. And they farther insisted, that the law which excludes strangers from inheriting the crown was not applicable to him, since Portugal had formerly belonged to the kings of Castile.

Besides these considerations, which had very little weight, except with those who were for other reasons inclined to espouse Philip's interest, the duke de Ossuna, his ambassador, endeavoured to impress the scrupulous and timid mind of Henry with a persuasion, that, in opposition to so powerful a competitor as the king of Spain, it would be impossible for the duke of Braganza to maintain possession of the throne; and that the fruits of all the glorious discoveries and conquests which had been made by his father and brother would be lost, and the kingdom itself involved in the calamities of war.

Henry's desire to prevent these unhappy consequences, determined him to proceed with great deliberation in examining the pleas of the contending parties. He consulted civilians in different parts of Europe, and called a convention of the States of the kingdom, to give him their opinion with respect to the measures proper to be pursued. The members of the convention differed widely in their sentiments from each other, and while some of them advised him, without delay, to nominate for his successor whichever of the competitors he thought fit, others exhorted him deliberately to examine the several claims that had been offered. In compliance with this last advice the candidates were cited to appear; and they all sent commissioners who pleaded the cause of the princes whom they represented, before Henry, as they would have pleaded an ordinary point of right before a civil judge.

This extraordinary trial, in which so great attention seemed to be paid to justice, was suited to the feeble and irresolute character, as well as to the habits of the king, who had spent his life in listening to the idle disputes of theologians. But his conduct was severely censured by all men of prudence and understanding. They considered that the fate of kingdoms can almost never be decided by the forms of principles of law; and they regarded this farcical trial, not only as useless for the purpose which was intended, but as calculated to divide the kingdom into factions, which must sooner or later produce a civil war.

He ought in the beginning, it was said, to have declared himself in favour of the dutchess of Braganza, whose right, according to

^e The duke of Braganza himself was sprung, though not in a direct line, from the royal blood.

the most common and obvious law of succession, was unquestionable ; and who, besides, was much more acceptable to the nation, than any other of the candidates. He ought, after this, to have caused her right to be recognised by the convention of the States, who would cheerfully have consented to acknowledge it ; he ought to have required an oath of allegiance to her, in the event of his own demise, from the army and all persons in public offices ; and then, instead of losing his precious time in consulting and deliberating, he ought to have employed it, in putting the kingdom into a posture of defence against the king of Spain. 1570.

But Henry was incapable of forming any resolution that required so much courage, vigour, and activity. He was no less attached to the dutchess of Braganza, and no less averse from Philip, than his nobility and people ; yet he still continued to deliberate as if he had expected to live for many years.

In order to extricate himself from this perplexity, Henry began to think seriously of a proposal which had been made to him by some of his counsellors, to marry ; and accordingly, notwithstanding his great age, his infirmities, and his having borne so long the character of a priest, he sent an ambassador to solicit a dispensation from the pope. There was little probability of his living to fulfil his intentions, and much less of his leaving any issue behind him ; yet Philip, being greatly alarmed at his design, sent Ferdinand de Castello, a Dominican Friar, to dissuade him from it, by reminding him of the offence which his marriage would give to all true Catholics, and the triumph it would afford to the Lutherans, and other sectaries of the age ; and when Henry refused to admit Castello to an audience, a circumstance that furnished Philip with a stronger proof of Henry's alienation from him, than any which he had hitherto received, he employed all his interest at Rome, to prevent the pope from granting the dispensation.

In the mean time he spared no pains to conciliate the favour of the principal nobility ; and having spread his emissaries over the kingdom, he published a manifesto, in vindication of his title, calling upon the people to turn their eyes towards *him*, as the only person who would have a right to the throne after the decease of the present king. This manifesto, while it incensed Henry more than ever against him, served in no degree the purpose for which it was designed. The Portuguese entertained the thoughts of falling under the dominion of the Castilians with an hereditary and violent aversion ; and there was nothing in the character of Philip by which their prejudice could be overcome. Philip's manifesto.

If Henry had availed himself of this disposition of his subjects, and acknowledged the dutchess of Braganza for his successor, almost the whole kingdom would have concurred to support her claim ; and so great a force might have been prepared, as, with the assistance of foreign powers, would have either determined Philip to abandon his design, or have prevented him from carrying it into execution. But as the duke and dutchess of Braganza were deterred from exerting themselves, by their dread of Philip, and the weak irresolute conduct of the king ; so Henry still flattered himself with the vain conceit, that Philip, as well as the other competitors, would submit to his decision.

Towards his nephew, Henry acted with much less hesitation and reserve, than towards the other candidates. Having obtained a bull from the pope, empowering him to judge of Antonio's claim to legitimacy, he examined the witnesses whom Antonio produced to prove his mother's marriage ; and, having extorted from two of them a confession of their having been surborned, while the other two

Don Antonio declared illegitimate.

1579. contradicted each other in delivering their evidence, Henry, on this foundation, joined with the circumstance of the Prior's being mentioned by his father in his latter will as his natural son, passed sentence, declaring him to be illegitimate.

Antonio had influence afterwards to persuade the pope to recall his bull, on the pretence of the king's having exceeded his powers. By this treatment Henry was highly exasperated, both against the pope and Don Antonio ; and he indulged his resentment against the latter, by banishing him first from the court, and afterwards from the kingdom. In obedience to this sentence, Antonio retired for some time into Castile ; but he soon returned, and found, that his uncle's conduct towards him had not produced that effect upon the people which Henry had expected. Their attachment to the Prior remained as strong as ever ; and, as no pains were taken to form a party in the interest of the dutchess of Braganza, great numbers of the people were entirely devoted to him, and regarded him as their only resource against the tyranny of Spain.

From this disposition of the people, together with the activity Philip's mi- which Antonio displayed in augmenting the number of his parti-
litary pre-
parations. zans, Philip perceived that he must not satisfy himself with argu-

ments, manifestoes, and private applications to individuals, but must resolve to support his claim by force of arms. Agreeably to this resolution, he issued orders for levying troops in Spain, Italy, and Germany ; and gave instructions to the marquis de Santa Croce to hold the fleet in readiness for action. He was aware how much reason he had to expect opposition from several of the European powers ; and, in order to prevent them from being alarmed, he caused a report to be propagated, that, having entered lately into an alliance with the new king of Morocco, his present military preparations were intended for an expedition which he had agreed to undertake, in conjunction with that monarch, against Algiers. This pretext served the purpose which he designed ; and neither the king of France, nor the queen of England, nor any Italian or German prince, seemed to attend to his operations.

In the mean time, Henry's health declined daily, and all about him perceived that his death was fast approaching. He appeared now more desirous than ever to have his successor fixed ; and having for this purpose summoned the States to meet at Almerin, he seems to have resolved to declare himself either in favour of the king of Spain, or the dutchess of Braganza according as he should find the one or the other of these competitors most acceptable to the States. But the members of this assembly could not agree. Most of the nobility and ecclesiastics had, by different means, been gained over to the interest of Philip, while the deputies of the cities were animated with the most irreconcilable aversion to his person and government.

Death of Henry, Jan. 31st, 1580. In the midst of their deliberations and disputes the king died, leaving the nomination of his successor to five persons, to whom he committed the regency of the kingdom.

The first act of the administration of the regents was to send ambassadors to Philip, to dissuade him from having recourse to arms, till, according to the will of the late king, they should deliver their judgment concerning his right to the succession. But to this request, Philip, whose preparations were now complete, gave the following reply : " That his right was clear and indisputable ; that he would not submit it either to the regents, or to the States ; and that he did not desire to have any judgment whatever passed in confirmation of it."

By this answer the regents were thrown into great perplexity. A ma-

jority of them stood well affected towards Philip, but they were prevented from declaring in his favour, by their dread of the indignation of the people, and were obliged to issue orders for equipping the fleet, and strengthening the fortifications and garrisons of the frontier towns. But the great exertion which had been made lately by Sebastian, and the exhausted state to which the kingdom had been reduced, by the numberless expeditions to India and America, from which no fruit had been yet derived, sufficient to compensate either for the expence which they had cost, or the loss of men which they had occasioned, rendered it impossible for the regents, if they had been ever so much inclined, to secure the kingdom against so great a force as the Spanish monarch had prepared.

His army, including four thousand pioneers, amounted to thirty-five thousand men, and his fleet consisted of thirty men of war, seventeen frigates, and seventy gallies and ships of burden loaded with provisions and military stores. It was not likely that so great a fleet and army would find employment in subduing a kingdom so ill prepared for defence, and so much weakened by intestine divisions, as Portugal at the present period. But besides that Philip was, from natural temper, generally cautious to excess in his military enterprises it should seem that, in the present case, he regarded the importance of the prize more than the difficulty of attaining it ; unless it be supposed, that he still had reason to apprehend that the French and English would interpose.

He gave the command of the fleet to the marquis of Santa Croce, who was reckoned the ablest naval officer in Spain. But he hesitated for some time with regard to the person whom he should place at the head of his land forces. His hesitation, however, did not proceed from any doubt which he entertained with regard to the merit and abilities of his generals. For the duke of Alva was still alive ; whom Philip knew to be possessed of every qualification requisite to secure the success of his intended enterprise.

Alva, upon his return from the Netherlands, had been admitted by Philip to the same degree of favour and confidence which he had formerly enjoyed. But his son, Don Gracia de Toledo, having debauched one of the maids of honour, under a promise of marriage, Philip had put him under arrest, and given orders that he should not be released till he should consent to fulfil his engagement : notwithstanding which, his father had assisted him in making his escape ; and, in order effectually to disappoint the king's intention, had concluded a marriage between him and his cousin, a daughter of the marquis of Villena.

Philip, highly provoked with this contempt of his authority, had banished the duke from court, and confined him to the castle of Uzeda. Alva bore this indignity with extreme impatience, and persuaded the pope, and some other foreign princes, to employ their intercession in his behalf ; but all his applications for forgiveness had hitherto been ineffectual, and he had remained almost two years in confinement. This severity, exercised for so small an offence, towards an old friend and servant, in the decline of life, was by some ascribed to Philip's imperious temper, and his implacable resentment ; whilst others said, that he had been long disgusted with Alva's arrogance ; and that the duke's conduct in the affair of his son, was only a pretence which Philip made use of, to justify himself for dismissing from his presence a man whose temper and manners were become intolerable.

To whichsoever of these motives Philip's treatment of Alva could be ascribed, it was expected, that neither his pride, nor his natural suspicion and distrust, would have suffered him to commit the charge of an enterprise of so great importance as the present, to one towards whom he had shewn

Philip's
fleet and
army.

Commanded
by Santa
Croce,

and the
duke of
Alva.

1580. himself so inexorable ; and it excited great surprise, when he sent two of his secretaries to the duke, to inquire whether his health would permit him to undertake the command of the army which he had prepared for the conquest of Portugal. To this inquiry, Alva, without hesitation, replied, that he was ready to devote the little health and strength that were left him to the service of the king ; and immediately afterwards he set out for Barajas to receive his instructions. He desired liberty to pay his respects to Philip at Madrid. But so ungracious was this prince even towards such of his ministers as he esteemed the most, and so incapable of entirely forgiving any offence or injury, that he refused to grant him admittance into his presence ; and, having transmitted his instructions to him at Barajas, he ordered him to join the army as soon as possible. Those who remembered the barbarous cruelty which Alva had exercised in the Netherlands, were not sorry for the mortification which he suffered on the present occasion ; but they could not with-hold the tribute of applause which was due to him, on account of that inflexible fidelity so becoming in a subject towards the sovereign, which determined him, in the extremity of old age, to expose himself to all the hazards and hardships of war, in order to advance the interest of a prince by whom he had been treated so ungratefully.

From Barajas Alva went, as soon as he had received his instructions, to join the troops, which were assembled at Badajoz ; and soon afterwards he began his march towards Elvas and Oli-
 March of
 the Spanish
 troops
 June 1580. vença. These, and all the other towns which lie north from the Tagus, as far as Setubal, on the western coast, though extremely averse to the Spanish government, yet being utterly unprepared for resistance, opened their gates and proclaimed Philip for their sovereign.

The marquis de Santa Croce, who had set sail with the fleet from Port St. Mary near Cadiz, found the same facility in reducing Faro, Lagos, and other towns on the coast of Algarva and Antejo ; and he came in sight of Setubal in a few days after the arrival of the land forces at that place.

Hitherto almost no blood had been shed, and neither the fleet Progress of
 the Spanish
 arms. nor army had met with any opposition to retard their progress. The duke of Alva intended next to march without delay to the capital, but it was necessary, he thought, to proceed now with greater circumspection than before, as Don Antonio had drawn together a considerable body of forces, had been admitted into Lisbon, where he was proclaimed king by the people, and had strengthened several of the towns and forts by which the Spanish army must pass in their approach to that city.

Three ways of reaching Lisbon were proposed in a council of war that was held on this occasion. One of these was to cross the Tagus, some miles above the city, at the towns of Almerin and Santaren ; another, to send round the fleet to Almada, and to put the troops on board at that place, which lies almost directly opposite to Lisbon ; and the third, to carry the army round by sea from Setubal to Cascaes. The two first of these ways was thought preferable to the last, by most of the officers, because they were safer ; yet the last was embraced by the duke of Alva. He acknowledged the justness of what his officers advanced in support of their opinion, but he observed that as the fleet was at hand, the army could be immediately put on board ; that the passage to Cascaes was not long, and that, as the enemy were ill prepared for their defence, his success would be greatly facilitated by the celerity of his approach.

Alva was not disappointed in his expectation of the effect which his sudden arrival was calculated to produce upon the Portuguese. They were

drawn up along the shore, as if they had intended to dispute his landing ; but no sooner had the ships begun to fire upon them, than they retired, and suffered him to land, and put his men in order, without giving him the smallest molestation. They might still have obstructed his approach to Cascaes, as his road thither lay over a hill, defended with a battery of cannon, and full of rugged rocks and brambles, of which Don Diego de Meneses, commander in chief of the Portuguese under Don Antonio, had taken possession with between three and four thousand men. Alva ordered the Spaniards to attack them, without being deterred, either by the strength of the ground or the number of the enemy. An old experienced officer, of the name of Bariettos, an intimate friend of Alva's, asked him in a whisper, Whether his attempting, with so little precaution, to dislodge an enemy so strongly situated, did not resemble the action of an ardent young warrior, rather than that of an experienced general ? Alva smiled, and replied, That a good general ought, on some occasions, to employ the prudence and circumspection of old age, and in others, the ardour and confidence of youth. The event shewed that his conduct, though apparently rash, was well adapted to the present circumstances. The Spaniards, inspired with their general's confidence, advanced boldly, and the Portuguese (almost all of whom were raw and undisciplined) retreated without waiting for their approach.

Alva laid siege immediately afterwards to the town and castle of Cascaes, and by the briskness of his operations he soon compelled the garrison to surrender. But on this occasion he sullied that renown which his wisdom and vigour would have procured him, by the cruelty which he exercised towards such of the Portuguese as had thrown themselves upon his mercy. In violation of his promise to Don Antonio de Castro, lord of Cascaes, who had joined him upon the first arrival in the kingdom, he gave up the town to be plundered by the Spaniards, and having sent all the soldiers in the garrison to the gallies, he put to death, without any form of trial, Don Diego de Meneses, a nobleman of an illustrious family, and one who, on account of his personal merit, was universally respected and beloved. To this barbarity Alva was prompted by private resentment against Meneses^d ; although it may be presumed that he would not have ventured to indulge it on the present occasion, had he not known that his conduct was conformable to the sentiments of the king. It was calculated to inspire the Portuguese with terror, but it served likewise more than ever to alienate their affections ; and considering how much superior the Spanish fleet and army were to any force which had been prepared to oppose them, it could not be coloured with the tyrant's ordinary plea of necessity.

From the town of Cascaes, Alva led his army against the forts of St. John and Belen, both which he soon reduced to the necessity of surrendering ; and being seconded in his operations by the fleet, the example of these places was quickly followed by Almada, and almost all the other fortified towns on both sides of the river.

During these transactions, Don Antonio, after having, from a consciousness of the weakness of his party, essayed in vain to obtain advantageous terms from Philip, had pitched his camp, with all the forces which he could collect, on the east side of the river of Alcantara on the road to Lisbon.

Alva amused himself for several days with the hopes of an accommodation, in order to afford time for the operation of a spirit of despondency

Don Antonio.

^d Thuanus, lib. lxx. c. x.

1580. that prevailed in Antonio's army. Meanwhile he omitted not to procure the most accurate information concerning the situation and strength of his camp ; and, on the 25th of August, he resolved to attack it. Before he could approach the entrenchments, it was necessary that he should make himself master of the bridge of Alcantara, or lead his army to a considerable distance up the river, the banks of which were so steep and rugged, as rendered it impossible to transport either horse or foot in sight of the enemy. Having drawn up his main army in order of battle, directly opposite to the Portuguese camp, he sent the horse under his son Ferdinand de Toledo, and two thousand select infantry, under Sancio d'Avila, to cross the river several miles higher, where the banks were practicable, whilst he ordered Colonna with the Italians, to make an assault upon the bridge.

Colonna's troops were twice repulsed, but in the third onset, being supported by a body of Germans, which the duke sent to their assistance, they drove the Portuguese before them, and secured possession of the bridge.

Defeat of the
Portuguese un-
der Antonio. Soon afterwards Toledo and d'Avila appeared. The Portuguese, astonished at the sight of them, and dreading that their communication with the city might be intercepted, threw down their arms after a short resistance, and betook themselves to flight. The Spaniards pursued, and slew between two and three thousand before they could reach the town.

Don Antonio, who displayed on this occasion neither fortitude nor conduct, had fled with his troops to Lisbon. There he knew that he could not remain long in safety, as, besides the insufficiency of the fortifications, the magistrates, and many of the inhabitants, were disaffected to his interest ; and therefore, immediately after releasing all the prisoners in the city (a poor expedient to recruit his ruined army), he set out, attended by the count de Vimioso, and the bishop of la Guarda, with a small number of troops, for the town of Santaren.

The magistrates of Lisbon did not hesitate a moment in resolving to submit to the conqueror, and the town was, immediately after the battle, delivered into his hands. The Portuguese fleet at the same time struck their colours to the marquis de Santa Croce, and received such a number of his Castilians on board as gave him the entire command.

Cruel treat-
ment of the
Portuguese. It was now become Philip's interest to provide for the security of Lisbon and its suburbs, as much as for that of any of his towns in Spain ; and Alva so far fulfilled his engagement with the magistrates, as to prevent any formidable number of his troops from entering the town ; but he gave up the suburbs (which were at that time no less considerable than the town itself^e) to be ransacked and plundered, without making any distinction between the friends and enemies of the king. He suffered them likewise to pillage the houses of such of the inhabitants within the town as had discovered any attachment to Don Antonio, and he allowed parties to go out and plunder all the country and villages in the neighbourhood. A Spanish historian says, that the soldiers committed these enormities without the duke's permission, yet no punishment was ever inflicted on them, and no restitution was ever made to the many thousand innocent persons, who were involved in the same common ruin with the guilty.

After a conduct so barbarous and impolitic, there was little reason to expect that the people of Lisbon would be able soon to overcome their

aversion to the Spanish government. From their dread of Alva's tyranny they took the oath of allegiance which was prescribed to them ; and, from the same motive, they were present at those public rejoicings which he appointed to be celebrated on account of his success ; but being unable to conceal the anguish of their minds, the acclamations which they uttered were feeble, and intermixed with sighs and groans.

The duke of Alva's joy, soon after his entrance into Lisbon, was interrupted by intelligence which he received from Spain, that Philip had fallen sick, and that his physicians were extremely apprehensive of the issue of his distemper. Alva knew that the king's death, at this crisis, would probably render all his labours and success in Portugal abortive, and therefore he suspended for a while the prosecution of the war.

In this interval Don Antonio exerted himself with great activity, and employed every expedient which he or his partisans could devise to raise another army, flattering himself with the hope of being able to maintain his ground, till the French, or some other foreign power, should be persuaded to espouse his cause. In the town of Santaren he had lately been received by the people as their only rightful sovereign, and every mark of affection and respect had been shewn him ; yet so great a change had his defeat and flight produced, that they refused to admit him within the town till he engaged that he should not remain in it beyond a limited time ; and, immediately after his departure, they sent ambassadors to the duke of Alva with an offer of submission.

New preparations of Don Antonio.

From Santaren Antonio directed his course northwards, and in the province which lies between Minho and Douro, he prevailed upon eight or nine thousand of the inhabitants to take up arms. With these tumultuary troops he procured admittance, partly by force and partly by persuasion, first into Aveiro, and afterwards into the city of Oporto ; but in both these places he exercised a degree of severity towards those whom he suspected to be his enemies, that was extremely ill calculated to increase the number of his friends.

He remained at Oporto till he was informed that the duke of Alva, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the king's health, had sent a part of his forces against him, under Sancio d'Avila, who was advancing towards the banks of the Douro with great rapidity. D'Avila had under his command only five or six thousand horse and foot, and Antonio's army consisted of about nine thousand ; but from past experience, the latter was deeply sensible of the difference between his undisciplined forces and those of d'Avila, and he was well acquainted with the character of that general ; who, in the Netherlands, and other places, had given the most conspicuous proofs of military skill and intrepidity. His safety, he knew, depended on his preventing the Spaniards from crossing the Douro, which, for many miles above Oporto, was so deep and rapid, that without boats they could not attempt to pass it. He exerted himself therefore with diligence in removing the boats and barks from the south side of the river, and planted his troops at different places on the north side, to watch the motions of the enemy.

In the mean time d'Avila advanced, and took possession of Villanova, a little town which stands opposite to Oporto. From that place he sent a party of his troops in search of boats ; who returned without success : but d'Avila being resolved to omit nothing in his power to accomplish his design, sent them back with orders to pursue their march a great way further up the river, which they did accordingly, and collected about twenty boats, from places at so great a dis-

Progress of the Spaniards under d'Avila.

1580. tance from Oporto, that Antonio had judged it unnecessary to remove them. Still, however, most of the Spanish officers thought it impracticable to effectuate their passage with so small a number ; and it was impossible to bring them down the river, on account of some armed vessels which Antonio kept ready to intercept them. To remedy this inconvenience, d'Avila ordered a part of his troops to march up to the place where the boats lay, and there he transported them, without opposition, to the other side. These troops had time to intrench themselves, before the enemy received intelligence of their landing ; and, under the shelter of their intrenchments, the rest of the forces were immediately carried over in the same way.

This unexpected success in the beginning of his enterprise, Defeat of
Don An-
tonio. gave d'Avila the highest assurance of victory, and demonstrated how little reason he had to dread the efforts of an enemy, who, on

so critical an occasion, had shewn themselves so deficient both in courage and cowardice, in permitting the Spaniards to land in small bodies, one after another, gave reason to expect. D'Avila drove them before him, till, with very little bloodshed, they were entirely routed and dispersed. This active general lost no time in sending a party of horse in pursuit of Don Antonio, who had fled, accompanied by a small number of his partisans, to Viana, a town on the sea-coast near the northern frontier of the kingdom. Upon the approach of the Spaniards to that place, he attempted to make his escape by sea, but was driven back by a violent storm, which overtook him soon after he had embarked. He then dismissed his attendants, and, disguising himself in the dress of a common sailor, eluded the search of his pursuers. Philip had recourse to his favourite weapon, a proscription, and offered a reward of eighty thousand ducats to any person who should deliver him into his hands. Notwithstanding this, so great was the aversion of the Portuguese towards the Castilian government, or such their attachment to Antonio, that no person was tempted by the proffered reward, either to seize him, or to give information of the place of his retreat. Antonio remained in the country between the Minho and Douro from November till May, living sometimes in the houses of the nobility, and sometimes in monasteries and convents, till he found an opportunity of going by sea to France.

After the dispersion of the Prior's army, all the towns between the Minho and Douro opened their gates, and submitted to the conqueror. The regents appointed by the late king had some time before declared themselves for Philip ; and the duke of Braganza, who seemed to have despaired from the beginning of being able to assert his wife's title to the throne against so potent an antagonist, had taken the same oath of fidelity and allegiance that was required from others.

The colonies in America, Africa, and the Indies, which belonged to the crown of Portugal, quickly followed the example of the mother-country ; nor did Philip find employment for his arms in any part of the Portuguese dominions but the Azores, where Antonio's agents had persuaded the people to proclaim him king. Some troops which were sent against them under an officer of the name of Valdes, were defeated by the governor of Angra. In the following year Antonio obtained from the court of France a fleet of sixty ships, with about six thousand troops, which he landed on one of the isles called St. Michael ; but the marquis of Santa Croce coming upon him with a fleet and army much superior to his, obtained a decisive victory over the French both by sea and

land, and afterwards reduced all the inhabitants to a state of entire subjection and obedience ^{1580.} f.

The success of Philip's arms, and the great accession of dominion which he had thereby acquired, occasioned much anxiety to the neighbouring powers ; and excited in the Dutch and Flemings the most alarming apprehensions. They had with infinite difficulty withstood his efforts, while he was employed in the pursuit of that plan of conquest which he had now carried into execution ; and they seemed, at this time, to have much greater reason than ever to dread that they should soon be obliged to submit to whatever terms of peace he should be pleased to prescribe. Yet, as will appear from the sequel, Philip's acquisition of the Portuguese dominions in India served rather to expose him to the assaults of his revolted subjects, than to furnish him with the means of subduing them, and contributed more than any other event to that wealth and greatness which they afterwards attained g.

f Antonio escaped, and once more returned to France, and the marquis de Santa Croce treated all his French prisoners as pirates, because war had not been declared between France and Spain.

g Thuani hist. sui temp. an. 1579.80. Cabrera, l. xiii. Ferreras, part xv. &c.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVII.

1580.
State of af-
fairs in the
Nether-
lands.

WHILE Philip's arms were employed in subduing the Portuguese, the prince of Parma had little room for the exertion of that activity and enterprise, by which his character was so eminently distinguished. Having, according to his late agreement with the southern provinces, dismissed his Spanish and Italian forces, he had thereby weakened his army so much as to render it unable to keep the field. The States of these provinces had laboured in vain to fulfil their part of the agreement. Their finances were exhausted, all their levies were carried on slowly, and their cavalry were so few in number, that they had been obliged to consent that Farnese should retain some of the foreign horse for his body guard.

It was fortunate for him, that at this juncture the confederates were in a similar state of weakness. After the departure of their auxiliaries, only a small number of troops remained; and after the revolt of so many of the nobility, and the death of the count de Bossut, which happened about this time, there was scarcely a single officer, a native of the Netherlands, whom they could intrust with the chief command. Matthias, a young man of no experience, bore the name, but was incapable of discharging the duties of governor. The whole weight of the administration lay upon the prince of Orange, who was involved in an endless maze of the most intricate political negotiations; and without his continual presence, activity, and vigilance, the weak frame of the confederacy would quickly have fallen to pieces. William was therefore obliged to leave the direction of military affairs to the count of Renneberg, La Noue, and Norris; and although these men were not deficient either in spirit and intrepidity, or in prudence and good conduct, yet they neither had forces sufficient to undertake any important enterprise, nor means to support such as were under their command^a.

The greatest part of Brabant and Flanders had acceded to the union of

a Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

Utrecht ; but the strength of the confederacy was not proportioned to its extent. The union of the several members was not sufficiently compact, the administration was not properly ascertained, and there was no common centre of power and authority established. The troops were scattered in small bodies throughout the provinces ; no adequate provision was made for their pay ; they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants ; and, as luxury is the constant attendant of licentiousness, the country was miserably oppressed and plundered, and the people reduced to an incapacity of furnishing the necessary contributions and supplies. In this situation many persons lamented that they had not embraced the opportunity lately afforded them, of making their peace with the king ; and they began to accuse the prince of Orange, who had advised them to reject the conditions that had been offered, of having preferred his private interest to that of the provinces. A spirit of discontent prevailed every where, except in Holland and Zealand, and it was generally believed, that they must soon either make their peace with the king of Spain, or elect some other sovereign able to deliver them from the calamities with which they were overwhelmed.

The prince of Orange was at this time in Ghent, employed in quieting the disturbances above-mentioned. At the desire of the States he published a vindication of his conduct, together with his sentiments concerning the causes of that distress in which the provinces were involved, and the means of their deliverance. As what he said on this occasion, and some weeks afterwards, in the assembly of the States at Antwerp, contains an interesting view of the situation of the Netherlands at the present period, it will not be improper to lay before the reader an abstract of the principal particulars.

He began with complaining of the injustice of those by whom he had been accused of having contributed to render ineffectual the late negociation for peace at Cologn. " For no person in the Netherlands, he said, had greater reason than himself to wish for peace, since without it he could never hope to obtain either the liberty of his son, whom he had not seen for many years, or the recovery of the many rich inheritances which he had lost, or the power of passing the remainder of his life, which now began to decline, free from labour and anxiety. But while for these reasons, joined with compassion for the miseries of the people, no person could more ardently desire to have an end put to the war, he could not help considering war, with all its calamities, as infinitely preferable to the proffered peace ; by one article of which many hundred thousands of the inhabitants would have been driven into exile ; and by another, all who remained exposed to the cruelty of the Spaniards, without any security either for their liberty or their lives, but the promises of those by whom the most solemn oaths had been often violated. These were not his sentiments only of the peace that had been offered, but the sentiments likewise of the States, and of all the sincere friends of their country ; nor could that detraction and calumny in which many persons had of late indulged themselves, be ascribed to any other cause, but the secret machinations of those, who, from selfish views, were desirous of reducing the Netherlands under the Spanish yoke.

" There was much ground, he acknowledged, for complaining of the irregularities of which the troops had been guilty in some of the provinces ; but nothing could be more unjust than to throw the blame on those who were intrusted with the reins of government. The governors of States ought to be judged of sometimes by the orders which they issued, and not by the success with which their measures were accompanied ; for what could it

The causes
of their dis-
tress.

Explained by
the prince of
Orange.

1580. avail to interpose their authority, when they wanted power to enforce obedience ? The disregard shewn by many, to the orders of the States, and council, was the principal source of the evils complained of. In all the provinces, except Holland and Zealand, there was scarcely a single town that would admit the garrisons appointed for its defence. To this was to be ascribed that facility with which the enemy had made themselves masters of Allost, and other places ; and it was owing to the same cause, that the troops were so much scattered throughout the provinces ; the consequence of which was, that the inhabitants of the country and of the open towns, suffering equally from the forces of the States that lived at free quarters upon them, and from the incursions of the enemy, were totally disabled from contributing their share of the public expenses. Thus there was no fund sufficient for the regular payment of the troops ; without which, it was in vain to expect either that they could be kept under proper discipline, or employed successfully in any important enterprise.

“ To remedy the abuses complained of, the most effectual method was to place numerous garrisons in the frontier towns. For if this were done, the great number of small garrisons would become unnecessary ; and the interior parts of the provinces being thereby delivered both from the oppressions of their friends and the devastations of the enemy, the people would be more able to furnish their proportion of the supplies, the troops would be paid more regularly, and discipline more easily maintained.

“ The States ought not however to stop there, but to exert themselves strenuously in drawing together such an army of regular forces, as might face the enemy in the field, or at least disturb and interrupt their operations. It was their want of such an army that had occasioned the loss of Maestricht ; and, if care were not taken to supply that want, there was ground to apprehend, that the confederacy would soon be stript of all the towns in the inland provinces. But in order to carry this, or any other expedient into execution, it was necessary that, instead of suffering each town or province to dispose of its troops and contributions as it thought fit, a senate or council should be established, with authority to determine every thing relative to the application of the public funds and the conduct of the war.

“ He was far from intending that this council should be invested with the power either of imposing taxes or of enacting laws. He meant only that it should be empowered to levy such taxes as were imposed, and to execute such laws as were enacted by the general States of the union. That it should not be subject to be controlled by particular towns or provinces ; nor obliged, in applying the public money, distributing garrisons, and regulating the motions of the troops, to have recourse on every emergency to the States ; but should have such a degree of discretionary power conferred upon it, as would enable it to seize the opportunities of action when they offered, and to conduct the operations of the war with secrecy and dispatch.”

William exhorts the confederates to renounce their allegiance. Besides these and some other points of less importance, William ventured, both in the writing which he published, and afterwards in the assembly of the States, to explain his sentiments concerning another subject, which he had long revolved, and concerning which he had sounded the inclinations of many of the deputies. Having, before the present period, despaired that peace could ever be restored between the king and the confederated provinces, he exhorted the deputies to consider, whether they were not now in a situation which required that, renouncing their allegiance to Philip, they

should transfer it to some other prince, who was able and willing to defend them. 1580.

In the eyes of the greater part of Europe, this proposal appeared in the highest degree audacious. Philip had, ever since his accession, been considered as the most powerful prince of the age ; he had lately received an immense increase of power by the acquisition of Portugal, and men could not doubt that the revolted provinces must soon yield to his superior arms, and bitterly repent of the offence which they had given him.

Reasons however were not wanting to shew, that the measure proposed was the best which the people of the Netherlands could embrace in their present circumstances. If they could have entertained the prospect of obtaining peace on tolerable terms, it might be difficult perhaps entirely to vindicate their conduct. The evils which accompany a change of government, are generally so great, and the obligation to maintain the present, so strong and powerful, that nothing but the most urgent necessity can ever justify a people for shaking off their allegiance to their legal prince. But, from the issue of the late negociations at Cologn, it was manifest, not only that Philip was unalterably fixed in his purpose to govern the Netherlands with despotic authority, in contradiction to their fundamental rights and laws ; but that the utter extirpation of the protestants, who were now become a most considerable part of the people was a condition, without which he was determined never to be reconciled. Desolation therefore, and slavery, must have been the certain consequences of peace, and no greater evil could be apprehended from a continuance of the war. "Even allowing (said the prince of Orange, in the assembly of the States) that the king should be persuaded by any mediating power, to grant us such conditions as our consciences would suffer us to accept, yet what security can we obtain for his fulfilling them ? He has, before this time, been set at liberty by the pope from his most sacred obligations. It is an established maxim of Philip and his counsellors, that with heretics, such as we are, no promises, or oaths are binding. Although he were of himself inclined to fulfil his engagements, yet the Roman pontiff and the Spanish inquisitors would reclaim, and soon persuade him to alter his intention. It has been said by some, continued William, that he is a prince of a compassionate disposition, and that we may safely rely upon his mercy. Of the truth of this, we can best judge from what we have seen and known. Do the deeds that have been perpetrated by his command, in India, in Italy, or in Granada, authorise us to form this favourable judgment of his character ? Has not every corner of the Netherlands been overflowed with the blood of thousands of our countrymen, barbarously butchered by his command ? Are not all the neighbouring kingdoms filled with his subjects, who have been driven from their native land, either to enrich the countries that have afforded them protection, with our trade and manufactures, or to drag out a miserable life in poverty and exile ? We know how grievously our late conduct has offended him, and from what we have seen on former occasions, we may judge of the measure of his resentment. He may humble himself so far as to soothe us with the hopes of a more mild administration ; but we should remember the discovery which we made lately, when, by the letters that were intercepted, it appeared, that, instead of the generous purposes that were pretended, nothing was meant but to employ some of the provinces as instruments of vengeance against the rest."

Influenced by these considerations, which shewed that Philip had entirely lost the confidence as well as the affections of his Flemish subjects, a great majority of the deputies were inclined

Opposition
of the Ca-
tholics.

1580. to renounce his authority. Some of the Catholic members, however, prompted partly by their political principles, and partly by concern for the safety of their religion, had the courage to remonstrate. They expatiated on the greatness of Philip's power, and the danger to which the States would expose themselves, by adding so great an affront to their former provocations. And to their representations on this head they subjoined, that they could not adopt the strong measure that was proposed, consistently with their oath of allegiance ; since the King was unquestionably their rightful sovereign, they had all solemnly recognised his right ; and the provinces were his inheritance, which he had derived from a long uninterrupted line of illustrious ancestors^b

But this reasoning had no weight with the prince of Orange, St. Aldegonde, and the other leaders of the protestants. They considered the breach between Philip and the confederated provinces, as irreparable ; and knew, that long before the present period, he was animated against them with the most implacable resentment. "It was too late," they said, "to talk of keeping measures with the King ; and no part remained to be espoused, but to provide against the effects of his displeasure. Nor was there the smallest reason for those scruples by which the Catholic members were disturbed, either with regard to the lawfulness, or the expediency of renouncing their allegiance. Kings were invested with authority, not for their own sakes, but for the interest of the people whom they were appointed to govern. If the rights of princes were to be investigated, they would be found, in most of the kingdoms in Europe, to have been derived from the will of their subjects, who, grown impatient under the injuries of former princes, had taken from *them*, and given to their successors, what they had an undoubted right to bestow. A prince was indeed superior to each individual in a State ; but neither his interest nor his pleasure was to be put in the balance with the security and happiness of the whole. On the contrary, he might be judged, and even punished, for his abuse of power, by the supreme council of the nation. If this truth were doubted of in other places, it could not be controverted in the Netherlands ; where, till lately, both the name of king and the measure of obedience which kings commonly require, were utterly unknown. In the Netherlands the engagements between the prince and the people were strictly mutual ; and in engagements of this sort, it was a clear and universal maxim, that the infidelity of either of the two contracting parties, absolves the other from the sacred obligation^c."

Deliberations about electing another sovereign The protestant members, in comparison with whom the catholics were few in number, being thus confirmed in their purpose of abjuring the dominion of Philip, the assembly proceeded next to consider, whether they should substitute another sovereign in

his place, or establish a republican government, upon the plan of that confederacy which was already formed. The latter of these measures would have been embraced by all the deputies ; by the protestants, from the conformity between the principles of a commonwealth, and those of their religion ; and by the catholics, from their persuasion that such a government would neither be so highly affronting to the King, nor so effectually preclude the hopes of a futurer concilement. But the present feeble state of the United Provinces obliged them to sacrifice their inclination to their preservation and security. From the representation which the prince of Orange made of the disorders that prevailed, together with the view which he exhibited of their strength and resources, they were con-

^b Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

^c Meteren, lib. x, and Grotius, p. 70.

vinced, that however strenuously they might exert themselves, they would be able to wage only a tedious defensive war ; by which their strength would be gradually wasted, till they were at last compelled to accept of such terms of peace as the King should be pleased to prescribe. To have recourse therefore to the assistance of some foreign prince, seemed not only expedient, but necessary ; and to engage the prince of whom they should make choice to espouse their cause with greater zeal and sincerity than they had hitherto experienced in their allies, they resolved to confer upon him the sovereignty of the provinces, with all the prerogatives which had been enjoyed by the princes of the house of Burgundy.

Nothing now remained but to fix upon the person to whom the offer of this high dignity should be made. The prince of Orange, having before-hand sounded the inclinations of the Emperor and other German princes, had found them utterly averse to taking any concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. The queen of England, and the duke of Anjou, brother to the king of France, were the only princes at that time in Europe, between whom the States thought there was ground to hesitate ; and they were determined to concur in giving the preference to Anjou, by the prince of Orange ; who, besides representing to them the necessity of electing a sovereign who would reside in the country, informed them that their making choice of the duke, would be highly acceptable to the queen. " For she had writ to him on the subject, and given him assurances of granting the States her assistance, in case the sovereignty were conferred on one with whom she had so much reason to expect to live on amicable terms ^d."

Motives for
chusing the
duke of
Anjou.

From this it should seem, that William had offered to employ his influence in favour of Elizabeth ; and it may be presumed, that unless he had found her averse to his proposal, neither he nor the other protestant leaders would have been inclined to give the preference to Anjou. Very different motives indeed were assigned for the prince's conduct, by his enemies. His principality of Orange, they observed, lay in the centre of France. He had lately married Charlotte de Bourbon, of the blood royal of that kingdom ^e. For many years he had maintained an intimate correspondence with the leaders of the Hugonots ; and he flattered himself with the hopes of enjoying the entire direction of the duke of Anjou, a weak prince, who would probably be more attentive to his pleasures, than to the affairs of government. These interested considerations, it is likely, were not entirely without their influence ; but the other circumstance above mentioned seems to afford a still more satisfactory account, since there was in reality no room for hesitation between Elizabeth and Anjou ; and Elizabeth, as will appear in the sequel, would certainly have rejected the sovereignty, in case an offer of it had been made to her. This political princess expected to derive advantage from that animosity which the election of Anjou was likely to produce between the courts of France and Spain. And the prince of Orange knew, that as it would be easier to reconcile the catholics in the United Provinces to the election of a prince of the same religion with themselves, than to that of a protestant ; so, without making such a choice, there was little probability that he should ever prevail on the Walloons to accede to the confederacy. Whatever were William's motives, a great majority of the deputies entered readily into his opinion, and they would have proceeded instantly to the election, had it not been deemed a matter of too much consequence to be decided without consulting their constituents.

1580.
La Noue
taken pri-
soner.

In the mean time the operations of the war were not wholly discontinued, although neither of the two contending parties was in a condition at this period to make any great or vigorous exertion. By means of a stratagem conducted by count Egmont, Farnese acquired possession of Courtray in Flanders, as he did by the like means of some other places. On the other hand, count Egmont and his brother were taken prisoners by La Noue in the town of Ninove : and not long afterwards La Noue himself lost his liberty. This gallant officer having been attacked unexpectedly by the marquis de Roubais, commander in chief of the Walloon forces, was overpowered by numbers, and obliged, through the disadvantage of his ground, to surrender himself a prisoner of war. The States were sensibly affected by the loss of a person of such uncommon abilities, and they offered to give in exchange for him count Egmont and the baron de Selles, who had been taken prisoner at Bouchain. But the prince of Parma refused to consent to this exchange, saying, that he would never agree to give one lion for two sheep. La Noue was conducted to the castle of Limburg, where he remained long ; and, during his confinement, employed himself in writing those military and political discourses which were afterwards published, and much admired by his contemporaries. Count Egmont's relations, and those of de Selles, solicited Philip with great importunity to consent to the exchange proposed. But this prince, who never hearkened to the voice of gratitude or compassion where his interest interfered, declined complying with their request ; and, rather than yield to the enemy so great an advantage as the recovery of La Noue, he chose to leave his friends to languish in prison for several years.

These two noblemen bore this indignity with extreme impatience. De Selles, conscious of having exerted himself with the most fervent zeal in detaching the Walloons from the revolted provinces, fell a sacrifice to the indignation and chagrin which the King's ingratitude and his own unfortunate situation were calculated to inspire. The same cause produced a different, but no less melancholy effect, on count Egmont, whom they deprived of the use of his understanding. Through the tender assiduous care of his sister, whom the States permitted to attend him, he recovered from this distress. But Philip still declined consenting to the exchange till the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-four, when La Noue engaged in the strictest manner never to bear arms against him in the Netherlands ; and the king of Navarre, the duke of Lorrain, and others, became sureties for his fulfilling this engagement. It is difficult to determine whether Philip's conduct afforded on this occasion a more striking proof of pusillanimity or ingratitude, while no stronger testimony could have been given of the extraordinary merit of La Noue, and the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities ^f.

Defection of
count Renne-
berg.

About the time when La Noue was taken prisoner, the confederacy sustained another loss by the defection of count Renneberg. This young nobleman having been appointed governor of Friesland by the States, had subdued the cities of Deventer and Groningen, besides several other places of considerable consequence ; and his zeal and services were the more highly valued, as all his relations adhered to the Spanish interest, and he himself was of the Catholic persuasion. But these circumstances, which gave him so much merit in the eyes of his countrymen, were the means by which he was enticed to abandon the cause which he had hitherto so illustriously supported. The prince of Parma readily perceived the advantage which they

^f Bentivoglio, part. ii. lib. i. Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 39. and Meteren.

afforded for gaining him over from the confederates ; and, with this view, he employed the count's sister and her husband, the baron de Monceaux, to offer him the following terms of accommodation : That he should be confirmed in the government of Friesland, and have that of Overyssel annexed to it ; that twenty thousand crowns should be immediately paid him, besides an annual pension of twenty thousand florins ; that a town, of which he was feudal superior, should be erected into a marquisate ; and that he should have two regiments of troops to be distributed throughout his governments, in whatever stations he should think fit. Besides these enticements, another object was held forth to him, more tempting perhaps than any of the rest ; he was flattered with the hopes of obtaining in marriage the countess of Megen, of whom he was greatly enamoured, and who possessed one of the richest fortunes in the Netherlands. His religious principles conspired with these allurements, and made him lend an open ear to his sister's repeated representations of the danger to which the Catholic faith was exposed, and of the designs formed by the prince of Orange for its destruction. He hesitated however for some time, and trembled at the thoughts of the infamy in which he was about to be involved ; but at last he consented to accept of the terms proposed, resolving to conceal his having done so, till he should take proper measures for delivering the towns and forts into the hands of the Spaniards.

His design could not entirely escape the penetrating eye of the prince of Orange. Various circumstances concurred to alarm William's apprehensions, and make him resolve, without delay, to prevent, if possible, the fatal effects of the count's intended treachery. He instantly went into Friesland, under the pretence of quelling some disturbances in that country, and ordered some officers to draw their troops together, and lead them against Lewarden, Harlingen, and Staveren. These orders were executed with secrecy and dispatch, and all the three places were wrested out of the hands of those to whom count Renneberg committed them.

The count, who resided at this time in Groningen, was thunderstruck when he received intelligence of this disaster, which at once shewed him that his perfidy was detected, and put it in a great measure out of his power to fulfil his engagements to the prince of Parma. Still however, he was either not prepared, or he had not courage, to throw off the mask. He complained loudly of the affront that had been offered him, and of the ingratitude with which his services had been repaid. Among the officers who beheld his confusion on this occasion, there were two, to whom, as he knew their fidelity to the States to be inviolable, he had not communicated his designs. These men, thinking it still practicable to preserve him in his duty, exhorted him to go immediately to the prince of Orange, in order to clear himself from the suspicions which were entertained against him. "This is the only expedient in your power," said one of them, "if you are conscious of innocence ; nor can I doubt that you are, when I consider, that by persisting to act the part which your duty and honour require, you must promote your interest more effectually, than by violating these sacred obligations, and involving your name in perpetual infamy." Renneberg listened attentively to this discourse, changed colour frequently, and at last burst into tears. He repeated his complaints of the treatment which he had met with, but he would not explain his intentions, nor follow the counsel that was given him. The two officers then left him ; and, after acquainting the chief magistrate of what had passed, they withdrew privately from the city.

By a popular and insinuating behaviour, accompanied with strong asseverations of the falsehood of the reports which had been propagated, Ren-

1580. neberg laid asleep the suspicions both of the magistrates and the people, till the plot which he had formed was ripe for execution. Having brought in secretly a body of troops, which he concealed in the palace, and put arms into the hands of his domestics ; with these, and the Catholic inhabitants devoted to the Spanish interest, he overpowered the garrison ; and having thus made himself master of the town, he proclaimed himself governor, in the name of Philip, and then mounted the fortifications with the troops which he had introduced.

But he did not long enjoy any of the advantages which he expected to derive from his revolt, and some of them he never attained. The money promised him was never paid, and the countess of Megen was given in marriage to another. His health being impaired by the fatigues which he had undergone in his military enterprises, the remembrance of his treachery filled his mind with anguish and remorse, which preyed upon his sickly frame, and carried him off in the prime of his age, lamented even by those whom he had betrayed, who felt for his misfortunes, on account of his many amiable accomplishments ^g.

The losses which the confederacy suffered from La Noue's imprisonment, and the infidelity of Renneberg, served only to confirm them in their resolution of conferring the sovereignty on some foreign prince ; and the reasons above mentioned, joined to the influence of the prince of Orange, determined the States of the several provinces and towns to give the preference to the duke of Anjou. The election was made accordingly in due form by the General States, and a solemn embassy sent to give intimation of it to the duke, who readily accepted the offer, and consented to all the conditions that were required. They were contained in a treaty signed by him and the ambassadors of

The conditions of it. of the States at Plessiles-Tours, on the 29th of September ; and the principal articles were those which follow : That the States of

The United Provinces having elected Francis de Valois, duke of

Alençon and Anjou, for their sovereign, did thereby confer upon

him all the titles and prerogatives which their former princes had enjoyed. That in case the duke should die without issue, the States, might elect

another sovereign, and that the Netherlands should in no event be annexed to the crown of France. That in case the duke should die leaving several

sons behind him, the States should have power to determine which of them should succeed him in his sovereignty, and that if the prince whom they

should make choice of were under age, they might assume the government into their own hands till he should arrive at the age of twenty.

That the duke should maintain inviolate all the rights and privileges of the people ; that he should summon the general assembly of the States to

meet at least once a year ; and that, if he should fail to issue letters of convocation, they should themselves have power, agreeably to ancient

form and custom, to meet together as often as they should judge expedient. That the duke should fix his residence in the Low Countries ; but if his

affairs should, on any occasion, call him thence, he should nominate for

governor some nobleman, a native of the Netherlands, with the consent

and approbation of the States. That all his counsellors should be natives

of the provinces, except two or three of the French nation, who might be

admitted into the council, provided the States should give their consent. That he should make no innovation in religion, but afford his protection

equally to the protestants and catholics. That Holland and Zealand

should, both in respect of government and religion, remain in their present state, being obliged, however, to contribute their proportion of the supplies requisite for the support of the confederacy. That the duke should spare no pains to engage his brother the king of France to assist him in carrying on the war ; that he should accede to all the treaties that subsist between the States and foreign powers, and should not himself form any new alliance without their consent. That all foreign soldiers should be dismissed on the first requisition of the States : And lastly, that if the duke should fail in performing any of the foregoing conditions, his right to the sovereignty should cease, and the Provinces be no longer bound to yield obedience to his authority.”

As this treaty was negociated in France, Philip complained to Henry of the breach of friendship in permitting it ; and Henry affected to be much offended with his brother’s conduct, but in reality did not feel the displeasure which he pretended. On the contrary, he secretly rejoiced in the prospect of being delivered from a brother, whose levity and caprice had given him much inquietude ; and it is said, he assured the States privately, that he would send them either troops or money, as soon as the troubles of his kingdom were composed.

But whatever reason Philip had to be offended with the French monarch, he was much more highly incensed against the prince of Orange, whom he considered as the contriver, as well as the chief promoter, of the revolution that had taken place. Having oftener than once attempted, by negociation and artifice, to free himself from an enemy, who had furnished employment to his ablest generals and best disciplined forces for so many years, he had recourse, on this occasion, to the ignoble expedient of exciting some wretch or desperado to make an attempt upon his life. For this purpose he published an edict of proscription against him, in which he accused him of having excited and fomented that spirit of discord, which had proved of the source so much misery to the Netherlands ; interdicted all the subjects of the crown of Spain from holding communication with him, and from supplying him with bread, or drink, or fire ; and offered to any person, who should deliver him dead or alive, or take away his life, the sum of twenty-five thousand crowns, besides making him and his associates noble, if they were not already noble, and granting them a full pardon of all crimes, however enormous, of which they had been guilty.

This practice of commanding assassination, almost unheard-of since the days of the Roman triumvirate, was suitable to the dark, revengeful, and ungenerous nature of Philip. The prince of Orange could have retaliated the injury ; but he scorned so ignoble a revenge, and chose rather to rest his defence on an appeal to the world for his integrity.

His Vindication and Apology addressed to the assembly of the States, and of which he sent copies to the several courts in Europe, is one of the most precious monuments in history. It contains an interesting relation of many particulars, which throw light, not only on William’s own character and that of Philip, but likewise on the characters of several of the other principal actors in the Netherlands. The author has, in some parts of it, indulged himself in the language of keen resentment, and ventured to assert boldly several facts, of which the cotemporary historians have spoken with reserve. Some allowance perhaps must be made for that just indignation with which he was inflamed ; but when it is considered, that no person had better access to information ; that no prince possessed a higher character for sincerity and truth, having never, in a single instance, been convicted by his numerous enemies of insincerity

Philip’s pro-
scription of
the prince of
Orange.

His Apo-
logy.

1581. and falsehood ; that the relation of the facts which he asserts was published at the time when they are said to have happened, and when it was easy for the persons accused, if accused unjustly, to have confuted him ; that their interest and honour called loudly for a confutation ; and yet, that no such confutation, nor any vindication of their characters, which had been arraigned as odious at the bar of the universe, was ever attempted ; when all these circumstances are duly considered, there does not appear any sufficient reason for calling in question the facts contained in this *Apology*, although some of them are of such a nature as to require the strongest evidence to justify the reader for yielding his assent^h.

Adopted by the States. The conduct of the confederated States on this occasion was such as William had reason to expect. After employing several days in examining his *Apology*, they voted him an affectionate address, in which they attested the falsehood of those imputations on which Philip had founded his proscription. They declared, that as the prince had been regularly elected into the several offices which he held, so he had never accepted of any office but in consequence of their most earnest intreaties. They prayed him still to exercise the authority with which they had invested him, expressed their gratitude for his many eminent services to the commonwealth, and promised to yield a ready and cheerful obedience to his commands. They concluded with expressing their anxiety for his life, and Dec. 17. made him an offer of maintaining a company of horse-guards, of which they entreated him to accept, being persuaded that on his preservation their own security depended.

Solemn renunciation of their allegiance to Philip. In a few days afterwards they gave him another proof of that zeal and sincerity with which they had espoused his cause. Their election of the duke of Anjou was a virtual renunciation of their allegiance to their former sovereign ; yet all public acts ran as before in the name of Philip and that of the States ; the oath administered to persons entering upon public offices had not been altered, and the people in some of those cities in the confederacy, which had consented to Anjou's election, were extremely averse to alter it, from that attachment which men often discover to exterior forms, even after the institutions on which they were originally founded have been abolished ; but the States, sensible at last of the incongruity between these forms and the steps which they had lately taken, and apprehensive of danger from leaving it in any respect ambiguous to whom the people owed their allegiance, agreed now to remove all ground of ambiguity by a solemn abjuration of Philip as their sovereign.

An act of abjuration was accordingly passed, with great unanimity, in an assembly held on purpose at the Hague, consisting of deputies from Brabant, Gelderland, Zutphen, Flanders, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Overysel, and Friesland. In this act, after enumerating the principal grievances which had prompted them to form their present resolution, they declared it to be a right inherent in every free people, to withdraw their allegiance from a prince who obstinately refuses to fulfil the duty which he owes them ; and much more from one who violates the fundamental laws, and acts the part of a tyrant and oppressor. They pronounced Philip to have forfeited for ever all authority in the Netherlands. They forbade all judges and others to use his name, arms, or seal ; and they required the magistrates of towns, and all other persons in public offices, to bind themselves by an oath, to oppose him and his adherents to the utmost of their power.

These resolutions were carried into immediate execution. All Philip's

^h An abstract of his *Apology* is subjoined to the conclusion of this work.

seals were broken, all commissions and letters patent in his name were cancelled, and the new oath was administered to every person who possessed any civil or military employment. It was not without difficulty that the magistrates in some towns were persuaded to take this oath. Some remaining scruples of conscience, arising from a regard to their former oaths, gave uneasiness to several ; and others doubted of the expediency of so strong a measure at the present crisis, on account of the ships and merchandise belonging to the people of the Netherlands, which were in the ports of Spain. But no pains were spared to remove these objections, and at last almost the whole inhabitants of the above-mentioned provinces entered into the views of the States, and took the oath that was prescribed them ^{i.}

About this time Matthias left the Netherlands, after having resided there between three and four years, without having acquired either reputation to himself, or any advantage to the people whom he had been called to govern. He had employed all his influence to persuade the States to make choice of him for their sovereign ; but the motives above explained having determined them to give the preference to the duke of Anjou, it should seem that the prince of Orange had been able to satisfy Matthias as to the necessity of that measure, since he remained in the country for a considerable time afterwards, and accepted of an annual pension of fifty thousand guilders from the States ^{k.}

During the course of these civil and political transactions, the troops were not wholly unemployed. In Friesland, the king's forces were commanded by Schinch and Verdugo, between whom and colonel Norris and count Hohenloe several sharp encounters passed, with various success ; but the only important event which happened at this time in the northern provinces, was the acquisition of Breda, into which the Spaniards were treacherously admitted in the night by some of the garrison, whom the agents of the prince of Parma had found means to corrupt ^{l.}

The prince himself was, in the mean time, intent on the reduction of Cambray. But not having a sufficient number of troops to carry on the siege with vigour, he was obliged to convert it into a blockade. D'Inchi, the governor, had recourse for relief to the duke of Anjou, and was warmly seconded in his application by the States and the prince of Orange. Anjou perceiving how deeply his honour was concerned to gratify this first desire of his new subjects, published at the court of France his intention of attempting to raise the siege. This was no sooner known, than a great number of the nobility flocked from all parts of the kingdom, to his standard. With their assistance, he collected in a few days an army of near twelve thousand foot and four thousand horse, and marched directly towards Cambray. The prince of Parma, too prudent to contend with an army, which, besides being greatly superior to his own in number, was conducted by a brave and warlike nobility, quitted his entrenchments and retired. In this manner was Cambray delivered, after it had been blockaded for several months, during which the inhabitants had been reduced to great distress.

Departure
of Matthias.

^{i.} Upon a representation of the prince of Orange, the States formed at this time several useful regulations relative to the administration of justice, to the finances, and the troops. That council of State likewise was established of the necessity of which William had laboured to convince them, which was instituted partly to remedy the inconveniences arising from the slowness with which the deliberations of the States were unavoidably conducted, and partly to serve as a check upon the future sovereign. Grotius An. I. iii. Meteren, &c.

^{k.} Matthias had afterwards a better fortune. His brother resigned to him the kingdom of Hungary in 1608, and that of Bohemia in 1611. and the year following he obtained the Imperial crown. Strada, lib. vii. Meteren, p. 317.

^{l.} Meteren, p. 313.

1581. Anjou having brought along with him an ample supply of provisions, it was immediately introduced ; and soon after, he made a magnificent entry into the city, amidst the applauses of the people, who saluted him the Protector of their Liberty. He then laid siege to Chateau-Cambresis, and quickly compelled the garrison to surrender ^m.

This success which attended Anjou's first enterprise, afforded inexpressible pleasure to the confederate provinces, and served to heighten their expectations of his future government. He was earnestly entreated by the States to improve the present opportunity, and to advance with his army towards Flanders. But it was not in his power, he told them, to comply with their request. All his troops but a few were volunteers, who had engaged in his service only for a short time, and for the single purpose of the relief of Cambray. He could not prevail upon them to remain with him much longer : and he had not yet provided money for their pay. But he hoped to return soon with a powerful army ; and he would in the mean time employ his utmost influence to interest his brother and the queen of England in their cause.

Anjou solicits aid from his brother. There were not wanting powerful motives to induce the French king to grant Anjou that assistance for which he now applied ; since, besides being delivered from the fickle, restless spirit of a brother, who had greatly increased the troubles of his reign, he would have thereby avenged himself of Philip, who had secretly undertaken the protection of the catholic league, which, as will be afterwards related, had been lately formed by the duke of Guise, on pretence of providing for the security of the catholic religion, but in reality to control the sovereign's authority. But Henry was not in a condition at this time to make an open breach with Philip. By his indolence, and voluptuousness, added to the numberless calamities in which his kingdom was involved, his finances were exceedingly reduced ; and the king of Navarre on the one hand, and the duke of Guise on the other, furnished more than sufficient employment to all the policy and power which he possessed. Promises therefore of future aid were all that Anjou could obtain from him, and his disappointment determined the duke to set out immediately for England, where it should seem he had better ground to hope for assistance than in his native country.

Elizabeth had for some time past appeared to lend a favourable ear to a proposal of marriage which he had made to her ; and his expectations were at present raised to the greatest height. On his arrival in England, she gave him the most gracious reception. Soon afterwards, he ordered the ministers to prepare the marriage contract ; and, in the presence of many spectators, after a long discourse with him apart, she took a ring from her own finger, and put it upon his ; which both the spectators and the duke interpreted as a declaration of her consent. It is impossible to believe, with some historians, that Elizabeth meant only to amuse Anjou, and thereby to advance some political design. It is inconceivable how any design whatever could be promoted by carrying her dissimulation to so great a length. This wise princess, notwithstanding the many extraordinary accomplishments which adorned her character, was not exempt from the weaknesses that are peculiarly incident to her sex. Flattered by the court which Anjou had long assiduously paid her, she appears to have entertained the most partial sentiments of affection towards him, and seriously to have intended to listen to his proposal. But at last her prudence, her ambition, and that love of independence which she had cherished through

^m Meteren, p. 315. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. ii.

her whole life, prevailed over the temporary passion into which she had been betrayed. She made an apology to Anjou for her change of resolution, and gave him the strongest assurances of assistance and support in his new dominions. The marriage was no more mentioned, and the duke, after the stay of three months in England, set sail for the Low Countries ; escorted by a fleet, on board which there was a great number of nobility and gentry, whom the queen had desired to attend him, as a proof to his new subjects, that although the intended marriage had not taken place, yet she was deeply interested in his prosperity.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND.
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVIII.

1582.
Anjou's ar-
rival in the
Nether-
lands.

AFTER a passage of three days, the duke of Anjou landed on the 10th of February, at Flushing. From Flushing he went to Middleburgh, and was conducted from thence by a fleet of fifty ships of war to Antwerp. The banks of the Scheld, the entrance into the town, and the streets which led to the palace, were lined by the citizens, to the number of twenty thousand in arms ; and no expence was saved, which a wealthy commercial city could afford, to express their attachment and respect. After having taken the usual oath to maintain their rights and privileges, he received from the States the oath of allegiance ; and then entered upon the sovereignty, while all around him wore the face of happiness and joy.

In Antwerp, the public exercise of the Catholic religion had for some time past been prohibited. But now, in order to gratify the new sovereign, it was permitted in one of the churches ; and all Catholics were allowed to worship there, according to the rites of their religion, upon condition that they should abjure the king of Spain, and swear allegiance to the duke. A few persons only accepted of this indulgence, while the greater part chose rather to forego the privilege held forth to them, than so solemnly renounce their former sovereign. On this occasion the States, as well as the duke, were not a little alarmed ; and thought it necessary without delay to provide against the danger that might arise from persons who gave so clear a discovery of their disaffection to the present establishment. They first published *one* edict, imposing a fine of two hundred guilders on those who should decline taking the oaths ; and soon afterwards another, by which the recusants were banished from the Netherlands^a.

Attempt to
assassinate
the prince
of Orange. In the midst of these transactions, that joy which Anjou's arrival had diffused throughout the provinces was interrupted, by an attempt which was made, not many days after his inauguration, upon the life of the prince of Orange. The design was first

conceived in Spain, by a man of the name of Isonca ; and it was suggested by him to Gaspar Anastro, a Spanish banker in Antwerp, of ruined circumstances, as an expedient for retrieving his affairs. To induce Anastro to undertake the execution of the bloody purpose, Isonca sent him a sign-manuel of the king, in which Philip engaged to pay him eighty thousand ducats as soon as the assassination should be perpetrated. Anastro had not courage himself to execute so bold and desperate an enterprise, and therefore he communicated Isonca's proposal to John Jauregui, a mercial servant in his family, a young Biscayan, of a thoughtful melancholy disposition, whom he knew to be both trusty and audacious. With this young man Anastro found there was little need for persuasion “ I am ready,” said he, “ to perform instantly what the king so earnestly desires. I despise equally the proffered reward, and the danger to which I shall be exposed ; for I know that I shall die. I only ask that you will assist me with your prayers to God, and employ your interest with the king, to provide for my father in his old age.” Jauregui was the better qualified to succeed in his design, as he spoke the German language fluently, and was in no danger of being known to be a Spaniard. He was confirmed in his purpose by a priest of the name of Timmerman ; from whom he received absolution of his sins, and the strongest assurances, that by putting to death so great a heretic as the prince of Orange, he would infallibly secure the favour of God and everlasting happiness.

Under a full conviction of the truth of what the priest had declared, this deluded wretch set out for the castle, and having taken his station near the door of the apartment in which the prince had dined, he watched the opportunity of his coming out ; when stepping up to him, he discharged a pistol at his head, loaded with a single ball. The ball entered a little beneath his right ear, and passing under his palate and upper teeth, came out on the other side. William was deprived for a moment of his senses ; which he no sooner recovered, than he desired his attendants to save the life of the assassin. But the guards, transported with sudden rage, had dispatched him. The appearance of the prince's wound, from the effusion of blood, was extremely formidable, and as he was deprived of his speech by the same cause, the spectators believed him to be at the point of death. The news of this disaster spread quickly over the town, and excited, in all ranks of men, inexpressible anguish and despair. The citizens poured in crowds from every quarter to learn the particulars of that calamity which had befallen them ; and, as if each individual had lost his own proper parent, as well as the common parent of the state, there was nothing to be heard but the voice of sorrow and lamentation.

In the midst of this distress, a rumour was propagated, that the French were the authors of the murder, and that it had been perpetrated in order to deliver the duke of Anjou from the restraints which had been imposed on his authority. This report gained easy credit from the people. Their grief was now converted into fury, and they flew to the palace with an intention to execute a speedy vengeance.

In the mean time it was known at the castle, that the assassin was a Spaniard, from papers found in his pocket, by Maurice, the prince's son ^{1582.} b. Of this discovery, notice was immediately carried to the prince, who had now recovered his speech ; and he was informed, at the same time, of the danger to which Anjou and his countrymen were exposed. This intelligence affected William in the most sensible manner ; and notwithstanding his pre-

^b Maurice was at this time only fifteen years of age, but was even then remarkable for his attention and sagacity.

1582. sent critical situation, he wrote, with his own hand, a billet in exculpation of the French. By this, joined with the pains which were taken by St. Aldegonde, the people were undeceived and pacified. The assassin's body having been exposed to public view, it was soon discovered that he had been a domestic of Anastro. Anastro himself had fled, but his secretary, whom he had left behind to wait the issue of Jauregui's attempt, and Timmerman, the priest, were seized, and having confessed the guilt, they were condemned to suffer death. At the desire of the prince of Orange, who never neglected an opportunity of inculcating humanity upon his countrymen, no tortures were inflicted on them. They were first strangled and then quartered, and their heads and limbs fixed over the gates of the city ^c.

William's recovery was dubious for some time, on account of the difficulty which the physicians found in stopping the effusion of blood; but after all their applications had failed, they made a number of persons succeed one another in pressing the mouth of the wound with their thumbs, without intermission, for the space of several days and nights; and this expedient proved at length successful ^d.

Anastro having gone from Antwerp to Tournay, where the prince of Parma then resided, affirmed confidently that William had died of his wound. Farnese too rashly believed him, and wrote letters to the citizens of Antwerp, and other places, exhorting them to return now to their duty, since that person was removed by whom they had been led astray. These letters would not have been calculated, in the present disposition of the people, to promote the prince of Parma's design, even if the information on which he proceeded had been true; but as they did not arrive till after the people were delivered from their apprehensions with regard to William's life, they served only to excite their ridicule and indignation.

Meanwhile the operations of the war were not discontinued
 Return of the by either of the contending parties. The States acquired
 Spanish troops. possession of the town of Allost, and the prince of Parma made himself master of Steenwick and Lierres. He was soon after enabled to act with greater vigour than the weakness of his army had hitherto permitted him to exert. Having consented, with great reluctance, to the dismission of the Italian and Spanish troops, he had employed all his address to convince the Walloons that it was in vain for them to expect, with their own forces alone, to bring the war to a conclusion. He found it extremely difficult to overcome their diffidence, and was obliged to observe the utmost caution, in order to avoid awakening those suspicions which they had long indulged against the Spaniards. At length, however, he accomplished his design through the marquis de Roubais, who, as was mentioned above, had acted a principal part in promoting the reconcilement of the southern provinces. With this nobleman, Farnese had formed an intimate connexion, and had laboured assiduously to make him sensible how necessary it was that the troops should be permitted to return. The marquis, flattered with the familiarity to which he was admitted, and prompted by the view of advancing his credit with the king, yielded at last to the prince's solicitations, and then employed his influence with the States

^c They remained there till the city fell into the hands of the prince of Parma, when they were taken down by the popish ecclesiastics, and buried with every mark of veneration which their superstition could devise.

^d While his life was in danger, a public supplication was offered up to heaven for his recovery; and when it was accomplished, a solemn thanksgiving was celebrated.

^e Bentivoglio, p. 263. Meteren, p. 326. Thuanus, lib. lxxv.

so effectually, that they not only consented to the return of the forces, ^{1582.} but even petitioned the king for it in the most earnest terms^f.

As nothing could be more acceptable to Philip than this application, orders were immediately sent to Italy for the march of four regiments of veterans, consisting of near ten thousand men ; who, together with several thousand Burgundians and Germans, arrived in the Netherlands towards the end of the summer one thousand five hundred and eighty-two. After the arrival of this reinforcement, the prince of Parma's army amounted to sixty thousand foot and four thousand horse ; but finding it necessary to leave more than the half of that number in garrisons, he could keep only about thirty thousand in the field ; and a part of these was employed in Friesland under Verdugo, while the rest were under his own immediate command in the southern provinces. With these last he took Chateau Cambresis, Ninove, Gaesbec, and several other places ; he attacked the army of the States, which he compelled to retire under the cannon of Ghent ; and then he laid siege to Brussels, but the severity of the season, and the difficulty of finding provisions in a country which had been so long the seat of war, obliged him to desist from his attempt, and to put his troops into winter-quarters^g.

The United States, on the other hand, discovered great alacrity and zeal in supporting their new established government. They raised their yearly revenue from two millions four hundred thousand, to four millions of guilders, with which they maintained besides their native troops, a considerable number of British, French, and German forces. But so great a proportion of these forces was necessary for defending the forts and towns, that no army could be assembled sufficient to contend with the enemy in the field, nor even to raise the siege of any of those places which the prince of Parma attempted to subdue. Thus the number of towns belonging to the confederates was daily diminished, while their acquisitions were few and inconsiderable. And, as the enemy was now much more formidable than before, they were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions when they looked forward to the opening of a new campaign. Anjou, who participated with them in the anxiety which so critical a situation was fitted to excite, did every thing in his power to procure from France the succours which he had given them reason to expect. After many delays, the duke de Montpensier and mareschal Biron arrived in the Netherlands in the end of November, with between seven and eight thousand men, partly Swiss and partly French. With this reinforcement, under so able a general as Biron, Anjou perceived that he might retard the progress of the prince of Parma's arms, but that he could not hope either to expel him from his new conquests, or to bring the war to a conclusion : he therefore renewed his solicitations at the court of France, and endeavoured to engage his brother more heartily to espouse his cause.

Henry's counsellors were much divided in their opinions with regard to the measures proper to be pursued on this occasion. ^{Henry's deliberations.} By some of them, the present opportunity was represented as the happiest that could offer for uniting the Netherlands to the crown of France. But, as these men did not intend to advance the interest of Anjou, they did not employ any argument addressed to Henry's friendship or generosity ; and, instead of exhorting him to afford his brother aid sufficient to establish himself securely in his new sovereignty, they advised him only to give him such assistance as might enable him to stop the progress

^f Bentivoglio, p. 253.

^g Meteren, p. 334.

1582. of the Spanish arms. To this counsel they subjoined, that Henry ought to maintain a fleet in the Channel, and an army on the frontier of Luxemburg, in order to prevent the prince of Parma from receiving supplies from Spain or Italy. And in this posture, they said, he ought to wait, without exposing his troops to the hazards of war, till the contending parties should exhaust their strength, when it would be easy for him to drive the Spaniards out of the Netherlands, and his brother and the States, in order to obtain his protection, would gladly accept of whatever terms he should think fit to impose. But such a plan, which the great abilities of Farnese would have disconcerted, was too refined, and required too much labour, patience, attention, and expence, to be relished by a prince so indolent and voluptuous as Henry, who was so improvident of the future, and whose affairs were so exceedingly involved.

Henry refusing to grant his request. He listened with less reluctance to a proposal made him by some others of his counsellors, who being well acquainted with his character, perceived that his hesitation proceeded in a great measure from the shame of deserting his brother, and that in reality he wished for a pretence to reject his application. These men, secret enemies to the duke, and partizans of Philip, whose money it was believed they had accepted, were afraid to declare openly against a measure in which the heir-apparent of the crown, supported by the queen-mother, was so deeply interested. They affected to approve highly of the granting Anjou's request, provided the king could comply with it consistently with the interest of his kingdom. But both the interest and honour of France, they thought, required that the States should previously agree, that, in the event of the duke's death without issue, the king and his heirs should succeed him in the sovereignty of the Netherlands. They knew that the States would not consent to this condition. It was, however, proposed to them, and having met with that reception from them which there was reason to expect, notice was soon afterwards sent to Anjou by the queen-mother, and his other friends, of the unsuccessful issue of their endeavours to serve him^b.

Anjou's attempt on Antwerp and other places. This disappointment, which rendered it impossible for him to fulfil the expectations of his new subjects, was calculated to give him the most sensible concern. A candid and grateful prince would have thought himself bound more strongly than ever to exert himself in their behalf; and, by a careful attention to their interests, joined to a faithful discharge of his other obligations, to atone for his failure in that engagement which he was unable to perform. Widely different were the sentiments which arose in the mind of the faithless ungenerous Anjou. Apprehensive that the Flemings, disgusted on account of their disappointment in those hopes of assistance with which they had been deluded, might withdraw their allegiance from him, and reconcile themselves to their former sovereign; he resolved to prevent them from executing this design, in case they should conceive it, and in violation of all the oaths which he had sworn so lately, he formed a plan of depriving them of their liberty, by making himself master of all the towns into which his troops had already found, or could by force or stratagem find, admission.

This strange design, it is said, was first suggested to him by his partisans in France, in order to induce Henry to grant him the assistance which he solicited; and it was strongly recommended by Fervaques, and other French nobility who had accompanied him to the Netherlands. These men were all real or pretended friends to Anjou, and affected to be deeply concerned for his honour, with which they persuaded him, that such a

^b Thuanus, lib. xxvii. c. ix. Meteren, lib. xi.

limited authority as he possessed was utterly incompatible. Had they been his most inveterate enemies, they could not have advised him to a measure more likely to prove fatal to his interest. Yet this weak prince, without communicating his intention to Biron or Monpensier, who would have refused their consent, readily embraced the counsel that was given him, and immediately proceeded to deliberate with his advisers concerning the means of carrying it into execution ^{1582.} ⁱ

It was agreed, that the French troops, in all the towns where they were quartered, should, under the pretence of a mutiny, take up arms, and expel the garrisons; and in this manner he got possession of Dunkirk, Dixmude, Dendremonde, and several other places; but his principal object was the city of Antwerp. It would have been in vain, he believed, to attempt making himself master of so strong a place by open force, with so small a number of his troops as were within the city; and therefore, in conjunction with his counsellors, he exerted all his ingenuity in contriving how force and artifice might be united. On this occasion, Fortune seemed to favour his design. Towards the middle of January, after the frost had continued for some time, the States signified their intention to have his troops employed in an expedition against some of the enemy's towns in Friesland, which, on account of their wet situation, were accessible only in the time of frost. Anjou pretended to enter with great alacrity into this design. He immediately gave orders to have his troops conducted to the villages in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, where he held them ready to march upon the shortest notice; and, under various pretences, he brought to his court at Antwerp almost all the French noblesse, who had been dispersed throughout the Netherlands.

Being thus prepared, his plan was to seize upon the gate of Cronenburg, which lay next to the palace, with his body-guards, and to introduce his army silently in the night; but, on the day immediately preceding, an obscure report of his intention was circulated among the citizens, and a general alarm excited. The prince of Orange and the magistrates thought it proper to inform the duke of this report, and proposed to hang up lights in the city, and to stretch chains across the streets, and gates, in order to quiet the apprehensions of the people. Anjou could not, without confirming the suspicions entertained against him, refuse his consent to this proposal; but as he possessed a considerable share of his mother's duplicity and artifice, he assumed, with so much seeming sincerity, an appearance of indignation against the authors of the report, accompanied with such strong professions of attachment to the Netherlands in general, and the city of Antwerp in particular, that not only the magistrates, but even the prince of Orange was almost persuaded of his innocence. The streets however were barricaded, the whole town was illuminated, and many of the citizens were under arms.

These circumstances having made it necessary for Anjou to change his plan, he went early next morning to the prince of Orange's apartment in the castle, and after informing him that he had ordered his troops to be drawn out for a general review before their departure for Friesland, he desired the prince to accompany him to the field. Whether William had still any suspicion of his design is uncertain; but he declined complying with his request, alleging the badness of the day, and the state of his wound, as an excuse for his refusal; and he advised the Duke to put off the review till some future day, when the people would be entirely delivered from those apprehensions with which they were at present dis-

ⁱ Thuanus, I, xxvii, c. 10. Meteren, p. 336.

1583. quieted. Anjou pretended that he would comply with his advice, and left him; but soon afterwards he sent him notice, that, finding the day cleared up, he still resolved to hold the review, as he had first intended. He then gave orders to remove the barricades in the street which leads to the gate of Ripdorff, and set out, attended with a retinue in arms, amounting to between two and three hundred men.

He had no sooner passed the gate and the draw-bridge, than his attendants fell sword in hand, upon the guards, and having butchered some of them, obliged the rest to take shelter in the guard-house. The orders which he had sent to the camp had been punctually executed. The whole army was in motion, and seventeen companies of foot, six hundred lances, and four troops of horse were at hand, and ready to enter the city. They rushed in impetuously; and having set fire to some houses near the gate, as a signal for the rest of the troops to hasten forward, they spread themselves over the town, crying out, "May the mass flourish! the city is taken."

The citizens had been in some measure free from their apprehensions, by Anjou's protestations on the evening before; but they had not been put entirely off their guard. They flew instantly to arms, and quickly formed a close compact body, of sufficient strength to make head against the enemy. Their number was soon augmented by others, who flocked to their assistance from every quarter of the city. None declined exposing themselves to danger, or trusted to others for their defence. They remembered the devastations which had been committed some years before by the mutinous Spaniards, and were persuaded, that they could not now avoid a repetition of the disasters which they then suffered, by any other means, but by exerting their utmost vigour, and shewing, each man for himself, a contempt of danger. Animated therefore by the dread of that ruin with which their fortunes, their friends, their wives and children, were about to be overwhelmed; and fired with indignation against their ungrateful, perfidious enemy, they advanced with a degree of fury which the French troops were unable to withstand. Many of the French had entered the houses for the sake of plunder. These men were quickly surrounded by the citizens, and put to the sword: the rest were driven back towards the gate. There they expected, either to be supported by their friends from the camp, or to make their escape out of the city; but, having neglected to secure the portcullis, the soldiers, who had shut themselves up in the guard-house, had sallied out and let it down. By this circumstance the French were thrown into despair, and the resolution and spirit of the citizens augmented. The situation of the former was now truly deplorable: disappointed of that assistance from without, on which they had depended, and crowded together into a narrow space; while the citizens, who pursued, poured their shot upon them without a moment's intermission; they fell in heaps above one another, till the gate was choaked with the dead and wounded.

The citizens made next a desperate attack on a body of French troops who had mounted the rampart, and either put them to the sword, or tumbled them headlong from the wall. Of this scene, Anjou himself, and the Swiss troops, who had attempted in vain to burst open the gate, were spectators. At first he thought it was the citizens that were thrown down, and believed it must have been by accident that the portcullis had been shut. He could not suppose that the inhabitants, unaccustomed to the use of arms, could, in the space of an hour, have discomfitted so great a number of disciplined forces; but he was soon undeceived in his conjecture. The citizens, still inflamed with indignation, on account of his unprovoked, atrocious attempt,

pointed their cannon towards the place where he stood, and killed a considerable number of the Swiss. 1553.

The prince of Orange, who lodged in the castle, at the opposite end of the city, remained ignorant for some time of what had passed, and when intelligence of it was brought him, he at first believed it to be some accidental scuffle between the inhabitants and soldiers; but at last receiving more certain information of the truth, he set out with a part of the garrison for the scene of action. In his way thither he met Fervaques advancing towards him with a body of French troops, which had been left behind in the palace. At the first onset, Fervaques himself was taken prisoner, and his troops, disheartened by the loss of their commander, and still more by the consciousness of their treachery, were easily overcome. William then proceeded to the gate of Ripedorff, where he arrived in time to prevent the citizens from wrecking an useless, though merited, vengeance upon the prisoners.

Nothing could be more affecting, says an historianⁱ, whose information was derived from eye-witnesses, than the spectacle at the gate: the dead bodies piled one upon another to a considerable height, and the wounded mingled with the dead, weltering in blood, uttering the most doleful lamentations, and struggling to disengage themselves from each other, or from the bodies of their slaughtered friends. At the prince's intercession the lives of all the prisoners were spared, and many of the wounded recovered, through the attention and tenderness of those to whose care they were committed.

The number of the French found dead in different parts of the city, amounted to fifteen hundred, among whom were upwards of three hundred persons of distinction. And the prisoners, including those who surrendered to the prince of Orange, were computed at two thousand. So great was the loss which Anjou sustained from this ill-concerted enterprise; while only one hundred of the inhabitants were killed, and the same number wounded. It would be impossible, notwithstanding the desperate bravery of the citizens, to account for this extreme disparity betwixt the loss on the one side, and that on the other, were it not for a circumstance which one of the historians^k has mentioned, that the French, either from negligence, or their general's confidence of success, had brought very little ammunition with them, and, during the greatest part of the combat, stood exposed to the enemy's fire, without having any other weapon to defend them but their swords.

It is easier to imagine than describe the confusion with which Anjou must have been overwhelmed, when he reflected on the egregious folly into which he had been betrayed. He passed the night in a neighbouring fort called Berchem, where there was neither furniture nor provisions. From that place he wrote a letter to the senate of Antwerp, in which, after boasting absurdly of the proofs which he had given of his attachment to the Netherlands, he subjoined, That although the misfortune which had happened, had arisen from the unworthy treatment which he had met with, yet he was deeply penetrated with sorrow and repentance on account of it; that he still retained all his wonted affection towards them, and had sent them this letter, partly to enquire what were their intentions with respect to him, and partly to desire that they would send him his papers, furniture, and servants; hoping that these last, who were entirely innocent of what had been done, should not suffer any harm^l.

To this letter the senate made no return, but referred it to the consider-

ⁱ Van Meteren.

^k Reidan.

^l Meteren, p. 339.

7583. ration of the prince of Orange and the States ; and in the mean time Anjou, being utterly destitute of every thing necessary for the support of his troops, left Berchem, and directed his march towards Dendremonde. He intended to have gone thither by the shortest road, but the citizens of Antwerp having sent a number of armed vessels to oppose his passage over the Scheld, he was obliged to turn back, and to fetch a compass round by Duffel, Mechlin, Rimenant, and Vilvorden. In this march, besides suffering the greatest hardships in his own person, he lost a considerable number of his troops by an inundation of the river Nethe. From Duffel he wrote letters to the governors of Brussels and other places, in which he threw the whole blame of what had happened on the inhabitants of Antwerp, and represented the affair as a tumult, in which his troops, when upon their way to the camp, had interfered, but which had arisen in consequence of the ill usage which he himself had received. This disingenuous conduct served to exasperate the people of Antwerp more than ever against him, and they published a vindication of their conduct, setting forth, " That they had in all respects demeaned themselves towards him as became good and faithful subjects. They had given him even more than their proportion of the supplies, and had raised the sum of seventy thousand guilders ; which, instead of applying it to pay the arrears due to the army, he had distributed among his French and Swiss troops to encourage them in their late atrocious attempt. Nothing could be more palpably unjust than to impute that attempt to the citizens of Antwerp, since, on the same day, the French troops had offered the same violence in other places. By the kind providence of Heaven, the plan concerted to enslave them, had been frustrated, in such towns as were of the greatest importance ; and it was their earnest prayer, that the duke might become sensible of the iniquity of his conduct, and resolve for the future to govern the provinces conformably to those fundamental laws of the constitution, which, at his accession, he had solemnly sworn to observe."

The news of what had happened, having been quickly diffused throughout the provinces, excited universal astonishment and indignation. The prince of Parma, desirous to improve the opportunity which was presented to him, attempted to reconcile the people to their ancient government. But his endeavours were not more successful now than formerly. The confederates were deaf to his proposals ; and even refused to appoint ambassadors to treat with him concerning peace.

The States in the mean time were deliberating concerning
 Deliberations of the States. the letter which Anjou had written to the senate of Antwerp. Had they listened to that just resentment with which they were inflamed, they would not have hesitated to declare that he had forfeited the sovereignty. But they considered how extremely critical their situation was become, while Aujou was master of several of their fortified towns, and the prince of Parma hovered round them with an army, against which they were unable to contend. In this perplexity they intreated the prince of Orange, who had hitherto remained silent, to assist them with his counsel. No person felt more sensibly for the distress into which Aujou's temerity had plunged the confederacy ; and no person had a juster ground of provocation. It was by his means chiefly that Anjou had obtained the sovereignty ; and yet it could not be doubted, that in sending Fervaques with troops to the castle, as above related, the intention was to deprive him either of his life or of his liberty. Notwithstanding this, William had at first interposed to prevent the citizens from using any violence against the prisoners ; and he now gave the following conciliatory advice to the States in writing, as he generally did in matters which he deemed of high importance.

It was not, he said, without reluctance, that he had resolved to deliver his opinion on the difficult question which was now before them, as it had of late been the practice of many persons to blame him for every misfortune that had befallen the confederacy. Even if he had been invested with absolute authority, their censure would have been unjust, since the issues of things belong to God only, and no man can answer for the success of the best concerted enterprise. Considering his age, and the injustice with which he had been treated, it would be prudent perhaps not to expose himself again to the obloquy of his detractors. But his concern for the prosperity of the Netherlands would not suffer him to maintain that silence, which a regard to his personal ease and security required ; especially as they assured him that they would take in good part, and interpret favourably, whatever counsel he should offer.

Nothing was farther from his intention than to attempt to justify that atrocious violence which had been lately perpetrated : on the contrary, he thought the conduct of the duke had been such as proved, beyond a possibility of doubt, that he had forfeited his title to the sovereignty. Notwithstanding this, no person, he believed, who suffered himself to consider attentively the course of events since their first connexion with the duke, would deny that this connexion had been attended with advantages. By his troops, not only the siege of Cambray, but that of Lochem too, had been raised, and the whole province of Guelderland thereby saved from the depredations of the enemy. In consequence of his election, peace had been established between the catholics and protestants in France, and the latter left at liberty to enter into the service of the States. Not to mention what they ought perhaps to prize more than any thing else, that, by electing the duke for their sovereign, not only the authority, but the name and arms of Spain, had been abolished in the Netherlands, and a foundation laid, upon which their liberty might be firmly established, provided they should exert themselves with their wonted zeal and vigour. When these things were considered, there would not appear much ground for the censures passed on those by whom the duke's election had been promoted. But whether they had judged wisely or unwisely, the States must now resolve either to make peace with the king of Spain, or trust for the future to their own strength, or enter into terms of accommodation with the duke.

With regard to the first of these, he observed, that besides that all the same reasons still subsisted against returning under the Spanish yoke, which had formerly determined them to shake it off ; it must appear preposterous to think of reconciling themselves as subjects to a prince, whose name and ensigns were obliterated, and whose authority they had so solemnly renounced. There was truth in what some persons (friends of Spain more than their native country) had suggested, that it was more desirable for the people of the Low Countries to be subject to a distant, than to a neighbouring prince, as it must be more difficult for the former, than for the latter, to encroach upon their liberty. But this maxim could not, in the present divided state of the Netherlands, be urged in favour of the dominion of the king of Spain ; who, besides possessing a powerful army ready to overwhelm them, was absolute master of several of the provinces ; and was therefore, in reality, much nearer to the confederacy than any other prince.

Prompted by this and other considerations, they had bestowed the sovereignty on the duke of Anjou ; and he, it could not be denied, had forfeited his title to it. This was acknowledged even by the duke himself, who was now sensible of his folly. But notwithstanding his repentance, there was much ground to doubt of the expediency of entering into a second agreement with one by whom the first had been so grossly violated. There was

1583. ground to dread that the same evil counsellors, by whom the duke had been once deluded, might again deceive him ; and there was reason to suspect, that confidence could not be soon restored between the French troops and the people of the Netherlands.

On the other hand, he thought it his duty to call their attention to the consequences which must attend their refusing to be pacified. The duke would deliver all the fortified towns which he possessed, into the hands of the Spaniards. Both he and his brother, the king of France, would from friends be converted into the most bitter enemies ; from whom all that mischief might be expected, that can be contrived and executed by those who are stimulated by ambition, and inflamed with animosity and resentment. An immediate stop would be put by the French king to their commerce with his subjects ; and while he would shut his harbours against their ships, he would open a passage through his dominions for the troops of the king of Spain. Even the queen of England, though highly dissatisfied with the duke's conduct, yet were she to be informed that the States had obstinately refused to be reconciled, would be exceedingly offended. And if they should lose her favour, as well as that of France, to what other friend could they have recourse, either able or willing to support them ? They must for the future trust for their preservation entirely to themselves. They must, without delay, make a numerous augmentation of their forces ; and yet he knew not where these forces could be raised, since the devastation of the war had been so great in every province of the confederacy, that scarcely a sufficient number of the people remained, to carry on their trade and manufactures. In order to maintain such an army as was necessary, much larger sums of money were requisite, than had hitherto been collected. What these were, would appear from the scheme which he now delivered to them, containing a particular description of all the ordinary and extraordinary expences of the war. From the difficulty which they had experienced in procuring money for paying the garrisons alone, they might judge whether they were possessed of funds adequate to the expence both of these and of an army in the field ; without which, it was impossible that they could for any considerable time resist the enemy.

He was far from censuring those who advised them to trust to the Almighty for protection. The counsel of these persons was pious and well-intended ; but he thought, that to engage in any difficult enterprise without the means of carrying it into execution, was more properly to tempt the Divine Providence than to trust in it ; and that those only could be said to exercise a proper trust in God, who, after embracing the most favourable opportunities of action, had recourse to Heaven by prayer, to crown their undertakings with success. It behoved them therefore still attentively to consider their strength and their resources ; and if, without foreign assistance, they should find them sufficient for the purposes which they had in view, they would, in his opinion, judge wisely in resolving to retain the sovereignty in their own hands.

There was a time when the people of the Netherlands might have established themselves in this happy state of freedom and independence ; when, in spite of the king of Spain, they might have expelled his brother John of Austria from the provinces. But our present situation, continued William, is widely different from what it was at the time of which I speak. A powerful Spanish army, seconded by those who were then our friends, is at our gates. The strength of the confederacy is impaired. Even with the assistance of the French troops, we have been unable to stop the progress of the enemy. If nevertheless you shall, upon inquiry, find that you are able, by making greater exertions, to do more alone, than when you

were assisted by others, banish for ever all thoughts of an accommodation with the duke, and resolve henceforth, alone and unassisted, to oppose both him and the Spaniards. Proceed instantly to the execution of your design. But I dread that before you can make the preparations necessary for entering upon action, before you can collect either the troops or the money requisite, and even before you can appoint a general to command your forces, many of your towns will be taken, and many of them, despairing of relief, will enter into terms of accommodation with the Spaniards. For these reasons you will judge, perhaps, that in your present circumstances the wisest resolution which you can form, is to enter into a treaty of reconciliation with the duke. And if this shall be the result of your deliberations, I have only one other counsel to suggest, which is, to give particular attention in your new agreement to prevent the fortified towns from being exposed on any future occasion to that danger from which the city of Antwerp has so narrowly escaped ; and for this purpose to require, that no officer or soldier shall be admitted into garrisons without taking an oath of allegiance and fidelity to the States ^o.

This reasoning of the prince of Orange produced the desired effect upon a great majority of the deputies, and a negotiation was immediately begun, and soon afterwards a treaty of peace and reconciliation was concluded on the following conditions : That all the French prisoners in Antwerp should be set at liberty, the duke's papers and other effects restored, and ninety thousand guilders given him for discharging the arrears due to his troops. That he should deliver up all the towns which he had seized, retire to Dunkirk with four hundred foot and three hundred horse, and remain there till every point of difference should be entirely settled ; that he should renew the oath which he took at his inauguration, to govern the provinces according to the fundamental laws, and that all his troops should take an oath of allegiance to the States, binding themselves to serve them faithfully against their enemies, and never to be concerned in any attempt to the prejudice of their authority.

As in promoting this agreement the prince of Orange appears to have acted under a conviction, that there was no other expedient by which the confederacy could be saved from ruin ; so, in being able to persuade the States to adopt it, he gave the most convincing proof of his unlimited influence over that assembly. The people in general, especially in Flanders and Brabant, were extremely averse to any accommodation. Their hereditary antipathy against the French had, on this occasion, risen to the greatest height. Many of the deputies too were animated with the same aversion and resentment ; nor can it be doubted, that if they had not been prevented by that deference which they had been long accustomed to entertain for William's opinion, they would have proceeded against Anjou to the utmost extremities, and have resolved never more to acknowledge his authority. The Spaniards were not ignorant by whom the States had been prevented from forming this resolution ; and they were now convinced, that, till the prince of Orange were removed, no event, however promising, would induce the confederates to return to their allegiance. They had recourse therefore to the dishonourable means of private assassination ; and to attempt it, different persons were instigated about this time by Philip or his ministers ; one of them by Philip himself, according to the declaration of the criminal ; but more probably, by his ministers at Madrid : another by his ambassador at the court of France ; and a third by the marquis de Roubais and the

Reconcile-
ment o^r the
States with
Anjou.
March 8th.

Attempts
on the
life
of the
prince of
Orange.

1583. prince of Parma. The conspiracy of the two former was detected, and they suffered death ; and the last, a French officer, whom Roubais had taken prisoner, and who had pretended to agree to the proposal, in order to procure his liberty, gave information to William's friends of the arguments which had been employed to persuade him, and shewed, by his conduct afterwards in the service of the States, the sincerity of his abhorrence of that unallowed deed which he had been solicited to perform ^p

The danger to which the prince was so often exposed from the ^{Discontents of the people.} inveterate resentment of the Spaniards, ought to have endeared his person and counsels to his countrymen, and they produced this effect in a high degree upon all those who were able to comprehend the wisdom and moderation with which he had conducted their affairs. But great numbers having formed their judgment of Anjou's election to the sovereignty, from the late unhappy consequences with which it had been accompanied, could not refrain from ascribing some sinister intention to those who had been active in promoting it. They were incapable of discerning the strength of the motives by which William had been prompted to advise the States to renew their agreement, and they even fostered suspicions of his having attached himself to the duke, with a view to the attaining of some private advantage. This spirit of discontent was not confined to the vulgar, but likewise infected several of the deputies of the States, who became sullen and refractory ; and by their contentious opposition to almost every measure that was proposed, disturbed and retarded the deliberations of that assembly. A great majority, however, of the members agreed to employ the French and Swiss troops under mareschal Biron, whom the duke had appointed to command them. Biron having not only had no concern in the attempt upon Antwerp, but having been considered by Anjou as one by whom it would have been opposed, was the most unexceptionable person to whom the command could have been committed, and he had been long distinguished for his military skill and experience. At first his arms were attended with success. He compelled the fort of Wouda to surrender, and with inferior forces he repulsed the prince of Parma, who had attacked his lines near the towns of Rosendal. But it was impossible for him with so small an army to stop the progress of the Spaniards in other places, or to face them in the open field. Farnese therefore pushed his conquests with great rapidity, and made himself master of Endove, Diest, and Westerlo, while he practised every art of negociation and intrigue against Bruges, Ghent, and other places.

During the course of these transactions the duke of Anjou fell into a lingering illness at Dunkirk, which was generally supposed to be the effect of those hardships which he suffered in his retreat from Antwerp. Whether he believed himself insecure in his present situation, while the prince of Parma was so briskly carrying on his conquests in the neighbourhood, or found that his health required a change of air, and a relaxation from the fatigues of business, or whether he had conceived hopes at this time of obtaining, by a personal interview with his brother, more powerful assistance than he had hitherto received, does not appear with sufficient evidence. But whatever was the motive which determined him, he left Dunkirk, and set out for France.

^{Progress of the prince of Parma's arms.} The prince of Parma was no sooner informed of his departure, than he quitted Herentals, and led his troops to Dunkirk. The States, aware of the importance of that place, ordered mareschal Biron to march with all his forces to its relief. But

such was the resentment which the Ghentese and other Flemings had conceived against the French, that no consideration could prevail upon them to suffer Biron to pass through their territories. They had resolved, they said, never to accede to the late agreement with the duke, whom they could not trust, and they would not be indebted to his troops for their defence. The consequence to be expected followed. The garrison of Dunkirk, which consisted wholly of French, gave up the town in a few days to the prince of Parma. He then laid siege to Nieuport, and took it with so much facility as gave ground for a suspicion of treachery on the part of the garrison. He intended next to have invested Ostend, but having learnt that the prince of Orange had taken particular pains to provide for its security he relinquished his design; and having turned his arms against Dixmude and Meningen, he subdued these and several other places with a degree of celerity with which the people of the Netherland had never been accustomed to see any military enterprises carried on. But his success served only to dazzle and confound the confederates, instead of opening their eyes to the fatal consequences of that discord which had exposed so great a number of their associates an easy prey to the Spaniards. Except augmenting the garrisons of two or three towns, in the preservation of which some of the deputies were personally interested, no vigorous resolution of any consequence was formed by the States, although they held their sessions daily, and were daily alarmed with fresh accounts of some new loss which the confederacy had sustained.

About this time an incident fell out at Antwerp, which strongly marks the spirit by which the Flemings were actuated on this occasion. The prince of Orange having given orders for building an additional rampart for the greater security of the castle, some secret partizans of Spain took occasion from thence to insinuate, that he intended to deliver the fortress to the French, and was now preparing it for their reception. The people too easily believed this injurious suggestion; and having taken up arms, they ran tumultuously to the castle, with a resolution to expel the garrison. William immediately presented himself before them. The sight of a person whom they had been so long accustomed to revere, joined to the evidence which they received on the spot, of the utter falsehood of that report which they had so rashly credited, appeased the fury of the greater number, and quelled the tumult. But there were some among them more audacious and malignant than the rest, who called him by the contumelious names of deserter and traitor of his country. His treatment, so unmerited from a people whom he had saved from ruin, affected him in the most sensible manner. He admonished the magistrates to take cognisance of the licentiousness of which they had been spectators. But finding, that, on account of the great number of the guilty, they were afraid to exercise their authority, he left Antwerp, and retired into Zealand, after having delivered directions to the magistrates in writing, for the government and defence of the city, and nominated the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, chief magistrate, or governor, for the ensuing year^q.

Injurious
sus-
pic-
tions
against
the
prince
of
Orange.

He retires
to Zealand.
July 22.

^q Of the affection of the maritime provinces towards the prince of Orange, and of the trust and confidence which they reposed in him he received about this time a conspicuous proof, by a resolution into which all the cities entered, except two, of creating him earl of Holland and Zealand with all the powers and privileges which belonged to that ancient dignity. How far the prince himself contributed to their forming this resolution does not appear from the cotemporary historians. It did not contradict the treaty between the United States and the duke of Anjou; as, by that treaty, the maritime provinces had only bound themselves to contribute their share of the public expences. Yet it was matter of some obloquy against the prince, of whom it was said, that he had not been inattentive to his private interest.

1583. William did not intend, by changing the place of his residence, to withdraw his attention from the southern provinces. He interested himself as much as ever in their affairs, and meant only to provide for his own security, and to remove the assembly of the States (which was summoned to meet at Middleburg) to a situation in which the deputies would not be so much influenced by the emissaries of Spain, nor so much disturbed in their deliberations by the tumultuous disposition of the people. He still employed all his interest to reconcile the cities of Brabant and Flanders to the continuance of the French troops in the Netherlands. And his endeavours proved effectual with Brussels, and some other towns, which lay nearest to the enemy; but Ghent, and most of the other cities, remained as inflexible as ever, and resolved never to admit the French within their territories, or to be indebted to them for protection. The States therefore found it necessary to give orders for the departure of these troops, at a time when every friend of his country, who suffered himself to reflect on the critical situation of the confederacy, thought that the provinces ought rather to have made concessions to Anjou and the French king, in order to induce the latter to augment their number. Biron put them on board transports at Birvliet, and thence conducted them by sea to France.

August 27. The Spaniards were now at liberty to pursue their conquests almost without opposition. Farnese immediately formed the blockade of Ipres. Allost was sold to him by an English and Walloon garrison for the payment of their arrears. The country of Waes, and the town of Rupplemonde on the Scheld, were subdued, and Zutphen too was taken by surprise; the consequence of which was, that the Veluwe, an extensive territory between the Issel and the Rhine, was laid open to the incursions of the enemy.

In the mean time the secret partizans of Spain were daily increasing in Bruges, Ghent, and other places. Many persons had declared themselves against Anjou with so much violence, that they dreaded his return. Many were intimidated by the rapidity of the prince of Parma's conquests. Some having been intrusted with the public money, were afraid of being called to account for their management of it by the prince of Orange and the States, and all of them were allured to their first allegiance by the moderation with which Farnese treated such as had already submitted to him, and the strict fidelity with which he adhered to his engagements.

Among the persons who, prompted by these motives, were desirous of again reducing their country under the Spanish government, the prince of Orange had the mortification to find his brother-in-law, count Heremberg. This nobleman, weak, inconstant, and governed by his wife, who was the prince's sister, but had for some time been at variance with her brother, had formed the design of delivering the province of Guelderland, of which he had been appointed governor, into the hands of the Spaniards. His plot having been detected before it was ripe for execution, he was seized and imprisoned by an order of the States. But having been afterwards set at liberty upon his parole, he gave irrefragable proof of his guilt by flying over to the enemy.

The prince of Chimai's intrigues in Flanders were more successful than those of Heremberg. He was eldest son of the duke d'Arschot, and had been educated in the Catholic faith;

Treachery of the prince of Chimai. but some time before the present period, he had openly professed the reformed religion, and attached himself with much apparent zeal to the party of the prince of Orange and the States. Conscious that both his religion and patriotism were mere grimace, he had laboured with con-

summate artifice to remove any suspicions that might be entertained of his sincerity. He was perpetually surrounded with the protestant ministers, with whom he lived on the most familiar terms ; and he published an apology for his conduct, in which, with the highest encomiums on the protestant faith, he mingled the bitterest invectives against Philip, bestowing on him every reproachful epithet which the most implacable hatred could suggest. By these means he had insinuated himself into the favour of great numbers of the protestants, and particularly those of Bruges, who conferred upon him the government of their town. The prince of Orange, having received information of a secret correspondence which he held with the Catholics, had at first attempted to dissuade the people of Bruges from electing him their governor, and he now gave secret instructions to the magistrates, to employ colonel Boyd, a Scotch officer, who commanded one of the regiments in garrison, to deprive Chimai of his authority. Boyd affected to enter heartily into the plan proposed, but he betrayed the magistrates, and gave immediate information of their design to Chimai ; who, through an artful misrepresentation of their conduct, was enabled to expel them from the city. He then put others into their place who were devoted to his interest, and still pretended all his wonted zeal for the reformed religion, till, having obliged many of the principal citizens to withdraw, he made himself master of the town, and then delivered it to the prince of Parma, upon condition that the prince should confer upon him the government of the province. To the obtaining of this request, which was granted by Farnese, and confirmed by Philip, Chimai thought himself the better entitled, as he had contributed in the same perfidious manner to the reduction of Ipres, which, after a blockade of nine months, had lately been obliged to surrender. Not long after this he threw off the mask of religion, and both he and one of the protestant ministers, who had been a principal instrument of his deceit, publicly abjured Calvinism, and declared themselves converts to the popish faith^r.

An attempt of the same nature with that of Chimai on Bruges was made by Imbise, and other agents of Farnese, to reduce Ghent and Dendremonde under the Spanish power. In order to second their endeavours, the prince of Parma had pitched his camp between Ghent and Bruges ; but the plan which had been formed for the surprise of Dendremonde was discovered, and Imbise, the principal contriver, who was chief magistrate of Ghent, a factious and turbulent old man, was condemned and executed. During these transactions, the prince of Orange was employed in establishing a thorough reconciliation between the States and the duke of Anjou, whose return with a numerous army Death of Anjou. William considered as the only remedy for the increasing calamities of the commonwealth. There was more reason now than ever to expect that Anjou would soon be able to fulfil his engagements. Through the queen-mother's intercession, Henry had openly declared his resolution to exert himself with vigour in the support of his brother's interest in the Netherlands. An ambassador had been sent by the States to congratulate with the Duke on this desirable event, and to acquaint him of their having consented to certain conditions which he had proposed. His joy on this occasion was extreme, and he now indulged the most flattering expectations ; but he did not long survive these events, which gave him so much pleasure. Having never enjoyed perfect health since the hardships which he underwent in

^{1584.}
Beginning
of June

his retreat from Antwerp, he was seized about this time with an illness which might have been easily accounted for, from the unsound state of his constitution ; but which, agreeably to the practice of the age, was attributed to poison^s. Whatever was the cause, he died in great pain, at Chateau-Thierry, on the 10th of June, 1584, at the age of thirty.

Such was the conclusion of the restless life of this prince, *His character.* whose weaknesses and vices were equally pernicious to himself, to the Netherlands, and to France. Improvident of the future, and unable to judge for himself, he was a slave to the selfish purposes of others, as well as to his own humour and caprice. He seems likewise to have been incapable of discerning the merit or demerit of those who approached him, or the soundness or folly of the counsels which they offered. He was not void of friendship or attachment, and he was active and ambitious ; but he was entirely destitute of that patience, steadiness, and resolution, which are necessary in carrying on any important enterprise ; and his conduct towards the United Provinces above related, too clearly justifies what was said of him by his sister Margaret, that if fraud and infidelity were to be banished from the earth, there was in him a stock sufficient from which it might be soon replenished^t.

Assassination
of the prince
of Orange.

Yet his death, at the present crisis, was a real calamity to the people of the United Provinces ; but the memory of it was soon effaced by a much greater calamity, which in a few weeks afterwards befel them, in the death of the prince of Orange ; against whom one of those atrocious attempts, to which Philip's proscription gave birth, proved at last successful. It was planned, and afterwards executed in Delft, by Balthazar Gerard, a native of Villefans in Burgundy. This man, in order to facilitate his admission into the prince's presence, had called himself the son of a French protestant, of the name of Guion, who had suffered for the sake of his religion. By this fictitious account of his extraction, joined to an artful affectation of zeal for the reformed religion and the service of the States, he became known to the prince ; and William was so far deceived by this impostor, that he put him into the train of an ambassador to the court of France. This mark of confidence did not divert him from his ungenerous design ; on the contrary, he had no sooner returned from France, than he resolved to carry it into execution ; and he would have done so, as he afterwards declared, on his first arrival, when he was admitted with letters into the prince's apartment, if he had not neglected to furnish himself with arms. But in a few days after, having returned to the palace, on the pretence of applying for a pass-port, he placed himself at the door of that apartment, in which the prince was at dinner with his wife Louisa de Cologni, and his sister the countess of Schwartzenburgh, and waited there with a cloak cast round him, till they were retiring into another room. The princess, observing him look confused and pale, was greatly alarmed, and enquired what he wanted. He comes for a passport, answered the prince ; when the assassin, stepping forward, shot him in the body with a pistol loaded with three balls. William had time only to say, "God have mercy on me, and this afflicted people : I am grievously wounded."

Immediately after which he fell down, and in a few moments afterwards expired^u ; the princess, overwhelmed with anguish, looking on ; whose peculiar fate it was to see her second husband murdered, as her illustrious father, and her first husband, the amiable Teligni, had been, in the massacre of Paris, some years before.

^s It was supposed to have been given him by his physician bribed by the court of Spain.
^t Bentivoglio, 275. Davila, l. vi. &c. ^u In the fifty-second year of his age.

The murderer in the mean time had made his escape out of the 1584. palace by a back-door, and had almost reached the ramparts. He was preparing to throw himself into the ditch, which was full of water, in the hopes of being able to swim over, when he was overtaken by two of the prince's guards.

Upon his first examination he declared, that, six years before the present period, he had formed the design of putting the prince to death; that he had then been deterred from his purpose by his friends; that he had again resumed it, when the king published his edict of proscription; that having been in the service of Du Pré, secretary to count Mansveldt, he had procured from him some blank subscriptions of the count's, which, in order to gain credit, he had delivered to the prince; that he had communicated his design to four jesuits in Treves and Tournay, who assured him, that if he should die in the execution of it, he would be deemed a martyr by the church.

To these circumstances, after the torture was applied, he subjoined, that the reward promised in the proscription had been his principal motive; that he had made known his purpose to the prince of Parma, and had been desired by him to converse with his secretary, Christopher Assonville; that Assonville had desired him to reflect on the difficulties which he must encounter; but had assured him, that he could not perform a more acceptable service either to the King or the prince of Parma; that he might depend, with perfect security, upon receiving the money promised in the King's edict of proscription; but exhorted him repeatedly to deny, in case of his being seized, that the prince of Parma had approved of his design; although the prince, he said, had in reality approved of it, and had consented to his using the blank subscriptions.

When he was informed of the sentence pronounced against him, in which it was ordained, that his right hand should be burnt off, and the flesh of his body torn from the bones with burning pincers, he was at first thrown into the most dreadful consternation, and lamented bitterly that he had suffered the thirst of wealth to betray him into an action, which had plunged him into such intolerable misery; but he soon recovered his natural fortitude, and said, that, far from repenting of what he had done, he was conscious of having merited the favour of God, and was sure of being admitted into a state of eternal happiness. And in this temper of mind he remained, both in the interval before his execution, and in the time of it, during which he exhibited a degree of composure and tranquillity that filled the spectators with astonishment.

The highest encomiums were bestowed on this deluded wretch by the popish ecclesiastics in the southern provinces; and in many cities they would have lighted up bonfires, and celebrated public rejoicings, if the consent of the people could have been obtained; but even the prince of Parma's troops refused to join in these rejoicings, and openly declared their condemnation of an act, which they found repugnant to the dictates of their hearts, whatever might be said in justification of it, on the principles of crooked politics, or the popish faith.

It will be unnecessary to inform the reader of the grief and consternation, which this melancholy event diffused throughout the confederated provinces. Each person mourned as for his parent, his guardian, and friend, and felt for the loss which the State had sustained, as men are wont to feel for their private and domestic calamities. Being now deprived of the person whose wisdom had, for many years, been their principal support, they considered themselves as destitute and forlorn, and

1584. were overwhelmed with the most gloomy apprehensions of their future fate ^w.

Character of the prince. Never was any person better fitted than the prince of Orange for the difficult situation in which he was placed, or better qualified for the arduous task of delivering an injured people from the yoke of their oppressor. Even his bitterest enemies allow him to have been possessed of vigilance, application, penetration, and sagacity, joined with a peculiar dexterity in governing the inclinations of men, and in conciliating and preserving their affections. To these accomplishments both the history of his life, and the testimony of the best informed historians, authorise us to add the virtues of fortitude and magnanimity, of justice and equity, of patience, equanimity, and moderation, which were never perhaps found united in one person in so eminent a degree ^x. Amidst all the variety of fortune which he experienced, he was never either elated or depressed; but whether the events in which he was interested were prosperous or adverse, he preserved on all occasions the same composure and serenity of soul.

By a respectable popish historian ^y, he is accused of avarice and rapacity; yet that author has not been able to produce a single fact to justify his charge. It appears not from any historian, that he was ever guilty of employing his power for the purpose of advancing his private interest, to the prejudice either of individuals or the public. He always declined taking any concern in administering the finances. He did not even exact payment of the revenue which the States had appointed him; and at his death he left his private affairs so much encumbered, that the States found it necessary to make provision for the support of his widow and children ^z.

The same historian has loaded him with the imputation of fraud and hypocrisy, of which, however, no proof was ever given but general invective, nor a single instance of deceit produced by his most inveterate enemies. Before his rupture with Philip, he testified on all occasions his disapprobation of the measures that were pursued; and after it, he acted uniformly the part of an open foe. He had no religion, say some Catholic writers, but what his interest and ambition dictated. Yet he was decent and irreproachable in his conduct, as well as punctual in discharging the functions of that religion which he professed; nor do these authors pretend to offer any other evidence to justify their surmise, but that he gave up the Catholic religion, in which he had been educated at the court of the emperor, and returned to that with which his mind had been tinctured in his earliest infancy. His religion was not indeed of the same spirit either with that of those whom he forsook, or of many of those whose cause he adopted. It suffered him not to regard either speculative opinions or external rites, as sufficient ground for harassing and butchering those from whom he differed in opinion. But in an age of cruel gloomy superstition, with which almost all the companions of his youth were deeply infected, his religion, conformably to the example and precepts of its author, was mild, moderate, and humane. Nor was it to one sect of Christians only that his moderation and humanity extended. As he did what he could, while he adhered to the Catholic faith, to put a stop to the persecution of the protestants; so after he had embraced the reformed religion, he exerted his most strenuous endeavours to protect the Catholics from violence, and to procure liberty for them to exercise their religion as far as was consistent with the public peace. To

^w Van Meteren, p. 363. Bentivoglio, lib. xii. Thuanus, in hoc anno.

^x Thuani Historia. ^y Bentivoglio. ^z Wickfort, lib. ii.

infer from this conduct that he had no religion of his own, is going a great deal farther than to assert the lawfulness of persecution ; it is equivalent to maintaining that no christian can be sincere who can live at peace with those who differ from him in his religious persuasion.

It is not to the purpose which the popish historians intended to serve by their portraits of William's character, to say of him that he was ambitious ; in itself, ambition merits neither praise nor blame, but is culpable or laudable according to the end at which it aspires, and the means which it employs. But if we judge concerning the character of the prince of Orange according to this criterion, it must be impossible for persons so opposite in their principles, as the Catholic and protestant historians, to agree.

If, with the former, we place the rights of all sovereigns on the same foundation, without distinguishing between an absolute prince and the sovereign of a free people, and believe that every prince is, by an indefeasible and divine right, entitled to exercise a despotic power over the religion and liberty of his subjects ; if we believe, that, with the permission of the pope, a king may violate his most solemn oaths, and that the obligations of his subjects to obedience remain in force, even after every condition upon which they entered into them has been violated . if, with such principles as these, we judge of the character of the prince of Orange, it will be difficult not to consider him as guilty both of perjury and rebellion ; and in this case, the most favourable verdict that can be passed upon his conduct, is to say. that it proceeded from a criminal ambition.

But if, on the other hand, we regard the pontiff's pretensions to the power of setting men at liberty from their oaths as absurd and impious ; if we regard the rights of subject as no less sacred than those of kings ; if we distinguish between a prince invested with unlimited authority, and one whose power is circumscribed by the fundamental laws of the state ; between a prince whose right to his dominions is indefeasible, and one who obtained his sovereignty only upon certain terms, which he swore to fulfil, while his subjects engaged to yield their obedience on condition of his fulfilling them ; in this case, our judgment of William's character will be extremely different from what it was on the former supposition. We shall not be satisfied with barely asserting his innocence of those crimes of which his enemies have accused him, but shall confer upon him the glorious appellations which his countrymen bestowed, of the father of his country and the guardian of its liberty and laws, who generously sacrificed his interest, ease, and safety to the public good, and who, first by counsel and persuasion, and afterwards by force of arms, did more to rescue his fellow-citizens from oppression, than was ever done in such unfavourable circumstances by any patriot in the world before*.

* William left issue, four sons and eight daughters. By his first wife, Anne of Egmont, countess of Buren, he had Philip-William, who was detained for thirty years a prisoner in Spain ; and Mary de Nassau, who was married to count Hohenlo.

By his second wife, Anne, daughter of Maurice, elector of Saxony, he had prince Maurice, so much celebrated in the history of the Netherlands, and a daughter, named Emilia, who married Emanuel, son of Don Antonio, prior of Crato.

By his third wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the duke de Montpensier, he had six daughters, viz.

1st, Louise Juliana, who was married to Frederic IV. Elector Palatine.

2d, Elizabeth, whom he gave in marriage to Henry de la Tour duke of Bouillon ; and who, besides other children, bore her husband the celebrated Viscount de Turenne.

3d, Catharine, who married Lewis count de Hanau,

4th, Charlotte Brabantina, married to Claude, duke de la Trimouille, to whom she bore

1584. the celebrated countess of Derby, who distinguished herself during the civil wars in England; and from whom are descended the present noble families of Derby and Athol.

5th. Charlotte Flandrina de Nassau, who embraced the Catholic religion, and died abbess of St. Croix in Poitiers. And,

6th. Emilia de Nassau, who was married to the duke of Lansberg.

By his fourth and last wife, Louisa de Coligni, daughter of the great admiral de Chatillon, William had one son, Henry-Frederic, who succeeded his brother Maurice in the principality of Orange and in his authority in the United Provinces.

Besides this numerous offspring, William left a natural son Justin de Nassau, who was highly respected for his bravery and conduct, was entrusted with several important commands, and is often mentioned in the sequel.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIX.

THE prince of Parma did not neglect the opportunity which the distress occasioned by the death of the prince of Orange afforded him, to persuade the confederated provinces to accept of peace. But their distrust of Philip, their attachment to the Protestant faith, and the other causes mentioned above, still retained their influence, and rendered them averse to any reconciliation with a prince, against whom their indignation was more inflamed than ever, by the cruel injury which they had lately suffered. They could attend to nothing now but how to prosecute the war with vigour, or to testify their respect for the memory of the prince of Orange.

1584,
Temper and
disposition
of the States.

William's eldest son, the count of Buren, was still a prisoner in Spain ; and his second, prince Maurice^a, was engaged in the study of literature and science at the university of Leyden. On this young man, who at the time of his father's death, was only eighteen years old, of great hopes, and whose actions afterwards exceeded the most sanguine expectations of his countrymen, the States bestowed the greatest part of the dignities which his father had enjoyed. Besides creating him high-admiral of the Union, they conferred upon him the government of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. And, in order to supply his want of experience, and secure his being early instructed in the military art, they appointed count Hohenloe, the most accomplished officer in their service, to be his lieutenant or deputy, till he should attain to greater maturity of years and understanding.

Prince
Maurice.

From this conduct of the States, which proved that William's ascendant over them had not terminated with his life, Farnese perceived that it would be impossible to bring the war to a conclusion in any other way than by force of arms. Dismissing therefore all thoughts of peace, he proceeded with great activity in the military operations which he had begun in Brabant and Flanders ; and his success was in proportion to the prudence and vigilance which he exerted. Be-

Reduction
of Brussels,
Ghent, &c.

^a Grandson, by the mother's side, of the celebrated elector of Saxony of the same name.

^{1584.} sides the towns above mentioned he had lately acquired Vilvorden and Dendremonde, but he had not yet reduced Ghent, Brussels, or Antwerp. To have proceeded separately against each of those places, in the ordinary way of sieges, would have protracted the war to an excessive length. Instead of that method, he bethought himself of another, which was suggested by the situation of the several towns, and the nature of their resources. This was to make himself master of the banks of the rivers and canals on which they stood, while he sent out flying parties of horse to scour the adjacent country. And thus he not only put a stop to their trade, without which they could not subsist, but cut off all of them but Antwerp from every sort of communication with other places. For several months, however, the inhabitants declined entering into any terms of accommodation. But when they considered that, unless he were obliged to draw off his troops by the approach of a superior army, they must soon be reduced to the last extremity, their resolution failed, they began to listen more patiently to the exhortations which the secret partisans of Spain were daily sounding in their ears ; and, at length, such of them as were situated in the more interior parts, first Ghent, and afterwards Brussels and some other inland towns, resolved to return under the Spanish government, upon conditions to which Farnese had, on different occasions, shewn himself willing to agree.

Of these conditions the most important were the following : “ That the people should engage to acknowledge no other sovereign but the king of Spain : That no religion but the Roman Catholic should be permitted, but that the Protestants should be allowed to remain in the Netherlands for two years, in order to dispose of their effects : That a sum of money should be paid for defraying the expences of the war : That all past offences should be forgiven, and all the ancient rights and privileges of the inhabitants restored and maintained inviolate.”

In fulfilling his part of these conditions, Farnese not only acted with strict fidelity, but displayed a degree of lenity and moderation that was admirably calculated to promote his views. Of the fine of three hundred thousand crowns, to which the people of Ghent consented in their treaty of surrender, he demanded only two hundred thousand. And although in his act of indemnity six persons, more obnoxious than the rest, had been excepted, he required from them only a pecuniary fine. He was likewise at all times willing to listen to the complaints of the Protestants, and to redress their grievances^b.

All the considerable towns in Brabant were now subdued, except Antwerp. The prince had early formed the resolution of laying siege to that important city ; and some time before his acquisition of Ghent and Brussels, he had taken measures for beginning it. But in order to secure success, it was necessary that his utmost skill and strength should be exerted ; and he now applied himself to the prosecution of his design, with all the anxiety, zeal, and industry, which an object of the highest consequence deserved.

Antwerp was at this time not only the richest and most splendid, but likewise the strongest city in the Netherlands. As it lies extended along the banks of the Scheld, and the confederates still maintained their superiority at sea, it was thought to be sufficiently secured on one side by a strong wall which ran parallel to the river ; and on the other sides it was fortified by ramparts of extraordinary height, and a ditch filled with water, of

^b Meteren, p. 368.

such depth and breadth, as in the opinion of those times rendered it almost impregnable.

Such was the judgment formed of it by the prince of Parma, and on this account he did not intend to attempt reducing it by storm, but to have recourse to the slower method of blockade, which he knew must sooner or later prove successful.

On the side towards the land, he found it extremely easy to render the blockade complete, as the States had no army able to contend with him in the field, and all the neighbouring towns were in his possession. But these circumstances he perceived would be of little advantage, while the besieged remained masters of the Scheld ; and therefore, to deprive them of this resource, was the great object to which all his operations, during this celebrated siege, were directed.

The people at Antwerp had penetrated into his design, and had omitted nothing in their power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. With this view they had constructed two forts, one on each side of the river, about three miles below the town ; to one of which they gave the name of Lieffkensoech, and to the other that of Lillo. Farnese judged it necessary to begin his operations with reducing these forts. He sent the Marquis de Roubais against Lieffkensoech, which stood on the Flanders side of the Scheld, while Mondragon laid siege to Lillo. Roubais found no great difficulty in fulfilling the general's intention with regard to Lieffkensoech. But Mondragon's attempt on the fort of Lillo was not attended with the same success. This fort was valiantly defended by colonel Balfour, a Scotch officer of distinguished merit, and Teligny, the worthy son of the brave La Noue. After battering the ramparts for several days, Mondragon attempted to take the fort by storm, but was repulsed ; and in his repulse, and a sally which the garrison had made some days before, he sustained the loss of no less than two thousand men.

Upon receiving intelligence of this disaster, the prince of Parma, after settling the government of the towns which he had lately conquered, came himself to view the scene of action. He found that all the time and pains and blood which had been spent in the siege of this fort had been misapplied ; and perceived, that as it stood at some distance from the banks, it did not materially interfere with his plan for putting a stop to the navigation of the river.

For this reason, instead of pushing the immediate reduction of it, he was satisfied with blockading it on the land side, so as to prevent the excursions of the garrison.

Having giving instructions for this purpose, he called a council of his general officers, and laid before them his project for blocking up the Scheld, by building a bridge over it, to intercept the communication between the besieged city and the maritime provinces ; an enterprise which, had it failed, would have exposed him to derision, but which shewed the boldness of his genius, and has contributed, more than almost any other of his military achievements, to raise his character to that exalted rank which it holds in the annals of history.

By most of the officers his proposal was regarded as chimerical. For where, said they, can materials be found for so great an undertaking ? And even if they should be found, yet how is it possible to transport them hither ? By land-carriage, it is utterly impracticable ; nor would it seem to be much easier by water, while the enemy possesses so great a superiority in naval force. Besides that, no beams, they observed, were of sufficient length to reach the bottom of the river.

To build a bridge of ships, they thought, would be equally impracticable,

The prince of Parma's plan for blocking up the Scheld.

¹⁵⁸⁴ because he did not possess so great a number as was necessary, and it would be impossible to collect them from different places, in the face of a vigilant enemy, of a superior naval strength. And even allowing it were possible, either with beams or ships to construct such a bridge as was projected, yet it would be quickly destroyed by the ice, or by the tides and storms, or by the enemy.

But Farnese, conscious of resources in the fertility of his genius, of which his officers could form no idea, was not discouraged by these objections. He considered that the measure on which he had resolved was the only one by which Antwerp could be reduced, and that till he should reduce that city, and thereby get possession of a naval force, the towns lately acquired (which usually carried on their trade by the way of Antwerp) must suffer the greatest inconveniences, and it would be in vain for him to attempt the conquest of the maritime provinces.

Determined by these considerations, he proceeded instantly to make the preparations necessary for executing his design. Having first sounded the river, and measured its breadth in different places, he found, that between the village of Ordham in Brabant, and Caloo in Flanders, it was neither so deep nor so broad, as above or below. At this place therefore he resolved to build a bridge. And he began with raising two strong forts, opposite to each other on the different sides of the river, besides several redoubts, on which, as well as on the forts, he planted a great number of cannon, to defend the bridge when finished, and to protect the workmen while engaged in building it.

In the mean time he ransacked all the country round for materials, and had the good fortune to find at Dendremonde and Ghent, great quantities of every thing requisite for the intended work. If he could have conveyed his materials to Caloo down the Scheld, a great expence of labour and time would have been saved. This he repeatedly attempted; but he soon found that it was impossible to escape the vigilance of the citizens, who being directed in all their operations by St. Aldegonde, lay in wait for his boats near Antwerp, and either took or destroyed them.

In order to avoid the repetition of this disaster, Farnese made, on the Flanders side near Borecht, which stands higher than Antwerp, a large cut in the dyke of the Scheld, by which he laid all the neck of land between Borecht and Caloo under water; opening an egress for the water by another cut near Caloo, and transporting his apparatus for the bridge across the inundation. This expedient rendered it unnecessary for his boats to pass by Antwerp, and they likewise arrived sooner at their destined port.

But St. Aldegonde having built a redoubt on the Brabant side, opposite to the cut at Borecht, and stationed some armed vessels to cruise there, soon rendered the passage as difficult as before. Farnese was therefore obliged to adopt another experiment, much more laborious than the former, but which he knew would certainly be attended with success. This was to dig a canal fifteen Italian miles in length, to join the inundation just now mentioned, with a little river which falls into the Scheld at Ghent. That he might finish this arduous undertaking the more speedily, he fixed his headquarters at Beveren, in the neighbourhood of the canal, and was perpetually present himself, exhorting and encouraging the workmen; and sometimes taking the spade and pick axe into his own hand. The work was finished with wonderful expedition, and fully answered his expectation. As the enemy could have no access either to the canal, or the river with which it communicated, he conveyed all necessary materials and engines from Ghent without opposition, and immediately afterwards began the construction of the bridge.

The two extremities of this edifice were formed of huge beams, driven into the bottom of the river by the force of engines, and strongly bound together by other transverse or cross beams. This part of the work, called the stacados or estacados, ran from each side of the river towards the middle of it, as far as the depth of the water would allow ; which on the Flanders side was two hundred feet, and on the other nine hundred. These stacados were only twelve feet broad, except towards the two extremities, next the centre of the river, where their breadth being increased to forty feet, two forts were erected upon them, and furnished with artillery. The whole was covered at top with strong planks, and a parapet five feet high, of the thickest planks, was raised upon it for the security of the soldiers. A row of piles was then driven deep into the bottom of the river, parallel to each of the stacados, at the distance of a few feet from them, and strongly fastened to the beams of which *they* were composed. Besides which, another row of long beams pointed with iron, was placed horizontally a little above the surface of the water ; stretching out a considerable length from the bridge on both sides, so as to make it dangerous for ships to approach.

1584.
Description
of the
bridge.

By this part of the work, the navigation of the river was considerably straitened ; but as there was an open space in the middle, between the heads of the estacados, of more than one thousand two hundred and fifty feet, the enemy's ships, taking advantage sometimes of the night, and sometimes of the wind and tide, continued, though not without loss, to pass and repass as formerly ; and the city was still abundantly supplied with provisions. Farnese having from the beginning intended to fill up the intermediate space with ships, had with great difficulty collected two and thirty, which he judged to be a sufficient number. These vessels, after the masts had been taken out, were placed with their sides parallel to each other, at the distance of about twenty feet. They were strongly fastened together by chains, and were fixed in their places by anchors at both ends, in such a manner that the sailors could shorten or lengthen their cables, as the tide either rose or fell. Over the intermediate spaces, strong beams went from one ship to another. Above these were laid planks ; and the same sort of parapet was erected, as that which was raised on the stacados. Thirty soldiers and four sailors were put on board each ship, and all the ships were planted with artillery.

For the greater security of this part of the work, a flota one thousand two hundred feet long was constructed of barks, bound together in the same manner as the ships of which the bridge was formed, with the same sort of beams pointed with iron, resembling a file of pikes, stretching from that end of the barks which lay next to the enemy. These barks were filled with empty casks, to prevent them from being sunk, and were fixed in their place by anchors. Of this kind of flota, two were constructed, consisting each of two and thirty barks, one above, and the other below the bridge, at the distance of two hundred yards.

1585.

This stupendous work furnished employment to the prince of Parma's fleet and army for more than half a year. Without a fleet of considerable strength it could not have been executed, and the procuring of this fleet in such disadvantageous circumstances, was one of the many striking proofs which Farnese exhibited on this occasion, of that extraordinary activity and enterprise by which his character is so eminently distinguished. With infinite labour and difficulty he had equipped, at Ghent and Dunkirk, forty armed vessels, and put them under the command of the Marquis de Roubais ;

1585. who being well supported by the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river, protected the workmen, in spite of the most vigorous efforts which the besieged could make to interrupt them.

Farnese however would not probably have succeeded in his enterprise, if the United States had exerted themselves with vigour, proportioned either to that of the enemy, or to the importance of the prize contested. It now appeared how great was the loss which the confederacy had sustained in the death of the prince of Orange. By William's superior rank, wisdom, and experience, some turbulent leaders had been restrained, who, after his death, indulged their factious, interested spirit, without regard to the pernicious consequences which might ensue. Among these was Treslong whom the States had appointed commander of the fleet, destined for the relief of Antwerp. This man, whether from treachery or from private resentment, paid no regard to his instructions ; but on different pretences, at first delayed putting the orders of the States in execution ; and at last told them that he would not sail, unless some persons with whom he had quarrelled were removed from the magistracy. On this occasion, prince Maurice called an assembly of the States of the province, dismissed Treslong from his employment, and put him under arrest. The command of the fleet was then given to count Hohenloe ; but the time in which its operations might have proved effectual, was past ; and the bridge, with all its fortifications, as above described, was almost finished.

No words can express the astonishment which it excited in the Consternation of the minds of the besieged. At the commencement of the work, they besieged.

had regarded it rather as an object of derision, than as fitted to excite any serious apprehension or alarm. Their anxiety and terror now were in proportion to their former confidence and security. They saw an entire stop put to their trade in every quarter. They already felt many of the inconveniences of a siege. Their imaginations represented, in the most dreadful light, the calamities which they were about to suffer ; and persons of all ranks began to talk of the necessity of preventing them in time, by making their peace with the enemy. But they were divided from forming any fixed resolution by St. Aldegonde, who employed all his eloquence and address to rouse their abhorrence of the Spanish yoke, and to inspire them with the hopes of being able to raise the siege.

“ It is not surprising, said he, in an assembly of those who held public offices in the town, that many of our fellow-citizens should tremble at the prospect of those hardships which usually attend a long continued siege.

Speech of St. Aldegonde. But while we cast our eyes forward to these, let us reflect on the calamities which we have reason to dread from a surrender. We have seen, within these few years, two memorable sieges, the siege of Haerlem, and that of Leyden. The people of Haerlem, rather than submit to the last extremities, chose to throw themselves on the mercy of the Spaniards. But how bitterly did they repent of their having done so ? And how much better had it been to have fallen in the field of battle, than to suffer, as so great a number of the bravest did, that ignominious death, to which they were doomed by the cruel Spaniard ? The inhabitants of Leyden, on the other hand, resolved rather to die, than to deliver themselves up to such a perfidious enemy ; and the consequence of their adhering to this resolution, was, that the siege was raised, and a period put to all their miseries. Can we hesitate in deciding which of these examples we ought to follow ? Is not death more eligible than submission to the dominion of an enemy, from whom we have endured such intolerable outrage ?

“ If this city shall fall again under the yoke of these oppressors, can we doubt that the citadel will be restored, and with it all the tyranny which they were wont to exercise ? Will not our religion be proscribed, and the inquisition established ? This illustrious city will then become a colony of Spaniards. Her commerce will be ruined, and her inhabitants obliged to wander in search of places of abode, forlorn and indigent. But why should I thus describe the disasters of a surrender ? There is still no reason for despair. It is impossible that this bridge can stand long against the efforts which we shall make for its destruction. Let us not therefore be wanting to ourselves ; but with a fixed unalterable purpose, let us embrace the glorious alternative of liberty or death.”

By these exhortations, joined to the respect in which his character was held, St. Aldegonde gained over the citizens to a perfect conformity with his sentiments ; and persuaded them to renew the oath, which they had formerly taken, never to return under the dominion of the king of Spain. An edict was then published, prohibiting all persons, under the severest penalties, from listening to any terms of accommodation that might be offered ; after which they proceeded with redoubled ardour to put in practice such expedients as had been devised for the demolition of the bridge.

In order to effectuate this, they had been for some time past employed in preparing fire ships, under the direction of Giambelli, a celebrated Italian engineer, who appears to have been the author of this invention. They were formed of the thickest planks, and had each of them a mine or chamber in the middle. This mine was built in the strongest manner, and filled with gun-powder, and with rugged stones, bullets, and such other weighty materials, rammed hard and close, on purpose to increase the resistance and augment the force of the explosion.

Preparations
of the besieged
for demolishing the
bridge.

The citizens laboured at the same time in constructing a flat-bottomed vessel of extraordinary strength and size, with which they intended to attack the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river. This enormous machine was more properly a floating castle than a ship, and the town’s people had, on account of the sanguine expectations which they conceived from it, given it the name of the “ end of the war.”

While the people of Antwerp were thus employed, the confederates who lay at Lillo, under count Hohenloe, made a vigorous attack on the fort of Lieffkensoech, and compelled the garrison to surrender. From Lieffkensoech, they proceeded against another fort of the name of St. Anthony, which they likewise reduced with the same facility. When intelligence was brought to the prince of Parma of their descent, he set out with a detachment of his army to oppose their progress, but both the forts had surrendered before he could arrive. Being enraged against the commanders of these forts, on account of their having made too feeble a resistance, he ordered them both to be beheaded on the dyke of the Scheld, in sight of the enemy. He was the more concerned for the loss of Lieffkensoech, as it gave the enemy free possession of the navigation of the river below the bridge, and thereby tended to facilitate the execution of any design which they might form for its destruction.

At first he imagined that the solicitude which the confederates had shewn for the recovery of Lieffkensoech, had proceeded from their intending to make an attempt upon the lower side of the bridge. But it soon appeared, that their only view was to second the operations of the besieged, and to complete that ruin which they expected the explosion of the fire-ships would certainly produce.

These vessels were sent down the river, with a favourable wind and tide,

1585. on the fourth of April. The Spaniards, who had got some imperfect intelligence of their nature, were filled with the most anxious expectations. They knew them to be the fire-ships from their unusual appearance, and were variously affected, according to the various conjectures which they formed of the effects that were about to be produced. But they were all alike prompted by curiosity, to behold a spectacle which had never been exhibited in any siege before. And the banks of the river, the forts and redoubts, and even the bridge itself, were crowded with spectators.

Of several vessels which Giambelli had prepared, only two were constructed in the manner above mentioned, the one of which contained in its mine six thousand pounds of gun-powder, and the other, seven thousand five hundred pounds. One of them ran ashore before it reached the bridge. But the other being more fortunate in its direction, was driven towards that part of the bridge, where the stacado on the Flanders side was united to the ships. A great number of the Spanish officers and soldiers had the courage to jump on board, in order to extinguish the train, which Giambelli had contrived in such a manner, as to require an hour before it could reach the mine. The prince of Parma had advanced a little way on the stacado, to wait for the event ; but was prevailed upon by his officers to retire. He had scarcely entered the neighbouring fort when the explosion happened, with a noise more dreadful than the loudest thunder. A sudden darkness overspread the region round. The ground shook as in an earthquake. The river, disturbed in its course, was thrown over its dikes, and poured into the fort of Caloo with inconceivable violence. Not only such of the Spaniards perished as had ventured to go on board the fire-ships, but all those too who were upon the bridge, and many of those who stood upon the banks of the river. No language can describe the horror of the scene which presented itself after the smoke was dispelled. The bridge, and both the surface and the banks of the river, were covered with the dead and wounded ; whose bodies were disfigured in a thousand hideous ways by the smoke and flames, and the various instruments of destruction with which the ship was stored. Eight hundred men were killed, and a great number maimed and dangerously wounded. Among the killed were many officers of distinction ; but no person perished, so deeply lamented by the prince of Parma, as the Marquis de Roubais, the general of the horse : a nobleman distinguished by many shining accomplishments, brave, active, and expert both in the arts of peace and war ; once an enemy of Spain ; but who, prompted by jealousy of the prince of Orange, had abandoned the cause of liberty, and shewn for some years past no less zeal in reducing his countrymen under the Spanish yoke, than he had discovered formerly in asserting their independence. It was not only losses of this kind which the prince of Parma sustained on this occasion. The bridge likewise suffered considerable damage. Six of the ships which composed the middle part of it, were burnt ; some were forced from their stations, and others turned with their keels uppermost, and dashed to pieces.

If the confederates had improved the opportunity which this havoc afforded them, the whole work might have been demolished ; and in that case, a prediction of the prince of Orange would have been fulfilled, that if Farnese with so small an army should undertake the siege of Antwerp, it would prove his ruin. But, as was observed by the old experienced Mondragone, it appeared from many circumstances in the conduct of the confederates in this siege that the prince of Orange was dead.

By some strange fatality, or some unaccountable inadvertence, or, as one historian insinuates, by a misunderstanding between the magistrates of Ant-

werp and the admiral of the Antwerp fleet, those fire-ships which had cost so great an expence of money, ingenuity, time and pains, were sent down the Scheld before any concert had been formed with the confederates at Lillo ; who were therefore unprepared to second that mighty effort which had been made for opening the navigation of the river.—Giambelli, though extremely solicitous to know the success of his invention, remained entirely ignorant of it for two days. A large reward was offered to those who should venture to go down the river for intelligence. But none had courage to advance far enough to make any certain discovery, nor did the citizens know any thing of what had happened till the third night after, when they received information of it by a messenger from count Hohenloe.

The prince of Parma was in the mean time employed in repairing the bridge, and he exerted himself with so much activity and vigour, that it was made as strong as ever before the besieged were acquainted with the damage which it had sustained. His late experience suggested to him an alteration in the work, which was found afterwards of great importance : this was to remove the flotas, and to form that part of the bridge which was composed of the ships, in such a manner that, in case the enemy should repeat their experiment, it might be opened at different places to let the fire-ships pass through and continue their course down the river.

The spirits of the besieged were still supported by the sanguine hopes which they had conceived from that enormous vessel, which they called The end of the war. This huge machine was entirely the work of the citizens, and was not approved of either by Giambelli or St. Aldegonde. It was found, on trial, too unwieldy to answer the purpose for which it was intended. After planting the lower part of it with cannon, and filling the higher part with musketeers, they made an attack upon one of the Spanish redoubts ; but they failed in their attempt, and the machine itself was so much shattered, as to be rendered almost unfit for future use.

At Giambelli's desire, the senate of Antwerp had again recourse to their first expedient of fire-ships ; but the enemy having learnt the nature of these machines, employed different means to render them ineffectual. They laid hold of them as soon as they appeared, and sometimes extinguished the trains, and sometimes dragged the vessels to the banks of the river, or through the openings in the bridge.

Giambelli then bethought himself of another device, from which he believed that some more certain effect might be expected. Having bound together in one compacted body fifteen ships armed with pointed beams, and with scythes or falchions, for cutting the chains and cordage of the bridge, he sent them accompanied with fire-ships down the river when the wind and tide were combined and favourable. The shock which this contrivance produced was very great, but through the wise precaution which Farnese had taken, by making the openings just now mentioned, together with the unexampled boldness of his soldiers in laying hold of the fire-ships, the bridge received no greater damage than could be quickly repaired. Some other expedients were proposed by Giambelli, but the senate was deterred from adopting them, partly by the expence and time requisite to prepare his machines, and partly by the difficulty of finding mariners and soldiers willing to expose themselves to the danger with which the putting his inventions in practice would have been attended.

There remained now for the besieged only one resource, to which, if they had given proper attention in the beginning, all the anxiety, expence and labour, which they bestowed in attempting to demolish the bridge, might have been saved. In

The Counter-
dyke of Cou-
vestein,

1585. order to form a clear conception of what will be said on this interesting part of the present subject, it is necessary to remember that the ground on the north side of the Scheld, between Antwerp and Lillo, is much lower than the rest of the country ; and were it not for the dyke of the river would every tide be overflowed. This ground is generally covered with water in many places, but in other parts it furnishes pasture for a great number of cattle with which the Antwerp market is supplied. Through the middle of this plain there runs from the village of Couvestein, where the country begins to rise, to the great dyke of the Scheld, a smaller dyke, called the Counterdyke of Couvestein, which had been formed to serve for a road or causeway. The confederates at Lillo could, by opening the dyke of the Scheld, lay all the ground under water between Lillo and the counterdyke, while the besieged could, with the same facility, introduce the river into that part of the plain which lies between the counterdyke and Antwerp ; and thus, by breaking down the counterdyke, the inundations on each side of it could be united, and a free navigation opened between Antwerp and Lillo.

The reader will easily perceive, that while the bridge stood, the fate of Antwerp depended entirely on the counterdyke ; and that, in case the confederates could make themselves masters of it, they might bid defiance to the prince of Parma, and without anxiety suffer him to retain possession of the bridge. If, in the beginning, they had believed it practicable for him to execute his design of blocking up the river, they could have fortified themselves on the counterdyke in such a manner, that, with the assistance of the inundation, they would have baffled his most vigorous efforts to expel them. But they were deceived by the contempt which they entertained of his intended enterprise, and did not perceive their error in neglecting to occupy this important station till it was too late. The prince of Parma had already seized upon it, and taken every necessary precaution against the attemps which he doubted not they would, sooner or later, make to wrest it from him. He committed the charge of defending it to two of his most vigilant officers, Mondragone and Mansvelt. He ordered it to be made broader and higher than it was before. He strengthened it with piles of wood driven into it transversely, and he erected several forts upon it, besides planting redoubts on the dyke of the Scheld, with which he intended to take the enemy in flank, in case they should venture to approach.

The confederates, however, despairing of being able to demolish the bridge, resolved, if possible, to dislodge him from the counterdyke. And their first attempt, after laying the ground on each side of it under water, was made in the beginning of May by count Hohenloe. That general had formed the plan of this attack in concert with St. Aldegonde, who was to have co-operated with him, and had agreed to set sail with the Antwerp fleet immediately after lighting up, on a tower in the city, three fires as a signal of his departure. By a mistake of the person to whom the charge of this signal was committed, it was exhibited before the time, and through this untoward accident count Hohenloe was left alone in the execution of his enterprize. He conducted it however with vigour, and laid one of the forts and a part of the counterdyke in ruins ; after which he thought it prudent to retire, and to reserve his forces unimpaired till the besieged should be ready to second his operations. This unfortunate attempt served only to rouse the prince of Parma to greater vigilance and exertion. Agreeably to his conjectures, he saw that the principal efforts of the enemy would henceforth be directed against the counterdyke : and, therefore, he not only applied himself with diligence to repair the damage which it

had sustained in the late attack, but visited every day all the redoubts and forts, and reinforced the garrisons with chosen troops taken from the several nations of which his army was composed.

1585.

The confederates at Lillo, and the people of Antwerp, were in the mean time indefatigable in making preparations for another attack. St Aldegonde stood almost single in his opinion on this occasion, and endeavoured to convince his countrymen, that it would be easier for them to destroy the bridge itself, than to make themselves masters of the counterdyke, in opposition to an enemy so much upon their guard, and so strongly fortified. But having, since their disappointment with regard to the effect of the fire-ships, been accustomed to consider the bridge as impregnable, they were deaf to whatever he could advance upon the subject, and he was obliged to concur (which he did with all his wonted activity) in the execution of that design of which the majority approved.

Towards the end of May every thing was prepared, both at Antwerp and Lillo, that was thought necessary to secure success; and, on the 26th of that month, count Hohenloe, according to concert with St. Aldegonde, sailed from Lillo early in the morning, with a squadron of more than a hundred ships, having on board a numerous body of troops, under the command of the most experienced officers in the United provinces ^d. He resolved to make his attack at the broadest part of the counterdyke, between the two middle forts, called the Fort of the Pallisades and Fort St. George, where there was room to entrench his troops. In order to facilitate his landing, he sent before him four vessels resembling fire ships, with some trains of gun-powder, to which the soldiers, who were concealed within, set fire. This device produced the designed effect. The Spaniards taking the smoke and flame for the forerunners of an explosion, retired hastily from that part of the dyke to which they saw the vessels approaching. The confederates in the mean time advanced, and landed between seven and eight hundred men, who were quickly followed by all the rest of the forces. The Spaniards then discovered the artifice by which they had been deceived, and immediately returning, attempted to recover the station which they had left. An obstinate and bloody action ensued, while the contending parties were supported on the one side by the cannon of the fleet, and on the other by those of the forts on the counterdyke.

Battle of the counterdyke.

In the midst of this contest St. Aldegonde arrived with the fleet from Antwerp, which was nearly as numerous as that from Lillo. The confederates being thus powerfully reinforced, kept possession of the ground which they had gained, and while some of them fought, others were employed in cutting the counterdyke, and in raising temporary defences of piles of wood, and sacks of earth and wool, against the fire of the enemy. The combatants being cooped up in a narrow space, every stroke and shot did execution. But they received continual supplies of fresh men from the ships and forts, and their courage was superior to every danger. Both St. Aldegonde and Hohenloe, mingled with the combatants, and by their example and exhortations nourished the desperate and intrepid ardour of the soldiers. "This is the last difficulty, cried St. Aldegonde, which remains to be surmounted. Persist as you have begun, and Antwerp, that bulwark of our confederacy, will soon be delivered. Your liberty, your future safety, and every thing dear and sacred, depend on the success of your present enterprise. We have now no choice left but victory or death."

The Spanish generals were at no less pains to animate their troops. Both Mondragone and Mansvelt, though worn out with age and the fatigues of a

^d Justin de Nassau, Iselstein, Fremin, Morgan, and Balfour.

1585. long continued warfare, displayed on this occasion the highest degree of valour and intrepidity. But, notwithstanding their most vigorous exertions, the confederates still maintained their ground. They twice repulsed the Italians and Spaniards. Of the materials which they had brought along with them, they raised a considerable bulwark against the enemy's artillery. They made several openings in the counterdyke, and were so confident of victory, that St. Aldegonde and count Hohenloe, after assigning to the several officers their respective stations, set sail for Antwerp in a ship which had passed through one of these openings, and entered the city in triumph. Their design, it is said, was to consult with the magistrates concerning some future measures which they thought necessary to be pursued. But what the particular motives were, which determined the commanders in chief to leave their troops at this crisis, is not told by the cotemporary historians; and we are left to suspect two men, of vanity and folly, whose general conduct furnishes not the smallest ground for so unfavourable an imputation. They were received at Antwerp with the highest transports of gratitude and joy, and the people flocked to the harbour, impatiently expecting the arrival of the supplies of provisions which they believed to be near at hand

But this joy was of short duration: the prince of Parma was for some time ignorant of what had passed. Having watched all the preceding night, he had gone in the morning to his head-quarters at Beveren, and retired to rest; but being soon awaked by the noise of the guns, he selected a body of troops, and immediately marched to the place of action.

On his arrival, he viewed with indignation the enemy in possession of the counterdyke. He rushed forward at the head of his battalion, and sighing, exclaimed, "Where, my fellow-soldiers, is now your wonted intrepidity? Are you not ashamed thus to yield to an enemy you have so often conquered, and in one hour to lose the fruit of all your labours? Let who will follow me; I shall either die, or conquer." Having spoken these words, he advanced towards the enemy with a sword in one hand, and a buckler in the other. The danger to which he was exposed, inflamed his troops to a degree of madness. They returned to the charge with redoubled fury, and, in spite of the most intrepid resistance, they drove the confederates along the counterdyke, till they came to the place where their companions were intrenched: there they stopped. The dispute was desperate, and the confederates, being reinforced with fresh troops from their ships, once more compelled the Spaniards to retire; but Farnese, whose ardour was unabated, still urging and impelling them, the attack was instantly renewed, and the Spaniards proved at last victorious.

It was now only within their entrenchment that the confederates retained possession of the counterdyke. The prince of Parma and his troops were aware of the difficulty which they must encounter, in attacking an entrenchment defended by men who from the beginning had displayed the most determined bravery; yet they boldly advanced amidst an incessant fire both from the ships and the entrenchment. Great numbers fell: still, however, they continued to advance; and whilst those who were in the rear maintained a constant fire upon the enemy, the foremost ranks were employed in demolishing the fortification.

This fortification was at the same time attacked, on the other side, by two battalions sent against it by count Mansvelt, the one consisting of Spaniards and the other of Italians, who vied with each other in giving the most conspicuous proofs of their contempt of danger. The leaders of these battalions, Capisucchi and Toralva, were the first who entered the entrenchments; and soon afterwards the troops under the prince of Parma

entered it on the other side. The confederates, though thus deprived of all defence, still continued to fight desperately, till perceiving that the tide was going back, and that their ships were beginning to put off to a greater distance, while fresh Spaniards were pouring in upon them from both ends of the counterdyke, their courage failed, and they attempted to save themselves by getting on board their boats and ships.

The Spaniards, not satisfied with this victory, flung themselves from the counterdyke, and pursued the fugitives as far as the depth of the water would allow. No quarter was given to those whom they overtook. The counterdyke, and the water on both sides of it, were covered with the slain, and many fell with dishonourable wounds, who for several hours together had given incontestible evidence of the most heroic valour. The number of the killed on the side of the confederates amounted to two thousand five hundred, and that on the other side, to one thousand. The recovery of the counterdyke was not the only advantage which Farnese derived from his present victory: he likewise got possession of more than thirty of the enemy's ships, with all the artillery and engines that were on board. Immediately after which he proceeded to fill up the breaches in the counterdyke, and to repair the damage which his fortifications had sustained.

The confederates are defeated.

The besieged, being thus cruelly disappointed in their hopes of deliverance, were overwhelmed with consternation and despair. By their late great exertions, their internal resources were exhausted, and they had little prospect of any foreign aid that could arrive in time to prevent the necessity of surrendering. They had not indeed as yet experienced those intolerable miseries which attend on famine in a place besieged; but they foresaw that ere long these miseries must certainly overtake them, and they considered, that to delay making peace with the enemy, could only serve to increase the difficulty of obtaining favourable terms. Such were the sentiments of great numbers of every condition, notwithstanding the solemn engagement under which they had lately come, of never submitting to the Spanish government. St. Aldegonde, and the other magistrates, laboured to remove their apprehensions, by assuring them, that not only their friends in the maritime provinces were preparing forces to relieve them, but that the queen of England intended to exert herself in their behalf. St. Aldegonde himself appears to have been animated with this hope, and for several weeks it had the effect which he desired on the minds of the citizens; but their patience being at last worn out, they assembled in a tumultuous manner, and peremptorily required that ambassadors should be appointed to treat of a surrender. The magistrates, though extremely reluctant, found it necessary to comply with their request; and accordingly St. Aldegonde, and several others of the principal inhabitants, were sent to the Spanish camp.

They were received by the prince of Parma in the most gracious manner, and much more favourable terms of accommodation were offered, than they had reason to expect. Various motives concurred in determining this prudent general to act on the present occasion with the utmost degree of moderation which the King's instructions would allow; for, besides that the granting of equitable conditions to the citizens of Antwerp would contribute to facilitate his future conquests, he considered that his troops had suffered great diminution since the commencement of the siege; that, by accidents which he could not foresee, the bridge might be demolished; that he had with much difficulty resisted the efforts which the confederates had already made; that still greater exertions were to be apprehended from despair; and that the besieged, if com-

Capitulation of Antwerp.

1585 pelled by severity to imitate the example of Haerlem or Leyden, might resist his most strenuous endeavours to reduce them, till the queen of England, who was deliberating on the subject, should resolve to espouse their cause.

Moved by these considerations, Farnese shewed himself not only willing, but even desirous, to bring the treaty of surrender speedily to a conclusion; but the ambassadors of the besieged, still flattering themselves with the hopes of assistance, studied to put it off as long as possible; nor was the capitulation signed till within three days of the time when the whole stock of provisions in the city would have been consumed. This circumstance had been carefully concealed from the citizens, as well as from the prince of Parma, and was known only to the magistrates and masters of police. It had not therefore the smallest influence on the terms of peace, which were as favourable now as if the surrender had been made some months before.

In some respects they were more favourable than even those which had been granted to Ghent and Bruges. Whereas the Protestants of these places had been permitted to continue only two years, in order to settle their affairs; in Antwerp they were allowed to remain four; and although Antwerp was much richer than any of the other cities, and the expence of the siege infinitely greater, yet he demanded a fine of only four hundred thousand guilders for the payment of his troops. All the prisoners were set at liberty; all past offences were forgiven, and no exception whatever was made in the general act of indemnity; nor was any personal restrictions laid upon any of the citizens, except St. Aldegonde, who was required to engage, that he would not carry arms against the king of Spain for the space of a year. This circumstance had the appearance of a punishment inflicted on this distinguished patriot; but it ought to be considered rather as a mark of respect and honour, since it implied an acknowledgment of his superior merit, and discovered the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities.

Notwithstanding this public testimony which St. Aldegonde received from the Spaniards, he was accused of having delivered up the town without necessity; and so rash and ill-informed were the States of Holland and Zealand on this occasion, that they forbade him to take up his residence within their territories. Being conscious of having acted with perfect integrity, he paid no regard to their interdiction, but soon after the surrender set out for Zealand, where he required the States to produce his accusers, and to try him openly^g; and as no accuser ever ventured to appear, he published a vindication of his conduct, calculated to put his enemies to silence, and to shew that, instead of censure, he had merited the highest praise^h.

The ill-humour which the maritime provinces discovered on this occasion, in their injurious treatment of a person so beloved and popular as St. Aldegonde, proves the error of those who assert that these provinces were not displeased that the Spaniards had got possession of Antwerp, and that their jealousy of that commercial city was the cause why they did not exert themselves with greater vigour to preserve it. As the circumstances above explained seem to afford a full account of their inactivity in the beginning of the siege, so, towards the close of it, it should seem they did every thing for the relief of the besieged, which they could have done in their own defence. The only object of their dread at this time was the

^g The account here given is taken from Meteren, the best informed of all the historians in matters relative to Antwerp. It differs materially from that of Reidanus.

^h Bentivoglio, part II. lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xii. Thuanus, lib. lxxxiii. Reidanus, lib. iv.

power of Spain. They could not but consider Antwerp as a bulwark against that power, and they could not foresee those commercial advantages, which they derived afterwards from the reduction of that wealthy city under the Spanish yoke. 1585.

They soon experienced these advantages, by the removal of so great a number of the inhabitants of Brabant and Flanders to Amsterdam and Middleburg, that it became necessary to extend the walls of those cities in order to contain them. And thus the trade of the confederated States was greatly augmented, while that of the southern provinces received a wound, of which it never afterwards recovered. The prince of Parma had provided carefully against this event, so fatal to the prosperity of his late acquisitions, by the length of time which he allowed to the Protestants for disposing of their effects, and by the mildness of his administration; but, besides that their aversion to the Spanish government was become unconquerable, and that for some years past they had tasted the sweets of liberty, they were too sincerely attached to the reformed religion, to bear the thoughts of ever complying with the Catholic, or even to endure those restraints to which it behoved them, during their stay at Antwerp, to submit. Philip's bigotry had, in the time of the duke of Alva, transplanted great numbers of his subjects, together with their wealth and manufactures, into foreign states, and it now increased the power of the revolted provinces, at the expence of those which had returned to their allegiance. The Dutch began, not long after this period, to push their commerce to a greater extent than ever. They were more able than formerly to support the burden of the war; and in a few years afterwards they found themselves in a capacity, not only to defend their infant state, but to attack their powerful adversary, with splendour and success, in the most distant regions of the globe.

Brabant deserted by many of its inhabitants.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
—
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XX.

1585.
State of the
United Pro-
vinces.

ALTHOUGH the prosperity of the United Provinces was, in the issue, greatly augmented by that increase of inhabitants which they received from the conquered towns ; yet, at the present period, their situation was more alarming and critical than it had ever been since the commencement of the war. The prince of Parma was an enemy more formidable in every respect than the duke of Alva ; superior to him in military, and still more in political abilities ; and the more to be dreaded by the confederacy, on account of the moderation and equity which he displayed in his treatment of the people who had submitted to his arms. Almost the whole of Brabant and Flanders, except Sluys and Ostend, was already conquered ; and by his reduction of Antwerp, he had acquired a numerous fleet, which he knew well how to make subservient to the operations of his land-forces, in the further prosecution of the war.

They offer the
sovereignty to
the king of
France. The States were more sensible than ever of their inability to defend themselves, without the assistance of some foreign power. In their treaty with the duke of Anjou, they had dis-

covered great solicitude in guarding against the annexation of the provinces to the crown of France ; but soon after the death of the prince of Orange, they were persuaded that with their most strenuous efforts it would be impossible for them long to preserve their independence, and that they must either submit to Philip, or become the subjects of some other sovereign, possessed of power sufficient to defend them. Having towards the conclusion of the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-four, deliberated maturely on the subject, they hesitated for some time between the king of France and the queen of England ; but they came at last to fix their choice on the former, partly because they believed it would be easier for Henry, than for Elizabeth, to afford them assistance and support ; and partly because, at Henry's death, his crown would devolve on the king of Navarre, in whose hands they believed that both their religion and liberty would be secure.

That the offer which they resolved to make to the French monarch would be readily accepted, they could not doubt, when they considered that the principal reason why he had formerly declined to espouse their cause, was their refusing to consent to his succession, in the event of his brother's death. They could not but suppose that his ambition would be highly flattered with the opportunity of making so great an addition to his hereditary dominions ; and they were not ignorant of the resentment which he bore towards the king of Spain, who, under the mask of friendship, had long fomented the troubles of his kingdom.

Henry was not insensible to the force of these incentives. He gave the ambassadors whom the States had sent to him on this occasion, the most gracious reception ; assured them of his gratitude for the trust and confidence which the States were pleased to repose in him ; and bade them rely upon him for every mark of friendship in his power to bestow. But as their proposal was of too much importance to be hastily embraced, he desired they would deliver it in writing, that it might be submitted to the revisal of his counsellors.

Henry would not thus have delayed giving them a decisive answer, if he had been at liberty either to pursue his own inclinations, or to consult the interest of France. Peace indeed had been established between the inveterate factions, into which his kingdom was divided ; and the catholic league was apparently extinct. But the causes to which that pernicious confederacy owed its birth, still subsisted ; and it required a much more dexterous and steady hand than that of Henry, to guide the reins of government, in such a manner as to prevent the passions of the parties from breaking out again with as much violence as before. Henry duke of Guise, son of the celebrated Francis, was superior to his father in exterior accomplishments, and not inferior to him either in military or political abilities. Like his father too, he was actuated with the most inordinate ambition ; and could not endure that insignificance, to which the King's aversion to his bold aspiring character had reduced him. Enraged at being excluded from the government of the state, while all the power which he and his adherents had formerly enjoyed was engrossed by the minions of the King, he resolved either to compel Henry to redress his grievances, or to deprive him of his crown. With the most indefatigable industry he applied himself to the prosecution of his design. His emissaries were spread every where ; the kingdom swarmed with anonymous letters ; and the pulpit resounded with the imminent danger to which the church was exposed. " For the King, it was said, notwithstanding his pretensions to sanctity, had either no religion at all, or was secretly attached to that of the Hugonots ; for whom he had, in his late treaty with them, discovered the most unjustifiable partiality. This alone was sufficient to rouse the indignation of every faithful son of the church ; but there was ground for the most alarming apprehensions, when it was considered, that the duke of Anjou being now dead, and the King without any hopes of issue, the crown must (if the people did not exert themselves with vigour to prevent it) be inherited by the King of Navarre, a relapsed heretic, and a determined enemy of their holy faith ^a.

By these means the duke of Guise united more than one half of the kingdom in a fanatical, but firm confederacy, with which he hoped to control, and in time to annihilate, the authority of the King. In order to gain greater respect to this confederacy, he placed

State of
parties in
France.

^a *Memoires de la lingue, tom. iii.*

The catho-
lic league.

1585. at the head of it Charles, cardinal ^b of Bourbon, a zealous Catholic, far advanced in years, and noted for the weakness of his understanding. Guise intended this prelate for Henry's successor in the event of the death or deposition of that prince ; and he expected under him to engross the whole administration, and to pave the way for his own accession to the throne.

The king of Spain was not an unconcerned spectator of these transactions, in a kingdom to the affairs of which he had, for several years, given the most particular attention. For, besides the deep concern, which, agreeably to his general system of politics, he had ever taken in all the contests between the Catholics and Protestants in almost every European state he was greatly interested to prevent the king of Navarre (whose dominions he held unjustly) from ascending the throne of France ; and there was no other means he knew, by which he could deter the French monarch from lending assistance to the United Provinces, but to furnish him with employment at home.

^{His views.} Moved by this last consideration, he had given assistance to the league, when it was first formed by the same factious leaders some years before. He was now more determined than ever to support it ; prompted partly by the motives that have been mentioned, and partly by this consideration, that, by fomenting the disturbances in France, he would exhaust the strength of that mighty monarchy, and thereby either acquire possession of it himself, or be at least delivered from all dread of that power, which he believed to be the only one in Europe able to counteract his designs.

^{His treaty with the duke of Guise} Having some time before the present period revived his negotiations with the duke of Guise, and the other heads of the league, he gave orders to his commissioners Moreo, and Baptista Tassi, to form an alliance with them, without delay. And it was accordingly concluded between the Spanish envoys on the one hand, and the dukes of Guise and Mayenne, and the Sieur de Menneville, agent for the cardinal of Bourbon, on the other, at Joinville, on the second of February one thousand five hundred and eighty-five, upon the following conditions :

“ That in case the present king of France should die without male issue, the cardinal of Bourbon should, as first prince of the blood, be declared King ; and all those persons excluded from the succession, who were either heretics themselves, or favourers of heretics.

“ That the cardinal of Bourbon should, in the event of his succeeding to the crown, ratify the peace of Chateau-Cambresis, between the courts of France and Spain.

“ That he should prohibit the exercise of every religion but the Catholic, within his dominions.

“ That he should restore to Philip all the places which had been taken from him by the Hugonots, and assist him in subduing his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands.

“ That, on the other hand, Philip should contribute fifty thousand crowns a month, for the support of the confederacy, besides assisting it with a sufficient number of troops, till heresy should be utterly extirpated. That he should take the cardinal of Bourbon, the lords of the house of Guise, and all others who should accede to the league, under his protection ; and that neither of the contracting parties should enter into any treaty with the king of France, without mutual consent.”

Besides these conditions, which were committed to writing, and sub-

^b Uncle to the king of Navarre.

scribed, Philip engaged to pay annually the sum of two hundred thousand crowns to the duke of Guise, to be disposed of by him as he should judge most conducive to the interest of the league. And it was agreed, that this whole transaction should be concealed, till a more convenient season for divulging it.

Henry, however, received intelligence of the congress ; and from former experience it was easy for him to conjecture the purpose for which it had been held. Soon after this, the embassy from the States of Holland arrived, and was received in the manner above mentioned. Mendoza, the Spanish resident, could not be ignorant of what had passed at Joinville ; yet he complained to Henry of his kind reception of the Dutch ambassadors, as being inconsistent with the friendship which he owed to the Catholic King. Henry replied to this complaint, with a degree of firmness and dignity, which it had been happy for himself, and for his subjects, if he could have maintained uniformly in his conduct ; “ I do not, said he, consider the people of the Netherlands as rebels, but as men, whose patience has been worn out by oppression. Humanity and justice incline me to take an interest in the distress of a neighbouring nation, once subject to the crown of France. I have not however as yet resolved to concern myself in their affairs. I am unwilling to violate that peace which subsists between your master and me ; although I know, that, on his part, it has been violated. My resolution will appear, when I think fit to disclose it. In the mean time I desire it may be remembered, that I shall not be intimidated by the threats of the king of Spain ; and that I am master of my conduct, and at liberty, without being answerable to any other prince, to make either peace or war, as I incline.”

Among Henry’s counsellors were some who exhorted him to embrace so tempting an opportunity as the present, of advancing the glory of his crown. The perplexed situation of his affairs, they said, ought rather to determine him to enter into foreign war, than to deter him from engaging in it. It would prove the most effectual remedy for those noxious humours with which his kingdom was distempered, by giving a new direction to that restless spirit with which his subjects had long been actuated : and it will be found the surest method of disappointing the designs of the duke of Guise, by depriving him of the assistance of the Catholic King, to whom it would furnish sufficient employment in defence of his own dominions.

Henry hesitates as to accepting the proffered sovereignty

Such was the reasoning of those who advised Henry to accept of the sovereignty of the United Provinces. It was plausible, but not substantial or solid. “ For where,” said others of his counsellors, seconded by the queen-mother, “ can troops be found in France sufficient to carry on a war against an enemy so powerful as the king of Spain ? Upon such of the Catholics as are in league with that monarch, the King can have no reliance. On the contrary, they would unite with Philip against their native sovereign. To compose an army of such Catholics as retain their fidelity, and to send that army to the Netherlands, would be to abandon the kingdom naked and defenceless to the duke of Guise. And were the King to apply to the Protestants for assistance, what purpose would that measure serve, but to excite an universal alarm, and to determine all the Catholics in the kingdom to accede to the league ? ”

Henry could not resist the force of these arguments. Finding himself therefore thus fettered by his factious subjects, he resolved, though with much reluctance, to decline the tempting offer which the States had made to him : and having called their ambassadors, he informed them, that the unhappy situation of his domestic affairs

He declines accepting it.

1585. rendered it impossible for him at present to accept of their offer, or to undertake their protection ; but that he would not fail to recommend their cause to the queen of England in the warmest manner.

Elizabeth had formerly approved of their election of the duke of Anjou, and had even contributed her endeavours to promote it. But she dreaded the union of the provinces with

France, as an event which would have raised the maritime power of that kingdom to a superiority above her own, and therefore she had regarded with a jealous eye, the making a tender to Henry of their sovereignty. No sooner was she informed of that monarch's resolution to decline accepting it, than her anxiety taking another direction, she dreaded that their despair would induce them to throw themselves on the mercy of their former sovereign, whose severest vengeance, she could not doubt, would be poured out upon her, as soon as his affairs in the Netherlands were composed.

The States make her an offer of the sovereignty. In order to prevent this effect of Henry's refusal, which was a more immediate object of her dread, than any consequence that could have arisen from his acceptance, she sent an ambassador to rouse their drooping spirits, and to give them hopes of her protection.

The States were encouraged by this mark of her attention, to form the resolution of making the same offer of their sovereignty to her, which they had made to the king of France ; and ambassadors were accordingly appointed, and sent over to England in the month of July one thousand five hundred and eighty-five.

These ambassadors employed every argument which they could devise, to prevail upon Elizabeth to yield to their desire. After testifying in the strongest terms that gratitude with which the States were penetrated on account of the favour which she had already afforded them ; they represented, " That they had now more occasion than ever for her friendship, and must sink under the power of Philip, who possessed such inexhaustible resources, if she did not speedily interpose in their behalf. But although the power of the confederacy was small, when compared with those mighty efforts which were made by the king of Spain to enslave it, it was not unworthy of the queen's attention and regard. Besides possessing some important towns in Brabant, Flanders, and Guelderland, they were still in possession of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Friesland, in which there were many flourishing and well-fortified cities, capacious harbours, and navigable rivers, from which the Queen's subjects would derive infinite advantage in the way of commerce ; not to mention that, by the accession of so numerous a fleet as that of the United Provinces, her navy would be able to give law to all the maritime powers in Europe. They were far from supposing that interest alone would determine the Queen to regard their present application ; they had already experienced her generosity, and they now addressed her as the sovereign of a powerful kingdom, who had shewn that she was touched with their calamities. It was their earnest desire, at this time, that she would accept of the sovereignty of the provinces, upon the same conditions on which their native princes had enjoyed it, and that she would henceforth consider the people of the Netherlands as her faithful subjects, who would vie with those of her native kingdom in demonstrating their attachment to her person, and in advancing the glory of her reign.

Elizabeth received this proposal with much complacency, and assured the ambassadors, that they should not return without carrying such an answer along with them as would entirely satisfy the States ; but before she

could be more particular in her reply, she must consider the affair with that attention which it deserved, and hear the opinions of her counsellors.

The same thing happened on this occasion in the court of England, as in that of France some months before. Elizabeth's ministers were no less divided in their sentiments than those of Henry, and formed their judgments as ^{1585.} courtiers are wont to do in matters of doubtful issue, conformably either to the natural temper of their mind, or to the inclination of the prince.

She deliberates on the subject.

There were some among them who thought, that both justice and prudence required that Elizabeth should reject the offer that had been made to her; for it was the common interest of princes, they said, that subjects should be retained in their allegiance; and to encourage them in the violation of it, was in reality to undermine the foundations of their own authority. The Queen had hitherto favoured the inhabitants of the Low-Countries, not as a free and independent nation, but as a people who were cruelly oppressed; and her intention had not been to enable them to renounce their allegiance, but to induce their King to treat them with greater equity and moderation. In this purpose they thought she might still persist. But to acknowledge the States for sovereigns, and to accept from their hands that sovereignty which belonged to another, would not only be a violation of that justice which princes owe to one another, but might be attended with the most dangerous consequences to her own repose. The king of Spain would not rest satisfied till he had retaliated so great an injury. The state of Ireland, and even that of England, where there was so great a number of Catholics devoted to his service, would furnish him with means of executing his design. And from fomenting a spirit of division among her subjects, he would soon pass to an open invasion of her kingdom. With his arms the spiritual thunders of the Roman pontiff would co-operate, and in that case such a number of enemies might be excited against her as would endanger the stability of her throne."

But others of Elizabeth's counsellors were of opinion, that so inviting an opportunity as the present ought not to be neglected, and that the Queen could not, with reason, be accused of injustice for embracing it. The States, compelled by necessity, had, several years before the present period, assumed the sovereignty into their own hands, and since that time they had conferred it upon the duke of Anjou, whom the Queen had virtually recognized for their lawful sovereign. The king of Spain had clearly forfeited his right to their obedience, by his violation of all the conditions on which that right was founded. "Notwithstanding this, he will no doubt be highly offended," continued they, "if the Queen shall think fit to listen to the present application. But can he be more an enemy to the Queen, than he has already shewn himself? Has he not long endeavoured to stir up her disaffected subjects in Ireland? And in England does he not pursue the same hostile and insidious designs? Has he not warmly espoused the cause of the queen of Scots? Does he not on every occasion shew himself an implacable enemy to the English name? And what is it that has so long prevented him from declaring open war, but that his revolted subjects in the Netherlands have hitherto afforded full employment to all the forces which he could spare from his ambitious enterprizes? When he shall have disengaged himself from his embarrassments in the Low-Countries, can we doubt that he will turn his arms against the Queen? It is the part of prudence to provide against a distant as well as against an immediate danger; and prudence and a regard to self-preservation require that the Queen should, to the utmost of her power, support the people of the United Pro-

1585. vinces, because in their preservation the peace and security of her own dominions are involved. If she reject the application of the States, and either give them no assistance, or such only as has hitherto been granted, they will soon be overpowered, and Philip will then be not only at greater leisure, but much more able than at present, to execute his designs. But if the Queen accept of the advantageous offer that is made to her, and exert herself with vigour in defence of this people, who desire to become her subjects, she will encounter her enemy at a distance from home, she will be powerfully assisted by a brave and determined ally, and with her fleet acting in concert with that of the States, she will be able to maintain the tranquillity of her kingdom”

Elizabeth readily perceived the force of this reasoning : she believed that an open breach with Philip was unavoidable, and she thought it more eligible to begin hostilities herself now, than to wait till her adversary should be in a condition to execute his designs against her. She resolved however to decline accepting

Elizabeth undertakes the protection of the States. the sovereignty which the States had offered her, either because she apprehended that it would prove a greater burden than she was able to support, or because she was afraid of exciting the jealousy of the neighbouring powers. But while for these reasons she desired that the supreme authority might still remain in the hands of the States, she resolved to afford them her protection ; and with this view, after having received particular information concerning their strength, and the number of troops necessary for carrying on the war, she concluded a treaty with them, of which the principal articles were those which follow : “That the Queen should furnish the States with five thousand foot and one thousand horse, to be commanded by a Protestant general of her appointment, and to be paid by her during the continuance of the war. That after the conclusion of the war the States should repay her expences, and that the towns of Brille and Flushing, and the fort of Rammekins, should be immediately delivered to her, and should remain in her possession till she were fully reimbursed. That the commander of the forces, the governors of provinces and towns, and all the officers and soldiers, should take an oath of fidelity to the Queen and the States. That in case it should be found expedient to employ a fleet in the common cause, the States should furnish the same number of ships as the Queen, to be commanded by an English admiral. That the commander in chief, and two English ministers residing in the Netherlands, should be admitted into the assembly of the States. That none of the rights or privileges of the confederated provinces should be violated, and no change introduced in the established religion or government. And lastly, That neither of the two contracting parties should, without mutual consent, make peace, or enter into an alliance with the king of Spain.”

Leicester appointed commander in chief. This treaty was no sooner ratified, than Elizabeth issued orders for carrying it into execution. The earl of Leicester (to whom this wise princess had been long attached in a degree which far exceeded his merit and services) was appointed general of the forces, and went over with them to Holland in the beginning of the year 1586, accompanied by more than five hundred gentlemen, who intended to serve under him as volunteers. Leicester had neither courage, capacity, moderation, nor integrity, to qualify him for the arduous task that was assigned him, but his defects were concealed under the glare of superficial accomplishments ; with which, as he had long deceived the penetration of Elizabeth, he now imposed upon the people of the Nether-

lands, and excited in them the most flattering and delusive hopes. From his first arrival they regarded him as the restorer of their fallen state, and profusely heaped upon him every mark of honour which their immoderate fondness could devise. Not satisfied with receiving him rather as a prince and a conqueror, who had already wrought their deliverance, than as the subject of an ally by whom he had been sent to their assistance, they conferred upon him the offices of governor general of the confederacy, and commander in chief of all their forces by sea and land.

By this precipitate measure, of which they had afterwards the greatest reason to repent, they intended to gratify the Queen, and if possible, to induce her to take a deeper interest in their affairs. But they were exceedingly disappointed in their expectations ; she was offended at their artifice, and immediately dispatched her vice-chancellor^o to complain of their conduct, as being calculated to make the world believe her insincere in the declaration which she had published, of intending only to assist the provinces, and not to undertake the absolute charge of their protection. She desired that the States would recall that authority which they had conferred on Leicester, and commanded him to rest contented with the portion of power which she had given him. But it is extremely doubtful whether Elizabeth was in reality as much incensed on this occasion as she appeared to be. She soon discovered an unwillingness to mortify her favourite's vanity and ambition ; lent a favourable ear to the apology that was made to her by the States, and did not insist on a compliance with her request. Whatever was her motive for this conduct, Leicester was installed in the government, and invested with as ample powers as were consistent with the fundamental laws of the constitution ; after which he proceeded to make preparations for putting a stop to the progress of the Spanish arms.

The prince of Parma, on the other hand, was no less active in preparing for the further prosecution of the war. After the acquisition of so many important towns, he had conceived the most sanguine expectations of being able soon to complete the reduction of the revolted provinces. But by the interposition of Elizabeth he perceived his victory snatched from him, when he thought himself upon the point of reaping it, and was exceedingly disappointed and chagrined. Finding himself however still superior to his enemy in the field, he resolved to improve this advantage, and as soon as the season would permit, to proceed with his wonted vigour.

The confederates had, notwithstanding their loss of Maestricht above related, been able to keep possession of two considerable towns on the Maese, Grave in Brabant, and Venlo in Guelderland. Farnese was desirous to make himself master of these two places before he should turn his arms against the northern provinces ; and early in the spring he sent count Charles of Mansveldt to form the blockade of Grave. Mansveldt executed his commission with little opposition, by casting a bridge over the Maese, and by building forts and redoubts not only on the dykes of the river, but on the land side of the town, where he pitched his camp, and cut off all communication between the besieged and the country behind them. The town was defended by an English garrison, under the command of a young nobleman, baron de Hemert, a native of Guelderland. Leicester, sensible that the place was of the greatest importance for preventing the enemy from advancing into the provinces of Guelderland and Utrecht, went himself as far as the city of Utrecht, and from

Operations of
the prince of
Parma

The siege
of Grave.

1586 thence sent count Hohenloe and colonel Norris with two thousand five hundred foot, partly Dutch and partly English, to the relief of the besieged. The Dutch arrived first, and having taken one of the Spanish forts on the banks of the Maese, opposite to Grave, they had begun to fortify themselves upon the dyke, when Mansveldt, having received intelligence of their arrival, sent three thousand Spaniards over the bridge already mentioned. By these troops the confederates were compelled to abandon their fortifications, and to retire along the dyke; but Norris and the English forces coming up to their assistance, a bloody battle ensued. The English, though long inured to peace, gave proof on this occasion of that strong military genius by which they have so often distinguished themselves in their wars upon the continent. They drove the veteran Spaniards before them with irresistible impetuosity, killed several hundreds of them, besides seven captains, and a great number of inferior officers, and compelled them to continue their retreat till they reached their fortifications on the bridge. There they were supported by fresh troops sent by Mansveldt from the camp. The battle was renewed, and both parties fought for some time with the same fury as before, till they were separated by a violent storm of wind and rain, which rendered all their efforts ineffectual. Through this accident the Spaniards still retained possession of the bridge, but the rain which fell furnished count Hohenloe with the means of relieving the besieged. The river being swelled to an uncommon height, he broke down the dyke near Ravestein, which stands on the same side with Grave, and having laid all the country between Ravestein and Grave under water, he conveyed to the besieged, ammunition, provisions, and a supply of troops across the inundation.

The prince of Parma, alarmed with this success of the confederates, set out for Grave with his main army; and in a few days after his arrival before the place two batteries were planted, and a part of the wall was demolished. It might still however have been defended for a considerable time; and De Hemert, the governor, gave the earl of Leicester the strongest assurances that he would hold out to the last. But his courage failing, he began to talk of the necessity of surrendering; and, although only two or three of his officers approved of his design, while all the rest remonstrated against it as cowardly and dishonourable, he resolved to put it in execution; and upon the seventh of June, before the breach was practicable, or the enemy had taken any measures for an assault, he sent to the prince of Parma a proposal to capitulate. The prince readily granted him the most favourable conditions, and suffered him and the garrison to march out with their arms and baggage. But as De Hemert was undeserving of this honour, he soon had reason to repent of the infamous part into which his cowardice had betrayed him. Both he and the officers who had concurred with him, were condemned by a court-martial to be beheaded. The sentence was acknowledged to be just, yet De Hemert's fate excited great commiseration in his countrymen. He was too young for the important trust which had been committed to him; there was no reason to suspect him of treachery or corruption, and he solicited in the most earnest manner to have his life spared, and to be permitted to engage in some perilous enterprise in which he might retrieve his honour. But Leicester thinking it necessary at this time, for the establishment of military discipline, which had been greatly relaxed, to give an example of severity, rejected all the applications which were made in his behalf.

¹ Meteren, p. 403. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. ii. and Strada.

Immediately after the surrender of Grave, Farnese led his army, amounting to twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, to besiege Venlo ; and he made the greater haste in his expedition against that place, the only one on the side of the Maese which remained in the hands of the confederates, as he understood that the garrison was weak, and that the celebrated Martin Schench, who commonly resided in it, had, by Leicester's orders, marched with the greatest part of his troops to secure the town of Gueldres. This man, a native of Gelderland, and a soldier of fortune, is celebrated by all the cotemporary historians, on account of his extraordinary valour, activity, and enterprise. Having first attached himself to the Spanish party in the Netherlands, he performed for that party several important services, but thinking himself dishonoured by a preference which the general bestowed on a Spanish officer, he had deserted to the States. Schench no sooner heard that the Spanish army had begun the seige of Venlo, than he set out with a body of horse in order to throw himself into the place. Finding it completely invested on every side, he attacked the besiegers in the middle of the night, and having penetrated beyond the general's tent, he continued to advance till he had almost reached one of the gates of the town ; but he could not enter, by reason of certain barricades which Farnese had raised to prevent the sallies of the garrison. Before he had time to demolish these, the whole camp was up in arms, and obliged him to abandon his attempt. He fought his way back through the thickest of the enemy, and escaped with the loss of between forty and fifty men. He made several other vigorous efforts for the relief of the besieged, but they were all rendered abortive by the foresight and vigilance of the prince of Parma, who repelled his attacks ; and, in spite of the annoyance which he gave him from without, kept up an incessant fire upon the town till a great part of the wall was demolished. The different nations of which the army consisted were disputing with each other for the honour of beginning the assault, when the besieged, dreading the fatal consequences that might follow, surrendered the town on nearly the same conditions with those which had been granted to the citizens of Grave. The prince of Parma found it necessary to employ all his authority to prevent the soldiers, whom the capitulation disappointed of their prey, from offering violence to the inhabitants ; and he gave a proof of his respect for Schench, by treating his wife and sister in the most honourable manner, and furnishing them with his own coach to carry them to whatever place they should incline g.

From Venlo, Farnese went without delay and invested Nuyts, which belongs to the bishopric of Cologn, but was at that time in the possession of the States.

The siege
and de-
struction
of Nuyts.

Gebhert de Trusches, the archbishop and elector of Cologn, having, about three years before the present period, abjured the Catholic religion, and married, attempted still to retain his bishopric and electorate ; but his canons, supported by the Pope and Emperor, excommunicated him ; and having made war against him, in which they were assisted by the prince of Parma, they obliged him to take refuge in Holland, and elected in his room Ernest, son of the duke of Bavaria. The count de Meurs, one of his partisans, soon after recovered for him, by surprize, the town of Nuyts, and obtained from the States a garrison, with which he had been able not only to defend that town against the force of Ernest, but to over-run the country, and do infinite mischief to the Catholic inhabitants Ernest, unable to repress their eruptions, had gone himself in disguise to the prince of Parma

1586. to solicit his assistance, and it was in compliance with his request, that Farnese, postponing the prosecution of his designs against the nothern provinces, engaged in his present enterprise. He knew that Philip regarded no undertaking as foreign to his interest, in which the security of the Catholic religion was concerned ; and he dreaded that if the garrison of Nuyts was not checked in time, they might gather strength, and persuade some of the neighbouring Protestant princes to espouse their cause. Some historians affirm, that he was likewise prompted by the prospect of that glory which he would acquire, should he conquer, in a few weeks, as he expected, a town which Charles the Bold duke of Burgundy had in vain attempted to reduce with an army of sixty thousand men in the space of a year.

In this expectation he was not disappointed. Through a misfortune which befel the garrison in the person of Cloet the governor, who, being dangerously wounded, was disabled from attending to the operations of the defence, their resolution failed ; and in less than three weeks after the prince's arrival before the town, they began to treat of a surrender. That he might save time, and deliver the town as entire as possible to the Elector, Farnese agreed without any difficulty to an armistice ; and he had begun to treat with the deputies of the besieged, concerning the terms of capitulation, when the Italian and Spanish troops (who had been highly incensed on account of his having prevented them from plundering the inhabitants of Venlo), being transported with a sudden rage, ran forward in contempt of his authority, and assaulted the town on different sides, while the garrison, who trusted to the armistice, were off their guard. Meeting with little resistance, they quickly scaled the walls, spread themselves over the town, and butchered all who fell in their way, without distinction of age, sex, or condition. Nor was their barbarous cruelty satiated with the horrid carnage which they committed. Their fury being turned into madness, they spurned the thoughts of plunder, and set fire to the town ; and as the wind was high, and most of the houses were built of wood, it was in a few hours consumed to ashes. Two churches only escaped, in which a number of women and children had taken refuge ; and it was with difficulty that the marquis del Guasto prevailed upon the savage soldiers to spare the lives of those trembling, miserable remains of the inhabitants.

From this disastrous scene, Farnese, now duke of Parma, by Siege of Rhineberg. his father's death, directed his march towards Rhineberg ; another place in the electorate of Cologn, of which, on account of its important situation, the States were extremely solicitous to retain possession.

The earl of Leicester mean while had been employed in drawing together all the forces which could be spared from the operations of the earl of Leicester. garrisons of the towns and forts, and seemed determined not to suffer any more of the campaign to pass without striking some important stroke, which might satisfy the expectations of the confederates. But as his army, which consisted only of seven thousand foot and one thousand four hundred horse was inferior in number to the enemy, he durst not hazard an engagement ; but resolved to attack some place of importance in the possession of the Spaniards, in order to induce the duke of Parma to relinquish the siege of Rhineberg. He directed his march towards Zutphen, and in order to facilitate his design against that place, first attacked, and made himself master of the town of Doesberg ; after which he sat down with his whole army before Zutphen, and began the siege in form.

If he had followed the counsel that was given him, to secure certain passes which led to the town, it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands ; as it was neither furnished with provisions, nor with military stores. Of this the duke of Parma had been particularly informed by Baptista Tassi the governor ; and for this reason, although he had made progress in his operations against Rhineberg, he immediately raised the siege of that place, and hastened with all his forces to the relief of Zutphen. As he was acquainted with the extremity to which the besieged were reduced, he sent the Italian cavalry, under the marquis del Guasto, before the rest of the army, with a temporary supply ; and ordered a numerous body of Spanish infantry to advance with the utmost expedition. Through Leicester's neglect to fortify the passes, a part of this supply was introduced into the town without any difficulty, in the night ; and on the day following, del Guasto attempted to introduce the rest. On this occasion a fierce encounter happened between the Italian and English cavalry. At the first onset the Italians were compelled to retire ; but they soon returned to the charge. The action then became hot and obstinate, and the issue remained for some time doubtful. Del Guasto, seconded by several officers of distinguished reputation, made every effort that could have been expected from the most experienced commander. But the English, led on by colonel Norris and Sir Philip Sidney, proved a second time victorious, and drove the Italians before them till they reached the Spanish infantry ; when the English, being ignorant whether the whole Spanish army was at hand, thought it dangerous to advance. Of the Italians about one hundred and fifty were killed and wounded, and of the English thirty. But the latter paid dear for their victory, by their irreparable loss of the brave and accomplished Death of Sir Philip Sidney. Sir Philip Sidney, who is celebrated by his contemporaries, as a person of the most consummate worth ; and as he possessed the favour of Elizabeth, must, if it had been the will of heaven to prolong his life, have soon attained to the highest dignities in her power to bestow. Soon after this encounter, the duke of Parma arrived with his whole army in order of battle ; and Leicester, conscious of the inferiority of his forces, drew them off from the siege, and suffered him to enter Zutphen without opposition. Here the duke remained till he had visited the fortifications, and laid in a sufficient quantity of ammunition and provisions ; after which he repassed the Rhine, and having put garrisons into his new conquests, he set out for Brussels.

His troops were no sooner distributed into winter-quarters, than Leicester returned with his army towards Zutphen. He did not however intend to enter so late in the year upon the siege of the town itself, but only to make himself master of three forts on the opposite side of the river, which put it in the power of the Spaniards to make frequent incursions into the territory of Veluwe. In this attempt he succeeded, and thereby deprived the Spaniards for a time of what had been the principal advantage which they derived from the possession of Zutphen. After which, having stationed a part of his troops in these forts, he returned to the Hague, where the States had been appointed to convene.

This assembly had no great reason to be satisfied with their new governor's management of the war ; and they were highly discontented with his civil administration. During the course of those military operations which have been related, he had treated them in many respects rather as a conquered province, than a free state, to whose assistance he had been sent by their friend and ally ; and had shewn no less contempt of their fundamental laws, to which he

1586.
He lays siege
to Zutphen.

Leicester
obliged to
raise the
siege.
Oct. 12th.

Leicester
takes some
forts near
Zutphen.

Leicester's
arbitrary
and impru-
dent con-
duct.

1586. knew they were unalterably attached, than to the conditions of their treaty with Elizabeth. Instead of regulating his conduct by the advice of the States or council, as gratitude and prudence required, he appears to have conceived an early prejudice against all those who had distinguished themselves in the service of their country, while he bestowed his favour on a set of artful and designing men, of suspected fidelity, who were obsequious to his caprice.

By their counsel, he laid restrictions upon trade, which, if the States had not interposed with vigour, would have proved fatal to it ; and which obliged many of those Flemish merchants, who had lately settled in Holland and Zealand, to remove into foreign parts. By the same advice, he tampered with the coin, and made such alterations in it as enriched his minions or himself, whilst they impoverished the provinces.

Innovations were introduced without the consent of the States, in the manner of collecting the public money, and after it was collected, instead of putting it, as the constitution required into the hands of the treasurer chosen by the States, Leicester ordered it to be delivered to a treasurer of his own appointment, who refused to satisfy the States as to the purposes to which it was applied. Taxes were levied from the people, for paying not only all the soldiers in the garrisons, and all the country troops, but sufficient likewise for the payment of between six and seven thousand Germans ; yet the soldiers in the garrisons were so ill paid, that the officers found it difficult to prevent a mutiny ; and two thousand Germans who had enlisted under the count de Meurs, in hopes of receiving a certain sum on their arrival in the Netherlands, being disappointed, through the governor's negligence, or the corruption of those in whom he confided, returned to Germany without drawing their swords, at a time when their assistance was absolutely necessary to the success of the campaign.

In the treaty between the States and Elizabeth, it had been agreed, that when any vacancy should happen in the government of a town, fort, or province, the commander in chief should fill it up with one of three persons presented to him by the States. To this agreement Leicester paid no regard, but appointed persons to governments of great importance, not only without their being named by the States, but even when the States remonstrated against his appointing them. Roland York, a Londoner, who had some years before been detected in treasonable practices, of which they gave Leicester timely information, was notwithstanding this intrusted with the charge of the principal fort near Zutphen, which commanded the country of Veluwe ; and William Stanley, an English Catholic, who had been in the service of Spain, was made governor of Deventer, into which place Leicester, in contradiction to the treaty with Elizabeth, had put a garrison of twelve hundred foot and two hundred horse, consisting mostly of Irish papists.

Besides these and other instances of imprudent and arbitrary conduct, he disgusted the Dutch troops by appointing English officers to command them. He compelled the people to furnish him with carriages, and to serve in his army as pioneers ; and in violation of what had ever been esteemed a fundamental privilege of the inhabitants of the Netherlands, he obliged persons, prosecuted by his tools, to leave the provinces in which they resided, and to submit to their trial in other provinces, where their prosecutors had greater influence to procure their condemnation ^k.

Such a complication of despotic measures in the government of a people jealous of their liberty, appears repugnant, whatever were the gover-

^k Van Meteren, lib. xiii. Grotius, lib. v.

nor's motives, to the very lowest degree of prudence which we can suppose him to have possessed. It is not surprising that he was suspected of having formed a plan to suppress the assembly of the States, and to assume an absolute authority ; but if his presumption could impose upon him so far as to make him believe, that so wise a princess as Elizabeth would, from her partiality to him, and in open violation of her engagements, support his usurpation, yet his conduct was extremely ill calculated to promote his perfidious design. It disgusted all the better sort of those who had influence in the provinces, and served to diffuse an universal alarm, before he had taken measures proper for securing success in his attempt.

The States, however, sensible of their present dependence upon Elizabeth, resolved to avoid an open rupture with her The States remonstrate. favourite, and notwithstanding what had passed, they received him on his arrival at the Hague with every mark of respect. They delivered to him a modest but firm remonstrance, and intreated him with much earnestness to redress their grievances. Leicester could not justify his conduct in any of the particulars that have been mentioned. He attempted, however, to make some apology for it, and assured the deputies, though with little sincerity, that for the future he should be careful to avoid giving them any just ground of offence. He added, that at present he was under a necessity of passing over to England, on account of certain disturbances in that kingdom, which required his presence. The States were extremely surprised at this intimation, as they expected that he would have proceeded immediately to reform the abuses of which they had complained ; but they were in some measure reconciled to his departure, by his agreeing to a proposal which they made to him, that, till his return to the Low-Countries, his authority as governor should be lodged in the council of state ; and he accordingly executed a public deed to this effect on the twenty-fourth of November, although it soon afterwards appeared that he had done it only to avoid the trouble of any further solicitation upon the subject. He executed privately on the same day another deed, in which he reserved to himself an exclusive authority over all the governors of provinces, towns, and forts, and even deprived the council of state of their wonted authority. This conduct, at once so cowardly and insincere, alienated from him more than ever the affections of the States, and destroyed entirely the confidence which they had reposed in him. It confirmed the opinion of those who believed that he aspired at the sovereignty, and filled the minds of persons of all ranks with the most alarming apprehensions.

The States had, as mentioned above, remonstrated against the trust committed to Roland York and William Stanley. These men gave soon a fatal proof of the justness of the suspicions which had been entertained of their fidelity. In a few weeks after Leicester's departure for England, they entered into a treacherous correspondence with Baptista Tassi, governor of Zutphen, and began to prepare their measures for delivering to him the important fortresses which had been intrusted to their care. The council of state received intelligence of their perfidious design ; but they had not power to hinder them from putting it in execution. In the beginning of February both Deventer and the fort opposite to Zutphen were given up to the Spaniards. York did not live long to enjoy the wages of his iniquity, and died in misery, neglected and forgotten by those to whom he had sacrificed his honour ; but Stanley, having persuaded most of his troops to enter into the service of Spain, and having uniformly professed the Catholic religion

1586.
Treacherous
of Roland
York and
William
Stanley.

1587. (which Philip considered as an atonement for the most odious crimes), was permitted to retain the government of Deventer, together with the same rank in the Spanish, which he had enjoyed in the English army. This man, sprung from a respectable family in England, had been concerned in Babington's conspiracy in favour of the queen of Scots, and was probably betrayed, by the dread of a discovery, into this unworthy conduct, which has involved his name in perpetual infamy.

The news of these disasters spread grief and consternation over the confederated provinces. They recalled the memory of the duke of Anjou's attempt on Antwerp, and excited great anxiety and dread, lest the examples of York and Stanley should be imitated by the governors of other forts and towns.

Prudence and moderation of the States. The States participated of the distress which the people felt on the present occasion. They still however maintained their wonted fortitude, and without regard to Leicester's resentment, resolved to provide, as well as their circumstances would allow, for the preservation of the commonwealth. In an assembly held at the Hague on the sixth of February, after asserting their own supreme authority, they enacted, that during the absence of the earl of Leicester, prince Maurice should exercise the authority of governor, and that all officers in their service should take an oath of obedience to him, and of fidelity to the States. To this resolution, which was immediately published and enforced, two declarations were subjoined: the first, that the States did not thereby mean to abridge the authority which they had conferred on the earl of Leicester, but only to restore to the inferior governors their legal rights and powers; and the second, that they highly disapproved of those general reflections which had been thrown out against the English troops, on account of the late treachery of a few individuals; for there were bad as well as good men in every nation, and nothing could be more liberal and unjust than such undistinguishing reflections.

They represent their grievances to Elizabeth. But while their conduct at home contained this mixture of firmness and moderation, they gave vent to their resentment, in letters, which they appointed some of their number to carry to Elizabeth and Leicester; in which after making mention of the trust and confidence which they had placed in him, they entered into a full detail of their grievances.

Leicester was highly offended with these letters, and endeavoured to persuade Elizabeth, that they had been written by a party who were his enemies, while the generality were well affected both to his person and government. There was indeed a numerous faction in the Netherlands, under the direction of the clergy, whom Leicester had attached to him by a punctilious attendance on public worship, and an affectation of zeal for the reformed religion. These men not only concurred with his partizans in England, in attempting to discredit the representation of his conduct which the States had transmitted to Elizabeth, but studied to control the authority of the States at home, and endeavoured to inspire the queen with most groundless prejudices against prince Maurice and other popular leaders, through whose influence, they said, the States had conceived a disgust against the English alliance, and were now no less alienated from the queen than from the earl of Leicester. Elizabeth did not hearken implicitly either to the States or their accusers, but sent over to

Lord Buckhurst sent to the Netherlands. Holland lord Buckhurst, a nobleman esteemed for his prudence and moderation, to inquire into the ground of that contradictory information which she had received, but chiefly with an intention to extinguish, as soon as possible, the spirit of animosity.

and division to which the governor's imprudence had given rise. Buck-
hurst soon discovered the falsehood of those insinuations which Leices-
ter's partizans had propagated with regard to the designs of prince Maurice, and the disaffection of the States ; and he found no reason to call in
question any part of that remonstrance which had been sent to Elizabeth. 1587.
He wisely declined entering into any discussion of the points of difference
between the opposite parties, approved in general of the conduct of the
States since Leicester's departure, exhorted them to bury in oblivion what
had passed, and reminded them of the mischievous consequences with
which the want of harmony must be attended in the present critical situation
of their affairs.

These exhortations seemed to produce, in some measure, the
desired effect ; the States appeared satisfied that Leicester should
still retain the office of governor ; and lord Buckhurst carried
back to Elizabeth such a report of their disposition, as was cal-
culated to preserve that amity which had hitherto subsisted between her
and them ; but he scrupled not to condemn the conduct of her favourite,
and accused him of being the cause of all the disturbances which had hap-
pened. If any other of Elizabeth's courtiers had been guilty of the same
indiscretions with the earl of Leicester, it is not to be doubted that he
would have felt the weight of her resentment. He had far exceeded the
powers which she had given him. By his misconduct he had strengthened
the hands of her mortal enemy, the king of Spain. And by his misconduct
and arrogance together, he had almost involved her in dissensions with an
ally whom she had undertaken to defend, and with whom it was of the
highest consequence to her interest that she should maintain a perfect
understanding. Yet such was her partiality for this unworthy favourite,
and so great the influence which he possessed, that he found means to
turn her indignation from himself against his accuser. Lord Buckhurst in-
curred her displeasure and was even put under arrest, as if he, and not
Leicester, had been guilty ^k.

Nothing could be more agreeable to the duke of Parma than
these distractions in the confederated provinces ; but he was
prevented from availing himself of them by the miserable con-
dition to which the provinces under his command were reduc-
ed by famine and pestilence. The country, as well as the towns, in the
southern provinces, had of late suffered a prodigious diminution of inhabi-
tants. Great numbers had forsaken their habitations, partly on account of
their religion, and partly of the ravages which had been committed by the
troops ; and only a few of those who remained, had either seed to sow,
or horses and cattle to cultivate their grounds. There had been almost no
crop raised in the preceding year within the provinces, and the crops in
the neighbouring countries had been worse than usual for several years.
From Holland and Zealand the Flemings might have been abundantly sup-
plied, but the confederated States, besides prohibiting all communication
with the southern provinces, had placed guardships upon the coasts, and in
the mouths of the rivers, to prevent them from receiving supplies from
foreign parts, in the hopes of weakening the Spanish army, or of compell-
ing the frontier towns to return into the confederacy. This cruel policy
was not attended with either of these effects. The duke of Parma brought
provisions for his army from France, Germany, and England, at an immense
expence, and he gave particular attention to the supplying of those towns
which lay nearest to the United Provinces.

Elizabeth's
partiality for
Leicester.

Famine and
pestilence
in the southern
provinces.

^k Meteren, lib. xiv. Bentivoglio, p. ii. lib. iv. Reidanus, lib. vi. Cambden, an. 1587.

1587. Those dreadful calamities which are the ordinary concomitants of famine, were felt chiefly in the interior parts, where great multitudes died of want, and of those pestilential diseases which want and unwholesome nourishment produced. In Antwerp, Brussels, and other places, many persons of the better ranks in life, after selling their furniture and other effects to purchase food, were reduced to beg openly in the streets. In Brabant and Flanders several villages were entirely deserted : and the cotemporary historians add, that from the solitude and desolation of some parts of the country, wolves and other wild beasts were so much multiplied, that besides many persons who perished in other places, upwards of a hundred were devoured by those furious animals, within two miles of Ghent, in a country formerly one of the best cultivated and most populous in the Netherlands.

Prosperity of the United Provinces. Such was the state of the southern provinces, which are by nature the richest, though governed by the duke of Parma with superior abilities. On the other hand, the maritime provinces were torn by factions, and governed by one who possessed neither moderation, prudence, nor capacity ; yet the inhabitants were not only entirely free from those calamities with which their neighbours were oppressed, but were richly furnished with all the necessaries of life, and daily increased in numbers. Every house was occupied, new streets and new towns were built, and individuals grew richer every day, notwithstanding the perpetual burden of an expensive war. For these advantages the Dutch were indebted chiefly to their commerce, which had long been considerable, but was of late greatly augmented by the multitude of manufacturers and merchants who flocked into Holland and Zealand, when Brabant and Flanders were broken off from the confederacy. The calamities of the latter provinces contributed still more to increase the migration of people into the former, till they became the seat of the greatest part of that wealth and industry, which for ages past had distinguished the Netherlands above the rest of Europe¹.

In this condition of the United Provinces, it may appear surprising, that during the space of eight months, no attempt was made by the confederates to recover any of the towns which had been taken from them ; but division here, and the want of capacity and vigour in the person intrusted with the reins of government, were attended with some of the same effects as were produced by the famine and pestilence in the other provinces. Neither prince Maurice nor the States had power at this time to enforce obedience to their commands, except in the provinces of Holland and Zealand. In the rest, the partizans of Leicester disputed, and counteracted their authority ; and thus, the duke of Parma, notwithstanding those unspeakable calamities in which the provinces under his government were involved, was sooner ready than the confederates to resume the operations of the war.

The siege of Sluys. Ostend and Sluys were the only towns of importance in Flanders which had not submitted to his arms. He now resolved to attack the latter of these places ; and, in order to conceal his design, he sent Hautepeine and the marquis del Guasto, with a body of troops, towards the Veluwe, as if he had intended to make his principal attack in that quarter. This artifice had the effect which he desired. Prince Maurice and count Hohenloe were immediately sent to the Veluwe with the army of the States ; and in the mean time the duke turned suddenly towards Sluys.

Beginning of June. This place, which lies at a little distance from the coast, communicates with the sea by a spacious canal, capable of receiving the largest ships. By this canal, which separates Sluys from the iste

of Cadsand, the town is rendered inaccessible by land on the west and north ; and all the ground on the east is so broken and intersected, by an infinite number of smaller canals derived from the larger, that it is impracticable to approach the place except by a neck of land on the south leading towards Damme and Bruges. Sluys lies at the distance of nearly five miles from Ostend on the south, and from Flushing on the north ; from the former of which it might receive assistance by land, and from the latter, by sea. It was therefore the duke of Parma's first object to intercept the communication of the besieged with these two places, and for this purpose he began with attacking the fort of Blackenberg, which stands half way between Sluys and Ostend. As the garrison were utterly unprepared for resistance against so vigorous an attack, he soon compelled them to surrender ; immediately after which, he proceeded with a part of his forces to the isle of Cadsand. At that place, after erecting a fort on the banks of the great canal, nearer the sea than Sluys, he had recourse to the same expedient which he had employed so successfully at Antwerp, and blocked up the canal by a bridge of ships strongly bound together, and well furnished with troops and artillery.

Having thus cut off the only channels of communication by which the friends of the besieged could relieve them, he began to make his approaches to the place itself on that side which looks towards Bruges, on which alone it was accessible. Even there the ground was so wet, as to increase exceedingly the labour of working the trenches ; and the besieged had, in order to keep the enemy at a distance, raised a strong redoubt beyond the ditch. The garrison consisted of about one thousand six hundred men, partly English and partly Dutch, commanded by colonel Groenvelt, one of the bravest officers in the service of the States. In the beginning of the siege they made several vigorous sallies, in which they gave the most striking proofs of intrepidity. But finding that although in these sallies they did great execution among the enemy, their own numbers suffered considerable diminution, Groenvelt resolved to restrain them for the future from advancing beyond the redoubt. This redoubt they defended for some time with great bravery, and frequently repulsed the assailants ; but they were obliged at last to yield to superior numbers, and to retire within the town.

In carrying forward the trenches, Farnese encountered difficulties from the softness of the ground, and the incessant fire of the besieged, that were almost insurmountable. Many of his troops were killed, and the marquis of Renti, La Motte, and several others of his principal officers were dangerously wounded.

In the mean time prince Maurice and count Hohenloe had entered Brabant, and after destroying a great number of little towns and villages, had directed their march towards Bois-le-Duc, hoping that, in order to save that place, the duke of Parma would quit the siege of Sluys. But before they had taken the fort of Engelem, which lay in their way to Bois-le-Duc, they were informed that the earl of Leicester, who had long been impatiently expected, had at last arrived at Flushing with a reinforcement of troops. Maurice set out instantly, with some cohorts, to meet him, leaving Hohenloe with the rest of the forces to prosecute the enterprise against Engelem and Bois-le-Duc. When Maurice had joined Leicester, the confederate army was nearly equal to that of the besiegers. Leicester set sail from Flushing on the twenty-ninth of June, and in a few hours reached the canal of Sluys. But after examining the bridge, redoubts, and forts, with which Farnese had blocked up the passage, he judged it impracticable in that way to reach the town. Between the desire

Return of
Leicester
from Eng-
land.

His feeble
attempts to
raise the
siege of
Sluys.

1587. of accomplishing his design, and the difficulty which he must encounter in carrying it into execution, he balanced for some days, and at length he steered his course for Ostend, with the resolution to lead his troops from thence by land to the relief of the besieged. In the prosecution of this latter design, he shewed no greater spirit than in that of the former. To open his way from Ostend to Sluys, it was necessary he should make himself master of the fort of Blackemberg. He accordingly laid siege to that fort, and had begun to batter it with his cannon ; but he was no sooner informed that the duke of Parma was upon his march to give him battle, than he drew off his troops from Blackemberg, retired hastily in the night to Ostend, and soon afterwards returned to Zealand.

The duke of Parma resumed with fresh ardour the operations of the siege, and having at last, though with incredible labour, pushed his trenches near enough for erecting a battery, he soon laid a great part of the wall in ruins. He would then have attempted an assault, had he not perceived that the besieged had raised within the wall a half moon, which they had fortified in the strongest manner. Laying aside therefore all thoughts of taking the town by storm, he resolved to employ the slower method of filling up the ditch, and working mines ; and in these operations, against which the besieged made the most vigorous opposition, near three weeks

were spent after the wall had been demolished. The besieged had received certain intelligence that Leicester had given up all hopes of being able to relieve them, and they had now no

Generous resolution of the besieged. more gunpowder left than was sufficient to serve them for ten or twelve hours longer. Six days before this time Groenvelt, and the other surviving officers, having assembled together, were of opinion, that as they had no prospect of relief, it would not be dishonourable to surrender the place upon certain conditions ; and they resolved that, in case these conditions were rejected, they would set fire to the town, and endeavour to force their way sword in hand through the enemy's entrenchments. This resolution, with the articles of the surrender, which they committed to writing, and confirmed with an oath, was sent to the earl of Leicester, to serve for a vindication of their conduct. But their messenger was discovered in swimming across the canal, and the paper seized and carried to the duke of Parma, whose prudence and respect for valour, though in an enemy from whom he had suffered greatly, made him resolve to grant them

They capitulate. those terms on which he had thus accidentally discovered they were so much determined to insist. Accordingly when, their

gun-powder being almost spent, they offered to deliver the town, upon condition that they should march out with the honours of war, he instantly complied with their request. Their number had been reduced from sixteen or seventeen hundred, to seven hundred men. The loss of the besiegers was likewise very great. The cotemporary historians do not mention the particular number of the killed and wounded ; but they concur in saying that Sluys cost the duke of Parma more than Nuyts, Grave, and Venlo together ^m.

Guelders betrayed to the Spa- niards. It afforded him great satisfaction under this calamity, that during the siege of Sluys, he had, without any bloodshed, acquired the town of Guelders, which was betrayed to him by a Scots colonel

of the name of Paton. To this man, Leicester had committed the government of Guelders ; but having taken offence at some part of his conduct, he had openly threatened to put another, of the name of Stuart, in

^m Strado mentions the numbers killed on both sides ; but his whole relation of this siege is so exceedingly romantic, that no credit can be given to it.

Meteren, lib. xiv. p. 439. Bentivoglio, part. ii. lib. iv.

his room. In order to avoid this affront, Paton entered into a correspondence with Hautpeine, whose troops were at that time in the neighbourhood of Guelders, and with his assistance he soon afterwards executed his perfidious design.

To compensate to the States for so many important places, as they had lost since their alliance with England, their forces had gained no advantage but the reduction of Axel, which prince Maurice took by a stratagem ; and the fort of Engelen which was compelled to surrender by count Hohenloe ; who at the same time beat the Spanish troops under Hautpeine, in a rencontre, in which the latter lost his life.

After Leicester's unsuccessful attempt to raise the siege of Sluys, he transported his troops to Brabant, and made another equally inglorious attempt to reduce the town and district of Hoogstraten. This was the last military enterprise which he undertook in the Netherlands, immediately after which he set out for Dort, whither the States had sent some of their number to wait his arrival.

This assembly was now more disgusted than ever with his conduct. They long had reason to suspect, and they had lately received certain intelligence, that he had formed a design to deprive them of their authority. A letter of his, writ from England to one of his secretaries, had been intercepted, in which, after mentioning his intended return to the Low-Countries, he expressed, in strong terms, his discontent with the limited power which he had hitherto enjoyed as governor ; sent instructions to be communicated to those who were privy to his designs ; and insinuated, that if he could not obtain a more extensive authority, it was the Queen's resolution, and his own, to abandon the provinces altogether, and to leave them to their fate.

The States, alarmed with this intelligence, resolved to stand upon their guard against his machinations. Being still however unwilling, from their dread of Elizabeth's displeasure, to come to an open rupture with him, they took no notice of this letter, but exhorted him to reject such malignant counsels as might be offered by ill-designing men, who, in order to promote their own selfish views, wished to sow the seeds of animosity and dissension. From this exhortation, Leicester easily perceived that the States had come to the knowledge of his designs. With great disingenuity he accused them of having violated their faith, by abridging that authority which they had intreated him to accept ; and he threw the blame of all the misfortunes which had befallen the confederacy, partly on the States, and partly on prince Maurice and count Hohenloe. The States, he said, had neglected to furnish him with the necessary supplies ; and Maurice and Hohenloe, had, on different pretences, refused to co-operate with him in his military enterprises. Of a writing which contained these and some other groundless accusations, copies were sent by his partizans into different parts of the provinces. The parties accused published a vindication of their conduct ; and it is impossible, from what is preserved of this altercation, to consider what Leicester advanced, in any other light, but as the mean attempt of a person, equally weak and disingenuous, to blacken the characters of others, in order to conceal the cowardice and imprudence of which he himself was conscious. Such was the judgment formed of it by the impartial world, and by most of the inhabitants of the Netherlands. But there was still a numerous party who espoused Leicester's defence, and promoted the execution of his designs. The clergy were still as much attached to him as ever, and spared no pains to bring the people to a compliance with his will. Having with this view called a synod or assembly, they appointed four of their number to present

Intrigues of
Leicester.

The States
alarmed.

1587. an address to the States, in which, besides exhorting them to attend to the true interest of the country, and the advancement of religion, they advised them to maintain concord with the queen of England, and the earl of Leicester

To this address the States made such a reply as the officiousness of those in whose name it was presented, seems to have deserved. "They had not been inattentive (they said) to those important objects which the synod had recommended to their attention ; and they could not be more solicitous than they had always been, to preserve inviolate those engagements into which they had entered with the queen of England and the earl of Leicester ; but, in their turn, they must exhort the ministers to be on their guard against admitting among them persons, who under the cloak of religion, made it their business to calumniate the civil magistrates. By persons such as these, who affected great zeal for religion, the church had been ruined in the southern provinces : and its ruin in the United Provinces would soon be accomplished, if an end were not speedily put to the practices of such designing men. They concluded with exhorting the ministers to take warning from the fate of their brethren in Brabant and Flanders ; and to remember, that the only way in which they ought to interfere in public affairs, was to favour those to whom the administration was committed, with the assistance of their prayers."

Neither this wholesome counsel, nor any other measure which the States employed to enlighten and alarm their countrymen, frustrated, produced for some time the desired effect. Leicester still con-

tinued to carry on his intrigues in different places, and went from town to town, putting in practice every low art by which he might increase the number of his partizans. In Friesland, North Holland, and even in Dort and Leyden, there were many who espoused his cause, and shewed themselves desirous to invest him with authority to control the assembly of the States, notwithstanding the many striking proofs which he had given both of tyranny and folly. In Leyden a plot was laid for putting him in possession of that important city ; but the conspirators were detected, condemned, and executed. And by the vigilance of the States, seconded by prince Maurice and William de Nassau, governor of Friesland, his designs in other places were rendered equally ineffectual. Having come at last to perceive that he was not equal to the attempt upon which he had entered, he grew tired of his situation, and in the month of December passed over to England, where, not long after his arrival, Elizabeth, either from a conviction of his incapacity, or from the desire of keeping him for the future

near her person, required him to resign his government of the provinces ; which he accordingly did, on the 27th of December, one thousand five hundred and eighty-sevenⁿ.

The flame which he had kindled was not so soon extinguished. In some towns, the garrisons, instigated by him or his emissaries, openly despised the authority of the States. Against the garrison of Medemblic, they were obliged to employ force ; and in order to engage other garrisons to yield obedience to their commands, they had recourse to the interposition of Elizabeth, through whose good offices internal tranquillity was at length restored.

ⁿ Meteron, p. 455.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXI.

PART I.

ELIZABETH was the more solicitous to heal the divisions in the United Provinces, as she apprehended that she would soon have occasion for all the assistance which her allies could afford her. All Europe had resounded for some time with the noise of the preparations, which Philip was making, with a view to some important enterprise. He had been employed for several months in building ships of an extraordinary size, and in collecting stores for their equipment ; while the duke of Parma had made such numerous levies in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, as shewed that he intended to take the field against the next campaign, with a much more powerful army than any which he had hitherto commanded.

1587.
Philip me-
ditates the
conquest of
England.

Almost ever since the beginning of Philip's reign, a great proportion of his troops had been occupied, either in war with the Corsairs and Turks, in the reduction of the Morescoes, or in the conquest of Portugal. He had never fully exerted his strength against his revolted subjects in the Netherlands. Nor had he found leisure to take vengeance upon Elizabeth, for the support which she had given them, and the insults which he had received from her in America, where several of his colonies had been plundered by her fleet ^a. To these objects he now thought that his honour as well as his interest required that he should apply his principal attention. As he did not doubt that, with a much smaller force than he intended to employ, he should be able to compel the people in the Netherlands to return to their allegiance, he had begun his preparations, chiefly with an intention to invade England, and he aspired to the entire subjection of that kingdom. But he hesitated for some time as to the manner in which he should proceed ; and held frequent meetings of his council to assist him in deciding, whether it was most expedient to begin with the invasion of England, or with the conquest of the United Provinces.

^a By Sir Francis Drake, anno 1585.

1587. Idiaquez, one of his principal officers of state, advised him to abandon altogether the former of these designs

“ The situation of England (said that prudent statesman),
which is surrounded on every side with a tempestuous ocean, and
Idiaquez. has few harbours upon its coasts ; the numerous forces which defend it ; the genius of the people and the nature of their government, concur in making me believe that it will be found almost impossible to succeed in an attempt to conquer it.

“ The English navy is alone equal to that of any other nation ; and when joined with the ships belonging to the revolted provinces, must prove an overmatch for any fleet that can be sent from Spain. And even allowing that the King's forces should effectuate a descent, yet what ground is there to hope that they will be able either to subdue so great a nation, or to maintain for any considerable time, such conquests, as may be made ? In order to accomplish the most ordinary conquests, some favourable disposition in the people towards the conquerors is necessary ; and in order to preserve them, there is need for a continual supply of troops. From no part of the English nation, has the King any reason to hope for assistance in the intended enterprise. In the beginning of his reign, he had experience of the strong abhorrence which these islanders entertain of a foreign yoke. And he knows how difficult it must be to keep up a numerous army in England, besides all the other armies which are necessary for the defence of his hereditary, and his lately acquired dominions. If England should prove equally pernicious to Spain, as Flanders has done, would there not be reason to dread the consequences ? Even the consequence of success may prove fatal ; how much more those which may arise from a disappointment, by which Elizabeth, being delivered from her apprehensions of danger at home, would be at greater leisure than ever to support the provinces in their rebellion : and by joining her maritime force with theirs, do infinite mischief to the Spanish dominions, both in Europe and America. In my opinion, therefore, it will be better to suspend the design of invading England, and to employ both the fleet and army in the reduction of the Netherlands. The rebels will not long resist so great a force ; and when they are subdued, the King, having fewer enemies to contend with, will be much more able than at present to chastise the queen of England.”

The duke of Parma, whom Philip consulted on this occasion, Duke of Parma's opinion. was of the same opinion as Idiaquez ; and added, That before the King could enter upon the English expedition with a probability of success, it was necessary to acquire possession of some of the most considerable sea-ports in Zealand, for the accommodation of his fleet.

Philip was not naturally either bold or rash ; yet he refused to listen to these prudent counsels. Blinded by the splendid success of his arms in the conquest of Portugal, he thought it impossible that Elizabeth could withstand the powerful armament which he intended to employ against her. And if England were subdued, the reduction of his revolted subjects would quickly follow, as they would then be deprived of the only foreign aid, by which they had been hitherto enabled to persist in their rebellion. Nor would the conquest of the former, he thought, be either so tedious or so difficult as that of the latter ; because England was every where an open country, and the English, trusting to their insular situation, had neglected to provide any fortified towns to retard the progress of an enemy. A single battle by sea, and another by land, would decide the contest ; and as the fleet which he was preparing was greatly superior to any which Elizabeth could equip, so he could not suppose that

her land forces, undisciplined, and unaccustomed to war, would be able to resist his veteran troops, which had been long enured to victory, and were commanded by the greatest general and the bravest officers in the world

He was not ignorant how much reason the other European powers had to be jealous of his design ; but he considered that happily they were at present either not inclined, or not in a capacity, to prevent him from carrying it into execution. The emperor of Germany was his friend and ally. The attention of the northern potentates was wholly engrossed with the internal administration of their dominions. And the French monarch, who was more deeply interested than any other in opposing him, could with difficulty support himself upon the throne against his rebellious subjects

But there was nothing which contributed more to confirm him in his purpose, than the approbation which it received from the Pope^b ; who, although it has been asserted that no person entertained a higher admiration of the character of Elizabeth, considered her as the most formidable enemy that the church had ever seen upon a throne. She had not indeed, on any occasion, treated her Catholic subjects with that inhuman cruelty, of which Philip had set her an example in his treatment of the Protestants ; but she had shewn herself intent on extirpating the Catholic religion from every country in Europe, to which her power and influence could reach. For almost thirty years she had been the chief support of the Protestants in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. She had entirely abolished the Popish faith in Scotland, as well as in her own dominions ; and not satisfied of depriving the unfortunate Mary of her liberty, she had lately, after the farce of a solemn trial, ordered that princess to be condemned as a traitor, and to suffer death. This action, for which Elizabeth was severely censured by Protestants as well as Papists, excited in the violent mind of the Pontiff, the highest degree of rage and indignation. With these passions his interest concurred ; and the hope of seeing England, which had formerly been the most precious jewel of the triple crown, brought back to its ancient obedience of the Holy See. He approved highly therefore of Philip's intended enterprise exhorting him to persevere in his design, and gave him assurances that he would befriend him in the execution of it to the utmost of his power. Next to an insatiable thirst after dominion, it had ever been Philip's principal ambition to be considered as the guardian of the church ; and his vanity was not a little flattened at this time with having the sovereign Pontiff for his associate^c.

He proceeded therefore with much alacrity in completing his preparations. But although he resolved to spare no expence or pains to secure success ; yet, that he might find Elizabeth unprepared, he concealed with care the purpose for which his armament was intended. A part of his fleet, he said, was to co-operate with his land-forces in the reduction of Holland, and the rest to be employed in the defence of his dominions in America

Elizabeth had too much penetration to be so easily deceived by the artifices of a prince, with whose duplicity she was so thoroughly acquainted ; and in the spring of the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven, she sent sir Francis Drake with a fleet to the coast of Spain to interrupt his preparations. By this gallant seaman, the Spanish ships of war which

Artifice of
Philip to
deceive Eli-
zabeth.

^b Sextus V.

^c Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. See a very different account in Gregorio Leti's Life of Sixtus, lib. vii.

1587. had been sent to oppose him were dispersed, and near a hundred vessels filled with naval stores and provisions, besides two large galleons, were destroyed in the harbour of Cadiz. Drake then set sail for the Azores, where he took a rich carrack in her way from the East Indies, and afterwards returned to England loaded with spoils, having by this bold and fortunate adventure rendered it impossible for Philip to execute his enterprise against England till the following year.

Fruitless negotiation for peace. Notwithstanding these hostilities, Philip still affected to desire that all the grounds of difference between him and Elizabeth might be removed, and gave orders to the duke of Parma to propose a negotiation for peace. It is not probable that the Queen was deceived by this, any more than by his former artifice. She resolved however to appear to be caught in the snare : she pretended to believe his declaration with regard to the destination of his fleet, and to listen to his proposal of negotiating an agreement. She readily accepted of the mediation of the king of Denmark ; and that her conduct might have the greater appearance of sincerity, she urged the States to send ambassadors to Bourbourg, the place appointed for the conferences, and ordered her envoy to represent to them the expediency of putting a period to the war.

The States were much alarmed with her proposal, and suspected that, in order to avert the storm which threatened her, she had resolved to sacrifice the confederacy, and to deliver up to Philip the Dutch towns in her possession. She found it necessary to remove their apprehensions on this head, by declaring, that as she had not the remotest thoughts of forsaking them, so she would never consent to any terms of peace inconsistent with their security.

She could not however persuade them to send ambassadors to the congress. "They were deeply sensible, they informed her, of the weight of those considerations, which her ambassador had urged, to induce them to think of peace. They lamented that spirit of discord which had seized on some towns of the confederacy, and they heard with great anxiety, of those mighty fleets and armies which the king of Spain was preparing for their destruction. But their situation, though bad in some respects, was far from being desperate ; they were still in possession of more than sixty towns and forts, each of which could make a vigorous resistance against the enemy. In the two years during which the earl of Leicester had governed them, eight millions of guilders had been raised for the public service, and under a prudent administration they would be able not only to continue to afford the same expence, but even to augment it. But although their situation was in reality as ill as some had represented, it could not serve any good purpose to treat of peace with the king of Spain, who was unalterably determined never to grant them peace on such conditions as either their interest or their consciences would permit them to accept. And from past experience they were persuaded, that their sending ambassadors to the congress would be attended with the most pernicious consequences. It would create in many persons such despair with regard to the stability of the present government, as would determine some to change their religion, and others to leave the Netherlands. It would raise the spirits of the Catholics, and induce both them and the Protestants to withhold their share of the public expences ; the former, from the view of forwarding the peace, and the latter, from that of retiring into foreign parts. Thus, both the fleet and army, being ill paid, would become refractory, the commanders of towns and ships would provide for their future security, by entering into secret practices with the enemy ; and in the midst of

that sedition, confusion, and treachery that would ensue, it would not be in the power of the States, or of the Queen, to prevent the people from accepting whatever terms of peace the king of Spain should think fit to impose. ^{1587.}

In these reasons Elizabeth found it necessary to acquiesce ; but she persisted in the resolution which she had formed with regard to her own conduct, and ordered her ambassadors to repair to Bourbourg. In the conferences held there, various terms of accommodation were proposed, with no sincerity on the part of Spain, and with little hope of success on the part of England. The Spanish ministers still continued to assure those of England, that no invasion of that kingdom was intended ; and, considering how long this congress subsisted (for it was not dissolved till the arrival of the Spanish fleet in the channel), it should seem that their asseverations were not wholly disregarded by Elizabeth^d.

This artifice however did not prevent her from putting her kingdom into a posture of defence. An army was raised ^{Elizabeth's preparations.} amounting to eighty thousand men, twenty thousand of whom were stationed on the south coast of the island, twenty-two thousand foot and a thousand horse were posted at Tilbury in Essex, under the earl of Leicester, and the remainder, commanded by lord Hunsdown, were kept near the Queen's person, in readiness to march against the enemy where-soever they should attempt to land. Elizabeth did not trust implicitly at this juncture either to her own judgment, or that of her counsellors of state ; lord Gray of Wilton, sir Francis Knolles, sir John Norris, sir Richard Bingham, and sir Roger Williams, officers of distinguished reputation, were appointed to consider of the measures proper to be pursued ; and by their advice, all the sea-ports which lay most conveniently for a descent were fortified ; the militia was raised, their arms and manner of fighting ascertained, and a resolution formed, that if, notwithstanding the precautions taken, it should be found impossible to prevent the enemy from landing, all the country round should be laid waste, and a general engagement avoided till the several armies were combined.

While these prudent measures were pursued at land, Elizabeth exerted herself strenuously in the equipment of her fleet. When she began her preparations, it did not amount to more than thirty ships, and none of these were nearly equal in size to those of the enemy. But this disadvantage was in some measure compensated by the skill and dexterity of the English sailors ; and the number of her ships was soon augmented, through the alacrity and zeal which her subjects displayed in her defence. By her wise administration she had acquired their esteem and confidence. The animosity against her person and government, which the differences in religion had excited in the minds of some, was at present swallowed up in that universal abhorrence which the Catholics as well as the Protestants entertained of the tyranny of Spain. Great pains were taken to keep alive and heighten that abhorrence. Accounts were spread of the horrid barbarities which the Spaniards had perpetrated in the Netherlands and America : descriptions were drawn, in the blackest colours, of the inhuman cruelties of the inquisition, and pictures were dispersed of the various instruments of torture employed by the inquisitors, of which, it was said, there was abundant store on board the Spanish fleet. These, and such other considerations, made a strong impression, not upon Elizabeth's Protestant subjects only, but likewise upon the Catholics^e ; who, although the Pope had published a bull of excommunication against her, yet resolved

^d Meteren, lib. xiv. . 459. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv.

^e Meteren, lib. xv.

1588. not to yield to the protestants either in loyalty to their sovereign, or in zeal for the independency of the state. The whole kingdom was of one mind and spirit : some Catholics entered into the army as volunteers, and others joined with the Protestants in equipping armed vessels. Every maritime town fitted out one or more. The citizens of London furnished thirty, although only fifteen were required of them ; and between forty and fifty were equipped by the nobility and gentry throughout the kingdom. But all these ships were of small size, in comparison of those which composed the Spanish fleet ; and there was still much ground for the most anxious apprehensions with regard to the final issue of the war.

No person felt greater anxiety on this occasion than Elizabeth ; the principal object of whose prudent politics for thirty years, had been to avoid the critical situation to which she was now reduced. She did not, however, suffer any symptoms of uneasiness to appear, but wore at all times a placid and animated countenance, and in her whole behaviour displayed an undaunted spirit, which commanded admiration and applause.

Preparations and conduct of the Dutch. The States of Holland, in the mean time, were not inattentive to the approaching danger, nor did they think themselves less interested to provide against it, than if Philip had intended to begin his operations with an attack upon the Netherlands. From their fears of an immediate attack, they were delivered by intelligence of the enormous size of the Spanish ships, to which the coasts of Holland and Zealand were inaccessible. They turned their principal attention therefore to the assistance of their ally ; and kept their fleet, consisting of more than eighty ships, prepared for action. At Elizabeth's desire, they sent thirty of that number to cruise between Calais and Dover ; and, afterwards, when the duke of Parma's design of transporting his army to England was certainly known, they ordered Justin de Nassau, admiral of Zealand, to join lord Seymour, one of the English admirals, with five and thirty ships, to block up those sea-ports in Flanders where the duke intended to embark ^f.

The principal English fleet was stationed at Plymouth, and the chief command of it was given to Charles lord Howard of Effingham, who had under him as vice-admirals, sir Francis Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, three of the most expert and bravest seamen in the world.

The Spanish Armada. In the beginning of May one thousand five hundred and eighty-eight, Philip's preparations, which had so long kept all Europe in amazement and suspense, were brought to a conclusion. That Armada, to which the Spaniards, in confidence of success, gave the name of Invincible, consisted of one hundred and fifty ships, most of which were greatly superior in strength and size to any that had been seen before. It had on board near twenty thousand soldiers, and eight thousand sailors, besides two thousand volunteers of the most distinguished families in Spain. It carried two thousand six hundred and fifty great guns, was victualled for half a year, and contained such a quantity of military stores, as only the Spanish monarch enriched by the treasures of the Indies and America, could supply.

Duke of Parma's preparations. Philip's preparations in the Netherlands were not less advanced than those in Spain. Besides a flourishing army of thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, which the duke of Parma had assembled in the neighbourhood of Nieuport and Dunkirk ; that active general had, with incredible labour, provided a great number of flat-bot-

toned vessels, fit for transporting both horse and foot, and had brought sailors to navigate them from the towns in the Baltic. Most of these vessels had been built at Antwerp, and as he durst not venture to bring them from thence by sea to Nieuport, lest they should have been intercepted by the Dutch, he was obliged to send them along the Scheld to Ghent, from Ghent to Bruges, by the canal which joins these towns, and from Bruges to Nieuport, by a new canal which he dug on the present occasion. This laborious undertaking, in which several thousand workmen had been employed, was already finished, and the duke now waited for the arrival of the Spanish fleet ; hoping, that as soon as it should approach, the Dutch and English ships that cruised upon the coast would retire into their harbours.

The Armada would have left Lisbon in the beginning of May, but the marquis de Santa Croce, who had been appointed admiral, was, at the very time fixed for its departure seized with a violent fever, of which he died in a few days ; and, by a singular fatality, the duke de Paliano, the vice-admiral, died likewise at the same time Santa Croce being reckoned the first naval officer in Spain. Philip had much reason to lament his death, and it should seem that he found it extremely difficult to fill his place, since he named for his successor the duke de Medina Sidonia, a nobleman of considerable reputation, but entirely unacquainted with maritime affairs. This defect in the commander in chief, Philip supplied in some measure, by giving him Martinez de Recaldo, a seaman of great experience, for his vice-admiral.

Death of
the Spanish
admiral

In these arrangements so much time was lost, that the fleet could not leave Lisbon till the twenty-ninth of May. It had not advanced far in its voyage to Corunna, at which place it was to receive some troops and stores, when it was overtaken by a violent storm and dispersed. All the ships however reached Corunna, though considerably damaged, except four^g. They were repaired with the utmost diligence, the king sending messengers every day to hasten their departure, yet several weeks passed before they could be put in a condition to resume the voyage.

The Arma-
da sets sail
from Lisbon.

In the mean time a report was brought to England, that the Armada had suffered so much by the storm, as to be unfit for proceeding in the intended enterprise ; and so well attested did this intelligence appear to queen Elizabeth, that, at her desire, secretary Walsingham wrote to the English admiral, requiring him to lay up four of his largest ships, and to discharge the seamen. Lord Howard was happily less credulous on this occasion than either Elizabeth or Walsingham, and desired that he might be allowed to retain these ships in the service, even though it should be at his own expence, till more certain information were received. In order to procure it, he set sail with a brisk north wind for Corunna, intending, in case he should find the Armada so much disabled as had been reported, to attempt to complete its destruction. On the coast of Spain he received intelligence of the truth : at the same time the wind having changed from north to south, he began to dread that the Spaniards might have sailed for England, and therefore he returned without delay to his former station at Plymouth.

Soon after his arrival, he was informed that the Armada was in sight. He immediately weighed anchor, and sailed out of the harbour, still uncertain of the course which the enemy intended to pursue. On the next day he perceived them steering directly towards him, drawn up in the form of a crescent, which extended

Arrival of
the Armada
in the chan-
nel.
July 30th.

^g In three of these, the galley-slaves consisting of English, French, and Turks, taking advantage of the confusion occasioned by the storm, overpowered the Spaniards, and carried the ships into a harbour on the coast of Bayonne. Meteren, p. 476.

1588 seven miles from one extremity to another. It was for some time believed that Plymouth was the place of their destination ; and it was the opinion of many persons in that age, that their enterprise would have been more successful than it proved, had they landed there, and not proceeded up the channel. By doing this, it was supposed, they would have drawn Elizabeth's whole force to the south-west coast of the island, and have rendered it easier for the duke of Parma to transport his troops. But in this expectation it is probable they would have been extremely disappointed, as the Dutch fleet alone would have been able to block up the sea-ports in Flanders ; the English fleet might have destroyed the Armada had it once entered Plymouth harbour, and Elizabeth's land-forces would have been an over-match for all the Spanish troops which the Armada had on board.

Plan of operations presented by Philip But if the duke de Medina ever intended to make a descent at Plymouth, he soon changed his design, and adhered closely afterwards to the execution of the plan prescribed to him by the court of Spain. This was to steer quite through the channel till he should reach the coast of Flanders, and after driving away the Dutch and English ships, by which the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk were besieged, to escort the duke of Parma's army to England, and to land there the forces that were on board the fleet. In compliance with these instructions, he proceeded in his course, without turning aside to the English, who were drawn up along the coast, and ready to receive him.

Prudent and gallant conduct of lord Howard Lord Howard, considering that the Spaniards would probably be much superior to him in close fight, by reason of the size of their ships, and the number of their troops, wisely resolved to content himself with harassing them in their voyage, and with watching attentively all the advantages which might be derived from storms, cross winds, and such like fortuitous accidents. It was not long before he discerned a favourable opportunity of attacking the vice-admiral Recaldo. This he did in person, and on that occasion displayed so much dexterity in working his ship, and in loading and firing his guns, as greatly alarmed the Spaniards for the fate of the vice-admiral. From that time they kept much closer to one another ; notwithstanding which, the English on the same day attacked one of the largest galleasses. Other Spanish ships came up in time to her relief, but in their hurry, one of the principal galleons, which had a great part of the treasure on board, ran foul of another ship, and had one of her masts broken. In consequence of this misfortune she fell behind, and was taken by sir Francis Drake ; who, on the same day, took another capital ship which had been accidentally set on fire.

Superiority of the English sailors. Several other encounters happened, and in all of them the English proved victorious, through the great advantage which they derived from the lightness of their ships, and the dexterity of the sailors. The Spaniards in that age did not sufficiently understand nautical mechanics, to be able to avail themselves of the unusual magnitude of their ships. The English sailed round them, approached or retired with a velocity that filled them with amazement, and did infinitely greater execution with their cannon, for while every shot of theirs proved effectual, their ships suffered very little damage from the enemy, whose guns were planted too high, and generally spent their force in air.

The Armada opposite to Calais. The Spaniards however still continued to advance till they came opposite to Calais : there the duke de Medina having ordered them to cast anchor, he sent information to the duke of Parma of his arrival, and intreated him to hasten the embarkation of his forces. Farnese set out immediately from Bruges, where the messenger found him, for Nieuport, and he began to put his troops on board.

But at the same time he informed Medina, that, agreeably to the King's instructions, the vessels which he had prepared, were proper only for transporting the troops, but were utterly unfit for fighting ; and for this reason, till the Armada were brought still nearer, and the coast cleared of the Dutch ships which had blocked up the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk, he could not stir from his present station, without exposing his army to certain ruin, the consequence of which would probably be the entire loss of the Netherlands.

In compliance with this request, the Armada was ordered to advance, and it had arrived within sight of Dunkirk, between the English fleet on the one hand, and the Dutch on the other, when a sudden calm put a stop to all its motions. In this situation the three fleets remained for one whole day. About the middle of the night a breeze sprung up, and lord Howard had recourse to an expedient which had been happily devised on the day before. Having filled eight ships with pitch, sulphur, and other combustible materials, he set fire to them, and sent them before the wind against the different divisions of the Spanish fleet.

When the Spaniards beheld these ships in flames approaching towards them, it brought to their remembrance the havoc which had been made by the fireships employed against the duke of Parma's bridge at the siege of Antwerp. The darkness of the night increased the terror with which their imaginations were overwhelmed, and the panic flew from one end of the fleet to the other. Each crew, anxious only for their own preservation, thought of nothing but how to escape from the present danger. Some of them took time to weigh their anchors, but others cut their cables, and suffered their ships to drive with blind precipitation, without considering whether they did not thereby expose themselves to a greater danger than that which they were so solicitous to avoid. In this confusion the ships ran foul of one another : the shock was dreadful, and several of them received so much damage as to be rendered unfit for future use.

When day-light returned, lord Howard had the satisfaction to perceive that his stratagem had fully produced the desired effect. The enemy were still in extreme disorder, and their ships widely separated and dispersed. His fleet had lately received a great augmentation by the ships fitted out by the nobility and gentry, and by those under lord Seymour, who had left Justin de Nassau as alone sufficient to guard the coast of Flanders. Being bravely seconded by Sir Francis Drake, and all the other officers, he made haste to improve the advantage which was now presented to him, and attacked the enemy in different quarters at the same time with the utmost impetuosity and ardour. The engagement began at four in the morning, and lasted till six at night. The Spaniards displayed in every encounter the most intrepid bravery ; but, from the causes already mentioned, they did very little execution against the English, while many of their own ships were greatly damaged, and ten of the largest were either run aground, or sunk, or compelled to surrender.

The principal galleass, commanded by Moncada, having Mauriquez, the inspector-general, on board, with three hundred galley-slaves and four hundred soldiers, was driven ashore near Calais. She was quickly followed by some English pinnaces, and these were supported by the admiral's long-boat, in which he had sent a body of select soldiers to their assistance. Moncada himself, and almost all the Spaniards, were either killed, or drowned in attempting to reach the shore. The rowers were set at liberty. About fifty thousand ducats were

Is thrown into confusion by the English fire ships.

August 7th.

Battle between the two fleets.

August 8th.

Losses sustained by the Spaniards.

1588. found on board. Mauriquez escaped, and was the first who carried the news of the disaster of the fleet to Spain.

One of the capital ships having been long battered by an English captain of the name of Cross, was sunk in the time of the engagement. A few only of the crew were saved, who related, that one of the officers on board having proposed to surrender, he was killed by another who was enraged at his proposal ; that this other was killed by the brother of the first ; and that it was in the midst of this bloody scene, which paints the ferocious character of the Spaniards, that the ship had gone to the bottom.^g

The fate of two other of the Spanish galleons is particularly mentioned by the cotemporary historians. One of them was called the St. Philip, and the other the St. Matthew, which had on board, besides several other nobility, two general officers, Don Francis Toledo, of the family of Orgas, and Don Diego Pimentel, brother to the marquis of Tomnarez. After an obstinate engagement, in which the admiral's ship fought along with them, they were obliged to run ashore on the coast of Flanders, where they were taken by the Dutch. Toledo was drowned, and Pimentel, and all the rest who survived, were made prisoners.

^{The duke de Medina despairs of success.} The duke de Medina was much dejected at these misfortunes, and still more when he reflected on the superior skill of the enemy. For it is well attested, that in all the engagements which had passed since the first appearance of the Armada in the channel, the English had lost only one small ship, and about a hundred men. Animated by their past success with sanguine hopes of final victory, they were now more formidable than ever. Medina dreaded, from a continuance of the combat, the entire destruction of his fleet. He could not without the greatest danger remain any longer in his present situation, and much less could he venture to approach nearer to the coast of Flanders.

^{Cause of his despair.} It now appeared how great an error Philip had committed, in neglecting to secure some commodious harbours in Zealand.

He had from the first supposed that the enemy's ships would fly to their respective ports, as soon as his stupendous Armada should appear. But this Armada had been made unfit for the purpose for which it was designed, by means of that enormous expence which he bestowed in order to render it invincible. In constructing it, no attention had been given to the nature of those narrow seas in which it was to be employed ; and the consequence of this important error was, that even if the English fleet had been unable to contend with the Spaniards in the deeper parts of the channel, yet they would have prevented them from landing : and the Dutch fleet lying in shallow water, to which the galleons durst not approach, would still have kept their station, and rendered it impossible for the Spanish fleet and army to act in concert.

^{He resolves to return to Spain.} This the duke de Medina at length perceived, and he did not hesitate in resolving to abandon the further prosecution of his enterprise. The only subject of his deliberation now was, how he might, with the least difficulty and danger, get back to Spain. Had he been ever so much inclined to return through the channel, in which he must have been continually harassed by the enemy, yet the wind, which blew strong from the south, would have prevented him. He therefore resolved to sail northwards, and to make the circuit of the British isles.

This resolution was no sooner understood by the English admiral, than having dispatched lord Seymour with a part of the fleet, to join the Dutch in

watching the motions of the duke of Parma, he set sail himself with the greater part of it, in pursuit of the Spaniards. He followed close in the rear for three days, without attacking them. This he declined, from the apprehension of his not having a sufficient quantity of gunpowder, with which he had been ill supplied by the public offices. Had he not been deterred from renewing his attack by this provoking circumstance, he might have forced the Spaniards to an engagement off Flamborough-head ; and it is asserted by a respectable contemporary historian^b, that so great was the distress of the Spanish fleet, and such the admiral's dread of the long and dangerous voyage before him, that he would have surrendered without resistance, in case he had been attacked. But he was saved from the disgrace in which this action would have involved his name, through the necessity under which the English admiral found himself of returning to England, to supply the deficiency of his stores.

Lord Howard had reason to be incensed against those, by whose negligence he was thus disabled from completing the glory which his gallant conduct had procured him. In the issue, however, it would have been unfortunate if he had delayed his return. The two fleets sailed in opposite directions, were not far distant from each other, when a dreadful storm arose. The English reached home, though not without difficulty, yet without sustaining any considerable loss. But the Spaniards were exposed to the storm in all its rage, and became no less objects of pity to their enemies, than they had lately been of dread and terror. Having hitherto kept near each other, lest the English should have renewed the attack, this circumstance proved the first cause of their disasters. The ships were driven violently against each other, and thereby many of them were rendered an easy prey to the fury of the waves. At length they were dispersed. In order to enable them to ride out the storm, the horses, mules, and baggage were thrown over-board. This precaution was of advantage only to such of the ships as were stronger, or more fortunate than the rest. Some of them were dashed to pieces on the rocks of Norway, or sunk in the middle of the ocean. Others were thrown upon the coast of Scotland, and the Western Isles. And more than thirty were driven by another storm, which overtook them from the west, on different parts of the coast of Ireland. Of these, some afterwards reached home in the most shattered condition, under the vice-admiral Recaldo ; others were shipwrecked among the rocks and shallows ; and of those which reached the shore, the crews were barbarously murdered ; from an apprehension, it was pretended, that, in a country where there were so many disaffected Catholics, it would have been dangerous to shew mercy to so great a number of the enemy. The duke de Medina having kept out in the open seas, escaped shipwreck, and arrived at Saint Andero in Biscay about the end of September.

The calamities of the Spaniards did not end with their arrival in Spain. Two of the galleons which had withstood the storm, were accidentally set on fire, and consumed to ashes in the harbour. Great numbers, especially of the nobility and gentry, accustomed to a life of ease and pleasure, had died at sea ; and many more died afterwards of diseases occasioned by the hardships they had undergone.

Very different accounts are given by different historians, of the total loss sustained. Some assert that it amounted to thirty-two ships, and ten thousand men ; but others, without pretending to ascertain the number of men, which could not, they say, be less than fifteen thousand, affirm that

Disasters
which beset
the Armada.

1588. more than eighty ships were taken, destroyed, or lostⁱ. This dreadful calamity was sensibly felt all over Spain, and there was scarcely a single family of rank in the kingdom that did not go into mourning for the death of some near relation ; insomuch that Philip dreading the effect which this universal face of sorrow might produce upon the minds of the people, imitated the conduct of the Roman senate, after the battle of Cannæ, and published an edict to abridge the time of public mourning^k.

Rejoicings in England and Holland. While the people of Spain were thus overwhelmed with affliction, there was nothing to be heard in England and the United Provinces but the voice of festivity and joy. In Holland

medals were struck in commemoration of the happy event ; and in both countries, days of solemn thanksgiving to Heaven were appointed for their deliverance. Elizabeth went for this purpose to St. Paul's cathedral, seated in a triumphal chariot, and surrounded with her ministers and nobles, amidst a great number of flags and colours which had been taken from the enemy ; while the citizens were ranged in arms on each side of the streets through which she passed. Nor did the destruction of the Armada give joy only to the English and Dutch. All Europe had trembled at the thoughts of its success. For although it can hardly be supposed that Philip was so romantic as to flatter himself with the hopes of attaining universal monarchy, yet it is not to be imagined that he aspired only at the conquest of England and Holland. He had before this time formed the plan, which he afterwards pursued, of subduing France : nor can it be believed that any thing less would have satisfied his ambition than the subjection of every Protestant state in Europe, and the utter extirpation of the reformed religion.

Philip's magnanimous behaviour. His ambition was, on this occasion, severely mortified. But as he possessed in a high degree the art of concealing his emotions, he received intelligence of the disaster that had befallen him with an appearance of magnanimity and resignation to the

will of Heaven, which, if it was not affected, deserved the highest praise. He returned thanks to God, that the calamity was not greater. He issued orders to have the utmost care taken of the sick and wounded, who had survived the general catastrophe. And instead of forbidding the duke of Medina Sidonia to come to court, as is alleged by some historians, he wrote to him in the most obliging terms, expressing his gratitude for the zeal which he had discovered in his service ; and observing, that no man could answer for the success of an enterprise, which, like that wherein the duke had been engaged, depended on the winds and waves^l.

Philip's behaviour towards the duke of Parma on this difficult occasion, contained the same display of justice that appeared in his letter to Medina Sidonia. Notwithstanding the many proofs which Farnese had exhibited in the sight of all Europe, of indefatigable vigour and activity, as well as of heroic valour, yet the failure of the expedition against England was by some ascribed to his negligence in making the necessary preparations, and by others to his excessive caution or timidity. But Philip refused to listen to these groundless calumnies. He still continued to repose in the duke his wonted confidence ; and testified towards him all that attachment and esteem which his conduct in the Netherlands had deserved. The truth is,

ⁱ As the president De Thou, who lived at the time of this memorable event, pretends not to determine to which of these relations the greatest regard is due, it would be in vain at this time to attempt to decide betwixt them.

^k Meteren, lib. xiv. Grotii Historia, lib. i. Campana, Deed. vii. lib. i. Ferreras and Thuanus.

^l Ferreras, part xv. Strada, lib. v.

that as the principal error in conducting the expedition had been committed, by neglecting the duke of Parma's advice so no person was more deeply interested in its success ; since, if the Armada had opened a passage for his troops, the whole direction of the enterprise would have belonged to him, and the noblest opportunity, to which his ambition could aspire, have been given, of exerting those illustrious military talents which have acquired him such distinguished renown.

The duke had the greater reason to entertain the hopes of victory, in case his army could have been transported to England, as Elizabeth had, from her partiality for the earl of Leicester, bestowed the chief command of her land-forces on that nobleman, who was so little entitled, either by his courage or his abilities, to so great a trust. Her good fortune, or more properly the kind providence of Heaven, so conspicuously exercised in her behalf, saved her from the consequences with which this unjustifiable step might have been attended. It was perhaps the only imprudent measure of which, at this difficult crisis, she can be justly accused ; and she fully atoned for it by the wisdom, vigour, and fortitude which she displayed in every other part of her conduct.

PART II.

^{1588.} Situation of Elizabeth. **E**LIZABETH'S situation now was extremely different from what it had ever been since her accession to the throne. Having been delivered some time before the present period from the queen of Scots, who had long been a principal cause of her inquietude ; she had found the art of appeasing the resentment, and even of conciliating the favour, of the son of that unfortunate princess. She had united her Catholic and Protestant subjects in her defence, and had triumphed over her implacable enemy, the king of Spain. She had not the same reason as formerly to dread the power of that monarch, which he had exerted in vain for her destruction, and she had very little reason to apprehend that he would soon renew his attempt to invade her dominions. To prevent this, by furnishing him with employment elsewhere, had been long her principal motive for taking such deep concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. This motive did not subsist in the same degree of force as formerly, yet she resolved to adhere faithfully to her engagements with the States, and still to assist and support them. After Leicester's resignation, she had conferred the command of her troops in the Netherlands upon Lord Willoughby. **l**ord Willoughby, subjecting this nobleman, however, to the authority of the States, and leaving the command in chief to prince Maurice, to whom the States themselves had lately committed it.

Prince Maurice. **I**t was not gratitude alone, or a respect for the memory of the late prince of Orange, that determined the confederated provinces to repose so great a trust at this perilous conjuncture in his son, who was at this time only in the twenty-first year of his age. Maurice had, from his earliest youth, given proof of superior prudence and capacity ; and his conduct afterwards fulfilled the most sanguine expectations of his countrymen. With much less moderation and self-command, and less too of the art of governing the minds of men, which William possessed in so eminent a degree, Maurice was superior to his father in military accomplishments, and of these the confederacy stood more in need at the present period, than of political abilities.

Maurice had no opportunity of exercising his talents for war, from the time of Leicester's departure till the fate of the Spanish Armada was decided. A great number of his best troops had been put on board the fleet commanded by Justin de Nassau ; all the garrisons of the maritime towns had been augmented, lest the Spaniards should have attempted to make a descent ; and there was no body of forces left, sufficient to enable him to take advantage of the duke of Parma's inactivity, by undertaking any military enterprise.

The duke of Parma mediates the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. **T**he first opportunity of action was afforded him by a resolution which the Duke formed, as soon as he perceived there was no longer any prospect of invading England, to besiege the town of Bergen-op-Zoom. This town, as its name imports, is situated on the river Zoom, at a little distance from the place where that river falls into the Scheld ; and by this last river the territory of Bergen is separated from the isle of Tolen. Farnese thinking it necessary towards the success of his intended enterprise, to be master of this island, sent count Charles of Mansveldt with a body of eight hundred foot to take possession of it ; and in order to conceal his design, he ordered them to make a feint of marching towards Heusden. This artifice however had not the

desired success. Maurice had taken care to have both Bergen and Tolen properly furnished with troops for their defence. 1583.

At low water it is practicable to pass over to Tolen upon foot, and in this way count Mansveldt endeavoured to approach it. But the governor, count Solmes, was so well prepared to receive him, that Mansveldt was soon obliged to abandon his attempt, and in his retreat he lost about four hundred men. In the mean time the duke of Parma had advanced with his army, and invested the town on the land side, without having met with any considerable opposition. But the besieged beheld his operations with great indifference ; their communication with Holland and Zealand was still as free and open as before. In order to intercept it, they knew that the enemy must first reduce two strong forts which stood between the town and the Scheld, and this they trusted could not be accomplished before the approach of winter. October.

The Duke immediately began his operations with an attack upon one of these forts ; but before he had made any considerable progress, he conceived hopes of acquiring possession of it in a way much more easy and expeditious than by open force.

Two soldiers belonging to the garrison, whom some historians call Scots, and others English, having gone over to Farnese, offered to deliver the fort to him, on condition of his granting them a suitable reward for so great a service. Farnese lent a willing ear to their proposal, and gave them the most flattering promises ; but as he still suspected them of insincerity, he made them confirm what they had told him by an oath, and required that they should be carried bound in the midst of the soldiers whom he intended to employ in executing the plan which they had suggested. To this, as well as to the oath required from them they readily agreed. The Duke could no longer remain distrustful, and ordered De Levya, one his bravest officers, to be ready immediately after sun-set, with three thousand infantry, to advance towards the fort. De Levya set out at the time appointed, and arrived at the gate when it was beginning to grow dark. Upon a signal given by the two British soldiers the port was opened, but no sooner had about fifty Spaniards entered, than the portcullis was let down, and all the rest excluded. Those who had entered perceived the treachery of their guides, but being more solicitous to save their own lives than to take vengeance on the traitors, they suffered them to escape, and the Spaniards themselves were instantly surrounded by the garrison, and either put to the sword or taken prisoners.

Of those who were without, only such as were near the gate were acquainted with what had happened, while the rest who were ignorant of it still pressing forward, made it impossible for the foremost to retire. These men, rendered desperate by their perilous situation, attempted to scale the ramparts, but they were soon repulsed by the garrison, who were every where upon their guard. The guns of the fort began to play upon them. The darkness of the night increased their confusion, and they fell into an ambush which the garrison had prepared. A great number was killed, and many were swallowed up in the mud and water with which the fort was surrounded.

After this misfortune the duke of Parma despaired of succeeding in his enterprise. Heavy rains had lately fallen, his troops began to grow sickly, and all the country round which was naturally wet, was become almost inaccessible to his convoys of provisions. Determined by these considerations, he raised the siege before

He is deceived by two British soldiers.

The Duke abandons his attempt on Bergen.

1588. the middle of November, after fortifying some passes in the neighbourhood of the place, to restrain the excursions of the garrison^m.

No sooner had he drawn off his troops from Bergen, than having put the Italians and Spaniards into winter-quarters, he sent the Germans under count Peter Ernest de Mansveldt to lay siege to Wachtendonck, in Upper Guelderland, a small place, but strongly fortified, and situated in the midst of a marshy soil. Farnese was, notwithstanding these circumstances, determined to employ his troops in reducing it, by loud complaints which were made to him of the continual depredations of the garrison. This garrison consisted of troops formed by the celebrated Schenck, whose bravery would have baffled the utmost efforts of count Mansveldt, had it not been

^{The invention of bombs.} for a circumstance which intitles the siege of this little town to a place in history. It was in this siege that bombs, the late invention of an inhabitant in Venlo, where first employed. To save

the town from destruction, the citizens prevailed on the garrison to consent to a surrender, but not till they had sallied out and killed a great number of the enemy ; many of whom likewise perished by the inclemency of the season, and the humidity of the air and soil.

^{Anxiety of the duke of Parma.} In consequence of the loss of men sustained at this siege and that of Bergen, the duke of Parma found his army exceedingly diminished. This consideration alone must have been a sensible

mortification to a general of so great activity and enterprise, but he was more deeply mortified at the difficulty which he found in supporting the forces that still remained under his command. They had begun to murmur on account of the arrears which were due to them, and he dreaded the loss of that authority over them which he had hitherto maintained. He had earnestly solicited remittances from the court of Spain, and had represented the fatal consequences which must attend the irregular payment of his troops. But his requests had not for some time past been listened to as formerly, and some of the bills which he drew had been returned unpaid. This was owing partly to the low state of Philip's finances, which, great as his resources were, had been overburdened by the enormous expence in which his late armament had involved him ; and partly to the malignity and envy of the Spanish ministers. The Duke could not conceal his chagrin, which was augmented by the decline of his health, and the symptoms of a dropsy, which some years afterwards put a period to his lifeⁿ.

^{Gertruden-burg betrayed to the Spaniards.} In this situation he received great satisfaction from an event, which was one of the consequences of the intrigues of the earl of Leicester. The garrisons of several towns had, through the influence of that nobleman's partizans, or from the deficiencies in

their pay occasioned by his misconduct, shewn great contempt for the authority of the States and prince Maurice ; but they had all been brought back to their duty, except the garrison of St. Gertrudenberg, which consisted of one thousand five hundred foot and three hundred horse, partly Dutch and partly English. This garrison having indulged themselves in greater excesses than any other, were conscious of such a degree of guilt as they thought could not easily be forgiven : they were therefore still as refractory and seditious as ever, maintaining openly, that they were accountable to none but the queen of England ; and seizing upon ships, and carrying off plunder from the friends as well as the enemies of the confederacy. The States, apprehensive of their delivering the town to the enemy, applied every soothing expedient to prevent them. They offered them

^m Grotius Hist. lib. i. Bentivoglio, and Meteren, anno 1588.

ⁿ Meteren, p. 503.

a full pardon of their offences, got lord Willoughby to interpose his influence, and made immediate payment of a great proportion of their arrears ; but all endeavours were ineffectual. In the mean time Lanzavecchia, the governor of Breda, being well informed of their temper and disposition, employed secret agents to confirm them in their seditious purposes, holding forth to them the rewards which they might hope for from the duke of Parma, while there was nothing to be expected from the queen of England or the States, but either an ignominious punishment, or perpetual diffidence and contempt. They hesitated for some time ; but when an offer was made to them in the name of the duke of Parma, of full payment of their arrears, besides a sum of money equal to five years pay, they were unable to resist the allurement ; they agreed to give up the town on the terms proposed, and began to prepare for the execution of their design, by disarming the inhabitants. Upon receiving intelligence of this infamous transaction, prince Maurice set out by sea, with a body of troops, in order to reduce the garrison by force of arms. But before he had time to make any progress in the siege, having been informed that the duke of Parma was upon his march to oppose him with a superior army, he thought it prudent to retire. The Duke soon afterwards entered the town, and having fulfilled his engagements to the garrison, he bestowed the government upon Lanzavecchia, as a reward for the service he had performed. Gertrudenberg was the first town in Holland which the Spaniards had acquired since their expulsion from that province about twelve years before ; and it gave Farnese, on that account, the most sensible joy and satisfaction. The States, on the other hand, expressed their indignation against the traitors, by proscribing them ; and it ought not to be forgotten, that through various accidents almost all of them fell into the hands of the confederates, and had the sentence of proscription executed upon them with the utmost rigour.

From Gertrudenberg the Spanish army was sent under count Charles of Mansveldt, to reduce the towns of Heusden and Romersval, and the fort of Louvestein ; but all their attempts on these places were baffled by the activity and vigour of prince Maurice and count Hohenloe.

The duke of Parma returned to Brussels, and not long afterwards he set out for Germany, to drink the waters at Spa, although it was believed he would not have gone at this season, which was the most proper for all military operations, if his army had been in a condition to enter upon any enterprise worthy of his former fame^o. During his absence, prince Maurice was barely able to prevent count Mansveldt from making any new acquisition. The forces of these two generals were nearly equal ; neither party was inclined to risk an engagement, and no rencounter passed between them that deserves to be recorded.

Some important services were in the mean time performed by the indefatigable Schenck in the interior provinces. Having some time before the present period, proposed to the States to build a fort upon the Rhine, at the place where that river divides itself into two branches, and forms the isle of Betuwe ^p, the States approved highly of his proposal, and furnished him with every thing necessary for carrying it into execution. He finished it with great dispatch, and having fixed there his head-quarters, he over-ran all the country round, and seized every favourable opportunity of annoying the enemy. He took the city of Bonne, upon the Rhine, by surprise in the night. Having been informed that a body of troops were upon their march to reinforce Verdugo, the governor of

The duke
of Parma
at Spa.
May.

Achieve-
ments of
Schenck.

1589. Groningen, and were escorting a sum of money to that place for the payment of the garrison, he chose his ground with so much skill, and attacked them with such impetuosity and ardour, that he routed them, and got possession of the money without the loss of a single man. But there was nothing on which he was so intent as the recovery of Nimeguen, which some years before he himself had conquered for the Spaniards. Nimeguen stands on the banks of the Waal, at the distance of only a few hours sail from the fort which Schenck had constructed. Having embarked his troops, he set out with an intention to reach the town about the middle of the night. Through some accident or mistake he did not arrive till the morning, when he happened unfortunately to land at a house where a number of persons were assembled for the celebration of a wedding. By these persons the alarm was instantly given to the rest of the inhabitants, who were well acquainted with the enmity with which Schenck had for some time past been animated against them, and knew that an universal pillage would be the consequence of his success. They ran to arms from every quarter, made a furious attack upon his men, and, notwithstanding the most intrepid resistance, drove them towards their boats in great confusion. Schenck endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. The town's people pursued, and slew

many of them while they were attempting to escape. Schenck
 Death of himself was wounded, and immediately afterwards his boat was
 Schenck. overset, and he, and all on board, were drowned. Such was the fate of this brave man at the age of forty, by whom, ever since his revolt, the Spaniards had been subjected to perpetual apprehensions and alarms⁴.

No other material transaction occurred during this campaign
 Battle of but the siege of Rhinberg, which was undertaken at the earnest
 Rhinberg. desire of the elector of Cologn, and the charge of it committed by the duke of Parma to the marquis of Varambon. Colonel Vere, an English officer of high reputation, was sent by the States to the relief of the besieged, and between him and Varambon a bloody battle was fought, in which the English commander gained a complete victory. After this he entered the town, and fortified it so strongly, as enabled the inhabitants for some time longer to preserve their liberty and independence.

The duke of Parma returns from Spa.

It was now the end of autumn, and the duke of Parma was returned from Spa. Soon after his return, his apprehensions with regard to the consequences of the irregular payment of his troops were verified by the mutiny of a Spanish regiment which lay in garrison at Courtray. From complaints the soldiers proceeded to threats, and at last openly refused to obey his commands. With the utmost difficulty he raised money sufficient to appease them. But as this was the first sedition which had happened since the commencement of his government, he was the more sensibly afflicted by it, and dreaded, that example which it afforded, would soon be followed by the garrisons in other towns.

The surprise of Breda. 1590. This event happened about the end of the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-nine; and in the month of February immediately following, another misfortune happened,

which convinced the Duke, that prince Maurice was an antagonist of a character extremely different from that of any other with whom he had hitherto contended. This was the loss of the important city of Breda, of which Maurice got possession by a singular stratagem, suggested to him by the master of a boat, called Adrian Vandenberg, who had sometimes supplied the town and garrison with turf for firing. When Lanzavecchia, the governor,

was at Breda, all vessels which came there were carefully examined ; 1590. but the duke of Parma, having rewarded this crafty Italian, for the part which he acted in corrupting the garrison of St. Gertrudenberg, with the government of that town, still suffered him to retain that of Breda. Lanzavecchia found it necessary to be often absent from the latter of these places ; and, during his absence, usually committed the charge of it to his son. Vandenberg having observed that on these occasions there was commonly great negligence in searching his boat, founded upon this circumstance his plan for taking the citadel by surprise. It was communicated to prince Maurice, who readily embraced it, and immediately applied himself to put it in execution. The boat was loaded in appearance with turf, as usual ; but the turf was supported by a floor of planks fixed at the distance of several feet from the bottom ; and under this floor seventy select soldiers were placed, under the command of Charles Harauguer^r, an officer of distinguished valour and capacity. They had but a few miles to sail ; yet, through unexpected accidents, several days passed before they could reach Breda. The wind turned against them, the melting ice retarded their course, and the boat having struck upon a bank, was so much damaged, that the soldiers were for some time up to the knees in water. Their provisions were almost spent, and one of their number was seized with a violent cough, which, if it continued, they foresaw would certainly occasion a discovery. This man had the generosity to offer them his sword, and to intreat them to kill him. They as generously declined it ; and being resolved to run all risks, rather than embrue their hands in the blood of their companion, they still persisted in their design. Happily their virtue was rewarded : the soldier's cough left him, and even the leak in their vessel was stopt by some accidental cause.

In order to secure the absence of Lanzavecchia, whose vigilance there was much ground to dread, prince Maurice had made a feint of marching against Gertrudenberg, and this artifice produced the desired effect. Lanzavecchia was absent from Breda when the boat arrived. It was admitted within the fortifications of the castle, and the search was made in the most superficial manner.

Notwithstanding this, there was still the utmost danger of a discovery, and it would certainly have been made, had not Vandenberg possessed an extraordinary share of address and art, which he exerted on this occasion. There being a scarcity of fuel in the castle, the turf was immediately purchased ; the soldiers of the garrison were set to work in carrying it ashore, and so great a number of hands were employed, that they would soon have uncovered the planks, and thereby have detected the plot, had not Vandenberg, pretending to be fatigued with labour and watching, and unable to assist the soldiers any longer in unloading, first amused them with discourse, and then invited them to join him in drinking some wine which he had provided. His offer was readily accepted. The night came on, and the Spanish soldiers were all either asleep or drunk. Vandenberg then set out, in order to give notice of his success to prince Maurice and count Hohenloe, who, according to agreement, had in great silence brought forward a body of forces within a little distance of the town.

About the middle of the night, Harauguer issued forth from his retreat ; and having divided his band into two bodies, he attacked, at the same time, both the guards which were placed at the gate towards the country, and those which were stationed at another gate which led from the citadel to the town, and meeting with little resistance, he secured possession of the

^r A native of Cambray.

1590. gates. Young Lanzavecchia rushed out against him with between thirty and forty of the garrison ; but these men were not able to withstand the determined and desperate valour of the assailants. They were all either put to the sword or dispersed, and Lanzavecchia himself was wounded and taken prisoner.

The alarm was soon communicated to the town, in which there was a numerous garrison consisting of five companies of Italian foot, and one of horse. The citizens offered to co-operate with the garrison in defending the fortifications, till the duke of Parma should come to their relief ; but this cowardly garrison, being struck with an universal panic, and having no commander in chief to direct their operations, suddenly forsook the town. In the mean time prince Maurice arrived in the citadel, and the inhabitants having now no garrison to support them sent a trumpet with an offer to surrender, on condition that they should not be plundered. And to this prince Maurice readily agreed ; but required that they should pay him ninety thousand florins to be distributed among his troops.

Maurice received the greater satisfaction from this acquisition, which had been attended with the loss of only one man, as Breda had been for many years the hereditary property of his family ; and for the same reason the citizens were less reluctant in submitting to his authority. He appointed the brave Harauguer to be governor of the town, and liberally rewarded Vandenberg, and all the other sailors and soldiers, in proportion to their merit.

The duke of Parma, on the other hand, was extremely mortified with what had happened, and highly incensed against his countrymen, the Italians, who had so basely deserted the town committed to their care. He ordered the officers to be arrested, and afterwards commanded all of them to be executed, agreeably to the sentence of a court-martial, except one, whom he pardoned in consideration of his youth^t.

Old Lanzavecchia's imprudence in committing so important a charge to so young a man as his son, was already severely punished by his son's imprisonment, and the loss of his government of Breda. He punished himself still farther, by resigning his government of Gertrudenberg. Such were the bitter fruits of that corruption for which this man had been so lately rewarded. According to the principles which warriors and politicians are ready to adopt, his conduct deserved the reward which was bestowed upon it ; but to the friends of virtue it will give satisfaction to observe, that, in the course of providence, punishment is inflicted sometimes not upon the treacherous alone, but on those too by whom they are prompted, or encouraged in their treachery.

Meanwhile Farnese resolving to recover the town, if possible, before prince Maurice should have time to secure it, sent count Mansveldt against it with a part of the army. But Maurice had no sooner acquired possession of the place, than he furnished it with provisions sufficient for many months, and stationed a garrison in it consisting of one thousand two hundred foot and four hundred horse. Mansveldt did not therefore think it expedient to lay immediate siege to Breda ; but in order to cut off the communication of the garrison with Holland, he attempted to reduce a strong fort in the mouth of the river Mark, which commanded the navigation of that river. From this attempt however he was obliged to desist, after having lost between six and seven hundred men. He then built another fort at the mouth of the river, and began to make preparations for besieging the town itself. In order to divert him from the prosecution of

^t Grotius. Bentivoglio.

his design, prince Maurice marched with a body of about five thousand men towards Nimeguen, resolving to besiege that town in case Mansveldt did not relinquish his present enterprise.

1590.

Farnese, sensible of the great importance of Nimeguen, sent orders to count Mansveldt to lead his army thither without delay. Maurice perceived then that it was impracticable for him to attempt the siege with any probability of success, and encamped his troops in the Betuwe, on the north side of the Waal, opposite to Nimeguen. Having fortified the banks of the river, to prevent count Mansveldt from transporting his forces, he built, in sight of the enemy, a strong fort, afterwards called by the name of Knotzenburg, directly opposite to the town ; by which he not only deprived Nimeguen of all the advantages which it had hitherto derived from its situation ; but, as the cannon of this fort could reach the town, the inhabitants were exposed to continual danger. After having finished this important work, he dug a navigable canal across the Betuwe, from the Rhine to the Waal. This wise expedient rendered the navigation of the confederates in those parts secure, by making it unnecessary for their ships to pass by Nimeguen ; and it was of great advantage to all the country round, by lessening the violence of the inundations to which that part of the Netherlands is sometimes liable. The States of Guelderland and Overyssel had a just sense of the benefits which they derived from his operations, and they testified their gratitude by electing him governor of these two provinces.

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXII.

PART I.

^{1590.} Affairs of France. **F**ROM the capacity and vigour which Maurice had already displayed, Philip might have perceived that he should probably find full employment in the Netherlands for all the forces which, in the present state of his finances, he was able to support. And considering the unfortunate issue of his enterprise against Elizabeth, and how much the reputation of his arms and counsels had suffered from his long unsuccessful struggle with the inhabitants of the United Provinces, it might have been expected that he would have seen the absurdity of that preposterous ambition which had led him to undertake new conquests before he had reduced his own dominions under obedience. It does not appear that he ever seriously entertained the thoughts of renewing his attempt against England; but having never relinquished his designs on France, he had maintained his connexions with the heads of the Catholic league; and notwithstanding the difficulty which he found in paying his army in Flanders, he had from time to time supplied them with considerable sums of money.

These factious leaders had now more occasion than ever for ^{The Catho-} his assistance. After the treaty mentioned above, which Philip ^{lic league.} concluded with the duke of Guise at Joinville in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-five, the flames of war between the Catholics and Protestants had been kindled afresh from one end of the kingdom to the other. Henry, well acquainted with the secret intentions of Guise and his partizans, which were no less hostile to himself than to the Calvinists, would gladly have employed all his power for their destruction; but he soon perceived that he was unable to contend openly with so great a force as they had provided against him, and therefore disguising his resentment for the affront offered to his authority, he resolved to accede to the league, in hopes of acquiring the direction of it, by declaring himself its head and protector. In consequence of this resolution, great preparations were made for prosecuting the war against the Calvinists, and

three different armies were raised. One of these Henry commanded in person ; another was sent under the duke de Joyeuse against the king of Navarre ; and the third was led by the duke of Guise, to oppose a numerous army of Germans, who were upon their march to the assistance of the Hugonots. Joyeuse lost both his army and his life in the battle of Coutras ; but the duke of Guise, who made up for the small number of his troops, by his superior conduct and intrepidity, proved victorious over the Germans, and thereby acquired an increase of popularity and fame, which gave him uncontrollable influence over almost all the Catholics in the kingdom. Elated with his success, and conscious of his power, this ambitious leader could no longer delay the execution of his designs ; but resolved, after deposing the King, and confining him to a cloister, to place the infirm and aged cardinal of Bourbon upon the throne ; hoping to engross the whole administration, and to secure the succession to himself, in the event of the cardinal's demise. Henry beheld with much dread the precipice on which he stood ; and in order to avoid it, had recourse to that detestable expedient, of which, in his youth, he had shewn his approbation, in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, by commanding both the duke of Guise, and his brother the cardinal, to be assassinated.

This murder, which even Henry pretended to justify only by the plea of necessity, did not produce the effect which he expected. Instead of intimidating his enemies, it served to inflame their minds with wrath and indignation. In Paris, where the spirit of the league had long raged with the utmost fury, the people broke his statues to pieces, the ecclesiastics declaimed against him in the bitterest and most abusive terms, and the Sarbonne declared him to have forfeited the crown. His subjects almost every where rose up in arms against him, and the duke of Mayenne, brother of the Guises, a prince of extraordinary prudence and capacity, was chosen commander in chief in his brother's room.

In this situation Henry had no resource left but in the king of Navarre, whom he had deceived and persecuted. But this generous and heroic prince readily forgot the injuries he had received from him, and made haste to march with a numerous army to his assistance. Thus powerfully supported, Henry became an overmatch for his enemies, and he would soon have compelled the city of Paris to surrender, when a period was put to his life by a fanatic monk, who being seduced by his superiors, burned with the desire of meriting Heaven, by embruing his hands in the blood of his lawful prince. Such was the unfortunate end of Henry III. the last of the race of Valois, which had reigned over France for almost three hundred years.

The king of Navarre, the undoubted heir of the crown, and whom the deceased monarch had nominated his successor, was ^{Accession of} Henry IV. immediately proclaimed King in the camp, by the name of Henry IV. a name which will be for ever respected, not by the French nation alone, but by every friend of mankind and virtue. Brought up in the hardest school of adversity, patient, frugal, and laborious ; brave and wise ; sincere, humane, and generous ; of the strictest integrity, and the most untainted honour ; he had long commanded the admiration of his enemies, as well as of the impartial world. Never did any prince succeed to a throne, adorned with more splendid, more substantial, or more amiable accomplishments ; yet so fierce was the spirit of religious bigotry with which his subjects were inflamed ; so great their abhorrence of Calvinism ; and such their dread, that Henry, who was himself a Calvinist, although the most moderate of his sect, would, in imitation of the queen of England, overturn the Popish religion, that many of the Catholics instantly forsook his camp ; nor would any of them have been persuaded to remain

1590. with him, had he not given them ground to entertain hopes of his conversion.

In Paris he had a numerous party who would willingly have recognised his right, in case he would have agreed to embrace the Popish faith. There were others who, under the pretence of religion, had no other ends in view but to secure and perpetuate that unbounded licence which they had long enjoyed, of perpetrating the most atrocious crimes ; and there were many who, having been gained over by Spanish influence, had, in concert with Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, and Cajetan, the Pope's legate a partizan of Spain, formed the design of conferring the crown, either on Philip himself, or his daughter Isabella^a.

The duke of Mayenne, who had adopted his brother's plan in all its branches, hoped to make these parties subservient to his own elevation to the throne. This design, however, he concealed with care ; and that he might have leisure to prepare the means of putting it in execution, he prevailed on a great majority to concur in electing the cardinal of Bourbon king ; to which measure likewise, Philip, actuated by a similar intention, gave his consent.

Henry in the mean time finding himself unable, from the great desertion of his forces, to maintain his present situation before Paris, retired into Normandy, to wait there, till succours, which he expected from Elizabeth, should arrive. Mayenne, putting himself at the head of an army much more numerous than that of the King, pursued and attacked him in his fortifications near the town of Arques ; but having been repulsed with great slaughter, and having suffered afterwards a total overthrow in the battle of Ivry, in which, as on many other occasions, Henry's superior bravery supplied his want of numbers, Mayenne was obliged, with the shattered remains of his army, to take refuge in the metropolis. There he stayed no longer than till he had consulted with the duke of Nemours, the governor, with regard to the proper measures of defence, in case the city should be besieged by the victorious army ; after which he set out for Picardy, to meet the duke of Parma, from whom he expected a reinforcement of troops. The King arrived soon after in the neighbourhood of Paris, and having made himself master of the course of the Seyne and the Marne, Siege of Paris. and blocked up every entry by which provisions might be conveyed into the town, he invested it on every side, and soon reduced the inhabitants to extreme necessity.

By the persuasion however of their leaders, seconded by the Spanish minister and the Pope's legate ; by the decrees of the Sorbonne, and the harangues of the clergy ; they were confirmed in the resolution which they had formed from the beginning, to endure every calamity, rather than receive an heretical king, whose authority they were taught to believe they could not acknowledge, without endangering their salvation.

In their present distressful situation they had no prospect of relief, but from the arms of Spain ; nor was Philip less inclined than formerly. The affairs of France were at this time the principal object of his attention ; and he would gladly have exerted himself against the King with his utmost vigour especially as the cardinal of Bourbon was lately dead, if the present juncture had been favourable to his ambitious design, of seizing the monarchy for himself or his daughter ; by which, more than by zeal for the Catholic faith, he had long been actuated. But having penetrated into the views of Mayenne, and found that from him and

^a Grand-daughter of Henry II.

all his party he had reason to expect the most strenuous opposition ; he considered, that if Henry were utterly subdued, the Catholics, standing then no longer in need of his assistance, would probably unite against him, and without regard to the obligations which he had laid them under, render all his expence and labour fruitless. He resolved therefore, agreeably to the advice of the duke of Parma to protract the war, and to afford the league only such assistance as might prevent the King from acquiring an entire ascendant over them ; hoping thereby to waste the strength of both the contending parties, and sooner or later to oblige them to comply with whatever terms he should be pleased to prescribe.

Conformably to this plan, the duke of Parma, with whom Mayenne had an interview at Condé, gave him only two thousand seven hundred foot and eight hundred horse. But as this reinforcement was inadequate to the purpose for which it had been solicited, Philip became apprehensive that the resolution of the besieged might fail ; and dreaded, that if Henry were once master of the capital, a prince of so great ability and address might soon compel the rest of the kingdom to submit to his authority. To prevent this, he resolved to postpone every consideration of prudence and interest to the raising of the siege ; and sent positive orders to the duke of Parma, to conduct his army to France for this purpose, with the utmost expedition. Farnese, though possessed of capacity and courage equal to the most difficult and dangerous enterprise, would gladly have diverted Philip from his design. He represented to him the dangerous consequences with which the absence of his troops from the Netherlands would be attended ; and he attempted to make him sensible of the extreme uncertainty of those advantages which he expected to derive from taking so deep an interest in the affairs of France. But Philip, blinded by his ambition, could not relinquish those delusive hopes which he had long fondly indulged, of adding France to his dominions. He was deaf to the duke's prudent remonstrances, and only listened to his advice, so far as to consent that he might return to the Low-Countries, when the siege of Paris should be raised.

Finding the King thus obstinate and inflexible, Farnese committed the government, during his absence, to count Peter Ernest of Mansveldt, and appointed his son count Charles to command the small number of troops, which he designed to leave behind him for the defence of the Netherlands. He then applied himself with great anxiety to make the necessary preparations for his march : for he was well aware of the difficulty which he must encounter in his intended enterprise against a prince of so great abilities as the king of France, in the midst of his dominions, and at the head of a victorious army, commanded by a gallant and almost invincible nobility. This consideration, however, far from intimidating him, served only to make him exert, with more than ordinary vigour, those illustrious talents with which he was endowed ; lest now, when he was about to enter the lists with so great a rival for military fame, he should forfeit that high renown which his former achievements had procured him.

Henry was at this time about forty years of age, and Farnese a few years older. From their earliest youth they had been alike distinguished by the love of arms : and had passed their lives either in learning, or in practising the art of war. They possessed alike the talent of conciliating the affections of their troops, without any relaxation of discipline, or diminution of authority. They were equal too in personal courage, in quick discernment, and in fertility of genius. But the King was more prompt in his decisions ; the duke more

The duke of Parma's first expedition into France.

Comparison of him with Henry.

1590. cautious and circumspect. The latter always cool, and master of himself, transgressed on no occasion the bounds of the strictest prudence ; but the former was often betrayed by his natural impetuosity and ardor, rather to act the part of a common soldier, than of a general, and unnecessarily to expose his person to danger. From the same impetuosity of temper, the King was ever fond of striking a decisive blow, by a pitched battle in the field ; whereas the duke chose rather to accomplish his designs by stratagem and dexterity, without bloodshed. Notwithstanding this diversity in their characters, they were indisputably the greatest captains of the age in which they lived, and may be compared, without suffering by the comparison, with the most illustrious commanders either in ancient or in modern times.

His wise precautions. Farnese was ready to set out from Brussels in the beginning of August, with an army of fourteen thousand foot and three thousand horse. On his arrival in France, having convened his principal officers together, he explained to them the conduct proper to be observed in the present expedition ; and represented the necessity of requiring a strict attention from every individual in the army, to all the rules of military discipline. They were about to enter into a kingdom, where the people being naturally jealous of the Spaniards, suspicions would be easily excited, that, instead of having come to their assistance, he intended to reduce them under the government of Spain. Against giving ground for these suspicions, which might defeat the intentions of the King, they must be continually on their guard, and take effectual care to restrain the troops from offering any violence to the natives. They were ere long to pursue their march in the face of a bold and enterprising enemy ; and for this reason it would be necessary that the most perfect order should be observed, that no tumult should be permitted in their quarters, and no soldier allowed to leave his colours night or day, upon any pretence whatever ; that the country should be reconnoitred with the utmost care ; that they should take up their quarters every evening a considerable time before sunset ; that the troops should stand under their arms, till the intrenchments were completed : and that their intrenchments should be as strongly fortified, as if the enemy were in sight.

The duke secured the execution of these orders, by the activity and vigilance which he exerted. Although he had many officers of high reputation under him, yet he resolved not to put implicit trust in any of them. From charts or maps, joined to the information which he received from the natives, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the country through which he was to pass. He heard in person the reports of all the parties which he sent to reconnoitre ; marked out the encampments with his own hand, and bestowed such particular attention on every thing which he deemed of the least importance, that he left himself no other time for repose, but the few hours between beating the reveille, and the marching of the troops.

In order to preserve his men fresh and vigorous for the time of action, he marched gently forwards ; and did not arrive at Meaux, which is ten leagues distant from Paris, till the 23d of August. He was joined at Meaux by the duke de Mayenne, with ten thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse ; and from this place he sent intelligence to the besieged, that he hoped to be able in a few days to relieve them.

Distress of the Parisians. Their patience was almost exhausted. They had been for many days reduced to the most deplorable condition. Great numbers had died of want, or of diseases occasioned by the unwholesome food to which they had been obliged to have recourse ;

and though their bigotry made them still entertain the thoughts of a surrender with horror, it had required the utmost vigilance on the part of the governor, to prevent it from taking place. They believed it to be impossible for them to hold out even for a few days, at the end of which the duke of Parma had given them hopes of his arrival. Of this desperate situation, their leaders did not fail to inform him, nor did he delay advancing towards them one moment longer than was necessary in order to secure a fortunate issue to his enterprise.

Henry had for several weeks entertained the most sanguine hopes of being able to terminate the siege before the duke could arrive^b. He was now extremely chagrined and mortified, and was at the same time thrown into great perplexity, with respect to the measures proper to be pursued. Unwilling to quit his prize, when he was upon the point of seizing it, he would gladly have divided his army, and leaving a part of it, to continue the blockade, have led the rest to meet the enemy. But as it had lately suffered great diminution by sickness, he apprehended that he would find sufficient employment for the whole, in defending himself against the Spaniards. After much hesitation, he raised the siege, and set out to oppose the duke of Parma, before he should approach nearer the town^c.

Henry raises the siege.

Having advanced as far as Chelles (which lies about four leagues distant from Paris) he pitched his camp in a spacious plain, which is terminated by two hills of a gentle ascent, separated from each other by the road that leads to Meaux. The duke of Parma's army was encamped on the other side of these hills, and was well secured by strong entrenchments. In this situation the two armies remained for several days. The duke did not now lie under the same necessity as before, of precipitating his approach to Paris, because the citizens having ventured, after the King's departure, to make excursions into the country, had furnished themselves with some provisions from the places adjacent; and the King durst not attack such strong intrenchments, defended by an army superior in number to his own. But being eager to engage, and dreading the daily diminution of his forces from the sickness which prevailed among them, Henry sent a defiance to the duke of Mayenne, calling upon him to quit his den, in which he lay more like a fox than a lion, that the contest between them might be decided, and an end put to the calamities of the kingdom.

Mayenne sent the herald who brought this challenge to the duke of Parma, who answered, smiling, That his present conduct, he perceived, was not agreeable to the King; but that he had been accustomed to fight, only when he himself thought proper, and not when it was convenient for his enemies; and he added, That far from declining battle, he would offer it as soon as the interest of the cause which he had come to support, should render it expedient. Agreeably to the spirit of this reply, Farnese kept his army within their lines for two days longer; during which time he was employed in examining the situation of the country, and in considering how he might accomplish the end of his expedition, without hazarding an engagement. Having at length fixed his plan of operations, without communicating it to the duke of Mayenne, or any other of his officers, he gave out, that he now intended to offer battle. Of the van, which consisted of two squadrons of lances, with all the light horse in his army, he gave the command to the marquis

Stratagem of the duke of Parma.

^b It had lasted four months.

^c His army amounted to twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse.

1590. de Renti, with instructions, that as soon as he should reach the top of the interjacent hill, he should spread out his troops, and make as large a front as possible ; and then begin to descend slowly towards the enemy, but not to engage without further orders, whatever provocation he should receive. He committed the charge of the main army to the duke de Mayenne, and that of the rear to the sieur de la Mothe ; while he reserved liberty to himself, to ride from one part of the army to the other, as occasion should require.

When the King was informed of this disposition and movement of the Spanish army, he could not doubt that the duke had at length resolved to try the fortune of a battle. His eyes sparkled with joy. He drew up his army in battle array, with the utmost celerity and skill : but resolved to wait till the enemy should descend to the plain, where he might enter the lists with them on equal terms.

When the van of the Spanish army had formed so large a front, as totally obstructed the view of every thing behind them, the duke commanded De Renti to stop, and to wait for the King, in case he should think fit to ascend the hill. Then clapping spurs to his horse, he galloped back to the duke de Mayenne, who was advancing with the main army, and taking him by the hand, he said, with a cheerful animated countenance, “ Paris will soon be delivered now, my lord ; but for this purpose we must turn back, and direct our march to another quarter.” He then desired both Mayenne and La Mothe to march towards Lagny, a town on the other side of the Marne, and instructed them to take possession of the ground on this side, directly opposite to the town, and to employ all their troops in drawing strong lines of circumvallation around their camp.

These orders were executed with great expedition. A battery of the largest cannon was planted over against the town ; and the camp was fortified in such a manner with trenches, breast-works, and redoubts, as to render it impregnable.

When this was done, the marquis de Renti, who for several hours had amused the enemy with hopes that he intended to come down from the hill, began to file off towards Lagny ; after having planted a body of select troops, under an officer of the name of Basta, in certain woody parts of the hill, to secure his retreat.

The King in the mean time knew nothing of what had passed on the other side of the hill ; and when he saw the marquis de Renti depart, he sent a detachment after him to attack his rear, and if possible to discover the duke’s design. But this detachment fell unexpectedly among the Spanish troops under Basta ; and a furious encounter ensued, which continued with various success till night, when both parties retired to their respective camps. The King remained all night entirely ignorant of the operations of the enemy. He could not suppose that Farnese, a general so distinguished for his caution, would attempt to transport his forces over the Marne, in order to advance to Paris, on the other side of that river, while so strong a fortified pass as Lagny lay behind him. And it was still more difficult to believe, that in the face of such an army as lay ready to attack him, he would undertake the siege of Lagny, especially as the river lay between him and that place. It was the last of these measures, however, on which the duke of Parma had resolved ; and all his movements on the day before had been made in order to insure success. Next morning the King received intelligence of his design, but he had the mortification to perceive that it was beyond his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. On each hand he was perplexed with insurmountable difficulties. The fortifications of the Spanish army were already so

complete, that he could not attack them with the smallest hopes of success. If he should remain where he was, Lagny would certainly be lost, and thereby a passage to Paris opened on the other side of the river ; and if he should transport his army, in order to save Lagny, the duke would then be at liberty to march directly by the road on this side to the relief of the besieged.

There was no other expedient in his power, but, while he remained in his present situation, to send reinforcements from time to time to the garrison of Lagny.

The duke of Parma meanwhile pushed forward the siege of that place with the utmost celerity and vigour ; having, as already mentioned, planted a battery on this side of the river, he opened it next morning, and soon laid a great part of the wall in ruins. The garrison, however, still believed themselves to be secure, as the river was between them and the enemy ; but the duke had thrown a bridge of boats over it some miles above the town, and had already transported several thousands of his bravest troops. These troops were ready to mount the breach as soon as it was made practicable. In the first assault they were repulsed with great bravery by the garrison, but an error in military discipline committed by La-fin, the governor, quickly decided the fate of Lagny. Instead of relieving those who had sustained the first assault, by changing them file by file, according to an established rule in the defence of places, he attempted to do it all at once, and thereby threw his men into confusion. This blunder was perceived by the assailants, who returned instantly to the charge with redoubled fury, and after taking La-fin himself prisoner, put most of the garrison to the sword, while the King stood a sorrowful spectator of the loss of the place, and the slaughter of his troops.

After the taking of Lagny, no other obstacle remained to prevent the Spaniards from approaching Paris on that side of the river, but the garrisons at the bridges of St. Maur and Charenton. These were easily overcome, and the convoys with provisions advanced without molestation to the gates of the city. The joy of the Parisians on this occasion may be more easily imagined than described ; they poured forth in multitudes to receive that food of which they stood so much in need, and every tongue celebrated in the highest strains the praises of their deliverer.

No person admired more that dexterity by which the duke of Parma had accomplished his design, than the King himself ; but his generous spirit was severely mortified, and he had the greater reason for the chagrin which he felt on this occasion ; because, if, instead of encamping his army at Chelles, he had followed the council of the wise La Noue, and advanced as far as Claye, Lagny might have been saved, and the Spanish army so long retarded, that the Parisians must have thrown themselves upon his mercy.

Henry's uneasiness was greatly augmented when he considered, that at present it was impossible for him by any bold decisive stroke to retrieve his error. He knew it to be vain to entertain the hopes of forcing the duke of Parma, now when the end of his expedition was accomplished, to expose his troops to the risk of a battle. His own army was greatly weakened by sickness, and the fatigues of a long campaign. All the country round being laid waste, he began to feel a scarcity of provisions ; his exchequer was exhausted, and many of his nobility and gentry, who served at their own expence, having no farther expectations this season of either subduing Paris, or compelling the enemy to engage, were impatient to depart.

1590.

He takes
Lagny.Error of the
French mo-
narch.

^{1590.}
He disbands
his army. Determined by these motives, he retired to St. Dennis, and having disbanded the greatest part of his forces, he sent the nobility to provide for the security of the several provinces in which their interest lay, retaining only a flying army of his best troops, with which he intended during the winter to check the progress of the enemy.

^{Siege of}
Corbeil. This little army was not so formidable as to prevent the duke of Parma from undertaking whatever enterprise he should incline.

At the desire of Mayenne, and the other heads of the league, he laid siege to Corbeil ; and notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance, he took it by assault, but not till he had spent many days in the siege, and lost a great number of men.

Being desirous to preserve in his own hands an acquisition which had cost him so dear, he proposed to the leaders of the league to put in Corbeil a garrison of his Walloon or Italian forces. By this proposal perhaps, he meant only to make trial of their disposition towards the Catholic king ; or, considering how averse he himself had ever been to his present expedition, he intended to make Philip sensible of the difficulty of deriving any substantial advantage from taking so deep an interest in the affairs of France.

Whatever was his motive, Mayenne and the other leaders declined consenting to his proposal, and in their refusal gave him a clear discovery of their jealousy and suspicion. This discovery confirmed him in his opinion, that matters were far from being ripe for the execution of Philip's designs, and that probably he should never be able to accomplish them by any other means than by protracting the war, till the strength and patience of the contending parties were exhausted. This plan had, as mentioned above, been recommended to Philip by the duke himself ; and conformably to it, he resolved, since neither party was in immediate danger of being overpowered, to return to the Netherlands. Other motives concurred in determining him to form this resolution ; the inclemency of the season, the sickness of his army, the want of money, and a scarcity of provisions ; which last was so great, as made it necessary for him sometimes to suffer his troops to plunder the inhabitants, although he foresaw that his granting this permission must not only prove prejudicial to his discipline, but contribute likewise to alienate the affections of the people, and thereby to obstruct his master's views.

The catholic leaders, who had expected that he would have remained in France till the King was totally subdued, laboured with much importunity to divert him from his purpose ; but all their arguments were ineffectual. The state of affairs in the Netherlands, he informed them, rendered his return indispensably necessary, but he would send them money, and leave such a number of troops as would enable them to prosecute the war. Neither the money^d nor troops^e which he promised were answerable to the sanguine expectations which they had formed. They saw that Philip, notwithstanding the seeming zeal with which he espoused their cause, was surely actuated by some private motive of ambition ; that there was nothing farther from his intention than to bring the war to a conclusion, and that he would never contribute effectually to their gaining a victory over their enemies, unless he himself were to reap the fruits of it. They found it necessary however to conceal their suspicions, and to accept of the scanty supply of money and troops which the duke had offered. Farnese in the mean time was preparing for his march ; and, as he could not doubt that Henry would give him all the annoyance in his power, he employed the same precautions as he had done formerly when he left the Netherlands.

^d Thirty thousand dueats.

^e Between five and six thousand.

Having drawn up his army in four divisions, he marched always in the order of battle : the country through which he passed was diligently reconnoitred by the light horse, and his camp was every evening secured by strong entrenchments.

Notwithstanding these precautions, the King was determined not to suffer him to return un molested. With this intention he had brought a select body of troops to Compeigne, near the borders of Picardy, and he set out with them from that place, as soon he got information of the enemy's route, inflamed with the desire of taking vengeance for the injuries he had received. Henry had full scope in the present scene of action for his wonted bravery and vigilance, nor did he suffer any opportunity to escape of exerting these qualities with signal damage to the enemy. Hovering perpetually round them, he attacked them sometimes in the front, when they least expected it, sometimes in the flank, and sometimes in the rear, giving them no respite night or day, and filling their minds with continual apprehensions and alarms.

The duke returns to the Netherlands.

No general could have made greater efforts with so small a force ; and if the Spaniards had been commanded by a general less distinguished than the duke of Parma for prudence and circumspection, it is impossible, considering the length of their march, the badness of their roads, and the season of the year, but they must have been often thrown into confusion, and the greater part of them destroyed. But the duke's vigilance was not inferior to the activity of the King ; while he was perpetually on his guard, and ever ready to assist whatever part of his army was attacked, he suffered no provocation to divert him from the prosecution of his march ; and at last he brought his troops, though not without considerable loss, yet in good order, into the province of Hainault ^f.

^f D'Avila, lib. xi. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. xcix. sect. vi. and vii.

PART II.

1590.
Affairs of
the Low-
Countries.

THE duke of Parma, on his return to the Netherlands, found that all the unhappy consequences which he foretold had arisen from his absence. Having drained his finances by the French expedition, many of the troops left in the Low-Countries had mutinied on account of their want of pay. The forces of the confederated states had over-run the fertile provinces of Brabant and Flanders ; and prince Maurice, having made himself master of a great number of the smaller towns upon the frontier, had paved the way for future conquests.

These misfortunes gave the duke of Parma the greater uneasiness, as he had little prospect of being able soon either to retrieve his losses or to make reprisals on the enemy. Finding by his instructions from the court of Spain, that Philip was as much intoxicated as ever with his ambitious views in France, he was obliged to station the greatest part of his troops in the provinces of Artois and Hainault, where they might be ready to march if necessary, to the assistance of the league. And thus several of the most important towns which lay next to the revolted provinces, being badly furnished with garrisons to defend them, were exposed an easy prey to the enemy. The confederates were too sagacious not to discern the advantage which was thus presented to them : and whereas they had, till lately, been satisfied with defending their frontier, which they had done with much anxiety, and often without success ; they now took courage from the distractions in which Philip's preposterous ambition had involved him, and resolved to exert themselves with vigour in carrying on an offensive war.

1591.
Prince
Maurice
subdues

The year one thousand five hundred and ninety-one had just begun, when colonel Norris led out the garrison of Ostend, which had been reinforced by troops from England ; and having taken the fort of Blackemberg, between Ostend and Sluys, he laid a great part of Flanders open to his incursions. Soon afterwards another party of the forces of the States surprised the forts of Turnhout and Westerlo, in Brabant. But these conquests were inconsiderable, when compared with those of prince Maurice, who, having put his troops in motion as early as Zutphen, the season would permit, opened the campaign with the siege of Zutphen, and soon compelled the garrison to surrender.

From this place he led his army against Deventer, a town of and Deventer. still greater importance than Zutphen. Deventer had been, as above related, betrayed to the Spaniards by Sir William Stanley ; and Maurice was earnestly solicited to undertake the siege of it, at this time, by colonel Vere, who was fired with the generous ambition of wiping out the reproach which Stanley's treachery had brought upon his countrymen. Vere displayed in this seige all that bravery and conduct, for which he is so highly celebrated by the cotemporary historians ; and next to Maurice, who conducted the attack with consummate prudence, he principally contributed to the reduction of the place. It was vigorously defended by the count de Berg, cousin-german to the prince ; but the count being grievously wounded, and the wall on that side where Vere commanded laid in ruins, the garrison capitulated in a few days after opening the trenches, and the inhabitants returned under obedience to the States ^{10th of June.} ^g

The duke of Parma in the mean time laid siege to the fort of Knotzenberg, which Maurice had built in the end of the preceding year. By this fort, the confederates commanded the navigation of the river, and gave such annoyance to Nimeguen, as made the duke extremely uneasy about the fate of that important city. In order to conceal his design, he directed his march first towards the fort of Schenck. But Maurice was not deceived by this feint, and had taken care to strengthen the garrison of Knotzenberg with an addition of some chosen troops.

The duke therefore met with the most vigorous resistance, and lost a great number of his men; still, however, he persisted in the siege. Maurice, dreading his success, relinquished a scheme which he had formed for the reduction of Groningen, and having passed the Waal, he pitched his camp within sight of the enemy. As he did not possess sufficient force to attack their lines, he intended only to encourage the garrison by his presence, or to straiten the duke's quarters, and to intercept his convoys. Many skirmishes passed with various success, till Maurice at length found an opportunity of putting in practice the following stratagem: having planted an ambush of his bravest troops, he marched up to the enemy's camp, attended by count Solmes and colonel Vere, at the head of some companies of horse. The duke, less circumspect and cautious on this occasion than usual, sent out ten companies of Spanish and Italian horse to attack him. A fierce encounter ensued. Agreeably to orders, the prince's troops soon turned their backs and fled. The royalists pursued with ardour, till they had passed a narrow defile and a bridge, when Maurice returned suddenly to the charge, and the soldiers in ambush pouring in upon them from both sides, their return to the camp was intercepted, and almost all of them were put to the sword or taken prisoners.

This disaster afflicted the duke of Parma in the most sensible manner; a great number of the officers who fell were his countrymen, many of whom were persons of rank, in whose fortune he was particularly interested. He perceived that, if he remained in his present situation, he must find it extremely difficult, from the diminution of his cavalry, to supply his army with provisions, and he had not as yet made any considerable progress in the siege.

He would still however have prosecuted his enterprise, if he had not been obliged to desist from it by orders which he received from Philip, to act only on the defensive in the Netherlands, and to spare his troops as much as possible for another expedition into France. Maurice hoped to have gained some advantage over Farnese in his retreat from Knotzenberg; but both in this, and in his passage over the Waal, such wise precautions were employed, as rendered it impossible for the prince to annoy him; while they filled that young hero with the highest admiration of the duke of Parma's skill, and furnished him with important lessons in the military art, which he put in practice on many occasions afterwards with signal glory and success.

Having passed the river, and put his troops in safety, the duke ordered new levies to be made in Germany, Burgundy, and the southern provinces of the Netherlands; after which, he went, on account of his indisposition, to drink the waters at Spa. He had no sooner set out, than prince Maurice, having embarked four thousand foot and six hundred horse, made a sudden descent on that part of Flanders called the county of Waes, and invested the town of Hulst. Mondragone, the governor of Antwerp, lost no time in drawing together such forces as were stationed in the neighbouring places, with an intention to raise the siege. But Maurice having pierced the dykes, had laid the

He defeats
the Spanish
horse.

1591. country under water, and rendered it impossible for Mondragone to approach. Agreeably to the intelligence which had induced the prince to engage in his present enterprise, the garrison of Hulst was weak, and they were badly furnished both with provisions and military stores. Their defence therefore was spiritless and feeble, and they soon agreed to a surrender.

From Hulst, Maurice returned unexpectedly to Knotzenberg ; and as there was no Spanish army near, he threw a bridge over the Waal, and laid siege to Nimeguen. The garrison, consisting of Germans and Walloons, made several sallies to retard his approach : and, if they had been seconded by the townsmen, the reduction of a place of so great extent and strength as Nimeguen, must have detained him long. But he had for some time past held a secret correspondence with some of the principal inhabitants, and the people in general were extremely disaffected to the Spanish government. They took courage now, when Maurice was at hand to support them, and having risen tumultuously, required the garrison, in the most peremptory manner, to put an end to their calamities by a surrender of the town. The garrison, conscious of their inability to resist both the citizens and the enemy, complied with their request ; and Maurice was received by them rather as their deliverer from slavery, than as a conqueror by whose arms they had been subdued. They were admitted to the same privileges as the other towns of the confederacy ; and although the administration was put into the hands of the Protestants, yet no punishment was inflicted on any of the Catholics, by whom the city had been kept so long under the Spanish government.

After this important acquisition, Maurice set out for the Hague, and received there the most flattering testimonies of gratitude, attachment, and respect. The prudence with which his enterprises had been concerted, and the celerity and vigour with which he had carried them into execution, filled all Europe with his renown, and gave his countrymen the most sanguine hopes of future prosperity and success.

Their condition was extremely different at this period from what it had ever been since the confederacy had been formed :

State of the confederacy. till lately they had experienced an uninterrupted course of calamities ; they had been perpetually disturbed with intestine broils, and had lived under continual anxiety, occasioned partly by the neighbourhood of their active enterprising enemy, and partly by the perfidious designs of those whom they had intrusted with the reins of government. But their domestic dissensions were now composed ; the enemy was removed to a greater distance, and their frontier was formed either by towns strongly fortified, or by navigable rivers, in which they could avail themselves of the superiority of their naval force. They were no longer disquieted by suspicions of the fidelity of their governors ; and the loss which they had suffered by the death of the prince of Orange, was compensated by the extraordinary merit of his son.

But there was nothing which contributed so much to inspire them with their present hopes, as their knowledge of Philip's French affairs. attention being still as much engrossed as ever with the affairs of France. In prosecution of his plan for acquiring the sovereignty of that kingdom, by fomenting the war, he had, after the duke of Parma raised the siege of Paris, afforded the leaders of the league only such assistance as was necessary to save them from being overwhelmed. Their power was at this time exceedingly reduced, while that of the King had received a proportional augmentation. By his bravery and good conduct, joined to his clemency and moderation, Henry had allured great numbers

of his rebellious subjects to their duty ; and had, at the same time, engaged the Protestants in Germany, and the queen of England, to interest themselves more deeply than ever in his cause. For several months past he had been absolute master of the field, and he had lately begun the siege of Rouen, with an army mounting nearly to thirty thousand horse and foot. Both the town and garrison were commanded by the Sieur de Villars, who displayed the highest degree of intrepidity, vigilance, and skill in the defence. But there was little probability of his being able to defend it long against so powerful an army, whose operations were conducted by so great a master in the art of war.

The duke de Mayenne, and other Catholic leaders, dreaded that the reduction of so important a place as Rouen would prove fatal to their party, and they had exerted themselves strenuously to relieve it ; but having no army, with which they could venture to enter the list with the King, they had recourse as formerly to Philip, and spared no pains to convince him, that if he did not speedily interpose, Rouen, and all the other towns in their possession, must ere long submit to the King's victorious arms. They were seconded in their application by the Spanish ministers in France ; and in consequence of instructions sent from Madrid to the duke of Parma, that general, after his return from Spa, had been entirely occupied in preparing to lead his army a second time to the assistance of the league.

His preparations were finished about the middle of December, and on the 21st of that month he began his march, taking the same precautions as in his former expedition. He was joined by the duke de Mayenne in the province of Picardy, and his army, after the reinforcement brought him by the duke, amounted to five and twenty thousand foot and six thousand horse.

As, in order to preserve his troops fresh and vigorous, he marched only a few miles each day, it was near the end of January before he reached the province of Normandy. At that time the siege of Rouen was far advanced, and the garrison was reduced to the last extremity. When the King therefore heard of the duke of Parma's approach, he could not resolve to relinquish his enterprise ; but he left his infantry to prosecute the siege, and advanced towards the duke with his cavalry, in hopes that, by harassing and retarding him on his march, the garrison would be obliged to capitulate before he could arrive.

By his vigilance, intrepidity, and quick discernment, Henry was admirably fitted for the bold and dangerous enterprise in which he was now engaged ; but his impetuous courage was not always under the government of prudence, and betrayed him sometimes into rash and desperate attempts, more becoming an officer of inferior rank, than a general or a king. Of this he gave a striking proof in his conduct on the present occasion. Having advanced before the rest of the cavalry with three or four hundred horse, he met, unexpectedly, near the town of Aumale, with the forerunners of the duke of Parma's army, and he repulsed them with little difficulty ; but although the whole Spanish army was in sight, he would not retire till he had taken a view of the order of their march, nor even after he saw the duke's light horse advancing towards him. With these likewise he encountered, and fought long and desperately, till many of his troops had fallen by his side, and he himself was wounded. Had not the duke of Parma suspected an ambuscade, he might easily have cut off the King's retreat. He was urged by Mayenne to send forward more troops for that purpose, but he refused to comply with the duke's request ; and when he was afterwards reminded

Siege of
Rouen.

Duke of Par-
ma's second
expedition into
France.

Danger of
Henry at
Aumale.

1591. of the opportunity which he had lost, he replied, that he could not reproach himself for his conduct, as he supposed, that, in the king of Navarre, he had a great general to contend with, and not merely the captain of a troop of horse.

Henry was no sooner able, after his wound, to get on horseback, than he resumed his first design of annoying the enemy on their march ; and this he did with more circumspection than before, but with such indefatigable vigour and activity, as kept the duke of Parma in perpetual alarms. Several warm encounters passed, in which the success was various. The duke's vigilance, and the perfect discipline which he maintained, preserved his army from sustaining any great calamity. His march however was considerably retarded, and there was much reason to apprehend, that the besieged would be compelled to surrender before he could advance to their relief.

Spirited conduct of Villars. Nothing less than the intrepidity and skill of Villars could have protracted the siege to so great a length. This brave man, far from having any thoughts of capitulating, aspired to the glory of raising the siege without the assistance of the Spaniards. With this view he resolved to take advantage of the absence of the King, and to exert at once his whole force in an attack on the besiegers. Never was attack conducted with more intrepidity and vigour. Great numbers of the royalists were put to the sword ; the marshal de Biron, their commander in chief, was wounded ; their trenches were filled up ; many of their cannon were spiked, or buried in the ditch ; and their stores of provision and ammunition were either carried into the town or destroyed. Villars was at last repulsed, and obliged to retire within the walls ; but not till the enemy had suffered so much loss by the destruction of their works and stores, that he expected to be able to defend the town for several months longer, if his garrison were reinforced.

Of this happy change in his situation, Villars gave immediate notice to the duke of Parma, and advised him to turn his arms to some other quarter, where they might be employed with greater advantage to the common cause. It was suspected, that vanity had considerable influence in prompting Villars to give this advice. The duke was within two days march of Rouen when he received it, and he immediately called a council of war to consider of what was proper to be done.

He was himself of opinion, that he ought still to pursue his march, in order to attack the enemy before they had recovered from their confusion ; and he observed, that if he should only send a reinforcement to the garrison, as the governor had desired, the king of Navarre would instantly renew the operations of the siege, and probably exert himself with greater vigour than before. But the duke de Mayenne and the other French nobility, less bold on this occasion than the duke of Parma, represented, that, notwithstanding the disaster which had befallen the royalists, it would be extremely dangerous to attack them in their intrenchments whilst their cavalry were so numerous ; that when the nobility, who served without pay, and were already impatient under the length of the siege, and the rigour of the season, saw that there was no prospect of a battle, they would leave the camp, and retire to their respective homes ; that the duke might then attack the King with the highest probability of success ; and that till then the troops might either be employed in some other enterprise, or conducted to winter-quarters, whence they might issue forth fresh and vigorous, when a more advantageous season for action should arrive. Whether Mayenne spoke from conviction on this occasion, or from his dread of the duke of Parma's acquiring too great a superiority over the

King, is doubtful. Farnese was not entirely satisfied with his reasoning, and could not approve of a resolution to neglect one favourable opportunity, on account of the uncertain expectation of another. But as the proposal was perfectly consistent with his plan of protracting the war, he complied with it ; and, having sent eight hundred select troops to reinforce the garrison of Rouen, he led his army back to Picardy, and invested the town of St. Esprit de Rue.

He had no sooner set out, than the King applied himself with the utmost diligence to the prosecution of the siege of Rouen ; and as he received at this time a seasonable supply of cannon and ammunition from the States of Holland, he was enabled to carry on his operations with greater success than ever.

In a few weeks the garrison was again reduced to the most critical situation, and Villars, notwithstanding the confidence, of which he had lately given so strong a proof, was obliged to let the duke of Parma know, that, if he did not return to his relief before the twentieth of April, he would find it necessary to give up the town. Mayenne was now as solicitous to persuade the duke of Parma to lead his army against the King, as he had been formerly reluctant and averse. And the duke more readily yielded to his desire, as certain intelligence had been received, that, agreeably to Mayenne's prediction, the cavalry in the King's army did not at this time amount to more than the half of their former number. Having drawn off his troops from St. Esprit de Rue, he set out without delay for Rouen, and proceeded with so great expedition, that he performed the same march in six day, which had formerly cost him twenty.

The king was equally disappointed and surprised when he heard of his approach. He dreaded the danger to which his army would be exposed, if he remained in his present situation, between so brave a garrison on the one hand, and the Spanish army on the other ; and he would have gone to meet the duke of Parma at a distance from the town ; but finding, upon an accurate review of his troops, that they were greatly inferior in number to the enemy, he raised the siege, after it had lasted five months, and retired to Pont de l'Arche, with a resolution to wait there for a return of his nobility. The duke of Parma in the mean time advanced in battle array, and entered Rouen in a kind of triumph. From Rouen he led his army, by the advice of Mayenne, and the other leaders of the league, against Caudbec, which it was thought necessary to reduce, before the deliverance of Rouen could be deemed complete.

In taking a review of the fortifications, and marking the ground for batteries, which he did as on other occasions, with his own hand, he received a wound by a musket-ball, which entered his arm a little below the elbow, and pierced downward till it lodged in his wrist. Without any change in his voice or countenance, he continued to give his orders as before, nor could his son and the other bystanders persuade him to retire till he had instructed them fully in his designs. In order to discover the course of the ball, his surgeon found it necessary to make three different incisions ; and the pain occasioned by these and the wound brought on a fever, which confined him to his bed for several days. This accident had almost proved fatal to his army and to the league. The siege of Caudbec was conducted agreeably to his direction, and was soon brought to a conclusion ; but in undertaking this siege, the duke had committed the only considerable blunder which we meet with in the history of his life. Caudbec lies in the peninsula of Caux, which is formed by the Seine on the west, and the sea and the river d'Eu, or Bresle, on the north and east. As the King, by possessing the towns of Eu, Arques, and

The siege
of Rouen
raised.

Duke of
Parma
wounded at
Caudbec.

1592. Dieppe, commanded the entrance into Caux from the east, it was impossible for the army of the league to get out of it, but either by crossing the Seine, or returning southward the same road by which they had entered the peninsula. In this way they might have escaped, if they had attempted it in time ; and perhaps they would have done so, had it not been judged necessary for the general's recovery, that he should remain for several days at Caudbec.

The King quickly perceived the advantage which was presented to him, and exerted himself with ardour to improve it. Having, immediately after he had raised the siege of Rouen, dis-

patched messengers to summon his nobility to return to his camp, they had obeyed his summons with their wonted alacrity; and in the space of a few days, his army was augmented to seventeen thousand foot, and between seven and eight thousand horse. With this army he left Pont de l'Arche on the 30th of April, and arrived on the same day within sight of the enemy, who had encamped at Yvetot, which lies at the distance of three or four miles from Caudbec.

Henry's first care was to fortify his camp in such a manner, that it might not be in the power of the enemy to compel him to engage ; and his next, to make himself master of all the defiles through which they might attempt to force their passage. Many hot encounters happened, in which both parties gave conspicuous proofs of prowess and intrepidity. The royalists were frequently repulsed from their stations, and much blood was spilt. But at last they accomplished their design, and hemmed in the enemy so closely that it was no longer practicable for them to approach to the outlet from the peninsula. In this situation they remained a fortnight. Their stock of provisions was almost spent, and Henry began to indulge the flattering hope, that in a few days they would lay down their arms.

Nothing but the bold inventive genius of the duke of Parma could have saved them from this disgrace : he had erred when he entered the peninsula, while so vigilant an enemy as Henry was so near. Neither the importunity of the chiefs of the league, nor his ignorance of the country, nor the hopes of finishing his enterprise before the King could arrive, are entirely sufficient to justify his conduct. But he now fully atoned for his imprudence in exposing his troops to so great a risk, by the extraordinary capacity and vigour which he exerted in their deliverance.

As soon as he had recovered from the distress occasioned by his wound, and taken a view of the position and strength of the enemy, he perceived that it would be in vain to attempt to force their lines ; and consequently, that there was no other way by which he could save his army from captivity, or ruin, but by transporting it over the river. To this expedient he resolved to have recourse, and he communicated his design to the duke de Mayenne, and some other of his most experienced officers, who all pronounced it to be impracticable. They knew how difficult it was to pass even the the most inconsiderable river in sight of an enemy, and they could not conceive it possible for an army so much incumbered with artillery and baggage, to pass so broad a river as the Seine at Caudbec, when not only a powerful enemy, so vigilant as the King, but the Dutch ships of war likewise, were prepared to obstruct their passage.

The duke was fully sensible of all the difficulties with which his enterprise must be attended, but as the urgent necessity of his situation would not suffer him to relinquish it, he persisted in his resolution of attempting to carry it into execution.

Having first cleared the river of the Dutch ships, by planting batteries along the banks, he ordered the Sieur de Villars to hold all the boats and barks at Rouen in readiness, and to prepare a number of rafts of strong beams fit for transporting the artillery. After this, taking advantage of a thick mist, on the 16th of May, he sent out his cavalry by day-break, as if he intended an attack, and while the enemy were thus amused, he drew off his infantry from Yvetot to Caudbec. The cavalry followed ; and as soon as they had retired, the King advanced with all his forces, having no suspicion of the Duke's design, and wondering that he should have chosen to move his camp to a situation in which it was more confined and straitened than before. Henry still thought of nothing but blocking up the passages, and fortifying his camp so as not to be obliged to accept of battle.

While the King was thus occupied, the Duke employed a great number of pioneers in raising two forts, one on each side of the river, directly opposite to each other, which he planted with cannon, and lined with musketeers. To prevent the King from taking the alarm, he maintained all the same appearances as formerly, of a design to enlarge his quarters, and frequent skirmishes were fought.

At last, every thing necessary being prepared, the rafts and the boats (of which there was a great number at Rouen employed in the river-trade) fell down with the ebbing tide, in the evening of the 20th of May ; and, on the same night, the greatest part of the troops, artillery, and baggage was transported. The King perceiving next morning a change in the appearance of the enemy's camp, sent the baron de Biron to reconnoitre it. The baron returned immediately at full gallop, calling out, that the Spaniards were passing the river. Henry set out without delay, at the head of his cavalry. When he came in sight, he had the mortification to observe, that only two or three thousand of the Spaniards remained on this side, and that they were so skilfully defended by the fort, that he could not approach them without sacrificing the lives of many of his troops. He then planted his artillery on a hill which commanded the passage, and the Dutch ships came up the river from Quillebeuf ; but before the cannon were ready to fire, and before the Dutch were near enough to do execution, the rear of the Spaniards, conducted with much prudence by prince Rannucio, the duke of Parma's son, had landed safe on the other side, and set the boats on fire.

Neither the King nor any of the French nobility had ever suspected that such a retreat was possible ; and this circumstance, joined to the nature of the ground near Caudbec, which concealed the duke of Parma's operations, contributed not a little to the fortunate issue of his enterprise. Henry had for several days entertained the most sanguine hopes of gaining a decisive victory, which would probably have given him immediate possession of his kingdom ; and his mortification now was in proportion to the confidence of his former expectations : it was the more sensible and galling, as his infantry was so much exhausted by the hardships of a tedious winter's campaign, that it was impossible for him at present either to pursue the enemy, or to renew the siege of Rouen. The duke de Mayenne entered this city with a part of the forces, and the duke of Parma directed his march towards the Netherlands, where he arrived in a few weeks without receiving any molestation by the way.^h

While Philip thus kept alive the flames of war in France, he had the good fortune to preserve his Spanish dominions in a state of undisturbed tranquillity ; and as a kingdom in this situation furnishes few materials for history, hardly any transaction passed

History of
Antonio
Perez.

^h D'Avila, lib. xiii. Betivoglio, part ii. lib. vi. ; and Thuanus, lib. ciii.

1592. in Spain during several years preceding the present period that deserves to be recorded ; but in the course of this year an affair happened, which, while it marks the character, and shews the secret life of Philip, was attended with the most serious consequences.

Having been engaged in a love intrigue with Anna Mendoza princess of Eboliⁱ, he had committed the conduct of it to his secretary Antonio Perez, who having frequent opportunities of conversing with that princess, had become no less enamoured of her than the King ; and it was generally believed that she had made him a full return to the passion which her beauty had inspired. At the time when Antonio's correspondence with the princess was much talked of, Escovedo, the friend and confidant of Don John of Austria, had arrived from the Netherlands, to solicit the King for the return of the Italian and Spanish forces ; and finding the secretary averse to Don John's designs he resolved to take vengeance on him, by making a discovery to the King of what was reported of Antonio's familiarity with the princess of Eboli. Philip readily believed this intelligence, and conceived an implacable resentment against the secretary ; but he was animated at the same time with hatred no less implacable towards Escovedo ; who, he believed, had fomented Don John's ambition, and would sooner or later engage that prince in some desperate enterprises inconsistent with his allegiance. Philip resolved to employ one of these men as the instrument of his vengeance against the other, and gave a private order to Perez to have Escovedo assassinated. This order was executed without delay, and soon afterwards a prosecution was begun against the murderer, with Philip's permission, by the widow and children of Escovedo. Philip intended by this measure to remove all suspicions of being accessory to the murder. But dreading that Perez might, for his own exculpation, make a full discovery, he wrote him several letters with his own hand, requiring that he would conceal the order which had been given him, and assuring him, that a stop should soon be put to the prosecution. It was stopped accordingly ; and although Perez was forbid to come to court himself, he was allowed for some years to transact the several branches of public business which had been intrusted to him, by his deputies or clerks. But no time could assuage the King's resentment : after six years he commanded him to be tried for malversation in the discharge of his office, and having ordered a fine of thirty thousand ducats to be imposed on him, he threw him into prison and loaded him with chains. Perez was offered his liberty on condition that he should give up all the King's letters relative to the murder of Escovedo. He delivered some of them, and was released ; but Philip was no sooner in possession of the letters, than a new process on account of the murder was commenced. Perez was again thrown into prison, and put to the torture ; and he now perceived, that nothing less than his death was intended. With the assistance of his wife and friends he escaped and fled to Arragon, his native country, where he expected to avail himself of the rights and privileges of the Arragonians. Philip no sooner heard of his escape, than he dispatched certain officers after him, who overtook him in the town of Calataiude ; and having forced him from a monastery, where he had taken refuge, conducted him to Saragossa. When he arrived in that city, he appealed to the Justiza, to whom, according to a fundamental law of the constitution, an appeal was competent from every other judge whether civil or ecclesiastical.

By the Justiza, Perez was lodged in the state prison, called the Manifestation, to remain there till his cause should be tried. But although no person could legally enter this prison without the special permission of the

Justiza, the marquis of Almenar, the King's attorney for Arragon, broke into it with a body of armed men, and carried off Perez to the prison of the Inquisition. The people, who had ever been accustomed to hold the person and authority of the Justiza in the highest veneration, were inflamed with rage at this indignity, and having risen tumultuously, they rescued Perez from the inquisitors, surrounded the marquis of Almenar, and after reviling him as a traitor to the liberty of his country, maltreated him in such a manner, that he died soon afterwards of his wounds.

Perez was again lodged in the prison of state, and remained there for several months, during which time the governor, or viceroy, ordered thirteen of the principal lawyers of Saragossa, to examine whether the cause belonged more properly to the Justiza, or to the court of inquisition. After long deliberation they declared, that it would be a violation of the liberties of Arragon, if Perez were tried by any other judge than the Justiza; but afterwards, being either corrupted or intimidated, they reversed this sentence, under the pretence, of the prisoner's having held a secret correspondence with the king of France, a heretic, and pronounced that it belonged to the inquisition to take cognisance of his cause.

The Justiza paid no regard to this opinion of the lawyers, but persisted in defending the privileges of his office, and in refusing to deliver up the prisoner. The viceroy had recourse to force; and having drawn together a great number of the familiars of the inquisition, he broke open the state prison, loaded Perez with chains, and was carrying him off in a sort of triumph, when the people arose a second time, and set him at liberty. He immediately left the town, and made his escape into France, where he gave useful information to the King with regard to the designs and measures of the court of Spain.

Philip in the mean time resolved not to neglect the opportunity which this sedition of the Arragonians afforded him, to show how little he regarded those rights and privileges of which they had shewn themselves so tenacious. Having formed an army of the troops which were quartered in different parts of Castile, he gave the command of it to Alphonso Vargas, with instructions to march to Saragossa with the utmost expedition; and to prevent the Arragonians from preparing for resistance, he gave out that this army was intended to assist the Catholics in France. The Arragonians however having received certain intelligence of his design, began to prepare for their defence. Lanusa, the Justiza, having convened the principal inhabitants, and read to them a fundamental law of their constitution, by which it is declared, that they have a right to oppose by force the entrance of foreign troops into Arragon, even though the King himself should lead them, it was decreed with unanimous consent, that conformably to this law they should take up arms on the present occasion, to prevent the entrance of the Castilians under Vargas.

Intimation of this decree was sent to the other cities of the province, and the inhabitants of Saragossa repaired in great numbers to the standard of liberty that was erected. But they had no leader of sufficient capacity to conduct them, and there was no time for the people in other places to come to their assistance. Vargas having arrived much sooner than they expected, they were overwhelmed with terror, and threw down their arms.

Vargas entered the city without opposition, and cast such of their leaders as had not made their escape into prison. Among these were the duke de Villa Hermosa, the count of Aranda, and the Justiza. The two first he sent prisoners to Madrid, but he put the Justiza publicly to death without either trial or sentence, and then confiscated his effects, and levelled his houses with the ground;

The Justiza
of Arragon
put to death.

1592. ordering proclamation to be made in the city, that such should be the punishment of all those who, like Lanusa, should adventure to dispute the authority of the King.

The people heard this insulting proclamation with unspeakable grief and indignation ; but they were obliged to lament in secret, the ruin of those invaluable rights which they were unable to defend. The palace of the inquisition was fortified that it might serve the purpose of a citadel ; and a strong body of Castilian troops were quartered there and in the town, where they remained till the minds of the citizens were thoroughly subdued. Philip thought it unnecessary to abolish formally their constitution of government, as he had given them sufficient proof how insignificant they would find it, if they should ever trust to it as a barrier against the encroachments of the regal power.

While this transaction passed in Spain, the duke of Parma, Sickness of the duke of Parma. had returned from France to the Netherlands, and from thence the bad state of his health had made it necessary for him to go once more to drink the waters at Spa. In the time of his French expedition, many of the troops which he had left behind him had mutinied ; and on his return from Spa, he had the mortification to find, that prince Maurice had subdued the two important towns of Steenwich and Coverden, although the former of these places had been fortified in the strongest manner, and was defended by a brave and determined garrison of one thousand six hundred men.

The duke's chagrin at these events contributed to quicken the progress of his disease, which having baffled the power of medicine, had now reduced him so low, that finding himself unable to fulfil the duties of his office, he had applied to the King for liberty to retire.

His death. But Philip believing that no other person was so able to bring his schemes in France to the desired issue, refused to grant his request ; and when he signified his refusal, sent him instructions to return as soon as possible to the assistance of the League. The duke would not desert a station which he had filled with so much honour, and resolved to struggle with his distemper to the last. Having by new levies supplied some of the vacancies in his army, he went, on the 29th of October, to Arras, and there applied with his wonted assiduity to hasten the necessary preparations for his expedition. The strength of his mind counterbalanced for several weeks the weakness of his body. From the vigour which he displayed, those about him conceived hopes that his death was still at a considerable distance. But on the third of December, immediately after signing some dispatches which had been prepared for his subscription, he expired in the forty-seventh year of his age, and the fourteenth of his government of the Netherlands.

and charac- ter. In this manner died Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma, who claims our admiration, no less for his political wisdom and sagacity,

than on account of those more splendid military talents which have procured him such distinguished renown. It was by his prudence, moderation, and address, more than by the force of arms, that he re-united so great a part of the Netherlands to the Spanish monarchy ; and if Philip had paid the same regard to his opinion on all occasions, which he did on some, it is probable that the United Provinces would have been compelled to return to their allegiance. England might in that case have been subdued, and France might have been swallowed up by the exorbitant power of Spain. Though it was happy for Europe that Philip, blinded by flattery and ambition, refused to listen to the counsels that were offered

him, yet we must admire that superior sagacity and penetration by which they were suggested. 1592.

The duke of Parma in his youth gave no indications of those extraordinary qualities with which nature had endowed him, and men were even disposed to think unfavourably of his understanding ; but in the war with the Turks, in which he served under John of Austria, the flame of his genius broke forth, and burnt afterwards through the whole of his life with unabating splendour. His person was graceful, his eyes lively and penetrating, his manner courteous, his address insinuating, and his temper generous and humane.

His vices, says a respectable Dutch writer^k, were those of the age in which he lived, or of the court in which he had been educated ; but what these vices were, neither this, nor any other historian has informed us. He appears not to have possessed that winning simplicity of manners, that perfect ingenuity and candour, by which his great rival for military fame, the French monarch, was so eminently distinguished ; yet the Protestant, as well as Popish historians acknowledge, that as he was dutiful and faithful to his prince, so he maintained the most inviolable fidelity in all his engagements with the people of the Netherlands who submitted to his arms.

^k Grotius.

THE
HISTOR Y
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXIII.

1593.
Count
Mansveldt
governor. **A**FTER the death of the duke of Parma, Philip committed the government of the Netherlands to count Peter Ernest of Mansveldt, whom he ordered to send an army, without delay, under the command of his son count Charles, to the assistance of the League. In obedience to this order, Charles immediately began his march with six thousand foot and one thousand horse, which was the greatest number of troops that could be spared from the defence of the Netherlands. These troops, when joined by those of the duke de Mayenne, composed an army of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, of which the duke was invested with the chief command.

Siege of
Noyon. He began his operations with the siege of Noyon, in which he exerted himself with extraordinary vigour, and compelled the garrison to surrender, before the King could arrive to their relief. From Noyon the troops were led into Lower Picardy, where some inconsiderable places were reduced. But soon after this success, count Mansveldt with the Spanish army returned to the Netherlands ; and the operations of war were interrupted by certain political negotiations, from which Philip expected to derive greater advantage than from the progress of his arms.

Convention
of the
States
of the
League. Having, during several years, wasted the blood and treasure of his subjects, in fomenting the war in France, in expectation of some favourable opportunity of seizing upon the crown, his patience had been for some time past exhausted ; and he had resolved to make trial, whether it was practicable to realize those alluring hopes by which he had so long been actuated. With this view his ministers had repeatedly requested the duke of Mayenne to summon an assembly of the States of the League, that it might be known what Catholic prince they inclined to choose for their sovereign. Mayenne still cherished the hopes of attaining the sovereignty himself, in some future more favourable crisis ; and he abhorred the thoughts of having the French nation subjected to the dominion of Spain. Influenced by these motives, he had on different pretences declined for several months complying with

Philip's request ; but finding that he would not be diverted from his purpose, the duke had yielded to his opportunity, and as lieutenant general of the kingdom, had issued a summons for the States to meet at Paris on the twenty-sixth of January one thousand five hundred and ninety-three. Philip sent the duke of Feria, and Mendoza, an eminent Spanish lawyer, to this assembly ; and he fondly imagined, that, by their influence, and that of the cardinal Piacenza, the Pope's legate, a majority of the deputies might be persuaded to abrogate the Salic law, and to place his daughter Isabella on the throne.

But it soon appeared how much his ministers in France had deceived him, and been themselves deceived. Neither the money which he had secretly bestowed to increase the number of his partisans, nor the armies which he had employed at so great an expence in their behalf, had produced in any considerable degree the effects which he expected. Some of the greatest bigots in the party, and some of the lowest of the people, had given credit to his professions of zeal for religion ; even the eyes of these men were now opened, and they perceived how little they had been indebted to the friendship of a prince, who now discovered, that his principal design in assisting them against their enemies, had been to take advantage of their distress, and to reduce them to the unhappy condition of a province of Spain. For it was in this light they considered his proposal ; and were no less alarmed at his demand of their crown for Isabella, than if he had demanded it for himself. In these sentiments the deputies were secretly confirmed by Mayenne. But as both he and they were conscious that they were utterly unable to contend with Henry, if Philip should forsake them, they studied to conceal their aversion to his proposal. They neither agreed to it, nor rejected it ; but expressed their solicitude with regard to the person whom the Catholic King should make choice of for his daughter's husband ; and insisted, that in the event of her election, she should not be married to any foreign prince.

The Spanish ministers informed them, that their master had indeed designed to give her in marriage to Ernest archduke of Austria ; but since it was not agreeable to the States, he was willing to bestow her upon the duke of Guise. The duke de Mayenne did not expect this concession, and was greatly disconcerted when the Spanish ministers produced instructions, empowering them to make it. He was stung with the preference which was given to his nephew before his son ; and he now secretly resolved to obstruct the election of Isabella, to the utmost of his power. Finding it necessary however to disguise his sentiments, he affected to be highly pleased with the proposal ; but alleged, that a regard to the honour of his Catholic majesty, as well as to the safety of the duke of Guise, required that the election of Isabella should be deferred till an army was assembled, sufficient to overpower her enemies, and to fix her upon the throne. At present there was no army in France able to contend with the king of Navarre, and a considerable time must elapse before so great a force as was necessary could be raised. The Spanish ministers were sensible of the strength of this objection ; they likewise knew that, without the assistance of Mayenne, they could not persuade the States to proceed to the election ; and therefore, without great opposition, they agreed to a delay. In this manner did the duke de Mayenne, influenced partly by ambition, and partly by concern for the freedom and independence of the kingdom, disappoint for the present Philip's plan to enslave it ; and other events afterwards happened, which would have rendered it impossible, even for Mayenne himself, had he been so inclined, to carry it into execution.

Discovery
of Philip's
views.

1593.
Henry IV.
embraces
the Catholic
religion.

The king of France, who knew the purpose for which the States had been convened, though he was in a great measure ignorant of Mayenne's views, dreaded violently his concurring with the Spaniards ; and felt great anxiety with respect to the consequences which might follow. For Philip, he believed, would regard an election made by the States of the League, though only a small part of the kingdom, as a sufficient foundation for his daughter's claim, and would employ all his power to support it, whatever prejudice might thence arise to his affairs in the Netherlands. On the first opening of the assembly, Henry published an edict declaring it to be illegal. And he gave permission at the same time to the Catholic lords of his party, to enter into a conference with those of the League ; intending to prevent the States from proceeding to extremities, by affording them the prospect of his speedy conversion to the Popish faith.

This expedient was in some measure attended with the desired effect. The nobility of the League, disquieted with the apprehensions of being reduced under the dominion of Spain, and conscious, that, if Philip should abandon them, they must soon yield to the King's victorious arms, were thrown into extreme perplexity ; and many of them shewed that nothing was wanting but Henry's conversion, to determine them to acknowledge his authority. This condition however was still as necessary as ever. From the long continuance of the war, their religious prejudices were become unconquerable. With these their sense of honour and consistency conspired, and their regard to an oath which they had sworn, never to acknowledge an heretical prince for their sovereign. They were confirmed in their resolution, by the Pope's legate, and by the archbishop of Lyons, and other partisans of Spain ; and were still as much determined as ever to adhere to their engagements, without regard to any inconveniences or dangers, to which they might thereby be exposed.

While the delay of the King's conversion proved an insurmountable objection against him with the members of the League, it gave the most sensible uneasiness to such of the Catholics as had espoused his cause. They had been induced to remain with him, after the death of the late King, by his promise of embracing their religion. They had often urged him to fulfil this promise. Amidst the hurry of arms, he found it easy to employ excuses, with which they had hitherto been satisfied. But their patience was now exhausted. They entertained suspicions that he had dealt insincerely with them. Though brave and warlike, they were sick of the hardships and fatigues of war ; and they began to hold conferences together, on the subject of transferring their allegiance to Henry's cousin, the cardinal of Bourbon. Henry perceived that the critical period was now come, when he must resolve either to change his religion, or to forego the crown, and expose himself and his Protestant subjects to the fury and vengeance of all the Catholics in France, supported by his inveterate enemy the king of Spain. Even some of the Protestant leaders were so candid as to acknowledge, that without embracing the Catholic faith, he would never be able to preserve possession of the throne ; and they exhorted him to embrace it, if his conscience would permit, as the only means by which they, as well as his other subjects, could be saved from ruin.

Never was an ingenuous prince placed in a more distressful situation. And never was a virtuous mind assailed by temptations more alluring. For he was not impelled only by ambition, or the desire of securing a great and mighty monarchy to himself and his posterity. The desire of delivering his people from calamities, which were become intolerable, co-operated with his ambition, and both together put his integrity to the severest trial.

Without any longer delay, he invited the Catholic divines throughout his kingdom, to come and instruct him in the principles of their religion ; and having heard them discourse concerning several of the points in dispute between the Protestants and them, he declared himself entirely satisfied with their arguments, and soon afterwards went to mass in the church of St. Dennis, where he read aloud his confession of the Catholic faith, and promised to maintain and defend it, against whatever attempts might be made for its subversion. 1593.

Henry's conduct on this occasion was very differently interpreted by his contemporaries, according as they stood well or ill affected to his person, or to the religion which he had embraced. It was alleged by some, that he had given a convincing proof of his indifference with regard to all religion, and that his conversion could be considered in no other light, but as hypocrisy and grimace. But others more justly observed, that if Henry had been capable of so great insincerity as his enemies ascribed to him, he would have listened to his interest at a much earlier period, and not have so long exposed himself to the danger of being for ever excluded from the throne. That no other satisfactory account could be given of his delay, but the scruples with which his regard to truth and his sense of honour had inspired him. That it was not surprising, that a prince who had passed his life amidst the tumults of war, should have been but very imperfectly acquainted with the niceties of theological disputes ; or that his opinions in matters of such difficult decision, should have been gradually bent to a compliance with so great an interest as he had at stake. And considering how candid and sincere he had ever shewn himself in all his conduct, it might justly be supposed that he had still preserved his integrity, and that his religious sentiments had in reality undergone that change which he now expressed with so much seeming seriousness and solemnity.

Whatever were the real motives of Henry's conduct, it diffused a general joy and satisfaction among his subjects. Worn out with the miseries of so long a war, they exulted at the prospect of peace, though still at some distance ; and being now freed from the fascination of their religious prejudices, they could perceive and admire those illustrious virtues in the character of their sovereign, by which he was so highly qualified to make them happy. Effect's of Henry's conversion.

The Spanish ministers, on the other hand, the cardinal legate, and the duke de Mayenne, were greatly alarmed at this event, and still more when they observed the reception which the news of it met with among the people. They represented it as a political device, intended to prevent the election of a Catholic prince. They persuaded a great number of their adherents to swear that they would not acknowledge Henry for King, unless his conversion were ratified by the Pope ; and at the same time they employed all their influence at the court of Rome, to dissuade the Pope from granting him an absolution.

Philip was not discouraged from the prosecution of his scheme, either by the opposition which it had received from the States of the League, or by the conversion of the King. He became sensible however of his error in pitching on the duke of Guise (a young nobleman indeed of great merit and moderation, but possessed of little power or influence) for his daughter's partner in the throne. This error he corrected, and ordered his ministers to acquaint the duke de Mayenne, that he was now determined to give the preference to his son. In consequence of this declaration, a negotiation which Mayenne had begun for reconciling himself to the King, was broken off. That powerful leader and the Spaniards were henceforth on more amicable terms ; and there

Philip still adheres to his plan.

1593. was no longer any reason to doubt, that in future he would exert himself with vigour in promoting their designs^a.

State of his affairs. But there was much less probability at the present than any former period, that these designs would ever be accomplished.

Philip had no general after the duke of Parma's death, qualified to enter the lists with the king of France. His treasury was exhausted, and even his credit was reduced so low, that the Genoese, and other Italian merchants, from whom he had already borrowed several millions of money, refused to lend him any more. His commanders in the Netherlands had not been able to make the necessary levies. His troops there were fewer in number than they had ever been since the commencement of the war ; and yet so great arrears were due to them, that the officers found it impracticable to maintain their authority. The greatest part of the Spanish soldiers in the Low-Countries had, upon their return from France, forsaken their standards ; and having elected officers, and a commander in chief, from among themselves, they had begun to exercise the most oppressive rapacity upon the inhabitants of the southern provinces.

The example of the Spaniards was quickly followed by the Italians and Walloons. The people in the open country were plundered in the most unmerciful manner. Those dreadful scenes of devastation were renewed, which had been acted after the death of Requesens ; and the Flemings had never suffered so much from the enemy, as they now suffered from troops engaged to protect and defend them.

Siege of Gertrudenberg. Prince Maurice in the mean time exerted all his wonted activity to improve the advantage which these disorders afforded

him, for extending the territories of the States. There was no town which the confederates were more desirous of acquiring than Gertrudenberg ; which, as it lies nearer them than Breda, subjected them to perpetual anxiety for the preservation of that important city ; besides giving annoyance to their inland trade, and furnishing the Spaniards with an easy entrance into Holland.

During the winter, Maurice had made diligent preparation for the siege of this place ; and early in the spring, he was ready to take the field with such an army as he judged sufficient to insure success. In order to prevent the enemy from suspecting his design, he directed his march first towards Sluys and Dunkirk ; afterwards to Bois-le-Duc and Grave ; and when by these feints he had induced count Mansveldt to divide his forces, he turned suddenly to Gertrudenberg.

Mansveldt, anxious to avoid the reproach to which the loss of a place of so great consequence would expose him, drew together all the forces which could be spared from the garrisons of the other towns, with an intention to attempt to raise the siege. Prince Maurice expected this, and conducted his operations with the utmost celerity. Not only his pioneers, amounting to three thousand, but a great number of his troops were employed day and night in fortifying his camp, both on the side towards the town, to prevent the eruptions of the garrison, and on the side towards the country. And not satisfied with this, he broke down the dyke of the river, and laid a great part of the adjacent country under water. After which, having approached the town as usual by trenches, he opened batteries against it at different places, and kept up a continual fire upon it from his fleet, on the side towards the river^b.

^a D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cxi. cxi.

^b The Maese at Gertrudenberg is more properly a branch of the sea than a river, and admits of the largest ships.

The garrison, consisting of Burgundians and Walloons, made a brave and vigorous resistance, and thereby gave count Mansveldt time to advance to their relief. The count's army amounted to more than double the number of the besiegers ; and he attacked their intrenchments in different places, where the inundation permitted his approach. But Maurice had constructed his works with so much art, and strengthened them in such a manner with forts and redoubts, at proper distances, that all count Mansveldt's attempts proved ineffectual. The count's quarters were at the same time greatly straitened by the garrison of Breda, which sallied out upon him, and made considerable slaughter among his troops. He found it necessary to retire, and Gertrudenberg soon afterwards capitulated. In the garrison there were several of those soldiers, who some years before had sold the town to the Spaniards. These men suffered the punishment due to their treachery, but all the rest, and the inhabitants of the place, received the most advantageous and honourable terms.

Count Mansveldt had, in order to retrieve his honour, by making reprisals upon the enemy, led his army from Gertrudenberg, to invest an important fort belonging to the confederates, called Creveceur. But this attempt likewise was frustrated by the celerity of Maurice, who arrived before the count's lines were finished ; got between him and the fort, and though greatly inferior in number, obliged him quickly to raise the siege.

During the rest of the campaign, Mansveldt acted on the defensive ; and no other event happened in the Netherlands this year, that deserves to be recorded ^e.

Although Philip had, after the death of the duke of Parma, committed the government to count Mansveldt, he had from the first intended that the count should resign it into the hands of Ernest archduke of Austria. This prince arrived in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and ninety-four at Brussels ; and was received there with every mark of joy and satisfaction. He was a prince of a modest and gentle disposition ; but he possessed not the capacity and vigour requisite in the present critical situation of affairs. Conscious of his want of military talents, he fondly flattered himself with the hopes of prevailing on the revolted provinces to return to their allegiance by argument and persuasion. And with this view he sent an invitation to the States to appoint ambassadors to treat with him concerning peace. But the States rejected his invitation, and accompanied their refusal with declaring, " That as from experience they could not repose any confidence in the King of Spain, so they would never enter into any treaty of reconciliation with him ; but would maintain their liberty to the last, and lay down their lives sooner than submit to that intolerable yoke from which they had been so happily delivered."

Ernest archduke of Austria, Governor of the Netherlands.
1594.

If it is true, as the Dutch historians relate, that two murderers were detected at this time, whom the Spanish ministers had employed to assassinate prince Maurice, it will not appear surprising that this declaration of the States, should have contained expressions of resentment ; especially as they were now in a much more flourishing condition than before, and had much less reason than at any former period to dread the power of Spain. For Philip, they knew, was still more intent on acquiring the crown of France, than on recovering his hereditary dominions ; and was likely to waste his strength in that chimerical attempt, before he could be made sensible of his folly.

^e Bentivoglio and Grotius, lib. iii.

1594.
Affairs of
France.

Wise and
generous
conduct of
the King.

The situation of affairs in that kingdom became daily more unfavourable to his views ; and the king's conversion soon produced the happy effects which were expected to arise from it.

The citizens of Meaux were the first who sent him a tender of their submission ; not long afterwards, the Parisians opened their gates to receive him ; and the example of the metropolis, which had ever been the chief strength of the League, was quickly followed by Rouen, Lyons, and almost all the other great towns in the kingdom. Henry's conduct was admirably calculated to promote that affectionate zeal of his subjects, of which he received at this time so many striking proofs. For several years he had suffered from them the most cruel injuries and affronts ; but his generous spirit, superior to resentment, abhorred the thought of punishing those who were willing to lay down their arms, and he received the submission of his most inveterate enemies, with a degree of goodness and condescension, which, while he won their hearts, determined many others to imitate their example.

He granted to all who submitted to him, the most favourable terms ; confirmed their privileges, as if they had done nothing to forfeit them ; adhered with inviolable fidelity to his engagements, and published an edict of general indemnity, in order to set the minds of the people every where at ease, and to convince them that it would be their fault, and not his, if the public tranquillity were not speedily restored.

By these measures, which were equally prudent and magnanimous, the strength of the League was reduced so low, that Philip and the duke of Mayenne might have easily perceived the vanity of their designs.

It can hardly be imagined, that either the one or the other could any longer seriously entertain the hopes of success. But Mayenne was so deeply engaged with the Spaniards, that he knew not how to extricate himself with honour ; especially as he had solemnly sworn, with many others of his party, that he would never acknowledge Henry for his sovereign till he should receive absolution from the Pope. And though Philip could not now be so chimerical, as to expect to procure the crown for Isabella, yet he could not overcome that implacable hatred, with which he had long been animated against the French monarch, in whom (judging of Henry from himself) he expected to find an irreconcileable and mortal foe. Besides, he was not ignorant of the justice of Henry's claim to the kingdom of Navarre, which Ferdinand the catholic had wrested from Henry's ancestors by fraud and violence ; and he could not doubt that this active victorious prince would, as soon as his affairs were settled in France, either attempt to recover his hereditary kingdom, or endeavour to procure a compensation for it, by invading the Spanish dominions in the Netherlands.

Moved by these considerations, Philip resolved to continue his hostilities, and by joining his forces with those of the duke of Mayenne, to make himself master of as many towns as possible on the eastern frontier of France.

This resolution he communicated to the archduke Ernest ; who, agreeably to his instructions, sent count Charles of Mansveldt early in the spring to invade the province of Picardy, with an army of between eleven and twelve thousand men. The count laid siege to the town of La Capelle ; and as he attacked it unexpectedly, he soon obliged the garrison to capitulate.

Siege of La Capelle.
9th May.
Siege of Laon.

The King had set out from Paris as soon as he received intelligence of the siege, but could not arrive in time to prevent the surrender. Having been joined on his march by the dukes De

Nevers and Bouillon, and finding himself at the head of a considerable army^d, he resolved to undertake some important enterprise, by which he might be compensated for the loss of La Capelle. One of the most considerable towns in that part of the kingdom was Laon, a place of great extent, strongly fortified, and well provided with every thing necessary to sustain a siege. The garrison which was numerous, was commanded by De Bourg, one of the bravest officers of the League; and there was at that time in the town, besides a great number of other nobility, the count of Somerive, the duke de Mayenne's second son. These considerations, far from discouraging the king from besieging Laon, were the motives which determined him to invest it, and he carried on his operations against it with his usual activity and vigilance.

The besieged gave him all the annoyance and interruption in their power; and in some sallies which they made, before he had time to cover his troops, he lost more than four hundred men. But his anxiety with regard to the issue of this enterprise, arose principally from the neighbourhood of the Spanish army, which was joined at this time by the duke de Mayenne, whom Philip, in order to prevent him from entering into an accommodation with the King, had entrusted with the chief command.

Various motives concurred on this occasion to determine Mayenne to exert himself with vigour. There was much need of some splendid instance of success to support the drooping spirits of his party. Laon was the most considerable town which remained in his possession; and besides his son, and many of his faithful adherents, he had left his most valuable effects in it, as in a place where there was little danger of their falling into the hands of the enemy. He lost no time in marching to its relief. His army consisted of nearly the same number as that of the King, but being inferior in cavalry, he found it necessary to approach the town on that side, on which there lay a wood or forest, where the enemy's horse could not be easily employed. Henry had penetrated into his design, and taken possession of the wood with a part of his troops. Mayenne at first obliged them to retire; but the royalists having immediately received a reinforcement from the camp, returned to the charge, and stood their ground for some time with great bravery against the Spanish veterans. They would have been compelled however to give way a second time, if the royal cavalry, which had advanced to their relief, under the baron^e, now marshal de Biron, had not, conformably to their gallant leader's example and command, dismounted from their horses, and thrown themselves into the front of the battle. The King himself soon after came up with the greatest part of his army; and if the ground had permitted it, a general engagement would have ensued, but it allowed only of skirmishes, which continued with various success till the evening; when Mayenne, dreading that the King might send his cavalry to attack his rear, drew off his forces to a little distance from the wood.

Although the nature of the ground in this encounter prevented the King from availing himself of the superiority of his cavalry, yet this superiority proved afterwards of the greatest use. Mayenne being obliged to bring his provisions through an open country from places at the distance of several miles, the King sent out his horse in numerous bodies to intercept his convoys; and, although the Duke attempted to bring them under a strong guard in the night, sometimes from one place, and sometimes from another; yet such was the vigilance of the duke de Longueville, and the marshal de

Mayenne attempts in vain to raise the siege.

^d Twelve thousand foot, and two thousand horse.

^e His father had been lately killed at the siege of Epernay.

1594. Biron, to whom the King gave the charge of intercepting them, that almost none of them were suffered to escape. These bold adventurous leaders were continually in motion. No guards which Mayenne could spare were able to withstand their vigorous attack, and his army was at last reduced to so great distress, as made it necessary for him to decamp. He was sensible how difficult he must find it to retire in the face of a superior army; but if he remained any longer in his present situation, his troops, he perceived, must either perish for want, or lay down their arms.

The duke had hitherto been unfortunate in his enterprises, ^{His masterly retreat.} and his misfortunes had contributed to obscure his fame; but, on this occasion, he gave a conspicuous proof of consummate military skill, as well as of the most unquestionable personal courage and resolution. His troops, drawn up in the most masterly manner, were every where so well prepared to receive the enemy, that the King, who attacked him with his cavalry, as soon as they began their march, found it utterly impracticable to penetrate their ranks, whilst Mayenne himself marched on foot in the rear, fought on some occasions as a common soldier, and by the gracefulness of his person, added to the fortitude which he displayed, commanded universal admiration. In this manner he advanced slowly, till he reached a narrow defile, where he had planted some batteries of cannon; from the dread of which, the King ordered his troops to halt, and suffered the duke to pursue his march to La Fere without any farther molestation.

Henry then resumed his operations before the town. The ^{Laon sur- renders.} sieged, though deprived of all hopes of relief, persisted for some time in their defence; but at last, finding their numbers greatly diminished, they offered to surrender on condition that the garrison and the count of Somerive should be allowed to march out with the honours of war; and to this condition the King readily consented, from his desire of preventing bloodshed, and saving the fortifications of the town. The capitulation was signed on the twenty-second of July. The terms of it were religiously fulfilled; and Henry, far from discovering ill-humour or resentment for the opposition which he had met with, embraced with pleasure the present opportunity of testifying his esteem for the duke de Mayenne, by shewing particular marks of respect and kindness to his son.

So much goodness, united with so much heroism and magnanimity, had charms in the eyes of Henry's enemies that were irresistible. The reduction of Laon, and his generous treatment of the inhabitants and garrison, were quickly followed by the voluntary surrender of Chateau-Thiery, Amiens, and Cambray. The duke of Lorrain, who from the beginning had given his assistance to the League, chose now to be at peace with a prince, in whose favour fortune, and his own merits, had produced so remarkable a revolution. And the duke of Guise, whom the Spaniards had tantalized with a glimpse of royalty, but had afterwards neglected, moved partly by this consideration, and partly by his admiration of the King, entered into a treaty of reconciliation with him; and having delivered to him the towns of Rheims, Vitry, Rocroix, and several other places in Champaigne, he was rewarded by Henry with the government of Provence^f.

^{Siege of Groningen by prince Maurice.} During the course of these events, so adverse to Philip's views in France, prince Maurice was engaged in the most important enterprise which he had hitherto undertaken, the siege of Groningen. That city, though almost surrounded with the

^f D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. ci. Meteren, lib. xiii. Bentivoglio, ann. 1594; Sully's Memoirs, lib. vi.

territories of the States, had been preserved till now in its allegiance to Philip, by Verdugo, a Spanish officer of great abilities, with whose assistance the Catholic part of the inhabitants had been able to keep the Protestants under subjection. Jealous however of their liberty, they had never consented to admit any Spanish garrison within their walls, but three thousand of the citizens, trained to the use of arms, had been enlisted in the King's service for the defence of the town, while nine hundred of his foreign troops were permitted to take up their quarters in the suburbs. 1594.

Maurice had long meditated the reduction of Groningen, not only because it would be of itself an acquisition of great value to the confederacy, but because it was the only place of consequence in those parts under the Spanish dominion, and furnished an easy entrance to the Spaniards into the northern provinces. Much pains had been taken, and great exertions made by Verdugo for its security. Many bloody encounters had passed between him and the forces of the States, in which, from the smallness of his numbers, and not from the want either of bravery or conduct, he was generally unsuccessful ; and Maurice, powerfully seconded in all his operations by his cousin count William of Nassau, had at length reduced Verdugo to the necessity of quitting the province, and had made himself master of almost every pass by which the citizens could receive assistance or supplies.

They had not neglected to inform the archduke of the imminent danger to which they were exposed. At their request, the emperor of Germany had transmitted to Philip a representation, importuning, that although they desired nothing so much as to maintain their allegiance, and had preserved it long amidst much greater hardships and difficulties than any of his other subjects had endured, yet if the army were not immediately sent to their assistance, they would soon find it necessary to open their gates to the enemy. Philip, far from disregarding their application, made them the most gracious and flattering reply ; and sent orders to the archduke to postpone every other object in the Netherlands to the relief of Groningen. But the greatest part of his forces were at this time engaged in the war in Picardy ; and the remainder having mutinied against their officers, on account of their want of pay, refused to obey the governor's commands.

Prince Maurice therefore applied to the prosecution of the siege, with very little apprehension of meeting with any interruption from the Spaniards, although, agreeably to his usual cautious maxims, he fortified not only his quarters, but likewise the several passes which led to them from the southern provinces. By beginning to open his trenches at a distance from the town, the siege was somewhat retarded, but he thereby prevented the loss of men which would otherwise have been sustained. On the third of June his batteries were unmasked, and soon afterwards all the outworks were laid in ruins. The besieged, alarmed with the rapidity of his progress, called the foreign troops, which were quartered in the suburbs, to their assistance. The defence was conducted for several weeks with the highest spirit and intrepidity, and much blood was spilt. But Maurice having blown up a ravelin, which was one of the principal defences of the place, the courage of the inhabitants began to fail, and there was nothing to be heard but complaints of the ingratitude of the King, in thus abandoning to their enterprising enemy a people so distinguished for their attachment and fidelity.

Their chief magistrate, Van Balen, who had long been secretly averse to the Spanish government, improved with great dexterity the opportunity which their present temper afforded him. He studied to confirm them in their sentiments of the King's ingratitude : he represented to them the

^{1594.} folly of flattering themselves with the hopes of relief from a prince, who was more intent upon conquering the dominions of others, than providing for the security of his own. He painted in strong colours the miseries which they must suffer, if either the siege were to be prolonged, or the town to be taken by assault ; and by expatiating on the advantages which would accrue to them from acceding to the union of Utrecht ; he endeavoured to make them sensible, that if freedom from a foreign yoke was an object to be desired, it was infinitely more for their interest to submit to the generous enemy, who now besieged them, than even to be delivered from the siege.

These exhortations made the desired impression even upon the minds of those who were most attached to the Catholic religion. That attachment had been long their only tie to the Spanish government ; and it was overcome at this time by their indignation on account of Philip's negligence in providing for their defence, joined to their desire of participating of that civil liberty, which had proved the source of so much prosperity and happiness to the confederated provinces.

^{Groningen united to the confederacy.} A deputation of the principal inhabitants was sent to treat of a surrender ; and the prince, without hesitation, granted them the most advantageous terms. The city of Groningen was de-

clared to be henceforth a member of the union of Utrecht. All the exemptions and ancient privileges of the inhabitants were confirmed ; the civil government of the place was allowed to remain on the same footing as before, and liberty of conscience was established, with this restriction, that no other religion but the reformed should be publicly exercised. The citizens, on the other hand, engaged to acknowledge the supreme authority of the States ; to submit to the general laws of the union ; to contribute their share of the public expences ; and to admit such a garrison into the town as the States should judge necessary for its security. The foreign soldiers were permitted to depart with their arms and baggage. The capitulation was signed on the 23d of July ; and on the same day prince Maurice entered the town. He remained in it for some time till certain articles of the capitulation were executed, after which, having committed the government to his kinsman, count William of Nassau, he set out for the Hague ^{g.}

^{Mutiny of the Spanish and Italian soldiers.} While Philip's power suffered so great a diminution in the northern provinces, his affairs in Brabant were daily more and more involved in disorder and confusion. The archduke had,

with the utmost difficulty, raised money to satisfy the Walloon and Spanish mutineers ; but no sooner had these men returned to their duty, than the Italians, to whom the same arrears were due, resolved to employ the same means to effectuate their payment. Many of the officers concurred with the private men in forming this resolution, and they put it instantly in execution, by seizing on the town of Sichen, where a part of their number had been stationed. They were joined by soldiers from all the garrisons in the neighbourhood, who continued flocking to them, till they amounted to two thousand horse and foot.

^{The mutineers protected by Maurice.} Not satisfied with laying the country round the town under contribution, they spread themselves over the province, made excursions to the very gates of Brussels, where the governor resided, and plundered the people with as much cruelty as if they had been engaged in open war. The governor having tried the power of persuasion without effect, resolved to employ force to reduce them ;

^g Meteren, lib. xvii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i. Grotius, lib. iii.

and for this purpose he sent the Spanish troops which he had lately pacified, under Lewis de Velasco, to besiege Sichen. In the beginning of this sedition, prince Maurice had made the mutineers an offer of shelter and protection in the territories of the States, and they readily agreed to accept this offer in case they should find it necessary ; but informed him, that they would defend themselves in Sichen as long as they were able, against the Spaniards. They accordingly did so, and made several desperate sallies, in which many on both sides were slain. Finding however that the place was too weak to be long defended against an enemy so much superior in number, they retired under the fortifications of Breda and San Gertrudenberg, where provisions were sold to them by the subjects of the States. The intention of Maurice in this singular treatment of an enemy, was only to prolong the term of their His motive. obedience. He made no attempt to persuade them to enter into the service of the confederacy, but gave permission to the archduke to send an ambassador to treat with them ; and when, after a tedious negociation, they had agreed to take up their quarters in Tirlemont, and to remain there till their demands were satisfied, without renewing their hostilities, Maurice readily allowed them to depart. They required a Spanish nobleman to be given as a hostage for the fulfilment of the governor's promises ; and so great was the disorder of the King's finances at this period, that these troops were suffered to remain inactive at Tirlemont for near a year before their arrears were paid^b.

Before the expiration of this term, the governor was seized with a hectic fever, of which he died on the twentieth of February, in the forty-second year of his age. He named the count of Fuentes for his successor, and his choice was soon after ratified by the King. This nobleman having been sent into the Netherlands a little before the death of the duke of Parma, had, agreeably to Philip's instructions, during the government of count Mansveldt and the archduke, possessed a principal share in the administration. By his advice, or more properly by his authority, count Mansveldt had published a barbarous edict, commanding all prisoners to be put to death ; and ordering the King's troops, who, in their excursions into the territories of the States, had been satisfied for several years past with levying contributions, henceforth to lay waste the country with fire and sword.

The States, in return, published a manifesto, in which they expressed their abhorrence of this barbarity ; but at the same time declared, that if the governor did not recal his edict against a certain time, they would retaliate the cruelty which it prescribed upon the troops and subjects of the King. This measure had been urged by Fuentes, on the pretence of shortening the duration of the war, although the experience of his kinsman, the duke of Alva, might have convinced him, that, considering the strength to which the confederacy had attained, it would serve only to increase the calamities of the war, and to render it perpetual. Count Mansveldt came soon to be sensible, that these must be the consequences, and either revoked his edict, or gave orders to prevent it from being carried into execution.

Fuentes however still continued to exercise an unlimited influence in the government. The Flemish nobility complained bitterly, as in the time of cardinal Granvelle, of the insignificance to which they were reduced, and before the death of the archduke they had given some striking proofs of their discontent. This discontent was greatly heightened when the count was appointed governor;

Death of Ernest;

Fuentes named g^o vernor.

^b Grotius, lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xvii. p. 581. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i.

Discontent of the Flemish nobles.

1594. they saw then how little sincerity there had been in those soothing promises which the King had made them some years before, when they consented to the return of the foreign troops. They perceived how little trust and confidence he reposed in them, and were sensible at last of the truth of what the prince of Orange had so often told them, that, by their agreement with the duke of Parma, they would reduce their country to the miserable state of a province of Spain. The duke d'Arscot and count Charles of Mansveldt, who had reason to expect to have been preferred before Fuentes, would not submit to the indignity put upon them, but resigned their employments, and left the Netherlands. The duke d'Arscot died afterwards in Venice, and count Mansveldt in Hungary, where he commanded the emperor's army against the Turks.

Vigorous conduct of Fuentes. Fuentes in the mean time entered upon the exercise of his office, and notwithstanding the prejudices which the Flemings seem justly to have entertained against him, he soon discovered that his abilities were not unequal to the charge with which he was invested. He applied with great success to quell the mutinous spirit of the army, and in a few months put it upon a much more respectable footing, both as to discipline and numbers.

Declaration of war between France and Spain. Philip had greater occasion now than ever for abilities and vigour in the person to whom he committed the government of the Netherlands. The league in France was about to expire, notwithstanding his exertions to prevent it; and the French monarch, being firmly seated on his throne, declared war against him, prohibiting all commerce with his subjects, and granting liberty to the French to invade and plunder, and take possession of whatever dominions belonged to the crown of Spain.

Henry's motives. This measure was condemned by many, as being highly inexpedient at the present juncture, on account of the exhausted state

to which his kingdom was reduced by the long continuance of the civil wars, and no person was more sensible of the strength of this objection than the king himself; but he believed that, in the present temper of the Catholic king, peace could not be obtained from him upon honourable terms. He was persuaded, that war with the Spaniards must of necessity continue some time longer; and he thought, that as nothing would contribute more to extinguish the flames of civil discord than a foreign war, it would be easier to interest his Catholic subjects in the prosecution of it, if it were regarded as a war between the crowns, to which political motives had given birth, than if it were suffered to remain on its present footing, and considered as carried on by Philip for the sake of religion. It is not indeed improbable, that personal animosity added force to these incitements. Philip had ever treated Henry in the most contemptuous manner; and under the mask of religion, had endeavoured first to exclude him, and afterwards to expel him from the throne. Henry detested that artifice and duplicity in Philip's character, of which, in his late attempt to procure the abolition of the Salic law, he had given such incontestible evidence; and the terms in which his declaration of war was expressed, demonstrate, that resentment had, on the present occasion, a considerable influence on his conduct.

Philip's answer to this declaration was perfectly conformable to his character. All his interferences in the affairs of France had proceeded, he said, from his concern for the prosperity of the people, and the security of the Catholic faith; and he declared, that his intention now was not to enter into war with the crown or nation of France, but only to perse-

vere in protecting the true Catholics of that kingdom from the oppression of the prince of Bearn and his adherents.ⁱ 1595.

Both kings had been employed, before their declaration of war, in preparing for the recommencement of hostilities ; and Henry, besides his domestic preparations, had entered into a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with the United Provinces. Agreeably to an article of this treaty, the States sent a body of horse and foot, under Philip, count of Nassau, to invade the province of Luxemburg. Their enterprises were for some time attended with success ; but Fuentes, having dispatched the brave Verdugo with superior forces to oppose them, they were obliged, after several encounters, to quit the province ; and were soon after recalled, and stationed near the frontier of Brabant, where it was expected they would be of equal service to the French monarch, by detaining the Spaniards in the Netherlands.

The army of the States however, even after it was joined by these troops, was not able to furnish full employment to those which the governor had prepared. He left an army under Mondragone to check the progress of prince Maurice, and set out himself for Picardy with the rest of his forces. His first enterprise was the siege of Catelet, of which he made himself master in a few weeks, though it was strongly fortified, and bravely defended by the garrison.

During this siege, Fuentes had reason to flatter himself with the hopes of acquiring possession of the castle and town of Ham without bloodshed. The castle was held by an officer called d'Orvilliers, and the town by his half-brother, whose name was Gomeron. These two men had been violent partisans of the league, and the latter resolved to deliver the town to the Spaniards rather than to the king of France, but he demanded from Fuentes a reward of twenty thousand crowns for the town, and a still higher reward, if he should prevail upon his brother (which he engaged to do) to deliver up the castle. The count readily agreed to these terms, and paid him the twenty thousand crowns upon his admitting a thousand Spanish troops into the town ; but required Gomeron himself and his two younger brothers to remain with him as hostages, till the castle likewise should be put into his possession. To this Gomeron consented, from a fond persuasion that his brother would imitate his example, rather than expose *him* and his other brothers to the resentment of the Spaniards, especially as their mother was in the castle, whose intreaties he expected d'Orvilliers would be unable to resist. But d'Orvilliers chose rather to abandon his brothers to their fate, than betray his charge to the enemies of his country ; and he admitted the duke de Bouillon into the castle, with a numerous body of the King's troops, who attacked the Spaniards in the town, and either put them to the sword or took them prisoners. The mother of Gomeron, now trembling with anxiety for her children's preservation, came to Fuentes, and represented, that d'Orvilliers repented of what he had done, and was willing to deliver the castle to him, if he would come himself with his army to receive it. The count believing her representation to be true, the more readily as she herself seemed entirely convinced of the truth of it, advanced with his forces towards Ham ; but finding that the mother had been deceived, and that, in order to avoid her importunity, d'Orvilliers had left the place, and resigned his government to another, he was inflamed with rage, and put Gomeron to death in presence of the army. This unhappy man did not perhaps deserve so severe a punishment from the hands of Fuentes ; but it was due to the treachery and egregious folly into which his avarice had betrayed him ^k.

Prosecution of the war.

Siege of Catelet.

Affairs of Gomeron and d'Orvilliers.

ⁱ D'Avila, lib. xiv.

^k Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. ii.

1595.
Siege of
Dourlens.

From Ham the count conducted his troops, after they had rested some days, to lay siege to Dourlens. This town being near the frontier of the Netherlands, was strongly fortified and garrisoned by a considerable number of select troops. Still however it was necessary, in order to prevent it from falling into the enemy's hands, that the garrison should be augmented ; and no sooner had the marshals Bouillon and Villars, whom the King had sent to watch the motions of the Spanish army, heard that Dourlens was invested, than they assembled all the troops in the neighbourhood, amounting to a thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, and advanced towards the town, in hopes of being able to force their way through the enemy's entrenchments ; but Fuentes having received intelligence of their design, left a part of his forces to guard his trenches, and marched out with the rest, in order of battle, to an advantageous situation at a little distance from the town. When the duke of Bouillon observed Fuentes so well prepared for his defence, he counselled marshal Villars to retire ; but that intrepid general, whose courage was ever too ardent and impetuous, refused to comply, and still continued to advance, till his troops were almost surrounded by the Spaniards. A desperate and bloody battle ensued ; in which, from their great inferiority in respect of number, the French were almost entirely cut to pieces, Villars himself was slain, and the cavalry, after great loss, were obliged to retire.

During the combat, the garrison sallied out upon the troops which had been left to defend the camp and trenches ; but through the wise precaution which had been taken, the Spaniards proved victorious ; and Fuentes resumed, with fresh spirit and vigour, the operations of the siege. Among the besieged there were more than three hundred gentlemen, who inspired the garrison with the same generous spirit by which they themselves were actuated, and defended the town for several days with extraordinary courage and resolution. But their skill and conduct were not equal to the bravery which they displayed. In an assault on the thirty-first of July they were overpowered by the assailants, and almost the whole garrison, amounting to more than a thousand men, with their governor the count of Dinan, were put to the sword.

Siege of
Cambray.

Fuentes, emboldened by his success, resolved next to lay siege to Cambray ; the reduction of which was the principal object of his present expedition.

This important city had been wrested from the Spaniards, as is above related, by the duke of Anjou ; and Anjou had bequeathed it to his mother Catherine of Medicis, by whom a French gentleman of the name of Balagny had been appointed governor both of the town and citadel. Balagny, taking advantage of the troubles in France, had for several years acknowledged no superior ; and as he had studied to maintain some degree of neutrality between the contending parties, he had been suffered to act as sovereign both of the city and its territory. But apprehending, after the discomfiture of the League, that it was necessary for him to make a choice either of the king of France or Spain for his protector, he agreed to acknowledge his dependence on the French monarch, on condition, that he should be permitted to enjoy under him possession of the sovereignty, with the title of the prince of Cambray ; and to these terms Henry the more readily consented, as he dreaded, that if he rejected them, they would be granted by the king of Spain.

Balagny, being thus confirmed in his possession, spared no expence or pains in strengthening the fortifications of the place. The garrison amounted to three thousand foot and six hundred horse, the greatest part of which were French troops of the most unquestionable bravery. The

town was strong, and it was well furnished with military stores and provisions. 1595.

Determined by these considerations, some of the principal officers in the Spanish army endeavoured to persuade the count de Fuentes to relinquish his design, by representing, that before he could accomplish it, either the winter season would overtake him, or the French monarch, being disengaged from his enemies in other quarters, would arrive with a superior army, and attack him after his troops were diminishing in number, and exhausted with the operations of the siege ; but Fuentes, ambitious to distinguish his administration by so important an acquisition, and elated by the success with which his enterprises had been hitherto attended, refused to listen to these remonstrances ; and, having received a great augmentation of forces from the neighbouring provinces, he began his operations without delay. They were carried on with a degree of skill and vigour which would have reflected honour on the greatest generals of the age ; and notwithstanding the most intrepid defence, conducted with much prudence by the celebrated de Vic, whom Henry had sent with a reinforcement of troops to the assistance of the besieged, the count opened his batteries in a few weeks so near the town, that some of its principal defences were destroyed, and a great part of the wall was laid in ruins. Still however his success was doubtful. He encountered the most discouraging difficulties in furnishing his troops with provisions ; and nothing but the most unconquerable resolution, added to the dread of tarnishing the glory which he had already acquired, could have prevented him from abandoning his attempt.

But he was saved from that mortification, by the inhabitants of the town, who having been long accustomed to the mild administration of their archbishops, had borne with extreme impatience the haughty imperious behaviour of Balagny ; and had been almost reduced to despair, by the extortion, rapine, and insolence of his wife, by whom he suffered himself to be entirely governed. The citizens had secretly sent a deputation of their number to the French monarch, intreating him to deliver them from the yoke of their oppressor, and offering on that condition to submit to his authority, and to receive a garrison of his troops. But through the influence of the famous Gabrielle d'Etrées, whom Balagny had gained over to his interest, Henry not only refused to comply with their request, but confirmed Balagny in his usurped authority.

Cambray
given up by
the citizens.

The inhabitants, inflamed now with resentment against the King, as well as against Balagny, resolved to embrace the first opportunity of putting themselves under the dominion of their former master the king of Spain ; and they were confirmed in their resolution, by the numerous ecclesiastics in the town, who hoped by this measure to effectuate the re-establishment of the archbishop, whom Balagny had expelled. Having formed their plan, they delayed the execution of it, till Balagny and De Vic were wholly occupied in taking measures against an assault, which they believed to be intended by the Spaniards. At that time they ran to arms, and made themselves masters of one of the gates of the city. De Vic, Balagny, and his wife, spared no pains to divert them from their purpose, but all their endeavours proved ineffectual. Two of the principal citizens were immediately sent to Fuentes, with an offer to surrender the town on the following conditions, to which he readily agreed : That the soldiers should be restrained from plunder : That all past offences should be forgiven : That the citizens should enjoy their wonted privileges, and the archbishop be restored to his ancient jurisdiction and authority.

1595. The garrison immediately retired into the citadel, where they expected to have been able to defend themselves for a considerable time. But having found, upon searching the magazines, that there was hardly provisions enough to support them for three days, they agreed on the first summons to capitulate. The wife of Balagny had reduced them to this necessity, by selling at an exorbitant price, without her husband's knowledge, the provisions which had been laid up in store.

During the siege, this woman had discovered a degree of spirit, capacity, and courage, above her sex ; but being unable to bear the consciousness of that egregious folly into which her avarice had betrayed her, and which was now attended with consequences so fatal to her ambition, she was overwhelmed with anguish and despair ; and refusing to take either medicine or food, she died miserably, before the citadel was delivered to the Spaniards.

The capitulation was signed on the seventh of October, and the garrison marched out with all the honours of war upon the ninth ; immediately after which, Fuentes having stationed five hundred Spaniards in the citadel, and two thousand Germans in the town, set out for the Netherlands with the rest of his forces, and put them into winter-quarters in Flanders, Artois, and Hainault¹.

The reader will not suppose that the active spirit of the Affairs in French monarch could be unemployed during the course of these Burgundy. disastrous events. He was deeply affected by the loss of the important towns which had been conquered by Fuentes, and would have marched in person to their relief, had he not believed that his presence was still more necessary in another part of his dominions. For Philip having resolved to prosecute the war with vigour in different quarters at the same time, had ordered Velasco, the constable of Castile and governor of Milan, to lead an army of ten thousand men into Burgundy ; and these troops were, upon their arrival in Franche Comté, joined by the duke de Mayenne with a thousand foot and four hundred horse. This army was greatly superior to any which marshal Biron, who commanded in these parts, could assemble to oppose it ; and Henry dreaded that the province of Burgundy would be speedily over-run. Having therefore sent orders to his troops in different parts to follow him, he set out himself at the head of one thousand eight hundred horse and foot, with an intention to harass the enemy, till the rest of his army should arrive.

The Spaniards had passed the Saône, and advanced as far as Fentaine-Française, when Henry attacked them on their march, with a degree of impetuosity and ardour that filled Velasco with astonishment. The King was bravely supported on this occasion by the marquis de Mirebeau, the count de Gramont, and several others of his nobility ; but above all, by the intrepid Biron, who fought long after he was covered with the blood that flowed from a wound which he had received in the beginning of the engagement. The King, by his exhortations, and still more by his example, inflamed his troops to a degree of madness. At the head of his squadrons, he plunged sword in hand into the midst of the enemy, broke through their ranks, and threw their van into confusion.

Had Velasco ordered his whole army to advance, it is impossible but Henry must have been surrounded and overpowered. But his courage on this occasion supplied the want both of caution and of numbers. Velasco, intimidated by the unexampled boldness which he had seen displayed, gave

¹ D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part iii, lib. ii.

orders for a retreat, and left the King in possession of the field of battle. Early next morning he repassed the Saone, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of the duke de Mayenne, who had procured certain intelligence of the strength of the enemy. Mayenne then intreated Velasco to leave him a part of the forces to raise the siege of Dijon, which had been invested by a party of the royalists, and to enable him to defend such other towns on this side of the river as were still in his possession. But this likewise the Spanish general refused, and continued to retire till he reached the town of Gray ; where he fortified his camp in the strongest manner, with a resolution to act only on the defensive, in case the royal army should advance.

1595.

Velasco, who was utterly unpractised in the military art, appears to have been strongly actuated with a dread of the superior skill and bravery of the King. But the duke de Mayenne likewise perceived, in his conduct towards *him*, on this occasion, manifest symptoms of diffidence and distrust. This the Duke could not help attributing to Valasco's instructions from the court of Spain ; and he could not doubt, that through the ill offices of the Spanish ministers in France, Philip had conceived some fresh jealousy of his designs. He was therefore thrown into great perplexity, while he believed that he should ere long be abandoned by the Spaniards, as he had already been by most of his adherents in France ; and could hardly suppose that now, when his power was reduced so low, he would be able to obtain advantageous conditions from the King. After long deliberation, he formed the resolution of going to Madrid, to justify his conduct to Philip against the misrepresentations of his ministers. But he was saved from that fatal step, by the invincible goodness of the French monarch, who, having been informed of his distress, sent Lignerac, a friend and confidant of the Duke, to assure him of his esteem, and to inform him, that he was still ready to receive him into favour, and to grant him the most honourable terms.

Reconcile-
ment of
Mayenne
with the
King.

Henry did not require an immediate submission from him, because the Duke had often declared, that he would never acknowledge his authority till the Pope should grant him absolution ; but he desired that he should retire to Chalons, one of his own towns, and wait there for that event, in full confidence that no advantage should be taken in the mean time, either of himself or his adherents.

Mayenne, who knew with how much safety he might rely on Henry's promise, and was deeply penetrated with a sense of the generous offer which had been made to him, accepted of it without hesitation, and left the Spanish camp.

Soon after this agreement, Henry advanced to the banks of the Saone with a resolution to transport his forces, consisting of seven thousand foot and two thousand horse, into Franche Comté, where Velasco lay intrenched. In spite of the troops which had been planted to dispute his passage, he forded the river about thee miles below the town of Gray, and then led his army towards the enemy ; but finding their intrenchments too strongly fortifyed to be attacked with any probability of success, he turned aside, and began to lay waste the country, or to levy contributions from the inhabitants. Velasco remained still within his camp. At length the Swiss Cantons, as friends and protectors of the people of Franche Comté, interposed their influence. At their desire, the King readily desisted from his depredations and having led back his troops into his own dominions, he resolved to march as soon as possible, to the frontiers of the Netherlands.

He was in daily expectation, at this time, of receiving the Pope's absolution, which had been much longer delayed than he expected, through the violent opposition of the Spanish ministers at

The pope
grants
Henry ab-
solution.

^{1595.} Rome ; but Clement, now perceiving that Henry was firmly established on the throne, and dreading that by a longer delay he might exhaust his patience, and provoke him to throw off his allegiance to the Holy See, resolved to run the risk of giving offence to Philip, and on the 16th of September pronounced the sentence of absolution. This event gave inexpressible joy to all the true Catholics of France ; and the treaty of agreement, which had been begun with the duke de Mayenne, was soon after brought to the desired conclusion. Such other members of the League as had not already submitted, imitated the example of their leader. Internal peace was every where established, and Henry had leisure to apply his whole attention to the Spanish war ^{m.}

The transactions in the Netherlands this year were less important and interesting than in any former campaign since the commencement of the war, which was principally owing to the

^{Affairs of the Nether. lands.} governor's prudent choice of the vigilant, experienced Mondragone, as commander in chief of the forces during his absence. About the middle of July, prince Maurice besieged the town of Groll ; but Mondragone, having augmented his army, by making draughts from the garrisons of the neighbouring towns, advanced towards him with so much celerity, that not having had time to complete his entrenchments, Maurice was obliged to raise the siege. The two armies lay long in sight of each other ; and as they were nearly equal in strength, and both generals exerted an equal degree of vigilance and circumspection, they effectually prevented one another from undertaking any important enterprise.

There were frequent skirmishes with various success ; but the only one which deserves to be mentioned was a rencounter near the river Lippe, where Maurice ordered count Philip de Nassau, with five hundred horse, to lie in ambush in a wood, to intercept a party of the enemy which had been sent out for provisions. Of this Mondragone had received intelligence and with great secrecy stationed a body of horse still more numerous in another wood, at a little distance from the first. When the Spanish foragers arrived at the ambuscade, they were attacked on every side, and repulsed with considerable slaughter ; but being speedily reinforced by their friends in the neighbouring woods, they returned to the charge. The Dutch troops, astonished to find themselves caught in their own snare, were at last overpowered by numbers ; three hundred of them, with their commander, were killed, and the rest obliged to save themselves by flight.

This was the last memorable event of the campaign, although the two generals remained in sight of each other till the end of October, when they broke up their camps, and put their troops into winter-quarters ; and Mondragone died not long after at the age of ninety-two, having to the last preserved sufficient vigour to fulfil, with distinguished reputation, all the duties of a commander. He had served in the Netherlands near fifty years, and had a principal share in almost every military enterprise, yet he had the singular fortune to escape without a wound ^{n.}

^m D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, anno 1595. Perefixe Elzevir, p. 230, &c.

ⁿ Grotius, lib. iv. Bentivoglio part iii. lib. ii.

During the course of the transactions recorded in this book, the Dutch performed their first expedition to India ; but as their acquisitions at this time were inconsiderable, and their most important conquests over Philip's subjects in that distant region were not achieved till several years after the present period, I have reserved the relation of the whole for the history of the subsequent reign.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXIV.

FROM the capacity and vigour of which the count de Fuentes had given so many proofs since his accession to the government, there was reason to expect, that he would have been suffered long to retain possession of it ; but Philip having from the beginning intended that he should continue governor only for one year, had immediately after the death of Ernest fixed upon the cardinal archduke Albert for his successor.

This prince, nephew to Philip, and youngest brother ^{to} to the Emperor, had been intrusted with the regency of Portugal. By his prudent administration he had acquired universal esteem ; and Philip, who entertained the highest opinion of his abilities, believed that no person was better qualified either to prosecute the war with vigour, or by an accommodation to bring it to the desired conclusion.

He arrived at Brussels about the middle of February, one thousand five hundred and ninety six, having brought with him a reinforcement of Italian and Spanish troops, and which was of still greater utility, a sum of money, amounting to fifteen hundred thousand crowns ^a.

^{1595.}
The archduke Albert, governor of the Netherlands.

a Albert likewise brought with him, at this time, Philip, eldest son of the late prince of Orange, who, as above related, had been seized by the duke of Alva, and sent to Spain, where he had been educated in the Catholic religion, and detained for almost thirty years. By setting him at liberty on this occasion it is not improbable that the court of Spain expected to have created some division between the prince, and his brother Maurice, that might have proved prejudicial to the United Provinces. But Maurice readily yielded to him all that he possessed of their father's fortune ; and the States, perceiving that the Archduke, besides restoring to him his lands in Brabant and Burgundy, treated him with much esteem and confidence, refused to grant him permission to fix his residence within their territories, or even to visit his kinsmen there, till the year 1608, a short time before the conclusion of the truce with Spain.

He married Eleanor of Bourbon, a daughter of the prince of Condé ; by the interest of whose friends, he recovered possession of his principality of Orange, in the kingdom of France. He lived on amicable terms with his relations in the Netherlands, but being sincere in his profession of the Catholic religion he seems not to have entertained any resentment for the injurious treatment he had received from the king of Spain : nor does he appear to have possessed any share of that bold and enterprising genius, by which his brothers were so eminently distinguished. He died without issue at Brussels, in the year 1618. Du Maurier.

1596. The count de Fuentes, unwilling to act in a subordinate station, in a country where he had enjoyed the chief command, resigned the government to the archduke, and set out for Spain.

Albert immediately applied himself to make the preparations necessary for a new campaign ; and conformably to his instructions from Philip, he turned his principal attention to the war with France. His first object was the relief of La Fere in Picardy, which had remained in the hands of the Spanish ever since it was delivered by the League to the duke of Parma.

Towards the end of the preceding year, it had been invested by the French monarch ; but as it was strongly fortified, and the garrison consisted of chosen troops, commanded by Alvaro Osorio, a Spanish officer of distinguished reputation, Henry was satisfied with blocking it up so as to prevent the entrance of supplies. This he accomplished with little difficulty. The blockade had lasted for several weeks, and Osorio had conveyed intelligence to the archduke, that if he was not speedily relieved, the want of provisions would render it impossible for him to hold out for any considerable time. The Spanish army was assembled at Valenciennes, and almost ready to begin its march : but the more the governor and his council of war reflected on the difficulties which must attend the attempting to raise the siege, by marching directly to La Fere, the more insurmountable they appeared. For they could not, it was observed, approach to that town, without leaving behind them St. Quintin, Ham, Guise, Peronne, and several other fortified places, the garrisons of which would harass them on their march, break up the roads, and intercept their convoys of provisions. An impassable marsh rendered the town inaccessible on every side, except where the French monarch had strongly fortified his intrenchments. Even if they should come in sight of the town, yet, before they could enter it, they must either attack the enemy within their camp, or engage with their whole army in the open field. They could not attack them in their camp, without exposing themselves to almost certain ruin ; Henry would not give them an opportunity of fighting in the field, unless his army, which was increasing daily, were superior to theirs, and the consequences of a defeat would prove fatal not only to the army, but to all the Spanish conquests in France, and perhaps too to the King's authority in the Netherlands.

Determined by these considerations, the archduke formed the resolution of besieging some other frontier town of sufficient importance to induce Henry either to raise the siege of La Fere, or compensate for the loss of that place, in case it should be obliged to capitulate.

He hesitated for some time whether he should lead his army against St. Quintin or Peronne ; but he soon laid aside the thoughts of attacking either of these places, and resolved to undertake the reduction of Calais, which he believed would be an easier, as well as a much more important acquisition.

The Sieur de Rône, a native of France, and formerly a violent partisan of the League, who had entered into the service of Spain against his King and country. He was a man of a dark intriguing spirit, whom no tie could bind but interest ; but he was bold and active, sagacious and penetrating, and eminently distinguished for his skill in the art of war. He had received intelligence that Calais, like many other towns in the kingdom, had been much neglected during the civil war ; that although the King had ordered the fortifications of it to be examined, yet his other occupations had not allowed him to bestow that attention on it which its

importance deserved ; and that, as some of the works were ruinous, so the garrison was too small to defend a place of so great extent. For these reasons, the governor approved highly of De Rône's proposal, and he committed the execution of it to himself.

In order to prevent the enemy from suspecting what was intended, it was communicated only to two or three of the principal officers ; and the archduke gave out that his design was to relieve La Fere. He accordingly began his march towards that place, while De Rône turned suddenly to Calais with a body of select troops, and attacked the fort and bridge of Nieulai, which commands the entrance to the town by land. He made himself master of it with very little difficulty, and then proceeded to attack the fort of Risbane, which stands at the mouth of the harbour, and was of the greatest importance for the preservation of the place. The garrison of this fort made a more vigorous resistance than that of Nieulai ; but no sooner had De Rône opened a battery against them, by which only a few were killed, than they were seized with a sudden panic, and offered to capitulate. This rapid progress exceeded De Rône's most sanguine expectations, and it gave him the greater joy, as not long after the Risbane had surrendered, some ships with troops for the reinforcement of the garrison, which had arrived from Boulogne, finding the entrance to the harbour in his possession, were obliged to return.

The archduke, who was in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, when he received intelligence of this fortunate commencement of his enterprise, set out immediately with his whole army for Calais, and pitched his camp in such a situation as he hoped would prevent the approach of the enemy.

He first attacked the suburbs, and took them by assault ; nor did he encounter greater difficulty in making himself master of the town. His cannon had hardly begun to play upon it, when Vidossan, the governor, retired with the garrison into the castle ; and quickly despairing of being able to defend himself in it, any better than he had done in the town, he offered to give it up in six days, if he was not relieved before the expiration of that time. The archduke, in order to save his troops and the fortifications of the place, readily agreed to this proposal, never doubting that he was fully able to prevent the entrance of any reinforcement either by sea or land.

The King, in the mean time, heard with much anxiety of the progress of the Spanish arms. But the blockade of La Fere having continued for several months, he expected that the garrison must be reduced in a few days to the necessity of capitulating ; and he thought it probable, that after finishing his present enterprise (which he could not abandon without losing all the expence and labour which he had bestowed upon it), he would arrive in time to raise the siege of Calais. He went himself however with a part of his cavalry to Boulogne, that he might be ready to administer such assistance to the garrison of Calais, as might enable them to hold out till his whole army should be at liberty to advance to their relief.

Upon his arrival in Boulogne, he was informed of the capitulation above mentioned. He lamented bitterly that he had not brought with him a greater proportion of his troops ; but finding it necessary to make some exertion without delay, he prevailed on Campagnol, the governor of Boulogne, with three hundred chosen men, to attempt to force his way in the night through the Spanish lines.

This arduous undertaking was executed without the loss of a single man ; and Campagnol had no sooner arrived in the castle, than having read the King's orders to the garrison, he required them all to swear that they would defend the fortress to the last.

In the evening of the sixth day of the truce, they were summoned to

Henry at-
tempts in
vain to raise
the siege.

1596. fulfil their engagement ; when they replied that they had received the reinforcement which they expected. But it soon appeared how unequal they were to the defence of so weak a place, against so numerous an enemy.

Early next morning De Rône began to play off his batteries, and in a few hours a great part of the wall was laid in ruins.

An Italian regiment, through whose negligence Campagnol Calais taken by storm. had got into the fort, was ordered to advance to the assault, and was followed by the Walloons and Spaniards. The garrison received them in the breach with undaunted courage, and, after an obstinate engagement, in which great numbers fell on both sides, compelled them to retire. But the Italians returned immediately to the charge ; and at last, through the great superiority of their numbers, they overpowered the garrison, entered along with them into the fort, and put all of them to the sword, except Campagnol, and a few others, who took refuge in the church, and afterwards surrendered at discretion. In this manner did Calais fall into the hands of the Spaniards in less than three weeks after De Rône had begun the siege. The King left Boulogne, after having taken precautions for the preservation of that place, and returned to La Fere. And the archduke, after staying eight or ten days in Calais to repair the fortifications, led his troops against the town of Ardres.

The garrison of Ardres consisted of two thousand five hundred men, commanded by the marquis of Belin, the lieutenant-governor of the province, and by the sieur de Annebourg, governor of the town, an officer of distinguished courage and capacity. By frequent vigorous sallies, the operations of the besieged were greatly retarded. At length however they took the suburbs by assault, and De Rône began to batter the walls of the town. But considering the strength of the place, and the number and bravery of the garrison, he had little reason to hope for success before the conclusion of the siege of La Fere ; when there was no room to doubt that the King would advance without loss of time to the relief of Ardres.

Notwithstanding this encouraging circumstance, the marquis de Belin called a council of war, and urged with great earnestness the necessity of capitulating ; alleging that it was impossible to hold out till the King's arrival, and that the sooner they submitted, they would the more easily obtain advantageous terms. This proposal was rejected with great disdain by the sieur de Annebourg, and all the officers in the council. But the cowardly Belin, availing himself of that superior authority with which he was invested as lieutenant-governor of the province, capitulated, notwithstanding their remonstrances, on a condition to which the archduke readily agreed, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war. La Fere having surrendered on the day immediately preceding, the King had already set out for Ardres, and as his army had of late received a considerable augmentation, he entertained the most sanguine hopes of being able to raise the siege. When a messenger informed him of the surrender, he was inflamed with indignation, and ordered Belin to be tried for his life. At the importunity of his friends, he afterwards stopped the prosecution ; but he banished him from court, and deprived him of his office of lieutenant-governor of the province^b.

Albert returns to the Netherlands. Henry was now in some perplexity with respect to his future conduct. He was extremely solicitous to recover as soon as possible the towns which he had lost ; but as his finances were in great disorder at that time, and Picardy having been long the seat

^b D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, &c. Thuanus, p. 116. lib. viii.

of war, was reduced to the most exhausted condition, he perceived that any enterprise so tedious as the siege of a fortified town, must be attended with insurmountable difficulties. He resolved therefore, in conformity to the opinion of his nobility, to advance towards the enemy, and to compel them, if possible, to give him battle. But the archduke, whose army was greatly diminished by putting garrisons into the conquered towns, had penetrated into his design ; and being no less averse to an engagement than Henry was desirous of it, he left France without delay, and put his troops into quarters of cantonment in the province of Artois. The King being thus disappointed in his hopes of a decisive action, dismissed the greater part of his army, and leaving the marshal Biron with only five or six thousand men to check the excursions of the Spanish garrisons, he returned to Paris, where a great number of important affairs of state required his attention.

While the Spanish army was employed in prosecuting the war in France, no memorable event had happened in the Netherlands. This was not owing to any want of activity and vigour on the part of prince Maurice, but to the extreme weakness of his army, which the States, from a desire of saving their strength when they were not exposed to immediate danger, had reduced so low, that when all the garrisons were full, he could not lead into the field more than three thousand men. With the assistance of this little army, the garrisons of some of the frontier towns had made several bold incursions into Flanders and Brabant, and either plundered the country, or laid the inhabitants under contributions. The States of these provinces had ardently wished for the return of the archduke ; and they now entreated him to employ his arms in reducing some of the places in their neighbourhood, from which they received so great annoyance. Albert, who did not intend, by returning so early to the Netherlands, to pass the remainder of the season without action, readily complied with their request ; and, after deliberating with his council of war, undertook the siege of Hulst in Flanders.

Maurice had, since his conquest of that place about five years before, made great additions to its fortifications. He had likewise formed the territory on which it stands into an island, by means of two large canals which were drawn around it ; and, by building forts on these canals, and laying a part of the adjacent country under water, he had rendered the town almost inaccessible.

This at least was the opinion of some officers whom Albert had sent to reconnoitre it ; but being ambitious to distinguish the first year of his administration, by performing some important service to the people committed to his care, and being excited at the same time by De Rône and other adventurous spirits, whom no difficulties could deter from any enterprise, he persisted in his design, and proceeded immediately to put it in execution. In order to conceal it as long as possible from the enemy, he made a feint of attacking some of the towns in Brabant, and this measure was attended with the desired effect. Of five thousand men who were in garrison at Hulst, prince Maurice ordered two thousand to reinforce the garrisons of Gertrudenberg and Breda.

Albert immediately after turned suddenly towards Hulst, and having prepared a great number of small boats, he ordered two of his principal officers, de la Biche and la Barlotta, to transport a part of his forces across the inundation and canals. These men executed their commission with great secrecy and silence in the dead of the night, and encountered difficulties which required the most determined resolution to surmount. The tide did not rise so high as they expected, and they were often obliged to

He besieges
Hulst in
Flanders.

1596. leave their boats, and push them forwards, while they stood up to their knees in mud. When, after much labour and difficulty, they had brought them to the side of the canal, they were discovered by the garrisons of some forts which had been built to obstruct their approach ; but, notwithstanding the incessant fire of these forts, they still continued to advance ; and having launched their boats in the canal, they at last arrived on the other side, with the loss of only a small number of men. Early next morning, count Solmes the governor of Hulst, attacked them before they had time to entrench themselves. A bloody combat ensued, in which one regiment of the assailants was routed, and their commander killed. But the rest reflecting on their desperate situation, from which it was impossible to escape, advanced with irresistible impetuosity, and, after much bloodshed, compelled the garrison to take shelter in the town.

Prince Maurice no sooner heard of what had happened, than he set out with all the forces which he could collect, hoping to be able to drive the Spaniards from the island, before their number was increased. But the archduke advanced with greater expedition, and prevented his approach. It was still practicable for Maurice to transport his forces to Hulst, by the canal which falls into the Hondt or Wester Scheld. But before he could reach the island in that way, Albert had transported his whole army, and begun the operations of the siege. The only expedient which Maurice could now employ, was to introduce supplies into the town by the canal, the mouth of which was commanded by a strong fort, which he hoped the enemy would find impregnable. For this purpose he fixed his residence at Cruning in Zealand ; and from that place, troops were frequently conveyed to the assistance of the besieged, notwithstanding the most strenuous endeavours of the Spanish army to intercept them.

The siege and the defence were conducted with equal vigour, and the combatants on both sides gave innumerable proofs of the most heroic courage. The garrison sallied out almost every day, and made dreadful havoc among the Spaniards. De Rône, to whom the chief conduct of the siege had been committed, was killed ; and by this irreparable loss the assailants were greatly dismayed. The archduke, however, persisted in this enterprise ; and although he had lost a much greater number of his troops than in both the sieges of Calais and Ardres, he continued his operations with unremitting ardour, till, besides demolishing all the outworks of the place, he had made a breach in the wall sufficient to admit of an assault.

The garrison had thrown up a deep entrenchment within the breach, and as they were still as numerous as ever, through the seasonable supplies which prince Maurice from time to time had sent them, they had little reason for despair. But being seized with a sudden panic they urged count Solmes, the governor, with the most earnest importunity, to capitulate ; and the count, dreading that, in the present temper of their minds, they would probably deliver the town without his consent, complied with their request.

Albert staid no longer in Hulst than was necessary to give orders for repairing the fortifications ; after which he returned to Brussels, amidst the joyful acclamations of the people ; who flattered themselves with hopes, that, under the government of a prince so successful in all his enterprises, an entire stop would soon be put to the incursions of the enemy, and internal security restored. But their joy on this account was of short duration. Marshal Biron, whom the French monarch had left behind him in Picardy, with a body of select troops, had hitherto been satisfied with acting on the defensive ; but soon after the surrender of Hulst, he began to make incursions into the province of

Hulst given up to the Spaniards.

18th. Aug.

Victory of M. Biron in Artois.

Artois, and kept all the southern frontier of the Netherlands under perpetual alarms. The archduke sent the marquis of Varambon to oppose him ; and Varambon for some time obliged him to act with greater caution and circumspection than he had hitherto observed. But Biron having received intelligence that the marquis was on his march to offer battle, he advanced rapidly to meet him ; and, having placed the greater part of his troops in an ambush, he proceeded with the rest till he had reached the enemy. A fierce encounter ensued ; and Biron continued fighting and retreating, till he arrived at the place where his troops were posted. He then returned to the charge with his whole forces united ; and having taken Varambon prisoner, he put many of his troops to the sword, and compelled the rest to save themselves by flight ^{1596.} k.

The prince of Chimai, now duke D'Arschot, was appointed to succeed Varambon ; and his endeavours to repress the incursions of the enemy were attended with no better success than those of his predecessor. Biron triumphed over him through the superiority of his cavalry, and continued to exercise his depredations in the open parts of the country, till the approach of winter obliged him to retire.

During the course of these transactions in the Netherlands and France, Philip sustained a calamity in Spain, which more than counterbalanced any advantage that could be expected from his late acquisitions. Almost every season since the discomfiture of his Armada in one thousand five hundred and eighty-eight, the English had undertaken some naval enterprise against his dominions in Europe or in America. The affairs of the Netherlands and France had not hitherto left him leisure to take revenge for these insults ; nor was his leisure greater at the present period, than it had been for some years past ; but his patience was exhausted ; and his acquisition of a sea-port, so commodiously situated as Calais, gave him a facility of annoying his enemy, which he had not possessed before. He resolved, notwithstanding his present embarrassments, to improve the advantage which this circumstance presented, and having begun to prepare a naval and military force, he intended to make a descent in Ireland ; where he had long fomented the rebellious spirit of the Catholic inhabitants, and had reason to believe that they would join his troops as soon as they should land.

Elizabeth was aware of the impending danger, and determined, if possible, to dissipate the storm before it should approach. For this purpose she fitted out a fleet of more than a hundred and fifty ships, having about eight thousand soldiers and seven thousand mariners on board, and gave the command of the land forces to the earl of Essex, and that of the navy to lord Howard of Effingham. To this fleet the Dutch added twenty-four ships, with a proportional number of troops, under the command of Wardmont, vice-admiral of Holland, and count Lewis of Nassau, cousin to prince Maurice.

With this powerful armament, Elizabeth intended to make an attack on Cadiz, where Philip's naval preparations were principally carried on. But its destination was carefully concealed. Sealed instructions were delivered to the several commanders, not to be opened till they should arrive at Cape St. Vincent's ; and they were ordered, in their way thither, to keep at a distance from the coasts of Spain and Portugal, in order to prevent a discovery of their design.

These precautions served effectually the purpose which was intended. The whole fleet arrived on the twentieth of June within sight of Cadiz,

Expedition
of the Eng-
lish against
Spain.

Earl of Es-
sex com-
mander in
chief.

1596. and found the Spaniards entirely unprepared for their defence. There was in the bay and harbour, besides thirty-six merchant ships richly laden, and ready to sail for America and the Indies, a fleet of about thirty ships of war, and a great number of transports loaded with naval stores, designed for the equipment of another fleet, which Philip was then fitting out at Lisbon. But there was no person in the place invested with the chief command, and no garrison in it sufficient for its defence.

The Spanish men of war, however, were quickly drawn up in the mouth of the bay, and they sustained the attack of an enemy so much superior to them, for several hours, till some of their largest ships were taken, others burnt, and the rest driven aground on the flats and shallows.

Immediately after this success, the earl of Essex landed his troops, and led them towards the town. A body of Spanish forces marched out to meet him ; but being unable to withstand the impetuosity of the English, they soon turned their backs and fled. The English pursued, and entered the town along with them. The inhabitants, who were thrown into the most dreadful consternation, made a feeble resistance, and the castle surrendered before the English artillery had begun to fire. Essex discovered no less humanity after his victory, than bravery in acquiring it. The town indeed was given up to be plundered by the soldiers, but no cruelty or outrage, such as occurs so often in the history of the Netherlands, was permitted to be exercised. The booty was immense, and would have been much greater, if, while the commanders were treating with some of the principal merchants about a ransom for the merchant ships, the duke de Medina, who lay with some troops near the town, had not given orders for setting them on fire. It was computed that, in military and naval stores, merchant goods, and ships, the loss which Philip and his subjects sustained on this occasion, could not amount to less than twenty millions of ducats. Had the advice of the earl of Essex been followed, the English would have attempted to retain possession of the town, but lord Howard and the other commanders regarded his proposal as chimerical. They believed that they had already fulfilled the queen's intentions : they dreaded the approach of a Spanish army, and therefore they made haste to put their plunder on board their ships, and immediately set sail for England.

The affront which Philip received on this occasion, in having one of his capital towns sacked and plundered, constituted a considerable part of his calamity, as it lessened exceedingly the opinion entertained of his prudence, as well as of his internal strength.

Destruction of the Spanish fleet designed for Ireland. This consideration, joined to an impatient desire of taking vengeance on Elizabeth, determined him, without regard to the approach of winter, to carry his plan of invading Ireland into immediate execution. By the arrival of his Plate fleet from America, he was enabled to equip, in Lisbon and other places, a hundred and twenty-eight ships of war and transports, with fourteen thousand troops on board, besides a great number of Irish Catholics, and a prodigious quantity of military stores, and materials and instruments for building forts. This fleet, under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, set sail from Ferrol in the month of November ; and if it had reached the destined port, the Spaniards, with the assistance of the Popish inhabitants, must have acquired so firm an establishment in Ireland, as would have cost the English many years, and much expence of labour and blood, to dispossess them.

Elizabeth and her subjects, flushed with their success at Cadiz, were as secure as if the wound which they had lately inflicted on Philip's naval power had been mortal. They had no suspicion of his design, and were en-

tirely ignorant of his preparations ; but the good providence of Heaven interposed remarkably on this occasion, as it had done formerly, in their behalf. The Spanish fleet was overtaken by a storm off Cape Finisterre, and about forty ships, with their crews and stores, were lost. Padilla got back with difficulty to Ferrol ; and henceforth all thoughts of the intended enterprise were laid aside ^{1596.} e.

These calamities were succeeded by another no less disastrous event, which happened in the Netherlands in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and ninety-seven. The fertile provinces of Brabant still lay exposed to the incursions of the confederates ; and the inhabitants, in order to save the country and villages from being sacked and plundered, had been obliged to submit to contributions, with which the United States were enabled to maintain the garrisons of Breda, Gertrudenberg, and other places. The archduke, solicitous to deliver the people from these oppressions, had cantoned between four and five thousand horse and foot in the open town of Turnhout, which, on account of its neighbourhood to Breda, he judged to be the fittest situation for watching the motions of the enemy ; and he had given the command of these forces to the count de Varas, brother to the marquis of Varambon.

Prince Maurice having received intelligence that Varas had been intrusted with this command more on account of his rank and family ^d, than his military skill, resolved to avail himself of this imprudence, into which the archduke had been betrayed. With great secrecy and expedition he drew together an army of five thousand foot and eight hundred horse, and set out from Gertrudenberg with a design to attack the Spaniards in their quarters of cantonment. Varas was informed of his intention only on the evening before, and was determined, in contradiction to the remonstrances of some of his officers, to retire to the town of Herentals. He accordingly sent off the baggage in the night, and began his march by day-break, without the sound either of drum or trumpet. His troops, almost all of whom were experienced veterans, were at first indignant at the thoughts of flying from an enemy whom they had often conquered ; but the dread with which their general was actuated, soon diffused itself into every breast, and begot a conviction, that their preservation depended on the celerity of their retreat.

Maurice was only a few miles from Turnhout when his scouts informed him of the count's departure. He immediately sent Sir Francis Vere with a party of horse to scour the woods and hedges, and dispatched another party under count Hohenloe, to retard the Spaniards on their march till the infantry should arrive. Besides count Hohenloe and Sir Francis Vere, the prince had brought with him count Solmes, Sir Robert Sidney, governor of Flushing, and several others of his bravest and most experienced officers, by whom all his orders were executed with equal prudence and intrepidity. Count Hohenloe, at the head of four hundred horse, began the attack, and quickly routed the Spanish cavalry, who, being driven back upon the foot, threw them into disorder. At this crisis, Maurice himself and Sir Francis Vere came up, and having broken through the enemy's ranks, completed their confusion, and made dreadful havoc among them, till the greatest part of them were either put to the sword or taken prisoners. Varas himself was killed, after having given proofs, that his misconduct had not proceeded from the want of personal bravery, but from the consciousness of his inexperience, and his solicitude for the preserva-

^{1597.}
The battle of
Turnhout.

e Grotius, lib. v. p. 266. Camden, p. 730. Carte, lib. xix.

d Of the name of De Rie in Franche Comté.

1597. *tion of his troops.* Above two thousand were slain, and five hundred taken prisoners, while the victors lost only nine or ten.

It was in this engagement that a practice invented by Maurice was first introduced, of arming the cavalry with carbines instead of lances ; and to this invention, which filled the enemy with amazement, Grotius ascribes the great facility with which they were overpowered ; for the victory was gained entirely by the horse, and the infantry arrived only in time to divide the spoil.

The battle of Turnhout, through the great disparity between the numbers of the slain on the opposite sides, contributed more to exalt the *character* of Maurice, than any of his former achievements. Nor was it military renown only which he acquired ; he gave a striking proof likewise of his humanity in his treatment of the prisoners, whom he protected from all injury and violence with the utmost care, and many of whom recovered through the tender attention which he bestowed. He sent the body of count Varas to the archduke ; and Albert on that occasion assured him, that he would follow his generous example, and take effectual pains to prevent all cruelty and outrage in the further prosecution of the war ^e.

The loss which Albert sustained in the battle of Turnhout
The surprise was soon afterwards compensated by his acquisition of Amiens,
of Amiens. the capital of Picardy, and one of the strongest and most important towns in France. The citizens, who had been zealous partizans of the league, had lately submitted to the King, upon condition that all their ancient privileges should be preserved, and in particular, that they should be allowed to guard the town themselves, and not be obliged to admit a garrison of mercenary troops.

The number of those who were enrolled for bearing arms was between fourteen and fifteen thousand ; but neither their discipline nor their vigilance corresponded to the danger to which they were exposed from the neighbourhood of the Spaniards. They gave the same attention to their ordinary occupations as in the time of peace ; only a few were employed as centinels and guards, and even these performed their duty in the most negligent manner.

Of this negligence, Portocarrero, governor of Dourlens, a brave and enterprising officer, had received intelligence from one of the citizens^f, and he founded upon it a plan for taking the city by surprise. Having communicated this plan to the archduke, and obtained his approbation, he collected from the neighbouring garrisons about three thousand horse and foot, which he judged to be sufficient to carry it into execution ^g. On the eleventh of March he set out from Dourlens in the beginning of the night, and before sun-rise arrived at an hermitage about a quarter of a mile from Amiens. As soon as he perceived that the gate which lay next him was opened, he sent forward ten or twelve of the most resolute of his soldiers, with three officers, called d'Ognano, La Croix, and Del Acro, disguised like the peasants of that country with long frocks, under which each of them had a brace of pistols and a sword concealed. Three of this party carried bags filled with nuts and apples. One of them drove a waggon loaded with large beams, and the rest followed slowly at a little distance. When the three first had passed the pallisades and approached the gate, one of them fell down, as by accident, and scattered the nuts and apples ; and while the guards, making game of the supposed peasant, were

^e Grotius, lib. vi. ab initio. Thuanus lib. cxviii. c. v. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iii.

^f He had been banished on account of some crime.

^g They consisted of eleven hundred Spaniards, five hundred Burgundians and Germans, four hundred Irish, two hundred Walloons, and nine hundred horse.

scrambling for the fruit, the waggon was driven under the gate. There it stopped, and Del Acro, by pulling an iron pin, quickly disengaged the horses. He then fired a pistol, which was the sign agreed upon, and he, and those who were with him, falling with great fury upon the guard, killed most of them, and made themselves masters of the gate. The sentinel upon the top of the gate-way, perceiving what had passed, attempted to let down the portcullis ; but it was suspended by the beams and the waggon ; and Portocarrero in the mean time brought forward his troops, and rushed into the town. The citizens, entirely unprepared for this sudden attack, were overwhelmed with astonishment and consternation. Their resistance was feeble and ill conducted ; and, after about a hundred of their number had fallen, they laid down their arms, and suffered the enemy to take possession of the town.

The news of this disaster affected the French monarch in the most sensible manner, and greatly allayed the joy which his late triumph over the League was calculated to excite. He considered, that the Spaniards were before this time, in possession of Calais, one of the principal sea-ports in his dominions ; and that by their present conquest they had opened a passage from the Netherlands, by which they could make incursions to the gates of the capital. He was mortified by reflecting on the judgment which foreign nations must form of a prince, whose glory consisted chiefly in victories obtained over his own subjects ; and he dreaded, that the malcontents in his kingdom might take advantage of the present calamity, and rekindle the flames of civil war. He had laboured for some time under bad health ; notwithstanding which, he broke off a course of medicine which had been prescribed to him, and set out immediately for Corbie on the Somme^b, where, after consulting with the marshal Biron and some other principal officers, he resolved to postpone every other object of his attention to the recovery of Amiens. He then ordered Biron to invest the town with such forces as he could draw from the neighbouring garrisons, and returned to Paris to hasten the preparations necessary to insure success.

Henry knew that the most vigorous exertion of his activity was requisite on this occasion, and he laboured with unceasing ardour, till, besides raising a numerous army, he had collected, from every quarter of his dominions, provisions and military stores proportioned to the difficulty of his intended enterprise. He concluded at this time a new alliance with the Queen of England and the States of Holland, in consequence of which the former sent him four thousand troops, and the latter furnished him with a considerable sum of money, besides engaging to make a powerful diversion of the Spanish forces in the Netherlands. Having sent off his troops to Amiens before him, as fast as they were raised, he found on his return thither in the beginning of June, that the siege was already far advanced. Biron, prompted by his natural ardour, and piqued by a saying which had dropt from the King, that his affairs almost never prospered where he was not present, had exerted the most indefatigable vigilance and industry. He had rendered the blockade complete, by drawing strong lines of circumvallation round the town, and had begun to make his approaches to the walls. Henry approved highly of every thing that he had done, and in order to pacify his resentment, suffered him still to retain the chief command.

As the number of the troops was considerably augmented by those which the King had brought with him, and by the arrival of the English forces,

Henry's distress on that occasion.

The siege of Amiens.

^b About three leagues higher than Amiens.

1597. the operations of the siege were carried on with redoubled ardour and alacrity ; but the progress of the assailants was retarded greatly beyond what had been expected, by the invincible bravery and unremitting vigilance of the governor and garrison, who disputed every inch of ground with matchless intrepidity, and in the numberless sallies which they made, put some thousands of the besiegers to the sword.

By these sallies their own number was considerably diminished, and in one of them Portocarrero was killed. The defence however was still conducted with the same skill and spirit as before by the marquis de Montenegro, a Neapolitan of the family of Caraffa, and the King had reason to despair of being able to finish his enterprise before the arrival of the Spanish army from the Netherlands.

Albert attempts in vain to raise the siege. The archduke was sensible that it was of great importance to Philip's interest to preserve possession of Amiens, whether he should enter into a treaty of peace with the French monarch, or prosecute the war ; and he could not have exerted himself with greater activity in making the preparations necessary to raise the siege. But his levies, as well as all his other preparations, had been carried on slowly, through the extreme difficulty which he found in procuring money. The destruction of the fleet and stores at Cadiz had contributed not a little to increase that disorder which had so long prevailed in the King's finances. For several years Philip had been in the practice of borrowing large sums from the Italian and Flemish merchants, for which he had agreed to pay them an exorbitant interest, and had mortgaged certain branches of his revenue. The inconveniences arising from thence had become intolerable, and he was determined to deliver himself from them at once, whatever should be the consequence. He had accordingly published an edict in the month of November of the preceding year, declaring all the contracts by which he had sequestered his revenue to be null and void ; and alleging, as an excuse for this step, that, through the unfair advantages which had been taken of his distress, he had reason to dread, that, unless some remedy were immediately applied, all his labours in behalf of Christendom and the true religion would be lostⁱ.

Philip had as little reason to be satisfied with the prudence, as with the justice, of this expedient. His annual revenue, though now freed from all incumbrances, was insufficient to defray the enormous expence of the present war. It was still necessary for him, while the war continued, to borrow money ; but no merchants either in Genoa or Antwerp, where it had been usually found, could be persuaded to advance it ; and it was this cause chiefly which had so long retarded the archduke's preparations for the relief of Amiens.

Surrender of Amiens. The blockade of that city had been formed in April, and it was the end of August before he could begin his march. At that time he set out with an army of more than five and twenty thousand men, and arrived within sight of the French camp about the middle of September. As his infantry was greatly superior to that of the enemy, he resolved to offer battle ; and from the well-known temper of the French monarch, he doubted not that his challenge would be accepted. But Henry being distrustful of his infantry, the greatest part of which consisted of raw troops, readily complied with the advice of the duke de Mayenne, whom he had brought with him to the siege, and resolved to remain within his lines. The archduke advanced towards him, with his army drawn up in order of battle ; but when he perceived that the king's

resolution was unalterably fixed, that he was well prepared for his defence and that his entrenchments were every where strongly fortified, he despaired of being able to effectuate his purpose, and returned to the Netherlands. In a few days after his retreat, the marquis de Montenegro, with the approbation of the archduke, consented to capitulate, and received from Henry the most honourable terms ^{1597.} ^k

During the greatest part of the siege of Amiens, nothing memorable was transacted in the Netherlands ; but as the archduke had, in order to fill up his army, almost drained the provinces of troops, he had no sooner begun his march, than prince Maurice, having assembled between twelve and thirteen thousand horse and foot, laid siege to Rhinberg, and in a few days obliged it to capitulate, though the garrison amounted to a thousand men. He next reduced the town of Meurs with the same facility. After which, having passed the Rhine, he made himself master of Grol, Brevort, and several other places, and then directed his march towards Lingen, the only fortified town which remained in possession of the Spaniards on the north side of the Rhine. Both the town and castle of Lingen were commanded by count Frederic of Heremberg, with a garrison of six or seven hundred men ; and the count made, for some time, a vigorous and spirited defence. But the prince, after his batteries were ready to begin to play, having sent him a summons to surrender on honourable terms, with an intimation, that as this was the first summons, so he might be assured that it would be the last ; Heremberg considered, that his perseverance must be attended with the destruction of the garrison, and therefore agreed to the terms proposed.

All these conquests were achieved in less than three months. In those of Grol and Brevort, places situated in a marshy soil, Maurice encountered difficulties which required a vigorous exertion of his superior talents to surmount ; but as no peculiar or striking circumstances are recorded by the cotemporary historians, I have not thought it necessary to descend to a particular detail. The acquisition of so many frontier towns was of great importance to the United Provinces, as they were thereby delivered from the incursions of the Spanish garrisons, by which the inhabitants of the adjacent country had been kept under perpetual alarms ; and the States, deeply sensible of this advantage, testified their gratitude to prince Maurice, by conferring on him and on his posterity the rich seignory of Lingen and its dependencies.

These transactions happened towards the end of the year one thousand five hundred and ninety-seven ; and the following was distinguished by a negociation which was set on foot for the establishment of peace between France and Spain. Neither Philip nor Henry had derived from the war those advantages, by the prospect of which they had been allured, and both of them had powerful motives for desiring that it might be speedily brought to a conclusion. Philip's eyes were now opened to the vanity of those flattering dreams of conquest by which he had been so long deluded. His acquisitions in France had cost him more than they were worth ; and besides the expence of making them, they were much more than counterbalanced by the losses which year after year he had suffered in the Netherlands. His finances, as has been already mentioned, were in extreme disorder ; his credit was ruined by the late violation of his faith ; his troops in many places of the Low Countries had mutinied again, on account of their want of pay ; and if the war

Progress of
the war in
the Netherlands.

End of
August.

26th Sep-
tember.

1598.
Negocia-
tions for
peace.

1595. should continue for another campaign, he thought it not improbable that the greater part of them would refuse to march against the enemy. From his advanced age, and broken health, he had reason to believe that his death was not far distant, and he dreaded the fatal consequences which might arise from leaving his son, who was hardly arrived at the age of manhood, involved in war with a prince so powerful and enterprising as the king of France.

Peace was no less desirable to Henry than to Philip ; those wounds under which his kingdom had bled for so many years, were still unclosed, and numberless distempers prevailed in almost every quarter, to which no effectual remedy could be applied during the continuance of the war.

While, for these reasons, both princes were alike desirous of peace, neither of them would yield so far to his antagonist as to be the first to propose it. But the sovereign Pontiff, as the father of all Catholic princes, and the common friend of the two contending monarchs, acted the part of mediator between them ; and Clement discovered on this occasion, a degree of zeal and prudence, which justly entitled him to that high respect in which his character was held by his cotemporaries. At his request, it was agreed by the two Kings, that a congress should be held at Vervins, a town in Picardy, near the confines of Hainault. The presidents de Bellievre and Sillery, were appointed plenipotentiaries by Henry ; and Ricardotto and Baptista Tassis, by Philip. Alexander de Medici, the cardinal legate, likewise repaired thither, and in the month of February the conferences were begun.

These conferences were matter of great anxiety to the States of Holland, as they could not doubt that a principal motive which had determined Philip to disengage himself from the war with France, was, that he might be at liberty to employ his whole strength against the confederated provinces. They were not without suspicions likewise, that the queen of England would embrace the present opportunity of delivering herself from the Spanish war, and were therefore much disquieted at the apprehensions of being left without an ally to support them. But they were soon delivered from their fears with regard to the conduct of Elizabeth, who being entirely convinced that the interest and safety of their infant republic were inseparable from her own, gave them fresh assurances of the continuance of her friendship.

The French monarch no sooner agreed to the Pope's proposal of a congress, than he sent an intimation of it to his allies, and expressed his desire, that, if possible a general peace might be established, in which they, as well as himself, might be comprehended. But neither Elizabeth nor the States were disposed to listen to his advice. The latter were well assured that no consideration would persuade Philip to treat with them as a free State, and they were unalterably determined never to acknowledge him for their sovereign. Elizabeth, who had on different occasions experienced the great advantage which she derived from her alliance with them, was no less solicitous than themselves that they should maintain their independence ; and she believed, that while they maintained it, she should have no great reason to dread the power of Philip. She was concerned however at the prospect of losing so useful an ally as the king of France, and sent Sir Robert Cecil and Mr. Herbert, who were accompanied by Justin de Nassau and the celebrated Barneveldt, from the States, to remonstrate with Henry against the peace.

These able negotiators left no argument untouched that could dissuade him from his purpose : they reminded him of the alliance into which he had lately entered with the Queen and the States, and of the assistance

The pope
mediates
between the
contending
monarchs

Opposition
to peace by
Elizabeth
and the
States.

which on different occasions they had afforded him. They represented the danger to which he exposed himself by treating with a prince who had given so many striking proofs of insincerity ; and they offered to furnish him with a large supply of forces, besides money, and a numerous fleet, for the recovery of Calais, and the farther prosecution of the war.

Henry replied, that no alliance which he had formed with the Queen or the States, could be reasonably interpreted as an obligation on him unnecessarily to prolong the war, which he was persuaded would soon prove the utter ruin of his kingdom. He expressed in strong terms his gratitude for the friendship which they had shewn him, and assured them, that no peace which he should conclude with Spain, would prevent him from making a suitable return. From the manner of life to which he had been so long inured, joined to the provocations which he had received from Philip, they might believe, that it was not an aversion to the war, but the necessity of peace, that had determined him to embrace a measure so repugnant to the inclination of his friends. The disorders which prevailed in his dominions were such, that if the proper remedies were not applied, they would soon become incurable, and these remedies could not be applied in the time of war ; but peace, he hoped, would quickly restore his kingdom to its native strength and vigour ; when, instead of being a burden upon his allies, as he had hitherto been, he would be able, and they should find him willing, not only to repay with interest the obligations which they had laid him under, but to defend and protect them, and the rest of Europe, against the exorbitant ambition of the king of Spain.

This apology, delivered with that irresistible force of natural eloquence, by which Henry was eminently distinguished, made a strong impression upon the minds of the English and Dutch ambassadors ; they could not doubt of the truth of what they had heard ; and before their departure, they had the candour to acknowledge, that as the peace which he was about to conclude was necessary for France, so it might be found in the issue highly beneficial to the other European powers. Henry sent ambassadors to England and Holland to enforce what he had said on this occasion, and still continued as formerly on terms of cordial friendship both with Elizabeth and the States.

The treaty of peace was soon after brought to the desired conclusion¹. Several difficulties occurred during the course of the conferences, which were removed through the disinterested zeal and great authority of the Pope and the cardinal legate ; and at length, upon Henry's resigning his claim to Cambray, Philip consented, though with great reluctance, to give up Calais, Andres, Dourlens, and all the other towns in France, which he had acquired at the expence of so much blood and treasure^m.

Philip had been the more solicitous to put an end to the war, on account of a scheme which he had conceived, after the dis-
appointment of his views in France, of transferring the sove-
reignty of the Netherlands to his eldest daughter Isabella, whom
he intended to give in marriage to the archduke. And to em-
brace this measure, he was prompted, partly by his affection for the Infanta,
one of the most accomplished women of the age, and partly by his esteem
for Albert, whom, of all the princes in Europe, he deemed the most worthy
of so illustrious an alliance.

Conclusion
of peace of
the 2d of
May.

Philip trans-
fers the Ne-
therlands to
Isabella and
Albert.

¹ At Vervins.

^m Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iv. p. 464. Sully, lib. ix. D'Avila, towards the conclusion. Thuanus, lib. cxx. sect. i. and v.; and Cambden, p. 760, &c. Miniana, lib. x. cap. xii.

1588.
His delibe-
rations on
this subject.

But while his attachment to his daughter and her future husband made him desirous of procuring for them some sovereign establishment, he could not, without reluctance, resolve to separate from the body of his empire so rich a portion of his hereditary dominions. To the troops and money of the Netherlands, the late Emperor and himself had been greatly indebted for most of their victories over their enemies in France and Germany ; and it had been the Netherlands chiefly, which, by their situation in the heart of Europe, had rendered them formidable to the several European powers, and enabled them so long to maintain the tranquillity of their other dominions. The preservation indeed of these provinces had, for many years, proved a perpetual drain for the wealth of the Spanish monarchy ; but it was doubtful whether, if they were disjointed from it, they would not be found as great a burden as ever, since it would still be incumbent on the King to support the archduke in his new sovereignty, against the attempts of his enemies in the revolted provinces.

These considerations were urged with great warmth by the count de Fuentes, in order to dissuade Philip from the prosecution of his design. But some others of his counsellors, and particularly the count de Castel-Rodrigo, in whom he reposed the greatest confidence, were at no less pains to confirm him in it, by representing, that the separation proposed, instead of lessening, would serve to augment the strength and vigour of the Spanish monarchy.

“ The Netherlands lay so remote from the seat of government, and the laws of that country, and the language, character, and manners of the people, were so extremely different from those of Spain, that it would be for ever found impracticable to preserve them in obedience. Their aversion to a foreign dominion, and especially that of Spain, was insurmountable ; the absence and distance of the King had been the cause of that inveterate rebellion which had furnished employment to his armies for almost forty years, and no other effectual means could be devised either to reconcile the provinces which had already revolted, or to prevent the rest from imitating their example, but to give them a sovereign of their own, who, by residing among them, might conciliate and secure their affections. It was true, that, without the assistance of the queen of England, the rebels must long ere now have laid down their arms ; but if with the feeble aid which they had received from a Queen engrossed with domestic cares, and tottering on her throne, they had been able for so many years not only to defend themselves, but to carry on an offensive successful war, how much reason was there to dread the consequences that must follow, if the British crowns were united, as they would soon be, on the head of a prince in the vigour of life, who being free from the embarrassments of a disputed title, would have full leisure to give attention to foreign affairs ? From jealousy of the King, the neighbouring princes would never cease to support the rebellion, and foment the discontents of his Flemish subjects ; but if the Netherlands were disunited from the Spanish monarchy, and erected into a separate and independent state, the cause of that jealousy would be removed ; it would become the interest of France and Britain, and the other neighbouring powers, to lend their assistance to extinguish the war ; and even the revolted states would, in order to secure internal tranquillity, chuse to return to their ancient union with the southern provinces.”

By these arguments, which coincided with Philip’s inclination, His deed of abdication. he was confirmed in his design ; and on the sixth of May, he signed the deed of abdication ; in which, after declaring his re-

solution to give the Infanta in marriage to the archduke, he resigned the sovereignty of the Netherlands, and of the county of Burgundy, to that princess, to be enjoyed conjunctly by her and her future husband ; and after their decease, by the heirs of the marriage, whether male or female, according to the established rules of hereditary succession.

But it was provided, that in case this sovereignty should devolve to a female, she should marry either the King or the prince of Spain : That neither any prince nor princess descended from the Infanta, should marry without the consent of the king of Spain ; and that in default of issue, the Netherlands should be reunited to the Spanish monarchy. By other articles, it was stipulated that the new sovereigns should prevent their subjects from trading to the Indies ; that they should, before their admission, take an oath to permit the exercise of no other religion but the Catholic, within their dominions ; and in case they should fail in the execution of this, or any other article, it was declared that the sovereignty transferred should immediately return to the crown of Spain.

This deed was immediately transmitted to the archduke ; and soon afterwards the States of the southern provinces agreed to accept of the archduke and the Infanta for their sovereigns, with the conditions which the deed contained ; being well pleased to be delivered, as they expected to be, from the yoke of Spain, which they had found so grievous and intolerable.

How received
in the Nether-
lands.

But although this event gave great satisfaction to the people subject to the Spanish government, it was not likely to produce any change in the sentiments or conduct of their neighbours in the United Provinces. The new sovereigns, said the confederates, whom Philip has appointed, will be sovereigns in name only and appearance, but not in reality. They will be utterly unable to support themselves without the assistance of the Spanish arms. They will depend on Spain, as much as any Spanish governor or regent ; and the Spaniards will still continue to exercise, as formerly, an unlimited influence in the government. In the deed of abdication, the Netherlands are treated, not as a free and independent state, but as a fief of the Spanish monarchy ; and from the advanced age of the Infanta ^m, together with the conditions of the deed of abdication, it was evident that the present measure could be meant only as a temporary expedient, intended to amuse the people of the southern provinces, and not as a fixed and permanent establishment. But whatever was the King's intention in this measure, and whether the sovereignty now transferred, should or should not return to the crown of Spain, it was the unalterable resolution of the United Provinces, to maintain their liberty, in opposition to whatever attempts might be made to deprive them of it by the king of Spain, or the archduke of Austria ⁿ.

Albert was in the mean time employed in preparing to set out for Madrid ; but having been detained in the Low Countries much longer than he expected, by a new mutiny of his troops, he had just begun his journey when he received intelligence of the death of the King.

For more than two years this prince had been extremely afflicted with the gout ; to which had been lately added, a hectic fever, and a dropsy. Finding his strength so much decayed, that he could not expect to live above a few weeks, he ordered his attendants to transport him from Madrid to the Escorial ; and when his physicians signified to him their apprehensions, that he would not be able to endure the fatigue : “ But I am resolved,” he answered, “ to accompany

Illness and
death of
Philip.

^m Thirty-two.

ⁿ Van Meteren, Grotius, &c.

1598. my funeral to my tomb." Upon his arrival at the Escurial, the gout returned with double violence both in his feet and hands ; and soon afterwards, several imposthumes gathered in his knees and breast, which occasioned the most excruciating pain. He was in some measure relieved by laying the imposthumes open. But another more intolerable distress succeeded. The matter of his sores was of the most purulent and nauseous nature, and swarms of lice were engendered in it, from which no application, and no care or pains, could deliver him. In this dreadful condition, he lay in a supine posture, for more than fifty days ; during which time he exhibited a striking display of patience, firmness of mind, and resignation to his fate. He gave proof of the sincerity of his religious profession, by practising, with great zeal and assiduity, those superstitious observances, which the church of Rome prescribes, as the means of procuring acceptance with the Deity. He seemed inclined likewise to make atonement for some severities which he had exercised, and ordered several prisoners to be released, and their effects restored^o.

About two days before his death, having sent for his son, and his daughter Isabella, he discoursed to them of the vanity of human greatness, delivered many salutary counsels for the administration of their dominions, and exhorted them with much earnestness, to cultivate and maintain the Catholic faith. When they had left him, he gave directions for his funeral ; and ordered his coffin to be brought into his chamber, and placed within his view ; soon after which his speech failed, and he expired on the thirteenth of September, in the seventy-second year of his age, and the forty-third of his reign^p.

No character was ever drawn by different historians in more His charac- opposite colours than that of Philip ; and yet considering the ter. length and activity of his reign, there is none which it should seem would be more easy to ascertain. From the facts recorded in the preceding history, we cannot doubt that he possessed, in an eminent degree, penetration, vigilance, and a capacity for government. His eyes were continually open upon every part of his extensive dominions. He entered into every branch of administration ; watched over the conduct of his ministers with unwearied attention ; and in his choice both of them and of his generals, discovered a considerable share of sagacity. *✓* He had at all times a composed and settled countenance, and never appeared to be either elated or depressed. His temper was the most imperious, and his looks and demeanour were haughty and severe ; yet among his Spanish subjects, he was of easy access ; listened patiently to their representations and complaints ; and where his ambition and bigotry did not interfere, was generally willing to redress their grievances. When we have said thus much in his praise, we have said all that justice requires, or truth permits. It is indeed impossible to suppose that he was insincere in his zeal for religion. But as his religion was of the most corrupt kind, it served to increase the natural depravity of his disposition ; and not only allowed, but even prompted him to commit the most odious and shocking crimes. Although a prince in the bigoted age of Philip might be persuaded that the interest of religion would be advanced by falsehood and persecution ; yet it might be expected, that, in a virtuous prince, the sentiments of honour and humanity would on some occasions, triumph over the dictates of superstition : but of this triumph, there occurs not a single instance in the reign of Philip ; who, without hesitation, violated his most sacred obligations as often as religion

^o Among these was the wife of Antonio Perez.
^p Miniana, lib. x. cap. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cxx. sect. xiv.

afforded him a pretence ; and under that pretence exercised for many years the most unrelenting cruelty, without reluctance or remorse. His ambition, which was exorbitant ; his resentment, which was implacable ; his arbitrary temper, which would submit to no control ; concurred with his bigoted zeal for the Catholic religion, and carried the sanguinary spirit, which that religion was calculated to inspire, to a greater height in Philip, than it ever attained in any other prince of that, or of any former or succeeding age.

Some historians have distinguished this prince by the title of Philip the Prudent ^q, and have represented him as the wisest, as well as the most religious prince, that ever filled the Spanish throne. But it is questionable, whether he be entitled to praise on account of his prudence, any more than on account of his religion. ^r In the beginning of his reign, he discovered great caution in his military enterprises ; and, on some occasions, made even greater preparations than were necessary to insure success. But his ambition, his resentment, and his abhorrence of the Protestants were too violent to suffer him to act conformably to the dictates of sound policy and prudence. ^s He might have prevented the revolt of his Dutch and Flemish subjects, if, after the reformation in the Netherlands was suppressed by the dutchess of Parma, he had left the reins of government in the hands of that wise princess, and had not sent so odious a tyrant as the duke of Alva to enslave them. He might, after the defeat of the prince of Orange, have rivetted the chains of slavery about their necks, and gradually accustomed them to the yoke ; if, by engaging in too many expensive enterprises, he had not exhausted his exchequer, and made it in some measure necessary for Alva to impose the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies, for the maintenance of his troops. He might, through the great abilities of the duke of Parma, have again reduced the revolted provinces to obedience, if he had not conceived the wild ambition of subduing England and acquiring the sovereignty of France. ^t His armies, in the latter part of his reign, were never sufficiently numerous to execute the various enterprises which he undertook ; yet they were much more numerous than he was able to support. Few years past in which they did not mutiny for want of pay. And Philip suffered greater prejudice from the disorders and devastation which his own troops committed, than he received from the arms of his enemies. Against his attempts on England and France, his wisest counsellors remonstrated in the strongest terms. And prudence certainly required that, previously to any attack upon the dominions of others, he should have secured possession of his own. Yet so great was his illusion, that rather than delay the execution of those schemes which his resentment and ambition had suggested, he chose to run the risk of losing the fruits of all the victories which the duke of Parma had obtained ; and having left defenceless the provinces which had submitted to his authority, he thereby afforded an opportunity to the revolted provinces of establishing their power, on so firm a foundation, as could not be shaken by the whole strength of the Spanish monarchy, exerted against it for more than fifty years.

^q *Eldiscreto.*

^r By his first wife, Mary of Portugal, Philip had no other issue but Don Carlos ; and by his second, Mary of England, he had none. Isabella, daughter of Henry II. of France, bore him two daughters Isabella Clara-Eugenia, and Catherine ; the former of whom was married to the archduke Albert ; and the latter to Emanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy. His fourth wife, Anne of Austria, daughter of the emperor Ferdinand and of Philip's own sister Mary, brought him three sons and one daughter, who all died young, except Philip, who succeeded him.

If the reader incline to enter more particularly into the private life and character of Philip than has been thought proper in the general history of his reign, he will meet with several interesting anecdotes, in the prince of Orange's *Apology*, of which an abstract is subjoined.

APPENDIX;

CONTAINING AN ABSTRACT

OF THE

APOLOGY OR VINDICATION

OF THE

PRINCE OF ORANGE,

AGAINST

PHILIP'S PROSCRIPTION.

THE prince of Orange begins his Apology, which is addressed to the confederated States, with observing, that being conscious of having devoted his life and fortune to the service of the Netherlands, it afforded him great joy to reflect upon the testimony given to his fidelity and zeal, in that barbarous Proscription which had been published against him by the king of Spain. "I have reason likewise," continued he, "to rejoice at the opportunity which is thus presented to me, to vindicate my conduct from those malignant imputations, which have been cast upon it by certain ignoble hirelings; and which are repeated and set forth in the blackest colours in this Proscription. For I am not accused at this time by any of those obscure libellers, to whom I have ever thought it beneath my dignity to reply; but by a great and powerful prince, who intends, through my sides, to wound, and if possible to destroy, the confederacy. I can with confidence appeal to you, who are well acquainted with my past life, whether it has ever been my practice, either to praise myself or to censure others. And I must likewise appeal to you and to the world, whether now, when I am accused of ingratitude, infidelity, and hypocrisy, compared to a Judas and a Cain, called a rebel, a traitor, a disturber of the public peace, and an enemy to mankind; and when both pecuniary and honorary rewards are promised to those who shall slay or murder me; whether after this the duty which I owe to myself, and to you who have reposed in me such unlimited confidence, does not call upon me to say what I can consistently with truth, to prove the malice and falsehood of my accuser? If you know his representation of my conduct to be just, you will shut your ears against the defence which I am about to offer; but if you have known me from my youth to be more faithful, and chaste, and virtuous, than the author of this infamous Proscription, I shall expect that you will attend favourably to what I shall advance, and deliver judgment in vindication of my integrity and innocence.

"The first crime of which I am accused in this Proscription, is ingratitude; and a recital is made of favours bestowed on me by the king himself, and the emperor his father; to the latter of whom, it is said, I owed my succession to the late prince of Orange; and to the former my having been admitted into the order of the Golden Fleece, and appointed a counsellor of State, and governor of the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht and Burgundy.

"No man respects more than I do the memory of the emperor, and I reflect with much satisfaction on the many proofs of attachment which I received from him. But the necessity which I am laid under to vindicate my character, obliges me to observe, that of the sort of favours which are objected to me, I never received any from the emperor, but on the con-

trary suffered great loss and prejudice in his service. With respect to my succession to the inheritance bequeathed to me by my cousin, the late prince of Orange, it is impossible to conceive any ground for alleging that I was at all indebted for it to the emperor. My right to that inheritance was indisputable ; nor was there ever any prince or private person, who pretended to call in question its validity. Would not the emperor have been justly accused of tyranny and injustice, if he had prevented me from enjoying it ? And does my accuser reckon it an instance of goodness in a prince, merely not to defraud and oppress his faithful subjects ?

" All Europe knows what important services the emperor received from the prince my kinsman ; who commanded his armies, extended his dominions, and died at his feet. Had the emperor employed his power to disappoint the last will of one who had served him with so much fidelity and success, would he not have involved his name in perpetual infamy ? Besides, that even although he had inclined to act a part so unworthy of his character, yet of the most valuable part of that inheritance he could not have deprived me, as it lies within the territory of the king of France, on whom alone I depend for the secure possession of it. But even allowing that what is said of my obligations to the emperor were true, yet the king of Spain is surely not entitled to reproach me with it ; who, in contempt of all law and justice, has, to the utmost of his power, endeavoured to deprive me of the inheritance in question, and rendered ineffectual that kindness of the emperor, for my unmindfulness of which he accuses me of ingratitude.

" Gratitude, in the opinion of this prince, ought not to be confined to the person by whom favours have been bestowed, but ought to extend likewise to his descendants : and it is because I have opposed the son, whose father was my benefactor, that I am deemed ungrateful. Let him apply this golden rule to his own conduct, as he has applied it to mine ; and he will then perceive which of us is guilty of ingratitude. Maximilian was the first of the family of Austria, who came into the Netherlands. And no person acquainted with history is ignorant of the important obligations which that emperor received from my kinsman count Egelbert of Nassau ; by whom he was powerfully supported against Lewis the eleventh of France ; by whom the people who had rebelled against him were subdued ; and by whom likewise he recovered his liberty, of which the jealousy of the Flemings had deprived him. Need I mention what every body knows, of the service performed to the late emperor Charles, by count Henry Nassau my uncle, who was in reality the person that prevailed with the electors to confer upon him the Imperial crown ? Was it not by the bravery of René, prince of Orange, that the emperor subdued the dutchy of Guelderland ; and by that of Philibert, that he gained possession of Lombardy and Naples, and the person of the pope, and the city and state of Rome ? And will his son pretend to reproach the memory of these great men, by boasting of his father's kindness in suffering justice to be done to their kinsman ? Am I not authorised from the few facts which I have mentioned, to assert, that had it not been for the houses of Orange and Nassau, which I have the honour to represent, my defamer could not have put so many pompous titles as are inserted in the beginning of his Proscription ?

" By what I have said, I would not be understood to disclaim every kind of obligation to the emperor. I shall for ever retain a grateful remembrance of the honour which he did me, when, after having taken upon himself the inspection of my education, and kept me nine years about his person, he gave me the important charge of all his ordnance in the Netherlands : and in my absence, without any application made in my behalf, in contradiction to the representations of his courtiers, and in preference to many officers of great experience, appointed me commander in chief of his army, at the age of twenty-one. I reflect with gratitude on that testimony of regard, with which he honoured me at the time of his resignation, when having sent for me from the camp, he gave me a public proof of his affection, by placing me next him, and leaning upon me, to support him under the fatigues of that solemnity. I know likewise, that he meant to give me a further proof of his regard, when he imposed upon me the irksome task of carrying the Imperial crown to his brother Ferdinand. But will my enemies pretend to assert, either that I shewed myself unworthy of these honours, or that my interest and fortune were promoted by them ? Did the troops, when I commanded them, suffer any repulse or damage ? On the contrary, although the plague raged among them, and I had two of the ablest generals of the age, the duke de Nevers and the admiral Coligny for my opponents ; I kept them at bay, and fortified the towns of Charlemont and Philipville, in spite of their most vigorous endeavours to prevent me. While the services which I performed corresponded to the trust reposed in me, I can affirm with truth, that honour was the only acquisition which I derived from the favour that was shewn me. From the chamber of accounts it will appear, that I never received any pecuniary recompence for my services. I am able to prove by the most uncontested evidence, that my unavoidable expense as general, added to the expense of my embassy into Germany, and that which I incurred, when the king required me to receive and entertain the numerous foreign nobility, who crowded to congratulate him on his accession, amounted to no less than one million five hundred thousand florins. And to indemnify me for this expense, what return did I receive from the king, who now accuses me of ingratitude ? Having, with the emperor's consent, begun to assert my claim to the lordship of Chatel Bellin, before the supreme court of justice at Mechlin ; when the counsellors had registered their opinion, and on the day when they were to have pronounced sentence in my favour, this King, who had just sworn to govern us according to the laws, did, in violation of these laws, interpose his arbitrary power, and forbid the judges to proceed ; nor since that time, have they been ever permitted to do me justice.

1580. "When what I have said shall be considered, the governments which were bestowed on me will not appear to be more than was due for the services which I have performed; nor more than an adequate compensation for that extraordinary expense, which these services had cost me. Had the King allowed me to remain in possession of these governments, he might have had some reason for reproaching me; although it was not in reality to him I was indebted for them, but to the emperor, by whom it was determined they should be conferred upon me, before his departure from the Netherlands. But since my accuser has laboured to expel me from them; since he has to the utmost of his power, deprived me of my possessions, besides carrying off my son to Spain, in contempt of the privileges of this country, which he had sworn to preserve inviolate, because I would not lend myself a willing instrument of his oppression; after this, I say, is he entitled to accuse me of ingratitude?

"Nor is there any better ground for his accusation, that I have violated the allegiance, which I owed him as my sovereign. Though I have rejected his authority yet I have done nothing more than was done by his ancestor, Albert duke of Austria, the founder of his family, against my ancestor, the emperor Adolphus of Nassau. And besides this, I should gladly know by what title my accuser possesses his Castilian dominions? Did not his predecessor Henry of Castile, a bastard, rise in rebellion against his brother Pedro, his lawful sovereign, whom he killed with his own hand? And is not Philip the lineal heir of that usurper? It may be said, that Pedro was a tyrant, and therefore justly dethroned and slain. And may not the same plea be offered in excuse for the part which I have acted? May it not be said with truth of Philip, that his conduct has been that of a cruel tyrant; and that the cruelties exercised by Pedro, were much less shocking and horrible, than those which have been perpetrated by the duke of Alva and his associates? I must farther observe, that as king of Spain I owe him no subission, but only as duke of Brabant. And as he is duke of that province, I, by reason of the baronies which I hold there, am one of the principal members of it. But he has forgotten the conditions on which he received this dukedom. He has forgotten the solemn oath which he took to preserve our privileges; and that it is an express article of the compact betwixt us, that if he fail in his engagements, our obligation to obey him as our sovereign shall cease. All Europe has witnessed his open contempt of these engagements. All Europe will bear me witness when I say, that not a single privilege only, but every privilege of which we boasted and which he had sworn to maintain, has been violated; and not in a single instance only but in a thousand instances. In my own person as I have already hinted, I have had ample experience of his lawless tyranny: my son, at an age when he was incapable of offending him, has been torn from me. All my estates and goods have been confiscated; and I myself declared a traitor and rebel, without any of those forms of trial which the laws require; and by whom? By men of the lowest class vested with his authority, by pettifoggers, and others too mean to be employed as pages, by one who holds the rank, which I have long held in the Netherlands. I do not deny, that at his accession I took the customary oath of allegiance; but the tie on me to yield obedience and that on him to afford protection, were mutual; and it is a dictate of common sense, that in obligations of this sort, the failure of either party sets the other free from his engagements.

"But even if I had not received any personal injury, I should have thought myself indispensably obliged to oppose the tyrannical measures which were pursued. For it is not the prince only who swears to maintain the fundamental laws. The same oath is required of the nobles, and of all who are admitted into public employments. By this oath I was strictly bound to do every thing in my power to rescue my fellow-citizens from the oppressions under which they groaned, and, had I not done what my enemy complains of, I should have been justly chargeable with the crime, of which all the world knows that he has been guilty, a breach of the most sacred and solemn obligation.

"To this imputation, I know that his partisans are ready to reply that although he swore at his accession to maintain our privileges, yet the pope had granted him a dispensation from his oath. I leave it to divines and others, better acquainted than I am with religious controversies, to determine, whether this arrogance of the pope, in assuming power to set men free from the obligation of an oath, be not an impious encroachment on the prerogative of Heaven, and I leave it to them to determine, whether this pretension is not destructive of faith among men, and subversive of society. I speak not therefore of the lawfulness of Philip's conduct, after having obtained this boasted dispensation, but of his folly in applying for it. The tie between him and his subjects was strictly mutual; and by procuring a dispensation for himself, he at the same time set me, and all his other subjects, free from the engagements which we came under to yield him obedience. It is childish and trifling to say, that by means of the dispensation he is free, but that we who have not been dispensed with, are still as much bound as ever. For from the moment that he considers himself as disengaged (by what means soever his obligation was dissolved), the condition on which we promised obedience being removed, it must be absurd to reproach us with infidelity.

"I come now to that part of the Proscription, in which I am accused of having been the author of all the disturbances that have happened. With such of you as are old enough to remember the rise of these disturbances there will be no need to defend myself against so groundless an imputation; but for the sake of those who were too young at that time to form a judgment of what they saw, it is necessary I should give some account of those transactions, which are so grossly misrepresented in this infamous proscription.

"No person acquainted with the conduct of my accuser in his other dominions, or with the cruelties exercised in Granada, Mexico, and Peru, will be at a loss to account for the calamities with which the people of the Low-Countries have been overwhelmed. In the very

beginning of his reign, his despotic temper was conspicuous. The emperor his father 1550, saw it with deep concern, and when the count de Bossut, and I, and several others were present, he exhorted him to treat his Flemish subjects with greater moderation ; and foretold, that if the pride and arrogance of his Spanish counsellors were not restrained, the people of the Netherlands would ere long be excited to revolt. But this wholesome council had not the effect which the Emperor intended. His son still consulted only with Spaniards ; he still fostered as much as ever his passion for arbitrary power ; and resolved, in contradiction to his interest, if rightly understood, as well as to his oath, to overturn our constitution. The condition annexed to your grant of the nine years supply, that the money should be disposed of by your own commissioners, excited in him, and in his counsellors, the most inveterate resentment. I have been present when these counsellors, who knew well their master's sentiments, advised him to the pursuit of measures, by which you were all to have been adjudged to death. But it was by accident I came to know that these bloody councils had been adopted. From the French King's own mouth, when I resided at his court as an hostage, I learnt that a plan had been concerted with the duke of Alva, to extirpate from France and the Netherlands all who were suspected of being favourably inclined to the reformed religion. I concealed from the French monarch my ignorance of the design ; and the indignation which it excited in me. By the intercession of the duchess of Savoy, I obtained leave to return into the Netherlands, where (I deny it not, on the contrary I glory in it) I promoted with all my influence that earnest request, which the States preferred to the King for the removal of the Spanish troops.

" I acknowledge, that amidst the numberless falsehoods with which this proscription is filled, there is truth in another part of the charge which is laid against me. I acknowledge, that after having remonstrated in vain to the duchess of Parma against the cruel and arbitrary measures that were pursued ; being prompted by my dread of a civil war, by my concern for the calamities of the people, and by a sense of duty arising from the oath which I had sworn to maintain their rights. I called together the principal nobility, and attempted to open their eyes to the impending danger.

" I acknowledge likewise, that I approved of the supplication which was presented by the nobility, against the placarts and executions. I am far from being either ashamed, or sorry, for the counsel which I gave. That supplication was not only the most moderate measure that could have been devised, but was strictly conformable to the constitution and practice of the Netherlands ; and happy had it been for the King, as well as for the people, had he complied with the request which it contained.

" With respect to that part of the proscription in which my accuser reproaches me, on account of the favours which I have shewn to the Protestants ; I confess, that before I embraced the reformed religion, I never hated those who professed it. Nor will this appear surprising, when it is considered that my mind had been early tinctured with its principles, and that my father, who had established it in his dominions, lived and died in the profession of it. I confess, that even while, in consequence of my education at the emperor's court, I held the Catholic persuasion, I always abhorred the barbarities which were exercised by the Popish inquisitors. I confess, that at the time of the King's departure from Zealand, when he commanded me to put to death certain persons attached to the Protestant faith, I refused to obey, and gave these persons private warning of the danger, to which they were exposed. I confess, that, in the Council of State, I made all the opposition in my power to the persecutions that were proposed ; partly from motives of compassion or humanity, partly from my conviction of the absurdity of punishing men for opinions which they could not change, when they did not disturb the public tranquillity ; and partly from a persuasion, that the violent remedies employed were calculated to disappoint the end in view. But while, for these reasons, I was from the beginning averse to persecution ; you all know that I had no concern, either in the introduction of the reformed religion into the Netherlands, or in the rapid progress which it made during the government of the duchess of Parma. You know, that at that time I possessed not the smallest influence with those, by whom it was introduced and propagated ; and you likewise know, that with regard to those disorders, into which the Protestants suffered their zeal to betray them, so far from giving them my countenance or approbation I exerted my authority to restrain them ; I punished the perpetrators with severity and have been, on account of the rigour which I exercised, by many among the Protestants, most cruelly calumniated and defamed.

" I hope to be excused, on this occasion, for observing that there is one circumstance in the proscription, that gives me pleasure. Notwithstanding the malice and rancour, and contempt of truth which my accuser has discovered, there is one crime, often laid to the charge of the governors of provinces, of which he has not ventured to accuse me ; I mean that of avarice, or the embezzlement of the public money. Of this despicable crime, indeed, I have been accused by some unknown persons, in certain defamatory writings that have been circulated. But from the silence observed on this head by my inveterate enemy, these libellers may see the folly, as well as falsehood, of their insinuations. To you there can be no occasion to vindicate my conduct. I give thanks to God, that I learnt, at an early period, of how much consequence it was for one who governs a free people not only to preserve himself untainted, but even to keep himself free from the suspicion of corruption. And you know that on this account I have constantly declined taking any charge of the public money ; and from the beginning of my administration, have transferred both the collection and distribution of it to others.

" I am accused in the proscription, of having practised to return into Holland, by undertaking to defend the people from the tax of the tenth penny, which, it is said, was imposed upon

1580. them by the duke of Alva, without the King's consent ; and I am accused likewise of having persecuted and expelled the Catholics. If by practising, my accuser means that I solicited for liberty to return, there is as little truth in this as in his other assertions. I myself was most earnestly solicited ; and I am ready to shew letters which I received, not only from the governors of towns, but from the citizens, intreating me to come and deliver them from the tyranny of the Spaniards. And, in complying with these entreaties, what did I do that my duty did not require from me ? I attempted to deliver from slavery, the provinces which had been committed to my care ; whose liberties I had sworn to maintain ; and of the right to govern which the King had no power, without the consent of the States to deprive me.

" No part of this proscription gives me greater surprise, than that in which I am accused of persecution. It is impossible but even the Romanists themselves must bear witness to the falsehood of so injurious an imputation. No person in the Netherlands can be ignorant, that far from employing rigour, I have often argued and remonstrated against it, and have promoted lenity in the treatment of the Catholics to the utmost of my power. Of this, even my accuser himself seems to make an indirect acknowledgement. I feigned he says, that the persecution of the Catholics displeased me. But how does he know that I feigned ? Have not my actions been at all times open ? Why does he not judge from them of my intention ? Never had one person less ground for accusing another of any crime, than my accuser has to cast on me the imputation of hypocrisy. Did I, either before, or at the time when he conferred these obligations upon me, for which he has reproached me with ingratitude ; did I ever offer the incense of flattery, either to himself or to the dutchess of Parma, or his tools and confidents in the council ? On the contrary, did I not openly, and without disguise, condemn the measures which he had dictated, and which they pursued ? Was it possible for me to speak more plainly than I did, or to give a clearer testimony of my aversion to his designs, than by desiring him, as I did frequently, to suffer me to resign my governments, because it was not in my power to yield him the obedience which he required ? Such was my conduct before my departure into Germany ; and since that time, is there a single step of my conduct that will admit of the interpretation of hypocrisy ? Did I not openly solicit aid from the German princes to oppose him ? Have I not raised armies against him ; taken towns which he possessed ; repulsed his forces, and expelled him utterly from at least two of the provinces, over which he tyrannized ? Is there any thing in this that can be termed hypocrisy ?

" But my accuser will not find it so easy to vindicate his own conduct from this odious imputation. Read my defence which I published some years ago ; and you will perceive to which of us belong the appellation of hypocrite and deceiver. In that defence, there are copies of letters which I received from him, filled with professions of friendship and regard, at the very time when, as appears from the sequel, he had doomed me to destruction.

" But why should I expect to be dealt with equitably, by one whose conscience allows him to affirm, that his minister the duke of Alva imposed the tax of the tenth penny, and urged the levying of it with such inflexible obstinacy, without his authority or consent ? Is it credible that one who knew this King's temper so well as Alva and who had ever shewn the greatest solicitude to please him, would have presumed, by a measure so tyrannical and unprecedented, to run the risk of kindling a civil war ? Or, if this wary Spaniard was in reality so rash and presumptuous, can it be believed by any person who considers the important consequences with which his rashness and presumption were attended, that the King would not, long ere this time have disavowed him, and made him feel the weight of his displeasure ? Was not Alva punished for ordering his son to marry his cousin, rather than another woman, whom he had debauched under a promise of marriage ? Was not this old servant banished for this venial transgression, from his master's presence, and thrown into prison, from which he would never have been delivered, if one better qualified to tyrannise over the Portuguese could have been found in Spain ? And what opinion must we form of a King, who, for this private offence, could punish an ancient friend and servant with so much severity ; while, notwithstanding the crime of treason, the most public and notorious, and productive of the most dreadful calamities to his faithful subjects he not only suffered him to pass unpunished, but received him with open arms, and loaded him with honours ? After this, will he still employ the language of a good King, and boast of his affection for his people ?"

In a great part of what remains of this Apology, the prince of Orange enters into a detail of the transactions recorded in the preceding history. I shall therefore pass over this, and set before the reader what relates to the reproach, which Philip casts on William's marriage with the daughter of the duke de Montpensier, who was the princess of Orange at the time of publishing the proscription.

" My accuser," continues he, " is not satisfied with saying every thing that can blacken my character, and render it odious to the world ; but he has likewise attempted to taint the honour of my wife. He says, " that I have infamously married a religious woman, solemnly blessed by the hands of the bishop, in contradiction to the laws of Christianity, and of the Romish church, and that I did so whilst my marriage subsisted with another woman." Though this assertion were strictly true, it would ill become this incestuous and adulterous King to accuse me. But you know that it is entirely without foundation. My marriage with my former wife, now dead, did not subsist, and the ground of her divorce was approved even by the doctors of the Roman church ; and by those illustrious princes to whom she was allied. My present wife was not, even by the rules of the popish church, a religious woman, in the sense made by my accuser. The duke of Montpensier, my father-in-law, who is sincerely attached to the Catholic communion (not as cardinal Granvelle, and other Spanish ministers, from interest, but from principle and conviction), spared no pains to put the lawfulness of his daughter's mar-

riage beyond doubt or controversy. He found it the clear opinion, not only of the principal persons in the parliament of Paris, but of several bishops and doctors whom he consulted, that even if a promise of celibacy had been given by my wife, yet, in consideration of her youth, it would not have been binding, as it would have been contrary to the rules of the Gallican church, to the decrees of the high court of justice in France, and even to the ordinances of the councils of Trent, to which my adversary pays such unlimited submission. He likewise found, that in reality no such promise was ever made; that sundry protestations had been taken, to prevent any person from imagining that his daughter ever intended to take the vow; and that, even in her absence, the most undeniable evidence of this had been produced.

" I said before, that although my marriage were not so unexceptionable as you see it is, even by the principles of the church of Rome, it would ill become my accuser to reproach me on account of it. He seems not to have remembered the common maxim, that whoever ventures to accuse another, ought to be well assured that he himself is innocent. And yet is not this King, who has endeavoured to stigmatise my lawful marriage with infamy, the husband of his own niece? It will be said by his partisans, that he previously obtained a dispensation from the pope. But does not the voice of nature cry aloud against such an incestuous conjunction? And in order to make room for this marriage, is it not true, that he put to death his former wife, the mother of his children, the daughter and sister of the kings of France? I say not this, prompted by my resentment, rashly and at random. I assert, that in France there is evidence of the horrid deed of which I now accuse him.

" It was not a single murder that was perpetrated for the sake of this extraordinary marriage. His son too, his only son, was sacrificed, in order to furnish the pope with a pretext for so unusual a dispensation, which was granted, in order to prevent the Spanish monarchy from being left without a male-heir. This was the true cause of the death of Don Carlos, against whom some misdemeanours were alleged; but not a single crime sufficient to justify his condemnation, much less to vindicate a father for imbruting his hands in the blood of his son. And if Don Carlos was in reality guilty of crimes deserving death, ought not an appeal to have been made to us, his future subjects? Did the right of judging and pronouncing sentence of death against the heir of such extensive dominions, belong to Spanish friars and inquisitors, the obsequious slaves of the father's tyranny?

" But perhaps this good king made conscience of leaving for his heir a prince, whom he knew to be born in unlawful wedlock. For Philip's marriage with the mother of Don Carlos was not less contrary to the laws of God and man, than that other of which I have already spoken. At the very time when he espoused the princess of Portugal, the mother of Carlos, his marriage subsisted with Isabella Osorio, by whom he had two sons, Pedro and Bernadino; a marriage brought about by Ruo Gomez de Silva, prince of Evoli, to which that nobleman was indebted for his power and greatness. And besides, is it not well known that this King lived in habitual adultery with another woman, the lady Euphrasia? Did he not compel the prince of Ascoli to take that lady for his wife, when she was big with child by himself? And while it has been affirmed with certainty, that that unhappy man was taken off by poison; do not even the Spanish courtiers ascribe his death to the grief which he conceived from the affront to which he was obliged to submit, and the cruel necessity imposed on him, of acknowledging for his heir the adulterous bastard of another? Such, and so chaste has been the conduct of this King, who has the assurance to calumniate my lawful marriage as a violation of the sacred laws of chastity.

" But I shall hasten to conclude this Apology, after offering some remarks concerning the nature of the sentence that has been pronounced against me. It is in this part of the edict of proscription, that the compiler, whether the King himself, or some ignoble instrument of his tyranny, has employed all the thunder and lightning of his eloquence. But I thank God, it intimides me no more than the anathemas of Clement VII. intimidated my kinsman prince Philibert, when he besieged and took the pontiff prisoner in his castle of St. Angelo, after the proofs which I have given, that I fear not all the power which my adversary is possessed of; and after contending for so many years against his best generals, with numerous armies under their command, it was weak in him to expect to frighten me with the high sounding terms of this proscription. I have less reason now, than formerly, to dread the attempts of those abandoned wretches whom he has endeavoured to instigate against me. For I am not ignorant, that before this time he has bargained with poisoners and other murderers, to deprive me of my life. He has now given me a public warning of his bloody design. And with the divine assistance, and the vigilance of my friends, I trust, that, notwithstanding his diabolical machinations, my life shall be preserved so long as the prosperity and interest of this people, to whose service I have devoted it, shall require.

" My confidence on this head is greatly augmented by reflecting upon the indignation, which I cannot doubt will be generally excited by that extraordinary method of proceeding against me, which my adversary has adopted. For there is not, I am persuaded, a nation or prince in Europe, by whom it will not be thought dishonourable and barbarous, thus publicly to authorize and encourage murder; except the Spaniards and their King, who have been long estranged from every sentiment of honour and humanity. In having recourse to private assassinations against a declared and open enemy, does not this mighty monarch confess his despair of being able to subdue me by force of arms? Does he not give a testimony in my behalf, and discover that he dreads the efforts which I may make against him? Is it not weak and mean, to make publicly so pusillanimous an acknowledgment? But the weakness and meanness of his conduct is not greater than the absurdity of his choice of the rewards which he holds forth to those who shall execute his bloody purpose. For it is not money only that he offers them,


1560. but nobility and honour ; as if a regard to honour could influence a man capable of perpetrating a deed held in universal detestation. And if any person already possessed of nobility were to pollute himself by so foul an act, would not his nobility from that moment be annihilated ? Would not all society and connection with him be held dishonourable ?

“ Even my adversary himself seems to have been in some measure sensible of the truth of this, and therefore he addresses himself more particularly to criminals and malefactors, as those who are most likely to comply with his request. “ And in order,” says he, “ that his destruction may be the more effectually and speedily accomplished, we, desirous of punishing vice, and rewarding virtue, promise on the word of a king, and as the minister of God, that if any person shall be found possessed of courage and public spirit sufficient to animate him to the execution of this decree and to free us from the aforesaid pest of society, we shall order to be delivered to him, either in land or money as he shall incline, the sum of twenty-five thousand crowns ; and if he shall have committed any crime, however enormous, we promise to grant him our royal pardon ; and if he be not already noble, we hereby confer nobility upon him and likewise upon all those who shall aid and assist him.” Is not this, in plain terms, calling on every desperate wretch, every outcast from society, to assist him in the execution of his design ? No crime, however enormous, but shall be pardoned ; no criminal, however detestable, but shall be crowned with honour. Does this king deserve the title which he assumes, of a minister of God, who thus confounds the distinction between vice and virtue ; and thus publicly avows his willingness to bestow the highest rewards and honours upon men defiled with the most abominable crimes ? Have I not ground to rejoice in being persecuted by one whose conscience allows him to have recourse to such unhallowed means ? And is not such depravity of sentiment in my accuser, a testimony in behalf of my integrity.


“ I have now said all that seems necessary to vindicate my character from those false aspersions which are thrown upon it in this proscription. Many things which I might have said, I have purposely omitted. Had I descended to a particular account of the cruelty, accompanied with a contempt of the most sacred obligations, which has been exercised by my accuser over this unhappy people, I should never have come to a conclusion. But with you there can be no occasion for giving a more particular detail. You have been spectators of the horrid scene, and have born your share of those oppressions, which would fall to be described.

“ But before I conclude, I must intreat you to reflect seriously upon the means to which our enemy finds it necessary to have recourse, in order to accomplish his designs. This infamous proscription, joined to the pains which he and his ministers continually employ to create divisions among the provinces, shews clearly that he now despairs of enslaving us by force of arms, while we remain united.

“ It is indeed against me chiefly, at this time, that his designs are directed. “ Were I removed,” he says, “ either by death or banishment, tranquillity would be restored.” You will easily conceive what tranquillity he means, if you call to mind your condition before I returned into the Netherlands, when you groaned under the tyranny of the duke of Alva. Would to heaven that by my banishment or death you could be delivered from our calamities ! My enemy should not, in that case, find it necessary to employ poisoners and assassins to destroy me. You all know how often I have exposed myself to danger in your defence. I leave it to you, to whom alone it belongs, to determine, whether my life and presence be repugnant or conducive to the interest of the provinces. To you only, and not to the King of Spain, I am accountable for my conduct. You have full authority (and I pledge myself to submit to it) to dispose, as you shall incline, either of my person or of my life. Interpose that authority with which I acknowledge you to be invested, and give orders either for my departure from among you, or for my death ; if you judge either the one or the other for the general good. But if, on the contrary, my past conduct has convinced you, as I trust it has, of the sincerity of my zeal and attachment ; or if my long experience gives you confidence in my ability for conducting your affairs, I shall still continue to employ in your service, the talents which I possess, hoping that you will listen to the earnest exhortations which I have given you, to maintain harmony and concord in the state ; and exert yourselves strenuously for the defence of this people, whom you have undertaken to protect ; depending on the favour of the Almighty, that your endeavours for this end shall be crowned with success.”







HSp
W3418h

Watson, Robert.
History of the reign of Philip the Second, King
of Spain.

10038

History of the Second, King

University of Toronto
Library

DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket
LOWE-MARTIN CO. LIMITED

